NICARAGUA.
The new threats and the imperialist strategy
Incidents are growing along Nicaragua's northern border with Honduras and Costa Rica. Behind these frontiers, the contras are given full freedom to stage murderous raids and sabotage in Nicaragua. The threat they pose to the Sandinista revolution is forcing the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to strike back, despite the risks of such clashes being used by the imperialists border with Honduras and its southern one wi A Costa Rican representative has said, in fact, that his government was studying the possibility of envoking the Rio de Janeiro Mutual Defense Treaty (1) if appeals to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Contadora Group (Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia) proved fruitless.
success for the imperialists. Nicaragua had to accept the Preliminary Accord that it approved in September 1984 being put in question, which was the Reagan administration's objective. The aim was to force the Nicaraguans to submit to the conditions of the Reagan plan.
On the economic level, the consequences of the American embargo are already making themselves felt, and the aid to Nicaragua from the EEC, Social Democratic governments, and some Latin American countries is decreasing.
Throughout the Central American region, the imperialists are stepping up their military pressure and reorganizing their forces in a context where revolu-
At the same moment, the meeting of the Contadora tionary fighters
Group held in May marked •an Jeannette HABEL
On January 9, 1983, the ministers of foreign affairs of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama decided, with the backing of their respective governments to offer their mediation for re-establishing peace in Central America. Representing governments geographically close to the Central American isthmus, this group of four countries had various interests in making such a move. First of all, there was a political interest. They wanted to avert a direct imperialist military intervention that would represent a major danger for the Latin American bourgeoisies in a situation of economic and social crisis, especially for Mexico, sandwiched in by the pressures on both its northern and southern frontiers. They also had an economic interest at stake, because the Central American region offers a major market for the industries of these countries.
This initiative coincided with the EEC's attempts to expand its economic relations with Latin America. For the region, the EEC countries represent its second most important market and its second major source of investment after the US. In 1979 24% of Central America's exports went to the EEC (the Burope of the Nine at the time). In 1982, 50% of the total aid to Latin America came from the EEC. In 1983, this share receded to 31%. (2) This convergence of interests was to be reinforced by the coming to power of several European Social Democratic governments, while at the same time the Socialist International had been trying to gain a foothold on the continent since the 1970s, seeking to take advanlage of the limited liberalization International Viewpoint 1 July 1985 initial diplomatic attempts in these by the US. (3)
The meeting in conditions.
countries promoted
September 1984 of the ministers of foreign affairs of the EEC countries, Spain and Portugal, and leaders of the Central American and the Contadora countries confirmed the explieit support of the European governments present for the Contadora's Peace Accord. (4)
However, the EEC's economic aid to this region remains very modest compared with that of the USA. The dependence of the Central American countries on the US has, in fact, been increased, and the importance of the aid they receive from the EEC been reduced by the extent of the economic problems they now face and the size of their foreign debts.
Nonetheless, the European parliament has endeavored to support the efforts of the Contadora Group, and the International Court at the Hague has condemned the mining of the Nicaraguan ports. The Socialist International has acted in a similar vein, seeking to play a greater mediating and moderating role inasmuch as it is directly linked to parties that hold different positions in the conflict, and it does not intend to put all its eggs in one basket. (5)
Nonetheless, the Socialist International finds its room for seeking a middle way limited by the predominant influence of US imperialism in the region, since Washington vetoes any proposal that does not seem to be in its interests. The Reagan administration has just made this clear.
It was Nicaragua's approval of the Peace Accord on September 21, 1984, that prompted the Reagan government to mount a general challenge to it, since are facing more and more difficult Reagan found himself impeded in his diplomatic maneuvers by the Sandinistas' signature. The American government counterattacked immediately, calling together a meeting on October 20, 1984, of the leaders of Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica to draw up amendments to the text of the Accord. In reality, the objective was to present an opposing draft and to sabotage the Accord signed by the FSLN. Already postponed for three months, the last meeting of the Contadora Group in May 1985 yielded to this operation.
The participating countries declared for a reediting of the Accord, as the US wanted, and for indefinitely putting off the possibility of an accord on bases acceptable to the Sandinistas.
In fact, the history of the Contadora Group has been marked by postponements and by direct and indirect pressures from the USA, which while giving the operation purely formal support, has 1. The Rio Treaty was adopted in 1947 and reunited all the American states, except Canada, within the framework of an agreement of mutual assistance in the case of aggression against any of its member states. CETRAL, October December 1984. From Amerique Latine, the journal of 3. Some EEC countries still maintain direct links with their colonies or ex-colonies in the Caribbean. This is true for Great Britain, the Netherlands and France, not forgetting the historic' links that the Spanish state has in the area. 4. This was a text approved by Nicaragua after being revised. 5. The Party for National Liberation (PLN) of Costa Rica; the Democratic Alliance of Venezuela; the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), a member of Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) of El Salvador; and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) of the Dominican Republic are all allied with the Socialist International. The Grenadan New Jewel Movement used to be, and the FSLN, are observers.
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sought to discredit the process set in motion. The imperialist alternative is the Reagan Plan. This plan is an ultimatum aimed at forcing the FSLN to surrender. It demands - under the pretext of national reconciliation - dissolution of the Assembly elected in November 1984, new elections in which the contras can participate, a general amnesty, and a ceasefire. A cover for US intervention
This plan could lead to the following scenario: The FSLN would engage in dialogue with the contras, who would thus be recognized as a belligerant force. The dialogue would fail, because the contras' demands would amount to capitulation by the Sandinistas. But the contras would have thus gained legitimacy and could, therefore, form a provisional government that would appeal for help from the imperialists to rescue "democracy." Such a maneuver has been approved by several Latin American presidents, and it is at the center of the pressures the imperialists are putting on the Contadora Group.
