Iranian victory would not have been possible without the unity of the entire population of Iran in defense of the hopes represented by the revolution and their readiness to make heroic sacrifices to defend it.
Even sections of the population at war with the Khomeini regime, such as 4 the Kurds, refused to cooperate with the Iraqi invaders.
For the imperialists, it is now essential to stop the conflict as quickly as possible and try to slow down the political processes inevitably generated by the Iraqi defeat. That explains the combination of threats and blandishments directed at the Iranian government by U.S. imperialism and its allies. that direct imperialist intervention now become a danger once again in the Persian Gulf area.
In an editorial May 28, the New York Times tried to cover up the defeat suffered by U.S. policy and present an interested in preserving the social status quo should now get together. Britain is slowly reversing the land grab by Argentina, Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran has been heaving back an invasion by Iraq at vastly greater cost. You don't have to like the ayatollah to welcome his military good fortune or the rebuff to the effort of Iraq's Saddam Hussein to shatter Iran.
"Like the war in the Falklands, the Iraq-Iran conflict left the United States with no happy choices. Its interest in preserving Iran as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the Gulf justified rooting for Iran. But the United States
Popular support for Iranian army against Iraq invasion (DR)
amples of two-faced operations by the in the major Kurdish towns.
mount a revolutionary crusade against the surrounding Arab monarchies.
"Stability is a tough hand to play in an unstable region, but so far so good.
U.S. in the Near East in particular. One example is the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in the 1970s, in which the CIA and the encouraged the insurgent leader,
At that time, U.S. officials and authoritative commentators in the U.S. capress made it quite clear that
Washington was far from favorable to a victory of the "valiant Kurds," but rather was that iran, Mullah Barzani to believe he had their beastly government and all, survive the
Its once-Americanized armed forces rose to the challenge; the Russians supplied weapons through Syria and North Korea, and the United States quietly sent its share, with the help of Israel and other unlikely allies....
"For all the resentments that Ameand Iranians bear toward other, they were thrown to the same side by overlapping interests. But their joint interests stop at the Iraqi border, which
Statements of officials that have come to light since then make it clear that Washington's interest was that "neither side win a clear victory." was eventually sold for a deal with the Iraqi regime.
In the Iran-Iraq war also, a decisive victory for either side was not in the U.S. interest. The breakup of the Iranian state would have released processes whose development could not be predicted. Now Washington faces such regarded the success of the Kurdish struggle as a major destabilizing factor in the
And they were right, the victory of regime's first attempt to restabilize the state in the face of the Iranian masses of all nationalities set in motion by the re-
After that, the Khomeini regime was forced to step up its anti-imperialist demogogy in order to retain control of the masses, and that brought it where diplomacy should now make sure that the war ends."
that the U.S. was "rooting for Iran" during the war was produced really laying it on thick. clearly hoped that Iraq would deal the Iranian revolution crippling blows, and did everything in its power to assure that.
However, it is also true that Washington also gave clear notice to the Iraqi regime that it would not tolerate any major annexations that would undermine the stability of the area or of Iran as detachment of the Arabthe Persian Gulf, nearly all Iran's oil is located, would obviously have made the country as it is now constituted unviable.
The U.S. imperialists did not want that; it clearly did not accord with their basic interests or what they could hope to gain from the Iran-Iraq war.
The principal historic strategy followed by Washington in dealing with revolutions, especially in countries the size of Iran, is to isolate them, wear them out, and promote the tendencies within them that are heading in a conservative direc-
Such a strategy is particularly recommended when the leadership of a national revolution is socially conservative, which the Khomeini regime clearly is.
This strategy requires a double such as the one the New York Times cheerfully admits.
There have been a number of exa prospect in Iraq and the Gulf emirates. The momentum of the Iranian revolution
La decisive defeat of the Iraqi army, which is a disaster for Washington's policy in the area.
The Iranian government's claims that the Iragis counted on the support of the Kurds and a broad spectrum of opposition forces in Iran to overthrow the Islamic republic are clearly designed to serve their needs of maintaining control over the Iranian masses. Neither U.S. imperialism, nor much less the Iraqis, are capable of such revolutionary adventures. The Iraqis, for example, face a bigger Kurdish problem than the Iranian rulers.
