INDIA-
The threat of Hindu communalism The Indian people will go to the polls on December 24, after what has been one of the worst outbreaks of communalist violence in the country's history, following the death of Indira Gandhi.
The new prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, declared the elections for that date in order to cash in on the sympathy vote. It can be confidently predicted that the Congress (I) Party will achieve a comfortable majority of the seats. A swing of between 6 to 10 per cent would give them a landslide.
It is unlikely that the honeymoon period with the new government will last long. The basic problems of Indian society will not be solved by the new regime and the communal card will be used by this government as it was under the last. All the tensions and pressures which have created an endemic political crisis of the Indian state will rapidly resurface.
The death and destruction which followed the assassination of Mrs Gandhi, in which over 1,000 people lost their lives, showed up very clearly the role of Hindu communalism which has been whipped up against the minority populations. And yet there were many incidents of Hindu-Sikh cooperation also. Out of a population of 730 million, Hindus form 80 per cent. In the following article our correspondent describes the situation in the country and gives a first response to the tragic events that have taken place.
began to go on a rampage. Sikh taxi stands and drivers were assaulted as impromptu road blocks were set up, shops looted and burnt, and their houses in various parts of south Delhi similarly assaulted. Sikh passengers pulled out of buses had their turbans set alight and replaced on their heads, others were beaten up and in many cases doused with petrol and burnt alive. In a few isolated cases even women were not spared.
By the afternoon of November 1, the rioting, killing, arson and looting had spread to all parts of Delhi, not just the wealthy housing estates of the south which had been the initial battleground. News of similar acts, though on a lesser scale, began to come in from other states like Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Jammu, Kashmir and West Bengal. The killings were much more limited in the last two states. Trains travelling in the north, west and central parts of the country were stopped at and between stations by organised hoodlums and spontaneously embittered villagers, to pull out Sikhs and murder them.
At the same time there were innumerable instances of Hindu fellow passengers in trains hiding Sikhs at risk to their own lives and of Hindu neighbours on housing estates doing the same. This was the one bright spot in a saga of brutal communal and politically motivated violence. Had it not been for such humanistic solidarity, the death toll would undoubtedly have been higher. It was only in the late afternoon or evening of November 1 that the government decided to call in the army to restore order in the capital and up and down the country. This was a criminal delay since actual deployment and properly organised patrolling in riot-affected areas would take another one to two days. This was particularly true of the capital and its immediate environs which in normal peacetime has no significant army presence in or around it. Divide and rule
Why this delay? First, the civilian authority hesitated to publicly declare its inadequacy and inability to control events by calling in the army. Secondly, the funeral of Mrs Gandhi was deliberately staged so as to become an international media event with the attendance of all sorts of foreign dignitaries. Too much emphasis on the need for army rule in the capital might have dissuaded many foreign visitors from coming. In fact, the decision to hold Mrs Gandhi's funeral three days after her death instead of immediately within a day was unforgivable creating as it did unnecessary tension as she lay in state.
Calling in of the army early on was made all the more imperative because of 1. In 1947, at the time of the collapse of British rule in India, a partition of the country was created along religious lines. There was a Muslim majority in Pakistan.
International Viewpoint 24 December 1984
M. NAVID
At 9:16 a.m. on the morning of October 31, two Sikh security guards pumped 16 bullets into the body of the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, as she was making her way from her residence in Safdarjung Road, Delhi to the adjacent lawns of her office where she was to be interviewed by the British actor Peter Ustinov and his television crew. Her bullet-ridden body was taken to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences where the doctors fought an ultimately futile battle to save her life. She died the same afternoon at 2:23 p.m.
Gandhi's assailants had clearly acted in retaliation for "Operation Bluestar," the army assault on the Golden Temple on June 3 which resulted in the death of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and many of his closest supporters who had turned the holiest of Sikh shrines into a fortress. In addition, extensive damage was done to the Akal Takth, the temporal seat of the five high priests who constitute the highest body of spiritual and religious authority for the Sikh community. Most ordinary Sikhs were justifiably embittered by this assault.
But if "Operation Bluestar" was an avoidable tragedy which only compounded the alienation of Sikhs from the government and the majority of Hindus who had supported the action, this act of revenge was yet another tragic mistake which, as events soon confirmed, was to drive a deeper wedge between Sikhs and the rest of the nation.