The Accord signed by the Nicaraguans in September 1984 has already been subjected to many amendments and corrections. An additional protocol was drawn up concerning the means for inspection to make sure that the provisions of the document are observed. But the essential thing in the original text is not that. It was a general document for Central America, including economic, social, and political aspects. It laid the bases for integration of the region, proposing reactivization of the Central American Common Market and preparing the way for a readjustment of the institutional frameworks of the various states in the region.
This document affirms the right of the peoples of Central America to self-determination. It opposes all discriminatory treatment and economic embargoes. It takes a stand against any foreign intervention and any use of force. It, moreover, defines the bases for agreement on the military problems of security, opposing international military maneuvers or foreign bases or military schools, and demands the removal of those already there.
The document also proposes checking up on the numbers of foreign military advisors and withdrawal of those whose functions are essentially operational. It bans all support for irregular forces fighting to overthrow the existing governments. It proposes surveillance of the borders, disarmament of the irregular movements, and dismantling of all military installations used against neighboring governments.
The Contadora Accord rules out any financial support for acts of sabotage or terrorism and defines the means for inspection applicable to problems of security, which are to make it possible to check that the foreign military instal-
4 lations are actually dismantled, that military advisors are withdrawn, and that a detailed classification is established of the arms, equipment, means of transport, and military installations of the armed forces (police, navy, air force, in fantery, paramilitary forces, etc.).
This document also reiterates the need for "pluralist democratic systems" in which all political currents can participate in "honest and regular elections." It advocates, finally, "national reconciliation," where "eep divisions" have developed, the establishment of dialogue with "the opposition groups" and a fullfledged amnesty.
The last part in form resembles Ronald Reagan's proposals, but, in substance it is quite different, because this process of dialogue and reconciliation is envisaged in the context of what provides the underpinning of the document, that is, the withdrawal of the bases and of the military advisors, which are essentially American, and the end of all foreign intervention.
This is what the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce calls the "Bolivar spirit" of the document, which he considers to be in conformity with the "project of the Nicaraguan revolution." In other words, the document represents a dialogue with the counterrevolutionary forces, which would then no longer enjoy colossal support from the imperialists, which would thus be semi-disarmed counterrevolutionary forces deprived of their major card. And it is clear that without the military support of the CIA, the contras would virtually disappear.
For its part the FSLN has already said that there was a place in Nicaragua for "all the forces that operate on a civilian basis," (6) that such forces could have the benefit of the amnesty and return to Nicaragua. This measure applies particularly to the peasants forcibly recruited to the counterrevolution.
The Contadora Peace Accord fits into a precise context. The symmetry that the imperialists want to get accepted between Soviet and American interference in the Central American isthmus masks a situation in which the military relationship of forces is overwhelmingly in favor of the world's greatest military power.
This relationship of forces is buttressed by the presence of gigantic US military bases in Honduras, by the great amounts of arms given to the Salvadorean army, by the militarization of Costa Rica, and by the presence of 16,000 US-trained contras on Nicaragua's borders. (7)
This part about foreign military involvement, is what makes the September 1984 Contadora document unacceptable for the imperialists. This is all the more true because the forms of inspection proposed, initially at the request of the United States, are, because of their precision, a means that would only highlight the imperialists war effort.
Eden Pastora Gomez
The full application of this Accord -which was to go into effect after being approved by five Central American states - would have meant the withdrawal of the American bases and advisors without any serious quid pro quo. The presence of the Cuban advisors is very limited, as the Pentagon knows very well. The Nicaraguan's armament is old and insufficient, and if the Yankee threat did not exist the Nicaraguan people would have no difficulty defending their revolution by themselves.
As for the revolutionary movements in El Salvador, they do not draw their strength from foreign aid, unlike the CIA's mercenaries. The American imperialists are well aware of this. This is why, while maneuvering to avoid a direct confrontation with the Contadora Group, they have continually increased the number of conditions, and finally come to veto a document that all the Central American countries were initially ready to sign.
The "amendments" suggested by the American Security Council are aimed at reversing the logic of the document, making Nicaragua the aggressor. In the name of a purported Sandinista threat, they would then keep their bases, their maneuvers, and their military advisors. And in these conditions, they could propose an amnesty for the contras, keep the present relationship of forces, and on this basis set up the mechanisms for arms limitations. This amounts to legitimizing the overwhelming military superiority of the imperialists, demanding that Nicaragua give up its defenses. 6. Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, at a press conference in Paris, May 13, 1985. 7. In April 1984, Honduras was able to receive 15,000 US soldiers of the 82nd brigade in one afternoon. Pensamiento Proprio, Managua, March 1985.
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
The Reagan Plan then comes to complement all these devices and to get the Sandinista revolution in a vise where it would have to chose between being crushed militarily and capitulation. This is the reason why the FSLN has put so much effort into getting an agreement with the Contadora Group.
In total, three successive versions of the Contadora Accord have been rejected by El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Nicaragua then relaunched bilateral negotiations with Honduras, proposing joint military patrols and guaranteeing the inviolability of the frontiers. But the Honduran regime turned this down.
This was the final touch to the imperialists' plan. The US broke off the Manzanillo bilateral negotiations with the FSLN. Reagan had made use of these talks running up to his reelection. But the difficulty with them for him was that they pointed up the role of the US as the main dealer too much. The aim of the American government, to the contrary, is to minimize its role. The Pentagon offered no response to the Sandinista's new diplomatic compromise proposal for taking into account the American "security needs" and tolerating the existence of military bases in Honduras, as the Cubans "tolerate" the Guantanamo base on their territory.
