Indochina: Ten Years after the Victory (2) — Interview with Pierre Rousset

INDOOLINI INDOCHINATen years after the victory (2) We publish below the last two parts of the Pierre Rousset interview to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the victory of the Indochinese revolution. In the first two sections published in the last issue of published in International Viewpoint, we discussed the nature of the imperialist war and its long-term consequences for Indochina and the crisis in Cambodia.

In this section we try to look at the development of the situation in the region following the defeat of US imperialism in 1975 and make an assessment of the impact of the Sino-Indochinese conflict which broke out in 1978-1979. The final part examines the position of Vietnam today and makes a balance sheet of the last ten years and the problems which still exist.

the dominoes - that is a whole range of countries from Vietnam to Singapore -would all fall at the same time.

Q. But the victory of the Indochinese revolution nevertheless had a profound impact both regionally and internationally.

A. bon Yes. This victory did create a 'favourable situation' for national and social liberation struggles at an international level. The exemplary character of the revolutionary struggle in Indochina showed that victory was possible, even against the all-powerful United States of America. Moreover the capacity of direct American intervention had been checked by the political crisis within the US itself and within the imperialist camp. The US government could no longer get involved in direct military intervention and no other imperialist power was in a position to replace it on an international level.

In this situation the US were forced to dismantle the bulk of their bases in Thailand just at a time when this country was being shaken by a deep wave of national and social struggles. Washington was unable to intervene with any force in the spectacular overthrow of a regime as important as that of the Shah of Iran in the Middle East. It was unable to replace Portugal in Africa when the anti-colonial struggles in Angola and Mozambique ( as well as Guinea Bissau) drove it out. And moreover it was not able to take the necessary measures to attempt to save the Somoza dictatorship or to nip in the bud the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Since the end of the Indochinese war, Washington has been attempting to share out the responsibility for the maintainance of the imperialist order more equally. This is clearly the reason for the pressures being exercised on Japan to get the government to build up its military strength in a qualitative way. The US government is also trying to re-establish its own capacity for direct intervention. That is why it attaches so much importance to the question of support for the 'contras' in Nicaragua. It has scored some political points in this regard, but it has far from succeeded in winning public opinion to the idea of a major direct involvement in counterrevolutionary activity.

Q. In this context, how do you see the turnaround in American policy toward China, formerly isolated on the international level and now welcomed with open arms?

A. This about-turn is an expression of two things, I think. One is good the other is pretty bad. The failure of Washington's policy in Indochina, in the 1960s also implied a failure of its Chinese policy. The war in Indochina was only the highpoint of a general approach aimed at 'containing and stemming

See the first part of the interview in International Viewpoint No 76. May 20, 1985.

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985 which still exist.

Question. Can we come on to the development of the relation of forces within the region? Ten years ago we were hoping that a victory of the Indochinese revolution would open up a rapid rise of revolutionary struggle in South East Asia and in the rest of the world. The US government itself had long held the so-called 'domino theory, that is that if South Vietnam were to fall then Cambodia and Laos would also fall. If Indochina were to fall then the whole South East Asian peninsula would be lost in the short term... The reality of the situation did not fit in with such schemas. Why?

Answer. You are dealing with two different things here. The impact of the Indochinese revolutions and the domino theory which has been used for a long time as anti-communist propaganda by Washington. We have never defended an alternative version of the domino theory! This was tainted from the start.

The point of departure of the domino theory was actually that revolutions are above all the produet of subversion -subversion from the outside. The enemy of course takes advantage of the errors and weaknesses of a particular national regime. But according to Washington, subversive activity by Moscow and, at the time, also Peking, explains why there was a revolutionary struggle in Vietnam. To capitulate in the face of pressure of subversion in one case (that is Vietnam) was to facilitate subversive activity everywhere else. The cold war philosophers use the same arguments today to justify support for the 'contras' in Nicaragua; a strategy of international subversion aims to ensure Russian-Cuban domination in the whole of Central America ...

This theory does not hold water and US experts know this very well. The existence of a real revolutionary struggle is in reality an expression of a crisis in society, of class conflict (combined or not with the national struggle), of which 14 the roots come from inside. If a society were not deeply shaken by such an internal crisis, then no amount of outside interference would be able to stir up a revolutionary struggle. That is also why it is pointless to want to artificially export revolutions.

Q. But international factors do play a role.

A. Of course, but for international factors to play a role in the unfolding of revolutionary struggle, there must be a crisis of society, social forces must be in movement and national political forces must be in a position to act. Of course the main international factor at play here is not communist subversion' either. The whole history of the Indochinese revolution shows that Russian and Chinese aid did not precede, but followed - and often very late - the development of the struggle in Vietnam itself. The main international factor' which assisted the extension of the Vietnamese revolution to Laos and then Cambodia, was in fact the intervention of imperialism. Cambodia was of course 'stirred' by the impact of the struggles in Vietnam, but the need to take a position on the Vietnamese war and US pressure were both factors in destabilising the paternalist regime of Sihanouk before 1970.

It was the 1970 coup d'etat organised by the Americans because of the demands of their Vietnamese campaign and US military intervention which brutally shattered the fragile stability of Cambodian society and influenced the course of the revolutionary struggle. (1) It was this 'international factor' - the activity of imperialism - which was a major factor acting on Cambodian society in a brutal fashion. This action was not even comparable with the so-called subversive action of the agents of Moscow or Peking ...

The situation in the region being what it was in 1975, it was unthinkable that all

the tide of the revolution in Asia which had begun its progress after the Second World War. Taking over from the defeated imperialism of Japan or the weakened ones of Britain and France, the US managed to isolate China. They set a price on this: the Korean war; aid to the regimes in Seoul, Tokyo and Taiwan; the establishment of a considerable military strength (the Seventh Fleet, the Korean bases, the bases in Japan, in Okinawa and the Mariana Islands, in Thailand and the Philippines...). And they undertook a direct show of strength in Vietnam. China was also included in this policy - behind the attempts at detente - as well as the whole of the "socialist bloc' and the national liberation movements.

The US government was that much more determined to put a stop to developments in Vietnam because of the victory of the Cuban revolution (1959-1960) which pointed to the reality of socialist revolution in Latin America itself. The Vietnamese war - and then the second Indochinese war - was therefore part and parcel of a whole world-wide policy, constructed by the United States acting

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There have been many defeats with only some victories. And some of these defeats have cost us - by that I mean all components of the worldwide revolutionary movement — a great deal. It was above all in Vietnam and Cuba that this counter-offensive by imperialism was blocked, exhausted. And it was in Indochina that the real test of strength between revolution and counter-revolution on a world scale was played out in the most violent way. Indochina was, as the expression coined by the Vietnamese said the 'most advanced point' of the international struggle against imperialism.

Q. You are talking in the same terms as ten years ago.

A. That's true. I know this language is not fashionable anymore in those

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O F inh Hoa milieux who are disillusioned with the solidarity campaign of the past. But it is no less relevant. Vietnam was not a local war but the main place for the crystallization of a very violent imperialist counter-offensive. If Washington had been successful there as it was in other places it would have been free to pursue its policy of 'stemming the tide'.

The people of Indochina have fought on all our behalfs and we should not forget it. Yes Washington's policy at the time was one of warlike barbarism -unfortunately for those who sing the praises of the good deeds done by American liberalism.