What followed was the politically most serious communal riot and carnage since 8 the Partition of 1947. (1) The politics of assassination are rarely, if ever, the way to resolve basic political and social problems. All too often such actions prove to be politically counter-productive in the extreme. For this, if for no other reason, Mrs Gandhi's assassination has to be strongly condemned. The political repercussions of such an act should have been apparent to anyone with a modicum of political sensibility. Indeed it is possible that the assailants did not act merely out of short-sighted revenge, but as part of a wider conspiracy which was well aware of the likely consequences and which sought to precipitate just the kind of situation that was to develop.
In any event, the question of motivation and possible conspiracy is of secondary importance to the objective impact of the assassination, immediate as well as long-term. The announcement of Mrs Gandhi's death on the afternoon of October 3lewas met with genuine and widespread grief throughout the country. The response of the Sikh community was more complex. If many Sikhs in Punjab welcomed the news of her death, most of those outside Punjab were subdued in their responses out of fear of the possible reaction because the assassins were Sikhs. If some Sikhs (including a few expatriates) openly celebrated her demise, this number was wildly exaggerated and became grist for the rumour mills and justification for the unjustifiable and obscene acts that were to follow.
Starting in and around the area where Mrs Gandhi was hospitalised, mobs of young males - lumpens, right-wing students, sons of shopkeepers and others
the Gujars and Jat villagers. But even this meagre commitment was often not kept to. The urban poor were then allowed by the government to build their small dwellings on this land. Owing to skilful manipulation by Congress politicians it was these settlers rather than the government that became the focus of resentment by villagers.
Thus, instead of the urban poor and the villagers uniting against the government, they have long been divided against each created extremely fertile ground for the communal carnage of the first days of
November which on occasion also affected some Hindu households.
say the worst carnage took place when the army was supposed to be already deployed and patrolling in the trans-Yamuna
The relief camps that sprung up were almost entirely located in the two worst hit areas of the capital - west and east
Delhi - particularly the latter. If the official figures of total deaths in Delhi are around 700 (1,300 throughout the country), the unofficial and more realistic death count in Delhi is between 1,800 to 2,000 deaths, possibly more, and around 50,000 people displaced in the
Most of the displaced persons took refuge in hastily set up refugee camps where a large part of the administrative responsibilities fell into the hands voluntary relief agencies (Mother Teresa,
Oxfam, etc.) and citizens' groups which
Rajiv Gandhi at his mother's funeral (DR)
had been formed during the riots.
all the government was capable of doing the complete failure of the capital's those days, did manage to escape relawas providing essential food and medical metropolitan police force to limit, let tively unscathed with no damage to life alone stop, the rioting. Out of a 30,000-
But without adequate adminsupplies.
and little or none to property.
istration the situation was little short of strong police force, 6,000 were on leave.
chaotic in many of the camps. Thus the the percentage and numbers of Sikhs
Furthermore all Sikh policemen (another in Shanadra with about were much less, each and every Sikh famlarge
6,000) were removed from active duty.
camp
10,000 people soon became a serious
This was a major mistake, for the Delhi ily was affected by the rioting in one health hazard. Inequitable distribution of terrible way or the other. Overall it was police force were either passive spectathe poorest of the Sikhs who suffered necessities added to the tension, and tors to what was going on or else active collaborators with the rioters, looters, government pressure on families to return most from the violent aftermath of Mrs to their homes when they continued to arsonists and murderers. The Sikh police
Gandhi's assassination.
protect themselves with or without the feel insecure hardly helped.
Even the contingent if judiciously used in mixed payment of the paltry compensation of patrols and large groupings, would have help of Hindu neighbours was gravely
10,000 rupees (about £700) for each been the one arm that would have genlimited by the ruthless and calculated ordeath suffered by a family or 5,000 uinely sought to control the destruction ganisation of murder by these Congress rupees (about £350) for property damage
(I) leaders and their goon gangs in the and mayhem.
was made contingent on families return-
If in the early phase (October 31 to party. For the first time rape and moling to their homes.
estation of Sikh women became a feature the evening of November 1) there was a strong element of spontaneity and class
By now those affected by the riots are of the rioting.
slowly picking up the pieces. of war (the looters were invariably from the
But the Congress (I) goons would not previous existence and patching them up resettlement villages which surround alon theirown have been able to cause such into some sort of pattern because life
They acted also as most every middle and upper-middle class immense damage.