So, the Contadora Group ended up in an impasse. Under the pressures put on them to include the Reagan Plan in the Peace Accord, the member governments contradicted each other a good deal. The Colombian president, Belisario Betancur, ended up by condemning the Reagan Plan, describing it as a "preparation for war." The Venezuelan president, Lusinchi, approved it, comparing it to the negotiations underway in El Salvador between the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the government. Only the Mexican president, Miguel de la Madrid, the cornerstone of the Contadora Group, said that the process of national reconciliation involved questions "that go beyond the character of the group, one of whose fundamental International Viewpoint 1 July 1985 principles is nonintervention in the internal affairs of countries." (8)
As for the Socialist International, in April it adopted a document condemning the Reagan Plan as a plan tor war.
One might wonder what the practical effects of these statements will be. The Contadora diplomatic operation seems more and more fictional, less and less in line with the political behaviour of the states concerned, even if the aim of the Latin American bourgeoisies is still to avert a regional confrontation of incalculable consequences.
The FSLN is trying through this diplomatic battle to build up the maximum Latin-American resistance to the imperialist plans. But it cannot today hide the fact that its efforts ended in failure at the last meeting of the Contadora. And it is unlikely, despite the worsening of the situation in the region, that the next meeting of the Contadora will change this course. Outcry against US embargo
Already discountenanced in the Contadora Peace Accord, the embargo declared on May 1 by the US government met with almost unanimous condemnation in the OAS in particular. But it is a long way from words to deeds. For the European and LatinAmerican bourgeoisies anything that weakens the Nicaraguan revolution is not too hard to swallow. Covert war, slow steady strangulation, are less glaring and less dangerous than an open military intervention.
Even if the economic embargo fails to strangle Nicaragua, even if it can be partially circumvented, it will not fail to have an effect. (9) The Nicaraguan economy was traditionally linked to the USA, and it is going to have to suffer the consequences of a shortage of spare parts for its agricultural machinery and its transport fleet. It is going to have to reorganize its medical
US arms on their way to Honduras services, to renegotiate for new imports to replace those blocked in the conditions of a worsening of the economic situation, with 40% of the budget going to defense.
Foreign debt and the cost of the war have created enormous difficulties. Nicaragua's oil needs alone represent a cost of 175 million dollars a year, 40% of all income from exports. Nicaragua owes Venezuela and Mexico, its main oil suppliers up till 1983, almost a billion dollars. Today, Iran and the USSR have replaced Venezuela, and shipments from Mexico have been suspended. • It was in this difficult conjuncture that the Nicaraguan president, Daniel Ortega, recently travelled to the East European countries to appeal for aid for the "survival" of the Nicaraguan people. And this was just the pretext that Ronald Reagan would take, on the eve of the summit meeting of the industrialized countries, to announce his economic blockade of Nicaragua.
Of course, the imperialists' economic pressures do not date from that decision. Recently, the American administration intervened to stop the Inter-American Bank for Development from granting a 58 million dollar loan to Nicaragua, while the 25 Latin American members of this bank had approved the loan in principle.
In February 1981, the government of the United States had already suspend,ed a loan and blocked the loading of 10,000 tons of wheat, then it stopped loans from international organizations, blocked access to sources of private or official financing in the US, closed the traditional markets to revolutionary Nicaragua, etc. This war of economic attrition, ranging from the mining of the ports — which resulted in the loss of 19 million dollars worth of exports — to the destruction of agricultural cooperatives, had already been envisaged by the US joint congressional committee headed by Henry Kissinger.
In this report presented in January 1984, the Kissinger Committee wrote cynically:
"Nicaragua must know that the use of force is only a last resort ... We have additional nonmilitary measures that have not been used yet, such as economic restrictions and the limitation of diplomatic contacts." [Retranslation from French.]
The blockade is going to affect all sectors of economic life, starting with imports. The following are the sectors concerned - medical care (70% of medical equipment came from the US), transportation, (35% of the spare parts), industry, energy, and telecommunications. But it is agricultural production, which is 8. Barricada, Managua, 12 April 1985. 9. This embargo includes the banning of all trade between the USA and Nicaragua, the suspension of all air and maritime traffic and the cancellation of the Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Navigation, signed in 1956 under the Somoza dictatorship which gave Nicaragua certain trading rights.
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vital to the economy of the country, that is going to be hardest hit. The material needed for the sugar mills, for the cotton and coffee harvest, and for irrigation came from the US, as well as fertliizers and various chemical products.
On the export side, the main products affected will be bananas, molasses, and sugar. But now only 16% of Nicaragua exports go to the US. The worst hit will be the middle and big private producers, those who have built up their business on agricultural exports to the US and are used to American technology. (10)
The primary objective of the US blockade is obvious. It is to weaken Nicaragua and to bring its people to their knees by starvation and misery. But the embargo is also aimed at creating growing social tensions. It is not impossible that we will see a "radicalization" of the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) and of the agricultural exporting sectors, attempts at boycott and sabotage, to say nothing of plant closures because of lack of raw materials and spare parts.
There may be processes of hoarding or sabotage of production - land left uncultivated, destruction of materiel, spare parts hidden, etc. In a general way, the economic war is aimed at suffocating the revolution, at undermining its social base in order to prepare the way for its destruction. Unholy alliance against Nicaragua
It is true that the Sandinistas, forseeing this decision, had begun to diversify their exchanges. In 1983, when the US closed its doors to sugar exports, the Sandinista government found new markets in the Middle East and North Africa at preferential prices. In 1985, Nicaraguan purchases of American products amount to 110 million dollars as opposed to 247 million in 1980, and Nicaragua's sales in the US are only 58 million dollars.
Moreover, the economies of other Central American countries are also going to suffer the consequences of a drop in Nicaraguan purchases, and investment is going to become scarce in a situation of rising tensions. Finally, the payment of Nicaraguan debts to US banks, which amount to 225 million dollars, will also be compromised.
However, the imperialists' major objective is to create a deteriorating situation within the country that can lead to the disaffection of some sections of the population from the Sandinista regime, creating divisions and breaks that could reinforce the opposition of the middle layers.