Bogged down and defeated in Indo. china, Washington had to compromsie elsewhere - and firstly vis a vis China. For twenty years the US government had refused to recognise China on the international level. In the expectation of a return to normal (for imperialism), the only China represented at the United Nations for example was Taiwan, the refuge of the Kuomintang armies. In 1970, Washington was still hoping to win in Indochina, but the government already knew that it would have to give way concerning China. It was a good thing for them. A very good thing. The point is that the government was able to make a virtue out of necessity and managed to turn the reversal of its previous policy to its own advantage.

Q. What do you mean?

A. This Is the second essential This is the second essential aspect of the development of Washington's policy toward China. The US were from now on going to implement a policy of 'peaceful coexistence' by reintegrating China into international organisations in order to isolate the revolutionary movements in Asia; just as they had previously used peaceful coexistence' with the USSR in order to isolate China.

And the Chinese bureaucracy, deeply shaken by the experience of the Cultural Revolution in 1966-1969, confronted with major economic difficulties and worried about the autonomous dynamic of the Indochinese revolutions, was prepared to play along with this. This was what was being negotiated in secret contacts which took place during Kissinger's visit to China in 1971 and during Nixon's Peking and Moscow trip in 1972.

The effects of the Sino-American rapprochement were immediately felt in Indochina. The negotiations took place behind the backs of the Vietnamese to whom they were of primary concern. The war in Indochina and Vietnam was in fact being stepped up. But the US government was able to take advantage of the negotiations underway with China to present itself, in the eyes of public opinion as if it were seriously preparing for peace. This undermined the anti-war mobilisation in the US itself. The situation became particularly clear at the time of Nixon's visit to Peking and Moscow which was endorsed

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Vietnamese soldiers en route to Cambodia (DR) by China and the USSR even though an American airborne fleet was bombing Hanoi and the strategic port of Haiphong at a most unprecedented level.

The disorientation of the anti-war movement in the US was a key factor in the outcome of the struggle in Indochina which was weakening. Elsewhere pressure was building up on the Vietnamese not to be too 'ambitious'

The Vietnamese gave a dual response to this. On the political level, they gave public voice to their disagreements, denouncing in inflamatory editorials those 'opportunists' within the world communist movement who had let themselves be beguiled by Nixon's policy (of isolating the most 'advanced point' of the struggle - Indochina - by making a compromise with China). And on the ground, they launched a very important military offensive in order to put themselves in a good negotiating position. The Vietnamese knew, in effect that, because of growing warweariness in Vietnam and the evolution of Chinese foreign policy, time was no longer on their side. They had to conclude a rapid agreement for the withdrawal of US forces, accepting the temporary maintainance of Saigon forces. This resulted in the Paris accords in 1973 which opened up the final phase of the liberation struggle.

Q. What were the long-term consequences of the conflict between China and Vietnam?

A. Very big. The turnaround in Chinese diplomacy was not merely 16 conjunctural. For the first time, following the social and political shockwaves brought about by the crisis of 1966-1970, the Chinese bureaucracy was settling into a long-term defence of the status quo regionally and internationally, in the same way that the Soviet bureaucracy had done. The relation of forces in the region was completely overturned by the parallel development of US policy toward China and the new foreign policy of Peking.

I think we can trace the real political rupture between the VCP and the Chinese Communist Party to 1971. Before, there had been several disagreements, but usually on the basis of a similar ideological framework. Now international and regional strategies were coming into conflict with one another more and more often; the theory of the three worlds' (2) made the USSR the main enemy for Peking (up until a few years ago), whilst Moscow remained at the heart of Hanoi's policy of alliances. For the Vietnamese, Chinese diplomacy directly threatened their struggle for liberation. For Peking, the Vietnamese revolution was an incontrollable factor which challenged its policy of integration into the regional and world-wide establishment. I think that in 1972, the US were still hoping, precisely because of this change in Chinese diplomacy to be able to 'freeze' the relation of forces in Indochina thereby keeping control of the "Mekong line' at least as far as Cambodia.

Moreover, the Sino-Vietnamese split was to have profound repercussions on the revolutionary movement in the region. The vast majority of the revolutionary organisations in the region were basically Maoist and often very much linked to Peking. Now in the 1970s it was no longer China but Vietnam that was giving revolutionary inspiration. The tensions between the Chinese and the Vietnamese divided the movement in the region and when military conflict eventually broke out, alliances were brutally shattered with Communist Parties supported by Hanoi (like the Thailand CP - TCP) taking the side of the Khmer Rouge. (3) At a time when, with the victory in Indochina, unity should have gained the upper hand, only divisions resulted.

Q. How was it that the revolutionary movements in the region were nearly all Maoist and the political influence of Vietnam was so weak?

A. Careful; this was the case in the 1970s. Since then the crisis of Maoism had developed including in South East Asia. But it is true that the preponderant weight of Maoism in the region up until very recently was rather surprising. One can easily find some explanation, but it is still surprising.

What is the explanation? Firstly the

The theory of the three worlds' was developed in 1974 by Teng Siao-ping. According to the theory the three worlds were USSR and its allies, imperialism and the 'third world' - which was the revolutionary motor force. 3. On the history of the TCP, see the articles in the French-language Inprecor Nos 84 and 85 of 11 and 25 September 1980.

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985

victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949; a new road seemed to open up at this time as a response to the serious defeats suffered after 1945 by several parties linked to Moscow (for example in the Philippines). Vietnam seemed to be simply continuing along the Chinese road. In fact Vietnamese strategy took up and extended many of the essential aspects of Chinese strategy. Objectively it was the expression of a more advanced and more dialectical experience, if only because it was confronted with a deeper and more sustained intervention by imperialism. But the cadres of the revolution in the area only took this into account much later.

You also have to take account of the fact that the communist movement in the region from the 1930s onwards often grew up within the Chinese communities. At the beginning the communist movement in Thailand and MalasiaSingapore was even organically linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) -it was their overseas branch.

And, with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 the CCP offered a global line of march which was an explicit alternative to that of Moscow. The Vietnamese remained very cautious for reasons of conviction and expediency. Peking's line corresponded more directly to the preoccupation of a new generation of militants. This was especially obvious in the Philippines, where the 'new party' was set up in 1968 with the Maoism of the Cultural Revolution as its reference point. (4) The first generation of communists were often made up of Chinese with many links with Peking. These new recruits saw in China the country of the continuing revolution, a global response to 'modern revisionism.?

Q. But doesn't the weak influence of the Vietnamese reflect quite simply their lack of an internationalist perspective?

I don't think that is a very good explanation. The VCP did actually have a regional view (and an international one) and above all they had a regional plan.

This was particularly clear in 19751979. The VCP understood the worldwide consequences of a defeat of imperialism in Indochina. They knew that a favourable period had opened up. They were betting on a global reinforcement of the 'socialist camp' which they still hoped would bring about its reunification. The VCP pledged extension of the revolution throughout the region. They knew that would be in their interests. They proposed to give massive support to the national leadership of the CP in Thailand and then to the regional leadership in the North East of Thailand in order to give impetus to the revolutionary struggle in the country, which was developing rapidly from 1973 (when the military dictatorship was overthrown) and 1976 (with the bloody coup d'etat). But ... the Thailand CP went over to the Sino-Khmer Rouge side in 1979. It was International Viewpoint 3 June 1985 a complete break.