"Normality" of a kind is the vital instigators and organisers of the housing estate in New Delhi), the submust go on.
sequent escalation of violence was almost
Gujars (shepherds who are responsible for slowly returning.
sense nothing now can ever be entirely organised by second rank leaders of the capital's milk and dairy
"normal" for these families or indeed for needs) and Jats from Haryana who live of the ruling Congress (1).
India as a whole. The political implicain the resettlement villages adjacent to
If in the rest of north and central tions of what has happened are nothing the houses of the urban poor in the trans-
India things were staggering back to nor-
It would be absoshort of profound.
Yamuna area.
The Congress goons were mal by November 2, in Delhi the worst lutely no exaggeration to say that the able to mobilise them because of factors carnage was still to come. The scenes of assassination of Mrs Gandhi and the comwhich had little to do with religious or violence now shifted to east Delhi to munal carnage that it triggered off conlike Shahadra, Trilokpuri and communal passions, or even with anger stitute the most serious crisis of Indian at Mrs Gandhi's death. Originally most of
Kalyanpuri where the poorer sections of society in the post-independence period.
the land across the Yamuna which now
Delhi's population live, whether Hindu,
It represents a qualitative leap in the de-
- houses the urban poor (Sikhs and Hin-
Muslim or Sikh.
secularisation of Indian society and of the dus) had belonged to the villagers.
This
Delhi the numbers and proportion of
The secularism of the Indian state land was acquired by the government many Sikh families,
Sikhs are greater, has always been deeply flawed and with minimum compensation promised to apart from the psychological trauma of
9
International Viewpoint 24 December 1984
weaker than than that of the society as a whole, but its deterioration in this whole sense has now been sharply accelerated.
Communalism represents the biggest threat to the body politic not only because it means greater repression of minorities, but because it accelerates the tendencies towards a break up of the nation, and of the drift towards a
"strong," more authoritarian state, thus undermining the bourgeois democratic character of Indian society. Even if this does not immediately result in a generalised authoritarian system of rule, it does mean the extension of selective repression, growing enclaves of striet military control and administration (e.g.
Punjab today) and systematic erosion of various democratic rights, through legislative enactments.
But it is the directly communal consequences and implications that are the most serious. The chances of a future carnage and massacre of Sikhs not necessarily through communal riots, but through direct repression by the state is now frighteningly high. Such a carnage would be on a scale as to make what happened already look like a picnic. The complex of factors leading to such a terrible outcome have now achieved a powerful dynamic.
The alienation of the ordinary Sikh and Hindu from each other is now deeper than ever before and this in spite of the fact that the bonds that link Hindus and Sikhs in everyday life are deeper and more complex than those between Hindus and Muslims. This closeness, for example, has not prevented carnage on a scale which rivals, even though it does not exceed, the scale of the worst riots that have taken place between Hindus and Muslims since independence. Attitudes entrenched
Indeed, the Hindu-Sikh problem is today more acute and dangerous in its implications than the Hindu-Muslim conflict. For one thing, the Muslim population is much greater, around 13%, and it is dispersed in significant concentrations throughout the country. Sikhs by contrast are less than 2% of the population and barely outnumber Hindus in their home state of Punjab. Elsewhere they are an even more insignificant minority and are also much more dispersed. Their capacity to unite and resist communal assaults outside Punjab is limited.
There is another important reason why the Hindu-Sikh conflict today constitutes a more serious phenomenon than the Hindu-Muslim communal conflict. The ultimate logic of minority communalism (Sikh or Muslim) leads to separatism (Khalistan [the demand for a separate Sikh state] or Pakistan). But Pakistan has already come into existence. The worst riots between Hindus and Muslims were associated with Partition. Subsequent Hindu-Muslim riots have never come close to that scale of horror and carnage. Indeed, many of the Hindu10
Muslim riots of recent years can be at- of Bhindranwale or from the deliberate tributed to the problems created by increasing integration (2) of Muslims into
Indian society, such as growing economic competition between sections of the two communities. The logic of growing Sikh communalism, a newer phenomenon is, however, Khalistan and this adds a nattional and more dangerous and frightening dimension to the Hindu-Sikh problem.