It is easy to imagine how the COSEP and the Church hierarchy could try to channel this discontent and force the FSLN to take coercive measures against some elements of the private sector. Such a policy could create favorable conditions for a direct American intervention by reconsolidating the ranks of an internal 6 political opposition that is today divided and disorganized.
What international support does Nicaragua have? In his recent trip through East and West Europe, Daniel Ortega got, in the words of an American newspaper, "a lot of sympathy in the West and financial help in the East." (11) Oil is being supplied essentially by the USSR, which was already the case after Mexico stopped its deliveries to Nicaragua, having demanded payment in advance.
The Soviet aid is apparently not in convertiblecurrency, which the Nicaraguans need urgently, but in supplies that are often costly to use and not always suited to the needs. Offers of aid have reportedly come from Sweden, Finland, and Canada. In France, the government of Francois Mitterrand is prepared to expand commercial exchanges with Nicaragua only on the basis of mutual advantage, which in the present state of affairs amounts to accepting a substantial cut in aid, if not ending it altogether.
West Germany is threatening to demand that the Sandinista government immediatetly pay all debts. Development aid projects may also be suspended in reprisal after Daniel Ortega's statements that are supposed to have described West Germany as an accomplice of the US in its policy in Central America. The Portuguese Social Democratic premier, Mario Soares, has confined himself to expressing his fears that Nicaragua will align itself with the Soviet Union.
For its part, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE - the Social Democratic party) has just made known its refusal to officially cover the Nicaraguan government's export credits for the last three months. The stated reason for this decision, which was portrayed as "purely technical" is that the Sandinistas have not paid the interest on loans granted since 1981. The decision not to provide credit cover for exports was taken on March 12 by the Spanish Export Credit Insurance Company (CESCE), in which the government has a 50% interest.
According to the Financial Times correspondent in Madrid, this decision means that commercial relations between the Spanish state and Managua have been completely blocked, and that Felipe Gonzalez's government will not grant additional credits until a part of the debt is cleared.
So, despite the official support of the PSOE government for Nicaragua, it is also making its contribution to the American blockade in the name of defending the mixed economy and the private sector. The fact that Felipe Gonzalez is also the one assigned by the Socialist International to LatinAmerican affairs can only be a cause for additional worry to the Sandinista government. The alignment of many Latin American and European governments in practice with the boycott policy of US imperialism makes the latter infinitely more dangerous, in particular because Soviet aid is essentially in kind and will not be sufficient to compensate for the effects of the blockade. It is unfortunately not excluded, as the proceedings of the last meeting of the Contadora Group show, that governments hostile to a direct military intervention will prefer a more discreet policy of strangulation which would be less compromising for the Latin American bourgeoisies. Militarization of the region
This disguised war against Nicaragua has been accompanied by a regional policy designed to prepare the way for overthrowing the Sandinista regime. The modernization and reorganization of the armed forces, the building up of massive military infrastructures, the percentage of the overall appropriations for Central America represented by military credits are all part of the preparations for massive military intervention in Nicaragua.
The realignment of forces in the region is spectacular. Costa Rica, the former "Switzerland" of Central America, which long ago adopted a treaty of perpetual neutrality, has just welcomed in the first Yankee troops assigned to "protecting" its northern border. This is the first time that American soldiers have been stationed in Costa Rica. In May, twenty US officers trained 750 members of the Civil Guard to form a "rapid response" battalion stationed near the Nicaraguan border.
Monge, the head of the Costa Rican government and a member of the Socialist International, has said that his country cannot defend itself — against Nicaragua, was the implication — "with machetes and old muskets." (12) Members of the Costa Rican Civil Guard are being trained in the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras and others in the US and Venezuela. Two anti-terrorist forces have been set up, one special operations unit and the public force "reserve."
Parallel to this, the Agency for International Development granted Costa Rica an outright gift of 160 million dollars. Soon, the Voice of America will begin to broadcast toward Managua from Costa Rica. Finally, the presence of CIA agents in the country has been confirmed.
Thus, with the buildup of a Costa Rican armed force and the stationing of military detachments on the northern frontier, the reactionary military potential of this country on Nicaragua's borders has been reinforced. Nicaragua finds itself caught between Costa Rica in the south and El Salvador in the north. according to me journand lara pay ucers, Small, middling and large account for 60 per cent of the total production of the country. 11. Christian Science Monitor, 25 May, 1985. 12. Financial TImes, 15 May 1985.
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
And in this encirclement Costa Rica is the kingpin.
In Panama, the nationalist policy of Torrijos ("Torrijismo") is in decline. (13) Joint military maneuvers by the Panamanian National Guard and the US army show how much cooperation the US brass has been able to extract from the local government. Finally, the Yankee imperialists are also envisaging the installation of a military base in Belize.
So, on the regional level an antiSandinista "southern front" is being built to mesh with the counterrevolutionary "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras), the center of which is Honduras. The latter has been transformed into a permament US base. The gigantic military infrastructure established in this country has made it possible to stage regular large-scale maneuvers and exercises that continually pose the threat of an invasion of Nicaragua.
Honduras plays a key role. It is the imperialists' central guard tower and a bulwark for the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN). From its territory, it is possible to put pressure on the rear areas of the Salvadorean guerrillas and to maintain surveillance of the Guatemalan rebels.
real epicenter of counterrevolutionary struggle in the region, Honduras has been transformed into a US protectorate. It is revealing in this regard that the signing of a new military aid treaty, as well as the setting up of the Puerto Castilla military training center, were not reported to the Honduran parliament until June 1983, when the US Green Berets were already disembarking in the country.
