EAST TIMOR and WEST PAPUA Indonesia's wars of occupation
While economic recession and growing political unrest face the Suharto regime at home, some 20,000 of its troops are involved in supressing two national liberation struggles in territories forcibly incorporated into Indonesia.
West Papua, officially the province of Irian Java was a part of the Dutch East Indies not relinquished at the time of Indonesia's independence. Sukarno's military campaign to "liberate" the mineral-rich territory, together with United States pressure, ended in a UN-backed transfer to Indonesia in 1963. The "act of self-determination" required under the terms of the takeover was carried out in 1969, but is widely regarded as having been farcical.
Since then, the Free Papua Movement (OPM) has waged a political and military struggle for independence. The OPM estimates that up to 150,000 Papuans have died in the struggle. The entire Papuan population is only about one million.
The Papuans are Melanesians and identify with the wave of nationalism now sweeping the South Pacific, particularly Kanaky (New Caledonia) and Vanuatu. A mass exodus of some 10,000 Papuan refugees to neighbouring Papua New Guinea followed an abortive uprising by the OPM last February.
The refugee situation has created an important political opening for the OPM. Leaders of the organisation are concentrating on building international solidarity and working for unity of what has previously been a factionalised movement.
The OPM claims the support of close to 90% of Papuans. This is reinforced by the overtly chauvinist attitudes of the occupation forces, which consider Papuans to be "savages"
Guerilla attacks on Indonesian military outposts have taken place as recently as last October. Indonesia has some 6,000 troops in West Papua, including some 450 members of Kopassandha, crack "Red Beret" para-commandos.
An important issue is the Suharto regime's policy of "transmigration". This is a World Bank-funded program to resettle Indonesian peasants from highly populated islands like Java and Bali, in less-populated islands. West Papua has received some 250,000 settlers from Indonesia, mostly under this policy. Papuans fear that they will become a minority in their own land if the program continues.
Although transmigration is usually explained as an attempt to reduce population pressures, this flies in the face of the actual results of this program, which has cost millions of rupiahs in foreign aid. In the latest Indonesian development plan, Repelita IV, it is described as a "vehicle to promote national stability and integration".
Most of the West Papuan transmigration camps have been set up in areas of strategic importance militarily. Their role is analogous to the Zionist soldier-settler kibbutzim in occupied Palestine.
So far, in all Indonesia, some 500,000 families have been transmigrated. Authorities plan to resettle 750-800,000 families over the next five years. There has also been talk of extending transmigration to East Timor, the other war zone.
Ten years after some 30,000 Indonesian troops invaded newly independent East Timor, a war is still raging in this former Portuguese colony.
Fretilin, the movement that led the independence struggle, is now fighting a guerilla war, particularly in the eastern and central regions. It ties down 16-18,000 Indonesian troops at present.
From 1977 to 1980, Fretilin suffered several major setbacks, as it was defeated in a number of set-piece battles forced on it as it sought to defend liberated zones with large civilian populations. Additionally, a number of Fretilin leaders defected to the occupation forces.
Fretilin gradually abandoned most of the populated liberated zones and adopted guerilla tactics. This change in direction was consolidated at a 1981 congress. Since then Fretilin has succeeded in strengthening its armed units and has built an extensive network of sympathisers and clandestine members. The organisation is said to have people in the very top ranks of the pro-Indonesian administration in East
Reports from the Catholic Church in the capital, Dili, indicate that the fighting continues and thousands of suspected Fretilin supporters are in concentration camps. There are many reports of army atrocities, including torture, and a massacre of up to 200 villagers in one recent case.
A 1983 ceasefire was abrogated by the Indonesian regime, which has pledged to wipe out Fretilin to the last man and woman. Support for Fretilin is still very strong all around the country.
The United Nations does not recognise Indonesia's claim to East Timor, and accepts Portugal as the legitimate administering power, but there are indications that the Portuguese government is seeking to change this situation, clearing the way for UN recognition of Indonesia's annexation of the territory.