It is possible that the VCP had been very careful in its political dealing with the Maoist CPs in the region because it did not want to open up a conflict with Peking since the aid they were sending was indispensable. Strict conditions had been put forward by the parties concerned. For example, the Thailand CP used to send cadres to be trained in medecine and military matters in Hanoi. But they weren't allowed to discuss politics with the Vietnamese. For political education they were sent to China and taught by the Chinese - often formally members of the TCP. But it is clear that in 1975 the VCP thought that South East Asia was an area where it should establish direct links, at the expense of Chinese influence, which obviously did not please Peking at all.

Q. And today?

A. Today the dynamic opened up by the victory has been broken, except in the Philippines. (5) This is especially the case in Thailand, where the TCP has entered into a deep crisis, where the guerilla struggle has for the most part disintegrated and where the revolutionary left is divided and greatly weakened - on the defensive. (6)

The Vietnamese are also on the defensive today. They do not believe any more in a rapid extension of revolutionary struggle into neighbouring countries. They are more dependent on support from the Soviet Union. They are seeking to break up the diplomatic front being presented on the question of Cambodia by the member countries of ASEAN. (7) The mutual distrust which separates the Vietnamese CP from other revolutionary formations in the region will be difficult to overcome.

However some contact is retained or is being renewed. A group of Thai militants are still linked to Laos - where the TCP had training camps up until 1979 -and there is talk of a new party having been set up, although it's difficult to gauge the real significance of this. Moreover, the TCP itself (or at any rate the latest 'younger' elements who remained in the TCP despite the crisis and who are now on the Central Committee) proposed renewing contact with the Vietnamese. A Vietnamese diplomat based in Bangkok has even been expelled from Thailand last year for agreeing to meet one of them.

Finally, it must be noted that the Vietnamese have given discreet support (in the form of military, political, technical and medical training) to several movements in Africa and Latin America. But I don't know what the situation is now.

Q.. To conclude this section, two questions; firstly what is your overall assessment of the situation in the region today?

A. Jail think that, on the whole, the situation in the region reflects the contradictory heritage of the 1975 victory and the crisis of 1979.

In the 1970s, the popular and guerilla struggles began to develop in special ways in two countries; in Thailand, in the North of the ASEAN area and in the Philippines, in the South. The revolutionary dynamic was interrupted in Thailand, but it is more alive than ever in the Philippines. This is precisely an expression of the contradictory impact of developments in the region but also of national political factors (such as the bureaucratic rigidity of the leadership of the TCP and the tactical flexibility of the Philippine CP) and economic factors (the Philippines is going through an unprecedented crisis at this level as well).

Moreover, the Cambodian crisis has given new life to ASEAN which used to only exist on paper. The economic projects of ASEAN are still not very substantial, but this coalition of six countries is now playing a notable international role. Internal divisions have obviously come out within ASEAN, especially with regard to Cambodia Vietnam and China. But there now exists a bloc of pro-imperialist regimes which is confronted with an Indochinese bloc and which is benefitting from an effective system of alliances: including both the US and China. Furthermore several of the member countries have undergone real economic development.

Q. Can you elaborate on what you see as the main lessons that we can draw from what we have been discussing?

A. I would like to stress four aspects. First; it is more and more obvious that each national revolutionary organisation must understand how to retain a real independence of decision making and action in relation to governments who might support them; that is the real meaning of the faction fight between Mao and Wang Ming. The Vietnamese CP also had to win its independence of decision making, on the national level first (after the difficult experience of the democratic front in 1937-1939 mainly, but also in 1945-1946 when Moscow refused to recognise the new independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam). Then on the international level.

Following the Yalta accords in 1945, Stalin agreed to certain Chinese and Vietnamese zones of influence without even consulting the interested parties. In 1954, the Vietnamese were seated at the conference table in Geneva. But 4. On the history of the Philippine CP •see the articles cited above. 5. For articles on the current situation in the Philippines see IV Nos 37 and 38, October 3 and 17, 1983 and Nos 49 and 59, March 26, 1984 and September 17 1984.

See the article "The crisis of the Communist Party and the left, IV No 49, March 26 1984. 7. ASEAN stands for the Association of Nations of South East Asia and its member countries are Malasia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei. This alliance opposed Vietnamese presence in Cambodia.

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nevertheless it was Molotov (USSR) largely and Zhou En Lai (China) subsequently who actually imposed very serious compromises on Indochina. In 1968, after the Tet offensive, the VCP felt strong enough to demand that the Paris negotiations be conducted by those directly concerned (that is the Americans and the Vietnamese), without the participation of the other powers, whether they were members of the Western bloc or the socialist camp. That is how they found themselves in a position to negotiate a delicate compromise which was basically in their favour; the 1973 accords.

More recently some parties, like the Thailand party have paid dearly for their subordination to Chinese diplomacy. This lesson obviously applies to everyone. It is obvious - indeed I would say inevitable - that revolutionary parties in South East Asia will some day or other be looking for aid from Vietnam. In any prolonged struggle, aid from countries like Vietnam, Cuba, USSR or China is a factor in the eventual outcome. But it is important that they don't become materially and politically dependent on Hanoi as some of them did previously on Moscow or Peking. The Vietnamese regime will probably grant ald although the present conjuncture is not favourable on this level, but they will also develop a state diplomacy which could be in direct conflict with the interests of the revolutionary struggle. It would be dangerous to forget this.

Second; it is important to understand the profoundly counter-revolutionary dynamic of inter-bureaucratic conflict between the USSR and China. The historic responsibility for this conflict rests, I am convinced, with the Stalinist bureaucracy in Moscow. But now that the Chinese bureaucracy has entered into the game of peaceful coexistence it is doing to Vietnam what Moscow did

Question. Let's move on now to the question of Vietnam itself and the policy of the Vietnamese Communist Party. In analysing the crisis in Indochina today you have stressed the objective factors, such as the effects of the destruction of the war, the policy of imperialism as well as that of the Chinese bureaucracy and the evolution of the Khmer Rouge current. But hasn't the Vietnamese leadership itself also taken wrong orientations which have deepened the crisis.

Answer. I think that the Vietnamese leadership has mainly been reacting to the increasing crisis following the victory. But it also appears that it has effectively followed a wrong orientation overall which has had negative repereussions in all areas. The existence of this problem was recognised in most spectacular fashion by the Central 18 to China in 1960.

Once again, if it becomes necessary to obtain aid from countries like the USSR or China, it is vital to guard against becoming involved in the logic of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The conflict itself must be fought against. Its consequences in South East Asia are very serious.

You can't replace one set of alliances (for example with Peking against the USSR and therefore with the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam) with another set of alliances (that is with the USSR against Peking and therefore for a Soveit intervention in Afghanistan). It is necessary to define an independent position, that of the revolutionary movement.

Thirdly; it is necessary to fight for a new sort of internationalism. The crisis of the socialist camp, the SinoIndochinese crisis and various other splits and realignments have profoundly shaken internationalist beliefs. Fighting for internationalism is not a utopia, its a basic need in every revolutionary struggle.