Now, Salvadoran aireraft have the right to overfly Honduran territory. Thanks to the peace treaty signed between El Salvador and Honduras in 1980, Salvadoran soldiers can be trained in Puerto Castilla, planes fly out of the Palmerola base to inform the Salvadoran army of the movements of the FMLN. The FDN groups also get supplies and air support when they move into Nicaraguan territory. When the contras retreat under pressure from the Sandinista army, they get cover from Honduran artillery.
HONDURAN AIR FORCES 15 B-2 Super-Mystery 25 180-Cessna 10 F-86 Sabre 30 185-Cessna 16 A-37 B Dragon 1 Piper Pa-31 Cheyenne 12 T-37 Tucano 2 S-76 helicopters 4 0-2 Push and Pull 2 H-19 Sikorsky 10 C-47 35 UH1H 4 C-54 Skymaster 15 UH10 6 IAl Arava 1 0HA 1 Electra 1 Mescalero 4 C-130 Hercules 12 T-28 A 1 West Wind 6 T-6 Texan 1 Beeck Baron 12 T-33
The Honduran air-based war involves
232 machines for combat amongst which are 55 helicopters, 83 transport planes and 37 for tactical support.
Source: Barricada, 26 November 1984. International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
However, the militarization of the region is not a simple affair or without contradictions. Revolutionary movements have existed for a long time in Guatemala and in El Salvador. Such movements are underdeveloped in Costa Rica and Honduras. Nonetheless, in Costa Rica the American plans are running up against an antimilitarist and antidictatorial tradition, and these problems are compounded by an acute economic crisis. The buildup of the country's military capacities, and the presence of mercenaries are eroding the traditional underpinnings of the state and its previous relative stablility.
In Honduras, the presence of three foreign armed forces, the contras, the Salvadorans, and the American Green Berets, and the privileges they enjoy, can create a favorable situation for the growth of popular mobilizations. This is why the regime is redoubling its efforts to forestall any opposition. Since 1982-1983, more than eighty persons have "disappeared," 28 activists and leaders are known to have been murdered by the armed forces or the paramilitary squadrons. Spying and informing have been institutionalized.
However, this militarization is not necessarily being accompanied by the maintenance of open military dictatorships. The crisis of the system of impeerialist domination in Central America, as well as reasons of international policy, are inducing the imperialists to adjust the forms of their domination.
If the objective is to overthrow the Sandinista regime, the operation has to be made presentable for international opinion, unless, as happened in Grenada, the revolutionary forces themselves offer the US a pretext for intervening militarily in the name of "democracy."
The Pentagon is working in the framework of a strategy that combines military and economic strangulation of Nicaragua in order to set the stage for a direct military intervention that would have to be able to finish off the revolution at the least possible human cost for the aggressors.
The war of attrition, thus, does not exclude a massive intervention, whose timing cannot be predicted. If an opportunity arises, as in Grenada, the Pentagon will seize it. The emphasis up till now has been put on the war of attrition, because a certain number of conditions are not yet "ripe" for moving on to the next phase.
Thus, the Nicaraguan magazine Pensamiento Propio considers that the lack of political consensus in the US on intervention in Central America and the reactions in Latin America "does not seem to allow the political aim of destroying the Sandinista revolution to be pursued by means of the direct intervention of US troops. We are seeing rather the combination of an aggressive escalation in military, economic, and political forms accompanied by attempts at negotiation for the sake of appearances without any real political will to negotiate. This combination of aggression and negotiations gives rise to a war of attrition or a "low intensity conflict,' which seems to be the dominant feature of American policy toward Nicaragua." (14)
Ronald Reagan and the US military hierarcy say that they have no intention of deploying combat forces in Central America except for periodic maneuvers such as those that have been held in Honduras. But they also reiterate that the US has to be ready - in pursuance of the Rio Treaty of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty - to send forces into the region if the security of the hemisphere is threatened and if the parties to these military pacts agree.
"We did not come out of Vietnam so well, and we have to do better the next time," a US officer said. (15) Doing better means adjusting military and political strategy. On the military level, US officers have been assigned to study the conditions for an intervention. The questions posed were the following: what sort of artillery will be needed to avert "collatoral" damage, that is, the massacre of civilians? What sort of tactical units are best suited to anti-guerrilla operations? How can the Americans set up espionage networks so that information can be collected rapidly?
In civic action, how can the American soldiers help citizens so that the US will not have to carry out the tasks of local government? These questions obviously reflect the lessons that the US imperialists drew from Vietnam and the risks involved in a direct intervention in Nicaragua. (16)
In order to restore "democracy" in Nicaragua, as the imperialists propose to do, they have at least to refurbish their image a bit and dissociate themselves from the most reactionary regimes. They need presentable govemments and credible partners to justify their enormous war effort and prepare the way for overthrowing the Sandinistas.
However, it is difficult for the imperialists to have any credibility in condemning the gulag and "totalitarianism" in Nicaragua, if Major d'Aubuisson rules in El Salvador, if the contras are led by former Somozista National Guards, or if the US government supports apartheid in South Africa. 13. General Omar Torrijos renogotiated in 1977 the agreements on the Panama Canal which became known as the Torrijos-Carter accords. Torrijos died in an air crash in 1981. 14. Pensamiento Proprio, Managua, March 1985. 15. International Herald Tibune, New York, 6 May 1985. 16. Kissinger challenged "the inability [of the administration] to take a clear decision." For him, those responsible for the policy in Central America "are like long distance runners refusing to sprint, in order to save their energy for part of the way. But the risk you run in proceding in this way is to lose the marathon altogether. At a certain moment they have to go out in front and know when to make a decision." (quoted in El Pais, Madrid, 19 May 1985) The former secretary of state attacks what he considers to be the uncontrolled and hesitant policy of the Reagan administration.