International Viewpoint 25 March 1985
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Kerema protesting against Japanese investment and demanding price reductions, an end to corruption and the ousting of Suharto's group of advisers (ASPRI). Riots continued for the next two days, until the army moved in with tanks and troops, killing 11 protesters and injuring many more. General Sumitro fell after this.
The anti-Tanaka protests clearly revealed the twin dynamics of the students' protests of the period. Students were motivated by basic demands for justice but were manipulated by factions in the ruling group.
Three prominent student leaders were tried and convicted on subversion charges, but received fairly short terms of imprisonment. There followed a lull in student activity. The Islamic character of the opposition
In 1977, when the next elections were held, Golkar won overwhelmingly once again. But student unrest followed the elections and continued into 1978. Once again the protests were against corruption and repression. The actions centred around the trial of Sawito Kartowibowo, a government employee who exposed corrupt Suharto family deals around imposition of a levy on all air cargo movements in and out of the country. Proceeds from the levy went towards setting up a cargo airline, Bayu Air, partly owned by the Suharto family. Sawito got eight years' prison for "subversion"
Students again attacked the Suharto regime in the approach to the 1978 presidential election. On January 28, 1978, the regime struck. All student bodies were frozen, some 600 students were arrested and some were tortured. Thirtyfour students were selected for trial the following year.
Since then, most campuses have been relatively quiet. But many of the veterans of the various waves of student revolt are now working in different sectors, organising workers, poor farmers or agitating in the mosques.
The most recent unrest in Java has sparked speculation about a revival of Islamic militancy in Indonesia. Last November's riots began when security officials forced their way into a mosque and tore down posters criticising the government.
Several people were killed and more were wounded in riots that swept through Jakarta's depressed port district of Tanjung Priok. In the following weeks bombs were exploded in a number of Chinese owned banks and businesses. At present a number of people are on trial for these bombings.
The "Islamic" nature of the recent protests has also derived from recent changes forced on the two opposition parties, the PPP and the PDI.
These were prompted by militant demonstrations led by the Islamic alliance (PPP) supporters, in the leadup to the 1982 general elections (which predictably were won by Golkar). Apart from the economic recession, these demon-
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CORAL : non-governmental development associations. Planned anti-strike laws will extend to the private sector the already existing ban on strikes in part-owned or fully owned government enterprises.
While labour struggles are a dynamic part of the opposition in Indonesia, repression prevents them from being an open forum for full political discussion and protest.
This contributes to the fact that political opposition tends to focus on workers' immediate bosses, the government and Chinese businesses. To many workers, imperialism's role in their country is not immediately discernable. This political problem is exacerbated by the lack of political forums open to workers.
Another important part of the opposition traces its roots to several post 1965/ 66 waves of student and youth protests.
It wasn't long before some of the student movements which joined the army in purging the left fell foul of the New Order regime.
As early as October 1966, the military was suppressing its former student allies with bayonets and rifle butts. There were allegations that students and some young officers were plotting to bolster Sukarno's position. (While many students were anticommunist, they supported Sukarno, who they were told was being manipulated by the communists. This supposedly led to the repression and economic crisis of the early 1960s.)
The following year some students took up the issue of "corruption" ', targetting a number of generals close to Suharto. In 1969 the anti-corruption movement gained momentum with publication of the writer Mochtar Lubis' series of articles entitled "We want to know!" The articles highlighted shady deals between several generals and Japanese companies.
In 1970 the attacks centred on General Suryo and the evidence was more than sufficient to go to court. Suharto refused International Viewpoint 25 March 1985 pondetta Trobriand Is
Woodlark I D'entre • a asteer uisiade Archipelago LEA to act, and the matter was settled out of court.
Some students attacked Suharto directly, exposing his links with Chinese businesses (cukong). These allegations were reflected within the military itself.
The next year a 100% rise in the price of kerosene and a 49% rise in the price of petrol sparked off another student-led protest movement. Demonstrations were banned as the country went through its first elections since the military takeover. Anti-Tanaka protests
The elections were a farce. The de facto government party was Golkar, formally a "functional group" which "united" all occupational groups (including unions) and commanded the enforced support of all government employees, military and civilian. The opposition was a collection of small conservative parties. Intimidation and fraud were widespread.