Revolutionary organisations have a big responsibility in this regard. The only way to rehabilitate internationalism is to apply a real internationalist policy, one which corresponds to the objective interests of the struggle of the people and not to the interests of a particular organisation or current or even nation state.

Fourthly; There are certain immediate solidarity tasks which must be taken up. In relation to Central America but also with regard to South East Asia: solidarity with the current struggles in the Philippines: but also solidarity with the revolutionary forces in Thailand who are attempting to draw the lessons of the crisis and of the sudden retreat and who are trying to establish new unitary relations.

Here again in the course of carrying out concrete solidarity tasks one will help to awaken internationalist sentiments. Committee of the VCP on the occasion of the official self-criticism which the latter presented to the fifth congress of the party in March 1982. (1)

The orientation mapped out immediately following the victory in 1975 can best be described as triumphalist and volontarist. The perspectives and the objectives were far too optimistic and ambitious. This triumphalist vision was fed by the euphoria of victory at the time, by the feeling that nothing was impossible for those who had successfully resisted US intervention. The volontarism was expressed in the attempt to use the dynamic of victory to mobilise the population in an immense programme of reconstruction and development.

The - Vietnamese leadership obviously understood the political, social and economic difficulties of the situation but it largely underestimated them.

However the leadership soon began to realise that their appeals for a mobilisation of the population were not getting the response they had hoped for. For example, the general secretary of the party, Le Duan, in his report to the fourth congress of the VCP in December 1976, noted that they had not yet managed to create really powerful movements' similar to what had existed during the war. But it was only very slowly that the Vietnamese leadership began to draw the lessons of this failure and to modify their overall orientation.

It must be said that it was difficult in 1975 to avoid making an error of perspective. It was difficult, for example, to be able to forsee, immediately after such an important victory, the scope and depth of the crisis which was on its way. But if the mistake was an easy one to make this did not make the implications any the less serious. The more complicated and difficult a situation is, the easier it is to make mistakes but the more dangerous those mistakes then become.

Q. You said that the wrong overall orientation from 1975-1976 bore grave consequences in all areas. Can you be more precise?

A. On the economic level, first the production targets of the fifth five year plan (1976-1980) given, were such that a virtual forced march' in industry and in agriculture was needed. In 1980, the country should have produced the equivalent of 21 million tonnes of rice per annum. It had only produced 13.5 million tonnes in 1976; production fell to 12.2 million in 1978 to rise to 14.3 million tonnes in 1980. The failure was obvious.

Coal production should have reached 10 million tonnes by 1980. Despite the prudence of Vietnamese theory of economic development, which underlined the importance of agriculture and light industry, decisive resources were put into huge energy projects such as hydroelectric power and into industrial projects which were supposed to turn Vietnam into an industrial country in twenty nam into an industrial countrv in twent years. A leadership which, during the war, had understood the importance of balancing regional and local economies had from henceforth become fascinated by big projects, similar to the ones which the World Bank or the Soviet bureaucracy are so keen on. Most of these grand projects have had to be abandoned or suspended, and any hope of a big industrial leap forward is now very distant. Now they are returning to more balanced forms of industrialisation.

On the political level, despite the warnings made by cadres of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the south and by the Communist Party, the political bureau decided on the very rapid reunification of the country which was accomplished institutionally in 1976, 1. See IV No 12, August 2, 1982.

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985

The evolution of the Vietnamese leadership

The evolution of the Vietnamese leadership

mainly through the organisation of legislative elections.

Personally I have thought for a long time that this was not a terrible problem given that the reunification was already well on the way following the victory on April 30, 1975. From that time on there was only one leading party, only one army, one body of civil servants, even if there were two separate policies because of the huge differences between North and South. However, the practically instantaneous winding up of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) in the South and the institutionalised unity forced on the country does seem to have had important negative consequences in preventing the development of an independent political process in the South. This contributed to the increase of tensions within the VCP and the NLF. On the social level, in the South the collectivisation of agriculture was implemented much too rapidly. In 1979 there existed, at least on paper, more than 13,240 production teams (required for the first stage of collectivisation), each using between thirty and fifty hectares. The following year nearly 10,000 of them had disappeared.

New economic zones were opened up in areas where the war had destroyed villages and agriculture. In 1975-1976 400,000 people from Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City - an area whose population had vastly increased during the war - had been displaced in order to populate these new zones. But because of a lack of preparation, as much on the political as on the socio-economic level, the measure became particularly unpopular. It seems that 60% of the people sent to these zones have returned in an uneven way to Saigon in the months following their removal.

In the North the transition to

*large-scale socialist production' had been pronounced, but the regime came up against strong social resistance when, in the name of economic efficiency, they sought to dissolve local village authorities into structures one step higher up.

On the international level the VCP quickly lost interest in the solidarity movement and left it to fall apart. Bearing in mind its economic policy, the Vietnamese regime directed its efforts toward Western governments. But the attempts to achieve an opening in the West were sharply rejected by the US and, though more insidiously, by Western Europe and Japan.

Convinced of the international prestige of Vietnam, it seems that the VCP leadership had not forseen that the conflict with China would flare up still more in 1978-1979, sharpened by the conflict with the Khmer Rouge. The international propaganda and information work having been completely neglected during those crucial years by the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge and China were able to occupy the field at this particularly bitter stage in the conflict. Here also the Vietnamese regime paid a high price for its neglect.

These are only examples of what the triumphalist and volontarist course taken from 1975-1979 really meant.

Q. Could these errors also be classified as leftist?

A. Often, yes, but not always. I indicated that the policy of the Vietnamese government during the first years following the victory included making overtures towards Western Europe and Japan in particular. Judging from the way this policy was carried out, the Vietnamese leadership seems to have underestimated the resistance that would be put up from within the imperialist bloc. In fact, the international policy of the VCP for a time combined an appeal for revolutionary struggle and a strengthening of the 'socialist camp' with an attempt to develop multi-lateral relations not only with the USSR and China but also with the West. The negative response from Europe and Japan strengthened the 'hard line' wing of the party. Then the break with China had made the USSR and the Soviet bloc practically the only allies that Vietnam had, with a few exceptions in the third world - India for example. If triumphalism brought hopes of open diplomacy, the policy of 'realism' which followed, fed a new siege mentality.

Lets take another example, this time on the internal level. In the aftermath of victory the Vietnamese leadership also seems to have underestimated the capacity of the enemy within, the large commercial bourgeoisie of SaigonCholon, who were generally of Chinese origin. In the name of the 'national unity' and 'reconciliation' which are not exactly ultra-left terms, the leadership took limited measures against this important section of the native bourgeoisie. But this big bourgeoisie was able to build a barrier between the regime and the peasants. It controlled a whole network of trusted commercial intermediaries, through whom it could buy up rice at bargain prices and offer producer's and consumer's goods to the population in the countryside. At that time the government could not compete with them in these areas. This commercial bourgeoisie also controlled the market and could therefore create scareity. Because of their immense wealth they could also resort to bribery and corruption. Nothing could stop them using any means they chose to accumulate profits, but also to sabotage the government's efforts.

In 1978, the VCP reacted somewhat late to this by mobilising the population against private commerce. But they did so at the worst possible moment when the country was beset with economie problems and in the full swing of the conflict with China. Under this dual pressure the leadership reacted in an ultra-left way.