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Sandinista soldiers on their way to the combat zone (DR)
The themes of democracy and elections are becoming central in the imperialist policy for the region. Such elections are held to provide an appearance of democratic legitimacy and to camouflage the growing militarization. Thus, after the vote in El Salvador, elections are to take place in most of the Central American countries in the coming year - in Guatemala in October 1985, in Honduras in November 1985, in Costa Rica in February 1986, and in Belize in December.
The Colombian model, which combines opening a dialogue leading to national reconciliation with the "rebels" laying down their arms, an amnesty, and the participation of these forces in elections, has already inspired the course followed in El Salvador, as well as the Reagan Plan.
Behind this regionwide pattern you can see the shape emerging of an operation to strangle the revolution by a democratic counterrevolution. This is what the American strategists call the "two-lane road." It combines US military aid and selective repression with "democratization" of the regime and some attempts at reform.
Even though the democratic and social aspects of this strategy are only a mascarade, the Christian Democrats' electoral victory in El Salvador gained Napoleon Duarte a not insignificant international and diplomatic credibility, above all, support from the US congress.
Such a combination of a new rise of the regime's military activity behind the democratic smokescreen of the Christian Democracy may create new problems for the FMLN.
This new imperialist tactic is necessary to isolate Nicaragua but it is also related to the traditional system of 8 domination. The military dictatorships consolidated the alliance between the old oligarchy - the landowners and the bourgeoisie exporting agricultural products and importing industrial goods (the compradore bourgeoisie) - and the army.
In order to defuse the explosive social situation that exists now, it is necessary to shove aside the old oligarchy, break its alliance with the army, give impetus to the development of an industrial bourgeoisie, and force through an agrarian reform and institutional reforms.
This attempt at "reform from above" has so far run up against all sorts of obstacles. In fact, the dynamic of the mass movement is making it difficult to isolate the old oligarchy without undermining the army. However, the army is essential in order to inflict a defeat on the mass mobilizations and to crush the radical wing of the FMLN in El Salvador or other revolutionary movements.
How can this old alliance between the oligarchy and the military be broken up for the benefit of the industrial bourgeoisie when the latter is still in formulation, when local industry is weak, and the domestic situation is so unstable that capital is fleeing the country? That is the imperialists dilemma.
Andres Zaldiva, the chair of the Christian Democratic Interational, for example, argues that there is a need for an orientation that will make it possible to remove from power "the landowning oligarchies supported by unscrupulous armed groups." This would require "regrouping the democratic forces that are in favor of peaceful solutions without
8 9 5 th of fis th ge slo mi Co de Co po th th in cO of ag th leg re it laT let outside intervention, whether American or Cuban, and profoundly changing are the economic and social structures. cal ev This would make it possible for a vast intermediate class to emerge." (17) fo
User wi The chances for "democratic"
Me. reform Car
However, carrying through such a project, which is similar to that of the Social Democratic parties and a section of the American administration, requires having strong domestic allies, a social base capable of supporting the economic, political, and military changes that have to be accomplished in the framework of a counterrevolutionary strategy and of maintaining an army that has, moreover, to be professionalized, modernized, and adapted to the present circumstances.
Countries with infinitely greater resources than the small Central American states have had big difficulties when it came to undertaking partial reforms. In Colombia, for example, there was an attempt •to institutionalize a restricted form of democracy at the end of the 1970s. This was a response to the rise of mass mobilizations and the threat posed by a guerrilla movement, as well as to the need to make room for the finance capital that had consolidated itself at the expense of certain sectors of the traditional bourgeoisie.
The plan of the Colombian president, Belisario Betancur, which inspired the Contadora operation, includes some economic, political, and institutional reforms, such as a dialogue with the guerrillas. In 17. Amerique Latine, journal of CETRAL October-December 1984.
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
the economic sphere, however, all the proposals for redistribution of the land met with the rejection of the farmers and ranchers associations.
As for the program of reforming the political institutions - the status of the parties, election-law reform, fiscal and judicial reform - it ran into the opposition of the dominant bourby the lack of electoral traditions, the entanglement of the army in every struggle for influence, and the existence of parallel networks and general corruption, complicated still more by the settling of political accounts by paramilitary groups. mho avidie of the nartios country, whose members are often better fed and paid than the Honduran soldiers. This situation is reviving the old antiSalvadoran nationalism, while the military occupation is giving rise to what the Jesuits in the country have called the "denationalization of Honduras."
If they are held, the elections may temporarily mask this political reality and caro tha nraiente of the imnerialists. and serve the projects of the imperialists, but they will not solve the grave crisis that is gripping the country.
In Guatemala, the difficulties of the armed revolutionary movement are facilitating a certain stabilization of the regime. The military dictatorship is taking advantage of this respite and preparing the way for a new electoral farce to clean up its own image and that of the imperialists, thereby enabling the latter to provide more direct military aid.
The participation in the coming elections of Social Democratic leaders, after six years in exile in Costa Rica, can help somewhat to legitimize one of the bloodiest military dictatorships in Central America. Such an interlude could improve Guatemala's image for US public opinion. The imperialists have quite a high stake in this. That is why, through the National Foundation for Democracy, an institution linked to the Reagan administration's Initiative for the Caribbean, they have provided a subsidy of 125,000 dollars to Guatemala's Center for Political Studies. The latter is supposed to be an instrument that can aid in the development of "democratic values" and facilitate a transition to democracy in the country. Thus, what the imperialists are trying to put together in Guatemala, as well as El Salvador, is a scenario combining a repressive regime, under which the paramilitary groups can do as they please, with a semblance of "pluralist democracy" based on crushing the armed revolutionary vanguard.
While it is true that the elections in El Salvador have not resolved any of the problems and that they were only a democratic smokescreen, they nonetheless brought certain political benefits for the imperialist project. They made it easier for Washington to extend economic and military aid, reducing the opposition to this in the US Congress. They also partially broke the international isolation of the Salvadoran government.