The imperialists and their allies may make maneuvers with such forces, but they remain limited by their nature. And sometimes, it's mostly hot air.
York Times columnist William Safire, close to powerful right-wing circles, wrote on March 16: "Logic also suggests that America should encourage support of the valiant Kurds, as well as the leftist but non-Communist Mujahadin on the ramparts of the counterrevolution."
The fact of the matter is that the left Kurdish nationalist forces formed the first stumbling block to the Khomeini leadership's attempt to restabilize the neocolonial capitalist state in Iran. They defeated the military forces of the Islamic republic in a three-month combined mass struggle and guerrilla war that culminated in August-September 1979 with uprisings into sharper confrontation in fact with imperialism.
Moreover, it was the Mujahadin and revolutionary that played a leading role in the mass uprising in Teheran that resulted in a clear victory of the people over the dictatorship, severely damaging the state rewanted, and what U.S. policy at the time was designed to achieve, was a cold transfer of authority from the old regime to the bourgeois group around the ayatollah.
Moreover, in the decisive battle in the first stage of the Iran-Iraq war, the heroic defense of Khorramshahr broke the momentum of the Iraqi victories, activists in and around the Mujahadin and Fedayan were in the forefront.
that the neocolonial Iraqi state is faltering under the impact of its launched attempts to bring it down are the left Kurdish nationalists led by Jelal Talabani, who made a significant contribution to the struggle of the Iranian Kurds fighting the Khomeini forces.
Agence France-Press reported May "Conflicts have been growing in Iraqi Kurdistan for three weeks. April 24 in Qala-Diza the forces of order opened fire on a march thousand persons who wanted to commenorate the massacre perpetrated here
There are two sides to the Iranian victory. One is the encouragement it gives to the masses. The other will be attempts to reinforce the Iranian bourgeois state and leadership.
The Khomeini regime made a certain progress in reconsolidating the capitalist state during the twenty-month war, and is now moving to make sure that this is not endangered after the end of the
For example, the mid-May issue of Hemmat refers to a circular from the Ministry of Labor banning the organization or reorganization of workers councils (shoras) in factories.
The fact is that over the past two years, repression has grown steadily more extensive in Iran. It spread from the Fedayan, who were involved in the struggles against the new regime in Kurdistan and Turkmenistan; to the Mujahadin, connected to liberal and left elements in the clergy, represented by Ayatollah Teleghani; to include even those groups on the left that support the regime, such as the Tudeh Party and the "Central Committee Majority" faction of the Fedayan.
Attacks by the right-wing Khomeini forces on the Mujahadin began as early as
Iranian masses destroy all symbols of Shah's regime (DR)
"After the attack on this march, strikes and demonstrations have spread to several towns in Kurdistan....
"The Voice of the Iraqi Revolu tion, the radio run by Jelal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, is continuing to call on both the Arab and Kurdish population to stage a general the recent Iraqi defeats, a two-sided phenomenon has appeared. The security forces, thinking about their future, have appeared to make tacit compromises with the Kurdish resistance. On the other hand, there has been growing activity by the population, which seems no longer to fear the wrath of the Raa. thist government."
At the same time, signs are appearing that another Near Eastern neocolonial regime is moving in to keep things from getting out of hand and maybe grab some advantages for itself in the bargain.
28 International Herald Tribune, Claudia Wright reported:
..crack Turkish forces are moving steadily into bases within range of northern Iraq and there is a strong view among nationalist Turkish commanders that for the first time since World War I they have a chance to recover the 'lost' provincesIraq's oil rich governorates of D'hok, Arbil and Sulaimaniya-taken from the defeated Ottoman empire by the British and the League of Nations.
"As surprising as a Turkish move into northern Iraq might seem to Iraq's current Arab allies...this might be preferred to the possibility of a realignment of political forces in Baghdad." also has reasons to fear the victory of a Kurdish revolt near its borders.