The following lessons can be drawn from all this; that in order to implement even a moderate policy of alliances, for example, with the peasantry, it is necessary, to hit the big bourgeoisie who can insert themselves between the new regime and the social layers it is trying to reach agreement with. And usually even to be moderate, it is necessary to create the necessary relation of forces by taking state power, on the one hand, but also, on the other hand, by breaking up or at least holding in check the most dangerous social centres of the counterrevolution.

One must therefore avoid drawing unilateral conclusions in this area. In order to have some influence on the interna-

19

VIETNAM SINCE THE VICTORY 30 April 1975. The taking of Saigon by the forces of the NLF and the North Vietnamese army. China immediately ceases all military aid. June 1975. The creation of a unified state bank and the suppression of other banks in the South. 1975-1976. Creation of new economic zones and the displacement of a section of the population of Saigon and other towns over-populated as a result of the war. July 1976. Formal unification of the country and the establishment of the socialist republic of Vietnam. December 1976. Fourth congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party. 1978. Armed conflict with Pol Pot's Cambodia. Incidents on the Chinese border. March 1978. Expropriation of the large private businesses in the South. June 1978. Vietnam joins Comecon. July 1978. Cooperation treaty between USSR and Vietnam. December 1978-January 1979. The Vietnamese army and the Cambodian forces of Heng Samrin intervene in Cambodia and overthrow the Pol Pot regime. February-March 1979. China invades part of the northern provinces of Vietnam in order to 'punish' them for their action in Cambodia and then withdraws after several weeks. In this time there are 50,000 killed or wounded on the Vietnamese side and 60,000 on the Chinese. March 1982. Fifth congress of the VCP. The party leadership makes a self-criticism. ernational Viewpoint 3 June 1985

tional level it was necessary to maintain links with the solidarity movement, insofar as it still existed. In order to proceed at a steady pace in agriculture, it was necessary to take firmer measures more rapidly against monopoly traders.

Q. Are you proposing any new guidelines for post-capitalist transition?

A. Obviously not. You have to take into account the whole of a given situation and the real difficulties they faced. If the Vietnamese leaders did not hit out at the big Chinese traders more quickly, it might have been because they were afraid of a reaction in China. But it might also have been because they did not have the network of retailers, or intermediaries, nor the financial means to replace these traders. It is easy to see mistakes with hindsight. It is useful to think things over politically. But it is another thing to be able to say, at the time what concretely should be done. I would pose the problem this way: How could you hit the commercial bourgeoisie and still maintain a small or medium-size trade network?

Q. But, from a more general point of view, how can we understand the scope of the errors committed? I mean on the level of the ideological terms of reference of the Vietnamese leadership and not just in relation to real objective problems. Do such errors reflect the political and programmatic weaknesses of the Vietnamese leadership, with its Stalinist education?

A. There is a Stalinist heritage which most notably underlines their conception of power. But this is not the only or even the most profound influence. The Maoist influence was very strong in the past and despite official statements it must still count for something.

I should imagine that Lenin is more widely read by the Vietnamese leaders A young Vietnamese recruit (DR) 20 than Stalin or his successors. The political thinking of the Vietnamese leadership was, above all, determined by their experience in struggle, as much on the national as the international level.

For my part, I would avoid talking too sharply about the 'political weaknesses' of the Vietnamese leadership. It certainly has its limitations, which generally reflect precisely the limits of its own national experience. But it also showed on several occasions, an exceptional capacity for political leadership which allowed it to resolve issues such as the conquest of power, despite the continuing difficulties due to imperialist intervention.

Q. Could you explain what you mean by that?

A. Here we are touching on one of the main lessons of the Vietnamese revolution I think, as is the case with many other revolutions. It is one which seems obvious when you bring it up today. But we must also remember how many errors have been committed by so many revolutionary organisations, including the Fourth International, through ignoring this lesson.

I would put it this way; you must have a strategy for the conquest of power which answers a certain number of key questions. For example, what are the social forces in the revolution? What is the role of the struggle for power? Around what basic national and social goals can the masses be mobilised? It is important to have a national implantation to invest and accumulate forces as part of a longterm plan. But for all that you cannot plan all the stages of the struggle for power and national liberation in advance, for obvious but very important reasons. The first is that you have to take the enemy into account. The enemy will react and as they too begin to learn about revolution and counterrevolution, they will regularly try to shift the terrain of the battle by changing their tack. The second reason is that the course of the struggle in any country will be affected and sometimes very profoundly by the course of regional and international struggles which will not conform to a pre-established schema. The third reason is that every phase of the struggle is conditioned by the results of the preceding stage. And these results, which then become a part of the stakes involved can never be forseen in any detail.

Examples of this abound in the history of the Vietnamese revolution. The development of US policy in Indochina forced the Vietnamese leadership to re-evaluate more than once their perspectives and their methods of struggle. In the 1930s, the course of the mass struggle was very different from what it became during the wars of national liberation in 1950 and from 1960-1970. One of the reasons for this was that, during the 1930s, there was a possibility of a convergence of anti-colonial struggles in Vietnam and the class struggle in Europe, mainly at the time of the 1936 general strike in France and the Spanish civil war. The mass strike, the organisation of the masses into action committees in the Saigon area could have led to a victorious insurrection, the imperialist forces being tied up as they were in the metropolis itself. The defeat in Europe and the march toward world war closed off this perspective.

In 1945, in another international context, at the time of the defeat of the Japanese, it was basically through a mass insurrection at a national level that power was first seized. This power was still very tenuous. But it was now an independent country which had to be conquered afresh by the French. This is what gave the national resistance that grew up its particular character.

No one could have forseen all this and integrated these events into a preordained schema for the conquest of power. The Vietnamese leadership, however, was itself a temporary prisoner of such schemas. That is why it was often late — by quite a few years in some cases - in modifying its policies. It is interesting to read what Giap, the leader involved in the taking of Dien Bien Phu, wrote on this in his book 'People's War, People's Army'. He writes about the call for agrarian reform during the anti-French resistance, a reform which was set aside for far too long. The errors committed during this struggle were numerous and it is very important to study them. That is how we draw the lessons of past experiences. But at each turn, the Vietnamese leadership was able to change direction and integrate new developments before it was too late.

To be schematic, I would say that the fundamental programme and Marxist theory give us the means to analyse and draw up historic objectives. A strategic dimension gives every tactical choice its own horizons. But the correct orientation at a given stage of the struggle flows from a concrete analysis of the situation which must draw together the maximum national and international data. Any tactic is conditioned by strategic objectives but determined by the needs of the moment.

A revolutionary struggle requires neither the oversimplification of tactics nor the too rigid strategy which could flow from the application of any model. The language of the VCP reflects an awareness of this problem. The notion of the combination of forms of struggle, of regions of struggle etc. is put forward against an oversimplification of tacties. The idea of the need to determine 'the favourable moment' underlines the belief that victory will not come as the result of a gradual accumulation of strength in the framework of a rigid schema, but out of the capacity of the leadership to seize the time which is most favourable,

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985

when the enemy is weakened and paralysed. That is what the VCP did in Vietnam in 1975 and before that in 1945. You cannot plan a twenty year process of prolonged revolutionary war from the stage of the defence strategy right up to a balance of forces and then to the counter-offensive, just as you cannot plan the mass insurrection years in advance. But simply seizing the right moment is not enough. It is also necessary to help create it through a policy which extends to all areas - the area of alliances, diplomacy, international action and in the political and military field. In this, the Vietnamese were expert.