The victory of the Christian Democracy provoked a crisis in the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) on the extreme right. But despite such internal crises and the fact that the Christian Democracy enjoys an absolute majority in the new Assembly, it would not be surprising if Duarte ran into a parliamentary blockade from the right-wing opposition parties.
Some sectors of the rightist opposition want to gain a role for themselves in the Assembly through negotiations and to get political guarantees. Others are taking a stance of boycott pure and simple in order to have their hands
9 geois parties and the slowly became bogge
Whether the maintains its cred Contadora Group depends entirely Colombia itself political and milit the framework estab
It is, therefore, that such reform in much weaker countries, such as t military forces and d down.
Colombian model libility within the or in El Savador on its ability in to settle the ary conflicts within lished by Betaneur. more than doubtful schemes can succeed and more dependent hose in Central Amer-
The crisis of the parties
In Honduras, the dominant parties are in crisis and deeply divided heading into the November elections. An opposition front has been formed, the Coordinadora i Democratica de Opposicion (CODECO). It revolves around the Christian Democracy and M-Lider, a left split from the Liberal Party. Its primary objective is to see that honest elections are held and to contes, such as those in centra Atter ica. On the economic level, the example of El Savador is eloquent. So far, the agrarian reform has remained blocked. Now that the Christian Democracy has the majority in parliament, it has the legislative means for carrying out this reform. It is, nonetheless, unlikely that it will manage to do so.
The attempts to establish the rule of law on the political and electoral levels have gotten further. Elections are to take place in all the Central American countries in the coming year. However, this institution of constitutional forms that is being pushed by some get support for a project to "take Honduras out of the regional war plan ... to restore economic and political stability in Honduras."
In an indirect way, the crisis of the parties reflects the deep economic, political, and social crisis that is wracking the country, where "the mixture of extreme poverty, high unemployment, and constantly deteriorating social conditions, and the extreme youthfulness of the population is potentially explosive," as the Kissinger Report acknowledged.
To these problems have to be added the consequences of the stationing of sections of the ruling class in agreement three foreign armies — American, Salvawith the imperialists is being hampered doran, and Nicaraguan contras — in the
Mexico's president, Miguel de la Madrid (R) watches as Venezuela's president, Luis Herrera
Campins signs a treaty.
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
free and destabilize the Christian Democratic government.
For the moment, since the elections, the army general staff has constantly proclaimed its support for Duarte's "democratically elected" government and its respect for the Constitution. This attitude is not by chance. It corresponds to the imperialists' new tactic and their project of installing civilian governments in place of the old military cliques. This is designed, moreover, to assure the survival of the regime, and reinforce the state apparatus, while modernizing the army in order to adjust it better to the needs of counterinsurgency warfare.
In Costa Rica, the electoral process is unfolding in a different context. This country has an electoral tradition and a well defined framework of legality. It is ruled today by the National Liberation Party (PLN), which is linked to the Socialist International.
The objective of these elections is to confirm the realignment of Costa Rica and its open support for the counterrevolutionary strategy. The electoral process is to be used to create a consensus for this by undermining the country's tradition of peace and neutrality, which is incompatible with the militarization that is underway.
The breakup of the political consensus that reigned in recent years is leading to a reorganization of the traditional political forces. The PLN went into an open crisis after President Monge's alignment with Washington and his acceptance of the stationing of US Green Berets in the country.
Nonetheless, through Reagan's Republican Party, the imperialists are supporting the Social Christian Unity
Party "(PUSC) and its presidential candidate, Rafael Calderon. The massive financial aid given to this party leaves no doubt about Washington's preferences. It wants to take advantage of the decline in the credibility of the Monge government, which it regards as still not hard line enough, in order to put in a candidate who is centering his campaign around the danger that Nicaragua supposedly poses to Costa Rica and criticism of Monge for his lack of support for the American embargo.
The PUSC leaders even say in private that Calderon's first decision if he were elected would be to break off diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. Moreover, some political observers think that if the PUSC wins, there is no doubt that US bases would be established on Costa Rican territory.
Given the growing ineffectiveness of the old military dictatorships and the crisis of the oligarchic system of domination, the establishment of "legally elected" governments is essential for the imperialists and for their domination of the region. This policy is made more difficult by the existence of armed revolutionary movements, by the extent of the decay of these regimes, and by the internal contradictions in these countries.
The electoral policy is obviously an integral part of the counterrevolutionary poliey, but as the Guatemalan revolutionists of the Revolutionary Armed forces (FAR) say, "this is not just a maneuver" and regarding these elections "as a comedy and a farce could lead us to make serious political errors."
These electoral maneuvers are designed act act to in an
SOI ma mc siti of cu ag:
att mi the to isolate the revolutionary movement, to create illusions in certain sections of the dir masses "who do not see revolution the as a real and immediate perspective." It
COl is not possible to ignore this process in a
SOL difficult period "without isolating ourin selves from the popular masses." (18)
to mi
The big squeeze car obj exa
The combined military and political ena offensive of the imperialists, the realignin ment and reorganization of the forces the flic on a regional scale, as well as the modernization of armaments and the profesmil sionalization of the bourgeois armies, the are creating a more difficult situation for ter the revolutionary movements.
In Guatemala, the armed organizagro tions have suffered reverses. In the words reg of the FAR itself, they are going through ty.
a "difficult situation." (19) The effect of the bombing, the regrouping of the poputer lation in "model" villages in the frameter work of so-called Civic Action programs.
work of so-called Civic Action programs, yoL plus the creation of the "self-defense"
wit patrols have enabled the army to retake fro control of certain zones that were fina formerly held by the guerrillas.
fav
The guerrillas have not been analo nihilated, but they have been forced to retreat, organizing mobile guerrilla units that no longer control territory and
De are relatively cut off from their social base.