In 1973, the government forcibly rationalised the opposition into two parties. The United Development Party (PPP), a forced amalgamation of Islamic Parties; and the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI), including all the rest. The only effective opposition took the form of more student-led riots against Chinese business and Japanese investments.
Various factions in the New Order regime began organising rival student groups in the leadup to a January 1974 visit by Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Among those involved were supporters of Kopkamtib head, General Sumitro, and Ali Murtopo's agents, who acted as provocateurs. Chinese business interests sought to encourage the students to turn their frustration against Japanese, rather than local Chinese, interests.
On the day of the visit, thousands of protesters marched through the streets,
strations were inspired by the worldwide wave of Islamic radicalism which began with the Iranian revolution in 1979. Unlike the Iranian Shiites, Indonesian Muslims are mostly Sunnis.
With about 90% of the population at least nominally Muslim, it is not surpris ing that Islamic values and ideals have a major influence on all the mass movements. The first-ever mass independence movement against Dutch rule was the preWorld War I Serikak Islam. (14)
After the 1982 elections Suharto announced that violence arose because "not all parties had accepted Pancasila as their sole political philosophy."
He also attacked the rise of violent crime in the cities. This was a natural consequence of the recession and the government's austerity drive. But his solution to both "problems" shocked many.
In 1983, hundreds of suspected criminals would be rounded up nightly by killer squads, dubbed "mysterious gunmen." The next day their mutilated bodies would be discovered in rivers or by roads. While the government did not admit responsibility, in rural areas the death squads did not trouble to disguise themselves - they were members of the police and armed forces.
The obvious intention was to terrorise the population and dissidents in particular, many of whom were threatened and assaulted. Even members of the elite Petition of 50 group were assaulted. 20
The main effect of this death squad activity was to rally support for the government from the sizeable small-trader and petty-capitalist sectors. These people had suffered most from the crime wave.
However, the government's plans to further "reorganise" the opposition parties probably offset any benefit it might have gained from the death squad activity.
The reorganisation forced both the PDI and the PPP to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophy. Thus Indonesia acquired three parties with the same platform. Their only formal differences are in their emblems. The PPP retains an image of the Ka'abah, the Islamic shrine in Mecca, while the PDI has the wild buffalo (a symbol with Sukarnoist origins).
At the same time, one of Suharto's trusted followers was made head of Golkar, which in turn adopted a more party-like structure. It may now become a training ground for New Order cadres.
The end result of these changes has been to close off the limited legitimate avenues of political activity. This may have contributed to the growing importance of mosques as centres for political activity.
The mosques are effectively the only places where people can and do gather and hear speeches. The army has tried to control this, without much success. Incidents such as Tandjung Priok only arouse more protest.
Working class and poor peasant congregations are led by local preachers. In
Indonesian riot police (D.R.)
addition, there are the muballigh, a corps of itinerant lay preachers. The chairperson of this corps is Syafruddin Prawiranegara, a well-known older-generation Islamic politician who is known to favour restoration of democratic rights.
The "pesantren", Islamic education centres which operate independently of the government, have also been centres of some ferment.
Indonesia may be approaching an important turning point. The pressure of the international capitalist recession has forced the military regime to rationalise itself to the limit. From here on, any further "savings" and cost cutting will have to be solely at the expense of workers and peasants who are already the poorest in the region.
But in the process of rationalising itself, the New Order regime has alienated many of its former supporters. The system built by Suharto and his financial and military supporters increasingly resembles the "crony capitalism" of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines.
A new generation of militants has emerged since the total destruction of workers' and peasants' organisations in 1965/66. These militants, together with disaffected sectors of the ruling class are now challenging the stability of the regime. To date no group has emerged as the clear political leadership of this opposition, and its politics remain in flux. 14. "Indonesia's Islamic Unrest" by Carmel Budiardjo, Inside Asia, November/December 1984.
International Viewpoint 25 March 1985
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