Q. To come back to my first question. How was it that a politically experienced leadership could make the mistake it did in the period 1975-1980, even taking into account the objective problems?

A. Once the objective difficulties have been underlined, you have to take other elements into account. First of all you have to take into account the big changes in the framework which was in operation after the victory. It is a very different to fight for power and national independence than it is to begin a process of reconstruction and transition toward a new society. That raises another problem. The type of organisations you have to build for revolutionary combat are not necessarily the same as the type of organisations needed to begin the transition after the victory. I am talking here about all types of organisations; parties, mass organisations, organisations of workers power. What is involved here International Viewpoint 3 June 1985 is not only the structure of these organisations but also their method of funetioning and the conceptions which underline them. This is an old problem which we must approach in a new way. The difficulty lies in the fact that you have to begin by overthrowing the old class rule in order to allow a revolutionary transformation of society and that the manner of overthrowing the old rule is not merely a matter of preference but depends also on objective conditions and the actions of the enemy.

How is the problem posed in Vietnam? The struggle was very long and very costly and it took the form of a military combat where the social revolution itself was finally expressed in the framework of a movement for national liberation. And all this took place in a largely agricultural society with a Confucian culture. These are the factors which, among others, made their mark on the Vietnamese communist movement and the new regime immediately following the victory.

We have already drawn attention to the consequences of the prolonged and costly character of the struggle. (2) The most obvious weakness lay in the apparatus made up of inexperienced cadres with few local roots and the very low level of self organisation of significant sections of the population.

The problem was particularly acute in the Saigon area. In 1975, the VCP had 400 members in Saigon, for a largely rootless population of 3.5 million inhabitants. In 1954 the party had 3,000 members in this town for a population that was two times smaller. In the

BROTE J2T1]-941 Working in the fields in I Vie t sixth District of Saigon with a population of 225,000 people the party had only six surviving members. They had to recruit en masse after the victory, which is always the worst time. One can understand the scope of the problem by the fact that in the first district of Saigon 95% of party members joined after 30 April 1975. (3)

The regime was deeply marked by this situation. The same goes for the functioning of the party apparatus characterised by a feeling of weakness which gave way to authoritarianism. This was reinforced by the fact that the party had been shaped for three decades by a lengthy military struggle which had its own rules. No organisation could go through such an experience without being deeply marked by it. Amongst other consequences there developed a conception of secrecy and discipline, a certain command structure and a party which was constituted as a kind of alternative government, intervening in all areas, not simply in the leadership of struggles.

All this influenced the concept of state power. Vietnamese theory says that the party leads, the state manages the population exercise their power of control as a collective master'. The party, which is basically unique, is as a leadership constitutionally above the state. The origin of this conception is not exclusively Stalinist. You find 2. See the first part of this interview published in /V No 76 May 20, 1985. 3. These figures, like most of the figures quoted in this interview are taken from Far Eastern Economic Review May 2, 1985.

21

elements of it in the first years of the Russian revolution, as well as in the Chinese revolution. The idea is even present in a revolution like the Cuban revolution. It corresponds to a prolonged experience of military combat. Its roots belong in a political tradition which is that of the state belonging to the Asiatic mode of production, as well as in the Vietnamese cultural tradition. The consequences of this are manifold.

In the Maoist tradition in Asia, the party can, for example, rule the personal lives of its members, on the question of marriage mainly, not only for reasons of security and functioning but also in the name of a so-called proletarian conception of morality.

The moral character of a revolutionary organisation is in fact a very important question. Revolutionary activity has moral implications, but to make the party the judge, on behalf of the population is very dangerous. It is to make the party the keeper not only of political power but of ecclesiastical and state power.

The fact that the struggle in Indochina has taken the form of movements for national liberation is not without its consequences either. The anti-imperialist struggle was fed by an awakening of deeprooted nationalist feelings, which was progressive. But that can also generate a chauvinist type of nationalism once victory has been achieved. This is what happened in varying degrees after 1975. The Khmer Rouge leadership developed a racist, almost frenzied nationalism. But in Vietnam also, once the conflict with China came out into the open, the leadership resorted to nationalist anti-Chinese propaganda which was very dangerous. In it they reminded people that for thousands of years Chinese dynasties had invaded Vietnam.

Finally, it is very tempting, when faced with huge socio-economic difficulties, as there were in Vietnam after the victory, to make simple recourse to the methods of action which have been tried and tested in the war; campaigns of rivalry, mass mobilisations, appeals to patriotism, leadership by the party etc. We saw it in China, for example, with the great leap forward at the end of the 1950s. We also saw it in Cuba in 1970 with the campaign for the "zafra" that is the target of ten million tonnes of sugar cane. In each case the aim was to break the limitations of underdevelopment through a massive mobilisation of the population. This method has always failed.

Q. It is in this framework that we have to understand the crisis which hit Vietnam between 1978 and 1979?

A. 1978-1979 was the crisis point when all these contradictions merged together. The final break with the Khmer Rouge meant the final break with China. Imperialism rapidly tightened its grip once more, following the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1979. The 22 conflict within the VCP became more acute. Relations with the masses as a whole had seriously deteriorated especially in the South. Class conflicts with the commercial bourgeoisie hardened. Bureaucratic arrogance and corruption of party members reached a more dangerous level. The fleeing of the boat people became more significant.

Q. Who were these boat people who left Vietnam in their thousands?

A. They represented several layers of the population which actually illustrate the different aspects of the crisis which was hitting the country at the time. There were those who had collaborated with the Americans and were afraid of repression. There were those who belonged to powerful Chinese bourgeois clans in the South. There were those who were quite simply attracted by the promises of the 'voice of America.' There were also members of the elite in society whose standard of living had declined. Such an exodus is to be expected in a time of revolution. All other revolutions have undergone similar exoduses. And the Vietnamese war was one of the most harrowing experiences of revolution because of the imperialist intervention.

But there were also workers and party members in the North who crossed the Chinese border. Of Chinese, origin, they feared in the climate of suspicion which was prevalent in 1978-1979, they might be seen as a kind of fifth column even when they had been workers and party members dedicated to the revolution. Peking seems to have favoured this exodus later on. Hanoi also favoured it. And then in the South there were those who had lost hope in the future. The liberation had not brought peace and stability. A new conflict was beginning with their huge northern neighbours. War had settled in in Cambodia. The economy was declining with the cessation of US In the paddy fields... (DR)

aid in the South and Chinese aid in the North. The future of the country seemed doomed. This particular exodus represented a serious defeat for the new revolutionary regime.

Q. Doesn't this failure raise the question of the absence of socialist democracy in Vietnam. You explained before the historic roots of the VCP's political conceptions and of the structure of the new government. But in trying to take account of too much don't we run the risk of forgetting the programmatic and essential importance of socialist democracy? A. We can never understand too much' about history and politics. But I don't deny the programmatic importance of socialist democracy. On the contrary I would even go so far as to say that this democracy is even more important in backward countries where the socialist transition is much more difficult and less 'natural'. The process has to be led. In order to do this, it is necessary to understand the real situation in society, something which is not possible without mass socialist democracy. But the realisation of socialist democracy in a socially backward country, under imperialist pressure as well as pressure from the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracy, is infinitely more difficult than in an industrialised country. The problem is not to know what to do but to know how to go about it.