In El Salvador, the army is taking its inspiration from the new politicalasse military tactic applied in Guatemala.
Am
According to the US advisors themin selves a status quo is being maintained the and a military victory is not on the of agenda. Although the 32,000 soldiers of who make up the official army are better inte and better trained, they cannot defeat the the
5,000 to 7,000 guerrillas "who can still con strike where and when they want," as the American colonel Edward King
US put it.
Am
However, the bombing is having terrible effects. The FLMN's lack of heavy armament and anti-aircraft weapons is limiting its capacities for
18. Panorama, Mexico, April 1985, balance sheet of the national leadership of FAR (June-
July 1984).
19. Idem.
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985
### Czechoslovak dissidents solidarise with Nicaragua On May 8, 1985 the French daily Le monde published an appeal for solidarity with Nicaragua. This text was signed by several well-known personalities living in the capitalist countries.
Ten new signatures have since been added to the original list. These signatories have a special importance because they come from Prague and are mainly members of Charter 77. It is the first time that activists involved in the fight for democratic freedoms in Eastern Europe have taken a position in defence of a revolution under US imperialist attack. Such an internationalist and anti-imperialist consciousness is a very important development which shows the political evolution that is taking place among these militants.
The taking of this position, which cannot fail to embarrass the Prague bureaucracy, can only serve to strengthen the credibility of the struggle for democratic rights in Eastern Europe as well as the struggle of those under attack by imperialism. Basically this appeal will not please either Reagan or Gorbachev.
Amongst the new signatories are Peter Uhl, a member of VONS (Committee for the Defence of Unjustly Tried Persons) and ex-engineer and currently a heating engineer who has spent nine years in prison; Anna Sabatova, a member of VONS; professor laroslav Sabata, ex-spokesperson of Charter 77, ex-member of the central committee of the Communist Party, elected at the fourteenth congress, eight years in prison; Jiri Dienstbier, formerly a journalist and now a heating engineer and current spokesperson of Charter 77; Doctor Gertruda Sekamnova-Cartova member of VONS and former parliamentary representative in Prague; Vasek Maly, member of VONS and former spokesperson of Charter 77, responsible for the 'flying university'; Milo Rejchrt, former spokesperson of Charter 77; Eva Kanturkov current spokesperson of Charter 77. 10
action. The FMLN guerrillas are obliged to move about quickly in small units in order to escape the night-time patrols, and the army has been able to retake some villages for a time.
Nonetheless, the dynamism of some mass mobilizations, while the armed movement is reorganizing in the new situation, shows that a rapid denouement of the conflict is not on the horizon.
In Nicaragua, despite enormous difficulties, the revolution is holding out against imperialist aggression and the attempts to strangle it economically and militarily. The mission of the contras is to undermine the popular support for the Sandinista government through economic sabotage and a military offensive directed against civilian targets, forcing the Sandinista government to devote considerable human and financial resources to defense. The idea is that in this way private capital will be able to exploit the crisis in order to undermine the mass movement.
Militarily and politically, the contra campaign has failed to achieve its objectives. It has been unable, for example, to win a social base that would enable the contras to eneyst themselves in Nicaraguan territory. To the contrary, the blows that the Sandinistas have inflicted have obliged the contras to avoid military confrontations and limit themselves to murderous raids on scattered targets.
However, to inflict losses on small groups enjoying a sanctuary in Honduras requires overwhelming military superiority. These needs of military defense make it necessary to organize an effective territorial defense through setting up territorial combat brigades and mobilizing youth in the Patriotic Military Service, with all the human problems that flow from this. The activities of the contras, e finally, are creating a focus of tensions e favorable to all sorts of provocations along Nicaragua's frontiers.
a
Democracy under the gun
Thus, all the conditions have been
S assembled for making the Central
American crisis a long-drawn-out conflict in which the American strategists and d their local allies are pursuing a policy e of attrition and gradual strangulation
S of the revolutionary forces locally and internationally in order to prepare
I the way for carrying out a massive e confrontation at the least cost.
To accomplish this objective, the g
US imperialists have first to prepare
American public opinion for such g a confrontation. That is the meaning f of the battle over credits for the contras in the Congress and Senate. They also have to make sure that the human cost of an invasion of Nicaragua is as limited as possible in order to avoid getting bogged down as they did in Vietnam.
The US has to be able to wage this battle in the name of freedom and
International Viewpoint 1 July 1985 democracy, and this means that they have to find presentable partners in these countries.
Finally, the US imperialists have to overcome or neutralize the reticence of the Latin American bourgeoisies, which are opposed to any direct intervention under the present conditions of social explosiveness that exist on the continent.
The points scored by Ronald Reagan's policy in Central America makes Nicaragua the key to the situation in the region. Any defeat for Nicaragua will be a defeat for the revolutionary movements. Conversely, Nicaragua cannot hope in the short run to get help from another revolutionary victory. Reagan is counting on time to tighten the noose around the neck of the revolution.
The Sandinista leadership has no choice. It is giving priority to the war effort. It has first to crush the armed counterrevolution. Otherwise, it faces the danger that the activities of the contras я318 BOdI A Sandinista militia (DR) can serve as a pretext for an imperialist provocation, whatever form it might take, a punitive expedition or invasion.
This war effort cannot fail to cause economic and social problems. The FSLN has at the same time to deepen popular support for the revolution by appropriate measures at the risk of compromising the neutrality of certain sectors, of reinforcing the internal opposition and seeing the international bourgeoisies line up more openly behind Reagan.
Despite the military aggression and scarcities, the maintenance of a pluralist democracy in Nicaragua is an unprecedented fact that must be publicized by an international campaign of support to expose the shameless demagogy of the crusaders for "freedom." 20. Latin America Regional Report, Mexico •and Central America, published in London, 15 February, 1985:
11
PEACE DOSSIER.