Choices for the Greens
After more than five hours of debate, the second federal conference of the Greens, meeting in Hamburg on December 8, decided not to seek to form a coalition with the Social Democrats on a federal level. The local, district and state organizations, on the other hand, were left the freedom to make their own choices about entering into coalitions. It was stated, moreover, that there was no need to make any decision about coalitions on the federal level.
Under the point on "Perspectives for the Greens," two line resolutions were put before the conference. The resolution of the Federal Leadership (Bahro and Trampert) called for "opposing the system." The other was proposed by the advocates of "Realpolitik" (Joshe realists, Cook a posite position in thee discussion toward the dealing between the Greens and the Social Democrats in the state of Hesse. They argued for a policy of gradual reforms to safeguard the environment, using the Social Democrats as a counterweight to the policy of the "Turn-Coalition" [the ruling rightwing coalition that wants to "turn" the country decisively to the right].
The so-called Fundamentalists, on the other hand, pointed out how little in the way of real reforms had been achieved in Hesse. They predicted that joining in a coalition with the Social Democrats would lead to coopting the Greens into the existing system.
Ás an alternative to the reformist policy of the "Realos," the "Fundis" argued for a clearer definition of the positions of the Greens, as the only real opposition, for a stronger party structure, and for increased involvement in extraparliamentary movements. But they did not show how a policy of radical opposition to the system could meet the need for unity felt by the SPD and Green voters.
In the voting, the Federal Leadership resolution got a majority of 330, with 280 against. The Realos then withdrew their own resolution and supported the "compromise" resolution, which was finally adopted by the conference over the resolution of the Federal Leadership.
The "compromise" called for no coalition on the federal level, but left the Green groups at the state and municipal levels a free hand in the matter. If the Realos had put their own resolution for a vote, they would have risked defeat.
Political suicide was committed at this conference by Rudolf Bahro, who fell prey to the tragic fate that has befallen many East European oppositionists in the West, who have lost their bearings and retreated into religious and mystical positions.
In a speech that lasted for hours, Bahro attacked even his own fundamentalist supporters personally, compared the rise of the Greens explicitly with that of the Nazis in the Weimar Republic, and projected the vision of "a God- or Goddess-centered country" as the perspective for the future.
The federal conference took its distance from Bahro subsequently in a statement rejecting his comparison of the Greens with the Nazis.
Another result of the conference was the election of a new Federal Leadership. Along with Rainer Trampert, it included the Franfurt fundamentalist Jutta
Ditfurth; the centrists Lukas Beckmann and Regina Michalik; Christa Wolf, who stood in the middle ground between the factions; and only one Realo, Norbert Kostede.
Klaus DRAEGER
The article below is from the December 6 issue of Was Tun, paper of the West German section of the Fourth International. It was written on the eve of the Greens' federal conference in Hamburg. Was Tun's introduction follows.
Can the Greens give passive support to SPD minority governments without surrendering their political independence? That question faces not only the Greens in the state of Hesse or the Green and Alternative Slate state organizations in West Berlin, the Saarland, and Nord-rhein-Westfalen, where conditions similar to those in Hesse may arise after the state elections next spring. This question also stands at the forefront in the Federal Delegate Conference of the Greens in Hamburg. Peter BARTELHEIMER
What is already on everyone's mind today is the political lineup that the pollsters consider likely in the 1987 elections for the federal parliament. That is, the Liberals (FDP) can no longer count on getting into parliament [i.e., they are seriously in danger of falling below the 5% threshold required for representation] 12 and thus on being able to give the "Turn" government a majority.
On the other hand, the SPD and the Greens together seem likely to come close to getting an absolute majority. The relations between the latter parties, therefore, are becoming a key political question.
For the first time since 1953 when the Communist Party, linked to the Ulbricht regime, was ousted from parlia ment and then banned in a climate of anti-Communism, a party to the left of the SPD has managed to establish itself as a parliamentary opposition and to force the Social Democrats, on their home ground of parliamentary politics, to confront the demands raised by broad social movements that challenge the system itself.
To be sure, the Greens have not been able to challenge the dominant role of the SPD as the traditional workers' party in the factories and in the trade unions. Nonetheless, the Greens remain the most active and the most critical section of society, in particular among the youth, and today the impact of these forces is far from being confined to the questions of defending the environment and peace. Their political activity is also increasingly determining the themes of critical discussions in the SPD and the unions.
Many of those who belong to the Greens or vote for them are open to a discussion of radical answers to the environmental, economic and social crisis. They are more ready to challenge capitalist and imperialist relationships of power. But at the same time they are looking for policies that can lead to concrete political changes here and now.
Today, the policies and program of the Greens can evolve in one of two directions. One road leads to a "neoreformism," of the sort that SPD lefts such as Peter von Oertzen talk about. This means the Greens becoming a mere "junior partner" of the SPD. The neoreformist tendency is being strengthened by the weight of thousands of elected officials in the municipalities, states and the federal
International Viewpoint 14 January 1985
parliament, the growing influence of the parliamentary fractions and the pressure for parliamentary collaboration with the SPD.