Of course, programmatic clarity is important as a guide to how to go about things. In this respect the programme of the VCP is inadequate, flowing as it does from the ideological formation of the Vietnamese leadership and its particular national experience. One of the functions of internationalism, by the way, is precisely to enrich and consolidate the programmatic gains of each national organisation in the face

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985

of particular national experiences in relation to other countries. It is a way of getting beyond the narrow horizons of each separate struggle.

But it is inevitable that the structure of a new regime should reflect in the actual revolution, the course taken in the struggle, the alliances made at the time of the seizure of power, the political traditions of the particular country etc. As a result it is also normal that new workers states appear in different forms. The problem is to work out how, starting from this concrete reality, you can take steps towards effective socialist democracy. That is the importance, for example, of the debate on the impact of the elections in Nicaragua.

Treating the problem in a normative fashion - it is necessary to do this or it is necessary to do that - is not very useful. I remember writing an article in 1975 on the deportation of the urban population in Cambodia which basically said; "If there had been workers and peasants councils this would not have happened like this ...' Obviously. But the point is this was so far from the reality in Cambodia at the time that it could not possibly constitute an alternative line.

Q. But there are concrete democratic goals which could be put forward in Vietnam today, aren't there?

A. Of course. The fight for real mass democracy is a pressing task from the very first steps in the revolutionary process and it is obvious that this fight is urgent in Vietnam. It is necessary to fight for the right to information against the monopoly exercised by the party apparatus. The last independent daily newspaper in the South, Tin Sang, has now finally closed.

We have to demand the generalisation of election procedures and an enlarged government accountable to elected bodies, the establishment of legal norms in the judicial domaine, the reduction of the de facto powers of the political police.

Q. What about the detainees in the re-education camps?

A. That is a very difficult question to sort out. The civil war in Vietnam was terrible. The pro-imperialist Saigon army had as much as a million men with a very strong and reactionary officer corps. The American special services used tens of thousands of people as informers, executioners and for other repressive tasks.

The new revolutionary regime decided not to proceed with any executions for past crimes. Very quickly the vast majority of soldiers in the Saigon army were set free. It was one of very few revolutions where there were no summary killings at the time of the victory. It is to the credit of the Vietnamese leadership and the Vietnamese people.

A promise was made to either free or International Viewpoint 3 June 1985 put on trial all the detainees in the re education centres within three years. That probably reflects the optimistic view the VCP had of the future in 1975. But in 1978 there was fear and crisis. The promise was not kept. It is very difficult to know how many detainees are still in the camps. The estimations that I heard vary between 7,000, according to government sources, and 20,000.

I think it is very important to keep the promise made in 1975. The continuation of the present situation is arbitrary. Some are freed and some are not. Nobody knows how long their sentence is. And all this must reinforce the semi autonomous power of the security services.

Q. You indicated that in 1982 the Central Committee of the VCP had presented a self criticism to the fifth congress of the party. What was this about and what changes in direction have been made since?

A. The scope and clarity of the self criticism made by the leadership of the party in 1982 is reminscent of the self criticism made in 1956 after the crisis opened up by the too rapid generalisation of the agricultural reform programme. But the context has changed and it will be much more difficult today to reestablish a dialogue between the regime and sections of the population. In my view, the 1982 self criticism centred on three basic questions.

First, the subjectivism of previous years - that is the voluntarism which we spoke of earlier — was denounced.

Second, the self criticism recorded the problems posed by the rift between the regime and important sections of the population due to bureaucratic sluggish-

Vietnamese soldiers in training (DR) ness and the absence of a real mass democracy and the decline in the quality of the revolutionary party. Le Duan's report to the fifth congress recognised that the institutional mechanisms were not functioning correctly, that they were inadequate and that the people had difficulty in taking advantage of their 'right to collective rule' . He had noted previously in 1976 before the fourth congress, that it was necessary to take practical measures to stop certain cadres and state employees from becoming a layer of privileged people' that is a bureaucracy.

This self criticism is very important. It shows that the problem of mass democracy in a country like Vietnam is a vital one and not an abstract idea of interest only to Western intellectuals. But Le Duan's report was as clear in outlining the problem as it was unsatisfactory and inadequate in proposing remedies and institutional reforms. The third essential element of the self criticism was on the economic and social policies.

Q. That is?

A. It is not only a question of working out more realistic objectives for production. There is also an easing of restrictions on the economy, of giving more responsibilities to individual units of production. The role of the free market is growing. Within the rural community, contracts are exchanged with families who take over sections of production and can sell an important portion of the products.

Q. Like in China?

A. Not really. The reforms are

23

a lot more cautious than they are in China where collectivisation has today largely been dismantled. But the reforms underway in the two countries raise important problems which we must think about more deeply.

Q. Problems concerning an economy of transition?

A. Concerning the economy of transition in countries like China and Vietnam but also in the struggle for power. There also, in studying concrete experiences we can see at what point we have to guard against schemas. I think that it would be useful here to clear the agrarian question before and after the up certain aspects concerning revolution.

Concerning the democratic revolution we have always insisted on the importance of the demand for the redistribution of the land. The self critical balancesheet that Giap made on this subject for 1940 to 1950 confirms the importance of the problem. If they don't get the land they work on, the poor peasants who bear the brunt of the war effort can become demobilised. There is then a risk that the large landowners will retain a dangerous level of political power in the village. But an agrarian reform which is too radical or too hasty rofomn which is too radical or too hasty can force sections of the rich or middle layer peasantry into the arms of the counter revolution, which happened in China or it can alienate the village community still further from the revolutionary regime which is what happened in Vietnam in 1956.

The Party's policy must therefore be very concrete and democracy within the village is indispensable for determining what is possible and what is not.

Furthermore, the peasantries of the third world have changed a great deal in twenty years. The peasantry of the Mekong delta in South Vietnam lived through the Vietminh reforms, the Diem counter reform and then the green revolution' instigated by the Americans. In many cases the peasants had become landowners, individualists and educated in modern techniques of production as well as being integrated into the market, which was not the case in the North. It is therefore impossible to take the same road today in the South as was previously taken in the North.

Concerning the transition to socialism therefore, many well-established beliefs have been challenged by the experience in countries such as Vietnam or China. Concretely, what should be the midterm goals that we should aim towards in relation to the degree of collectivisation?

In order to shed some light on the problem, I will say a couple of words about the development of my ideas on this subject. For a long time I used to think that the more that was collectivised the better, on the condition that this was done with the agreement of the peasants concerned and not through forced collectivisation. Then I realised 24 24that it might be necessary to slow down the rhythms of collectivisation, for reasons of economic efficiency and also according to certain social needs, in order to maintain majority support in the rural areas.

And now I am not sure what degree of collectivisation is desirable in the medium term. However, this is a central question for a revolutionary regime. Outside of a real capacity for mechanisation, collectivisation has certain limits. All the more so, because even with the most modern agriculture in the West family farms often persist - at the level of production. And finally, in countries like Vietnam, quite apart from China with its one billion inhabitants, I cannot see how urbanisation and industrialisation can follow the same road as in Europe, with the same type of rural exodus.