In its report on the Iraqi defeats, Hemmat, a fortnightly magazine published in Tehran that reflects the views of
Vehdete Kargare (HVKWorkers Unity Party), stressed the uprising of the Iraqi Kurds against the Saddam Hussein government. the context of the Khomeini ment's constant attempt to portray the Kurds as allies of the Iraqis. Iranian soldiers joyful after victory (DR)
May 1979, with the kidnapping of Teleghani's children. They intensified until the middle of 1981, when the Mujahadin became involved in a guerrilla campaign against the regime, with apparently the usual disastrous results of such private wars by left groups against the parapolice forces of neocolonial regimes.
That is, the effect was the strengthening of the state repressive forces, and the isolation and slaughter of large numbers of revolutionary activists.
regime moved against the democratic gains of the revolution almost immediately after the insurrection. The Shiite clergy dismantled and broke the factory and neighborhood com-
The newly freed mass circulation press became the target of mob attacks directed by the clergy. when the first Kurdish war was launched by the new regime in June 1979. But even then the left papers that did not criticize the regime were not closed down and their street sellers were not attacked. That is no longer the case, as shown by the attacks on the Tudeh party and its publications.
In mid-March, Kargar, the weekly paper of the Hezbe Kargarane Engelabi (HKE, Revolutionary Workers Party), was shut down after it published an interview with Bahram Atai, one of its leaders released not long before from Evin prison. Atai told of witnessing mass executions and torture of anti-imperialist militants. He was rearrested and jailed along with the printer of Kargar on charges of slandering the regime.
mid-May Hemmat, both Atai and the printer were
seems to reflect a certain beginning of de- revolutionary war?
Now, the fact that the Iraqi invano longer a threat creates a new political situation in Iran. The defeat of Iraq weakens the regime's pretext for repression and it encourages the masses to press forward.
It will now be tested how politically cohesive a force the new army is that was forged in the heat of war.
correspondent Jean Gueyras described the situation in the military forces in the May 3 issue of the
"The quite recent introduction of bassijs (members of the Mobilization of chief of the land forces, a captain before the revolution and-rumor has it-the real victor at Dezful (which opened the Iraqi rout), is the prototype of the young officer loyal to the Islamic regime. waged a pitiless war against the Kurdish guerrillas and is a strong partisan of a new homogeneous army, would be the revolutionary guards. This idea seems to have been rejected by both the military hierarchy and the clergy who fear that a united army might succumb to the temptation of bonapartism."
Gueyras' report indicates that while progress has been made in rebuilding an effective bourgeois army, it is not enough
The Iranian victory was clearly as a result of the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, and in turn will reinforce that. The test of the political effectiveness of this pressure will be whether Teheran makes a settlement of the war designed to stabilize the region.
But this does not depend only on the relationship of forces in Iran. most immediate question is what the Iraqi masses will do now that their neocolonial state and demagogic leadership have been weakened.
Kurdish revolutionary organizations will likely play a major role.
have important effects in the Disinherited) onto the battlefield has to assure success in restabilizing the neoenabled the Teheran leaders, who have tight control over them, to play another card to ease the rivalry of the army and the revolutionary guards....
"Another element favoring better cooperation among the elements of the armed forces is the thoroughgoing purge of the officer corps....
"Paradoxically, the clergy in Teheran seem more mistrustful of the revolutionary guards than the officers....A half dozen representatives of the clergy have recently been nominated to the supreme colonial state.
What happens in Iran now will depend on the emergence of a new leadership. Past experience has shown that it is not automatic that the regime will lose control of the masses in an upsurge or period of renewed confidence. After the Teheran insurrection itself, the conservative Khomeini forces quickly housebroke organizations, except among the minority nationalities, which had, to one degree or another, independent leademergence of such a leadership are a mi-
By the victory that they have won by their courage and sacrifice, the Iranian masses have deepened the crisis of neocolonial rule in the Near East. As a result, they have improved their chances to gain control of their own struggle and achieve the hopes for a better life that have inspired their sacrifices. It is the task now of all forces throughout the world that support such a fight against imperialism, and for democracy and an end to exploitation, to provide aid for that struggle. The only way to do that is to oppose all attempts of U.S. imperialism council of the guards....
pressure and a Turkish
Shirazi, commander in strong fight for democratic rights.
of imperialist
Iranian revolution.
The new