However, the possibilities remain for further discussion and programmatic clarification of anticapitalist conceptions.
The Green adepts of "Realpolitik" offer only the appearance of an answer to the felt need for a policy that can bring more and more pressure on the SPD for common action. Pressed by clever Social Democrats such as Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schroeder in the Saar and Lower Saxony to take "responsibility," the "Realos" argue for firm parliamentary alliances with the SPD and even Green participation in governments.
For example, Otto Schily and Waltraud Schoppe in the Green fraction in the federal parliament already see the Greens as a "reform party." And they have proposed a resolution corresponding to this orientation for the Hamburg Federal Delegate Conference. Moreover, Joschka Fischer wants to carry the policy of passive support [toleration] for the SPD government in Hesse further. From the failure of this experiment, he drew primarily the conclusion that in the future the Greens also have to have a direct, personal influence on the SPD state government.
Against this orientation, the "environmental socialists" and "naive" fundamentalists in the Green federal leadership have formed a bloc. Sacrificing programmatic clarity, this alliance is focused on a single point - rejecting both toleration of SPD governments and governmental alliances as "self-destructive."
Between these two positions are the great majority of the Greens, who want to continue the policy of tolerating SPD
RUNEN
International Viewpoint 14 January 1985 governments but are unsure or divided over how to carry out this policy and what the goals should be.
Both the SPD and Green voters expect both parties to use their parliamentary majority against the right (see box). If the Greens reject this demand for Red-Green unity, this will be taken advantage of by the "Turn" parties, as well as by the right-wing manipulators in the SPD and the class-collaborationist trade-union leaders.
Have not the head of the West Berlin SPD slate, Hans Apel, and the IG-Chemie president, Hermann Rappe, already called for parliamentary collaboration, or even a great coalition, between the SPD and the Christian Democrats?
In the interests of the social forces that stand in opposition to the "Turn" policy, the Greens should, therefore, make it clear that they are prepared to tolerate Social Democratic minority governments in the states, as well as at the federal level.
However, as much as the rejection of toleration of SPD minority governments would hurt the Greens, the central objection of those who advocate this line is equally weighty. That is, despite the Greens' electoral successes, it cannot be expected that the SPD will adopt a radically different policy than in the past, when SPD government chiefs Schmidt and Boerner politically pushed through such policies as blacklisting of radicals, cutbacks in social spending, deployment of missiles, and a line of favoring the interests of big business. And as long as this remains true, the Greens cannot take responsibility for the policies of any Social Democratic government.
Moreover, taking political responsibility does not begin with taking cabinet
A Greens' demonstration (DR) COMISO ITALTER posts. It starts with voting for a Social Democrat budget, such as the one in Hesse, which, while it made some concessions to the Greens' demands, involved continuing all the fundamental evils of procapitalist policies - inadequate social spending, gifts for the industrialists, money for the police and courts, and so on.
The central problem in the policy of toleration of SPD governments is not, however, just to make a radical verbal rejection of taking responsibility for capitalist policies once and for all. It is rather to clarify the reasons for this continually for the critical forces in the SPD and for the masses who vote for it.
The precondition for carrying out such a policy is a catalogue of clear and comprehensible demands that express the interests of active trade unionists, as well as of the peace movement, the citizens' initiative groups, the women's movement and immigrant workers.
This does not mean so much as complete as possible a catalogue of radical goals but rather demands that can serve as the focus for extraparliamentary mobilizations today and at the same time be "stepping stones to another pattern of development," that is, transitional demands. They could include a radical program against pollution, withdrawal of the new US missiles, immediate introduction of the 35-hour week, transferring industries to public ownership and alternative production.
Moreover, such a catalogue is not so much for any one-off negotiations with the SPD, which could only end in failure or rotten compromise, but rather for ongoing challenge to any "tolerated" SPD government. The specific demands have to be raised again and again, on the basis of mobilizations. of mobilizations.
Tolerating such an SPD minority government in no way means making a peace pact with it. The only thing it can expect is support against the right. For appropriations and laws serving the interests of capital, it will have to bear the sole responsibility. What is more, it has to be forced to seek the support of the bourgeois parties for these measures in a way that is clear for everyone.
The explosive power of such a program that is as radical as it is realistic could be enormous. In the SPD, it would push the unions that advocate a great coalition into sharp conflict with the critical forces, which on specific questions are more and more openly showing political sympathy for the radical demands of the Greens.
However, such a policy depends on the
Greens clarifying some basic questions — the role of the SPD as a bourgeois workers' party, the relationship between parliamentary work and extraparliamentary struggle, and the concrete content of both an environmentalist and socialist program.
The debate over this will be prolonged.
It must involve all forces that are looking not for some "neoreformism" but for a • social alternative.
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ICRACHI OTATE ISRAELI STATE.