Q. But in the immediate term what is the result of these reform measures taken in Vietnamese agriculture?

A. They are doubly positive. Firstly, production is increasing. It appears they have attained the equivalent of 17.8 million tonnes of rice in 1984, despite very unfavourable climatic conditions. And these measures have received a positive welcome from rural producers. That means that, despite a dangerous growth in the population, the food shortage in Vietnam has gone down. This is a major objective today. And the regime can use these measures of economic liberalisation to political advantage.

Q. But these measures are not unanimously supported within the leadership of the Party?

A. Basically, some leading members are afraid that these measures will weaken the political hold of the party. State employees are affected by the price rise on the free market which their wages do not follow and this can lead to rampant corruption.

These measures seem to me to be necessary. But it would be wrong to see them as a panacea. New social differentiations could come to light in the countryside and we must not forget that the increase in family work is above all an increase of work for women and children.

Q. That must raise problems for the participation of women in political life?

A. Exactly. There you are touching on a very delicate issue. Production has

The mechanisation of agriculture in Vietnam has a long way to go ... (DR)

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985

to be increased and so does productivity and also hours of work. This reduces leisure time, which is an indispensable element of democracy. Is it possible today to increase production in any other way? I don't know. But it is a real problem in leading the struggle for democratic rights as well as against the oppression to which women are subjected.

Q. Aren't you just putting forward the same old argument there; bread (or rice) first and democracy afterwards? With that reasoning the time is never ripe for democracy.

A. That is not what I mean. What I am saying is that Vietnam today needs a whole package of economic and political measures. It is easy to enumerate a certain number of democratic demands which are basic and essential. It is more difficult to put them into practice. And without such socio-economic measures the other demands could lose all content. My feeling is that we are, or anyway I am not, well-equipped to respond to this problem. It imposes a certain modesty.

Q. What do you think of the probable evolution of the situation?

A. Ithink that we are witnessing an ongoing crisis in Vietnam. But it is very difficult to make predictions. Without concrete knowledge and also because it is very difficult to know what is going on inside the VCP and the development within the party will have very profound repercussions. Finally, because the unfolding of the regional and international situation will also play a very important role.

Q. You talk about the evolution of the situation within the VCP. Can you be more precise?

A. There are disagreements but it is difficult to judge their depth and dynamic. But we do know something about these debates. Some important cadres of the NLF and of the PRG were opposed to the party's line in 1975-1976 and felt that people did not have confidence in them. Regional and provincial leaderships tried to prove their autonomy by applying the line in a 'creative' way. It seems that the Northern province of Vinh Phu, for example, started to establish 1976-1977 a system of family contracts in agriculture, a policy which was not adopted by the central committee until March 1979 during the sixth plenum. The party organisation in Ho Chi Minh city said in a document that it was necessary to inform the political bureau of the reality of the situation so that they can lead us better'.

On the military level different conceptions came out, including on the

Van Tra.

It took several years, from 1979 to 1982 to win the leaders of the party to a change in line. The central committee which prepared the reports of the fifth congress lasted a long time and the congress had to be postponed apparently because of the scope of the differences which emerged on the analysis of the crisis and on the responses which should be given to it. An official of the party, Nguyen Khac Vien, violently denounced, in a letter to the National Assembly in 1981, some high-up cadres for bureaucracy and illusions in China. (4)

Q. Important differences also emerged at the level of the central committee and the political bureau? Who opposed who?

A. That is a well-kept secret and it is possible that the realignments vary according to the people and the periods involved. What is obvious, however, is that among the leaders, Truong Chinh, president of the State Council and a member of the political bureau of the VCP who would have had a direct involvement in the 1956 crisis and To Huu, along with the support of some military cadres and middle cadres of the party were probably sceptical and opposed to the agricultural reform policy and the economic reforms which were implemented from 1979 onwards. Other members of the political bureau and of the old guard such as Le Duan and Le Due Tho, or the party secretary of Ho Chi Minh city, Vo van Kiet, became defenders of the reforms.

Anyway, something is going on within the VCP but it will probably be a long time before anyone knows exactly what.

Q. You were also talking about the development of the situation in the region as a whole?

A. Yes because that will affect the internal situation in Vietnam a lot.

The present situation is partly on ice at the moment because of the question of Cambodia. The game of indirect negotiations has forced the main protagonists to make their positions clear. The current stumbling block at the level of diplomatic discussions is the position of the Khmer Rouge.

The question of the Khmer Rouge is important for two reasons. They constitute the main military force of the Democratic Kampuchea coalition and they are indispensable to the maintainance of an alliance between the West and China and especially between China and Thailand on the Cambodian issue. 09

I think that the problems with the negotiations stem from the fact that no lasting compromise is possible. Either Cambodia is linked to Vietnam and point of view of the Indochinese revolutions, this is a strategically very important question. Sihanouk, today even less than before, cannot represent a truly neutral solution. Taking all this as well as the major differences which we demonstrated earlier into account, a process of in Cambodia te

Moreover, Vietnam and by the develo in Moscow. I want to see V dependent on begun by refus for example, Comecon (5), in its moveme opening with with China leadership to the Soviet bl onwards, with Comecon and cooperation brought impo Vietnam allow to be used by t

On the othe part of the po region which excluded from Moscow important poli from its allian Soviet leaders in mind and opening up of Peking is goir situation to p Vietnam. Pek squeeze Vietr Cambodian. H about the Sino-Soviet rela

But one of future of Indo of perspectives and worldwid struggle in the developments i could overturn game which t cipating in. revolutionary e different from the dangerous revolutionary v

So again we real self determination ›day is very unlikely. the relations between the USSR can be affected ›ment of global diplomacy ı 1975, the VCP did not ietnam become exclusively Soviet aid. Hanoi had ing several Soviet proposals, the proposal to join in order to be more free nts. But the failure of the the West and the break brought the Vietnamese i position uf integration in oc, especially from 1978 the entry of Vietnam into the signing of the treaty of vith the USSR. Moscow rtant economic aid and ed the old American bases he Soviet fleet. ir hand the Kremlin is now ›litical power game in the they had previously been is therefore drawing tical and strategic benefits ce with Vietnam. But the hip also has other aims is currently accepting the a new dialogue with China. ig to attempt to use the rise the USSR away from ing's policy remains to lam down to the last noi will have to be vigilant urrent - developments itions. the key questions for the china and Vietnam is that for struggle in the region e. The current rise in Philippines or important n other parts of the world the rules of the diplomatic he big powers are partiVietnam in a counternvironment would be very a Vietnam freed from pressures on it, by new ictories. find ourselves faced with the necessary task of solidarity. To support the anti-imperialist struggles in the region and worldwide and to support the development of social struggles in the imperialist centres and struggles in the bureaucratised wor states, is to aid the Indochinese revolotions, which today are so danger isolated. 4. The main part of this letter was publ in the French language publication Quar Internationale on December 1 1983. 5. Comecon stands for Council foe economic assistance. It was created and currently involves the USSR, the Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Mongolia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Vietnam

25 subject of the 1975 offensive as is against ASEAN and the West, or it is evidenced by the writings of those linked to Thailand and against the two

Van Tien Dung and responsible, Van Tien Dung and Tran other Indochinese states. But from the

International Viewpoint 3 June 1985