The ground for communal carnage in the future has been made more fertie by the spread of communal attitudes among the ordinary Sikh and Hindu. Recent events have added their own significant impetus. It is important to understand that one can be sincerely against communal riots and still be communal or harbour many communal attitudes. The same Sikh or Hindu who would never dream of killing someone - indeed, who goes out of their way to protect their neighbour — can still contribute to a general climate of opinion which greatly facilitates communal leaders, lumpens or insecure youths of the middle and lower classes who perceive participation in riots as an effective expression of frustrations which have other more fundamental causes.
Thus the ordinary Hindu in north India who may shake their head at the "excessive" massacre of Sikhs and indeed have protected their Sikh neighbour can also feel that to some extent "Sikhs deserved what they got for killing our prime minister." Or that "we Hindus have been tolerant for too long. We have been pushed around too much. Look at what Bhindranwale did to Hindus in Punjab and where were the majority of Sikhs then? It's time they got a taste of their own medicine. Maybe secularism is not worth it and we are better off having a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu state)."
There is, of course, no rational basis for such feelings. But they are as deep and as widespread as they are because such attitudes feed and flourish on a partial and selective vision of events and society. Thus, the fact that Bhindranwale killed almost as many Sikhs as Hindus in Punjab, or that he never succeeded in provoking indiscriminate mob violence against Hindus is forgotten. The idea that the Hindu giant (85% of the population) can ever be "pushed around" is frankly absurd. Indeed the ultimate logic of majority eommunalism (Hindu communalism) is in a sense more dangerous because it leads not to separation, but to the massive repression and domination of the minorities.
The ordinary Sikhs outside of Punjab feel more insecure than ever before. Their bitterness towards the central government and its failure to prevent or control the rioting is deeper than ever, justifiably so. But their communalist attitude expresses itself in an unwillingness to condemn their own communal organisations and leaders with the same force, or to reflect in a way which can recognise and acknowledge the failure of the Sikh masses to strongly dissociate themselves from the murderous tactics communal politics of the Akali Dal which has organised the Morcha (movement) in Punjab.
In sum, communal attitudes among both Sikhs and Hindus are more deeply entrenched and widespread than ever before. It is in the nature of communalism that it should make religion the most important unifying factor when in an objective sense it is not and cannot ever be.
Class, caste, regional and ethnic loyalties are generally much more important because they correspond much more closely to common objective needs. Sikh, Hindu and Muslim workers have much more in common with each other than each of them has with their co-religionists of a higher class or caste. Yet it is the success of communalism that such fundamental differences should become subsumed under a false sense of religious unity.
Hindu 'Rashtra'?
The beneficiaries of such a development in India today are the active and conscious communal forces among Sikhs and Hindus. The false, unattainable and unjustifiable goal of Khalistan will not attract greater support among Sikhs. Such an objective cannot be supported by revolutionaries because Sikhs do not constitute a nationality let alone an oppres sed nationality. Nor, despite their very real secular and to a more limited extent, religious grievances, has Sikhism been an oppressed religion. Khalistan must not be supported, not because "Indian unity" is some mythical ideal that must be preserved but because Khalistan does not correspond to the objective interests of the oppressed classes among Sikhs. Furthermore, it is simply not attainable. The Indian state is too powerful and will not ultimately hesitate to unleash the most brutal repression of Sikhs to "preserve the Indian union." Nor, contrary to the expectations of many Khalistanis will Pakistan commit suicide; that is, go to war with the powerful Indian state in order to help Sikhs carve out a Khalistan. Islamabad is not above utilising the Hindu-Sikh divide for its own purposes and in order to make things difficult for New Delhi. But there is a definite limit to their support to Khalistanis.
On the other side, the idea of a "Hindu Rashtra," the goal long propagated by the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh - National Volunteer Corps), one of the strongest and most deeply rooted of Hindu communal forces, will now have correspondingly greater resonance among the Hindus of north and central India, parts of western India and among Brahmins elsewhere. (3) 2. See International Viewpoint, No 60, October 1, 1984. 3. The RSS was established in 1926, and was an organisation designed to provide the shock troops for Hindu communalism. The RSS or ganised systematic attacks on Muslims and carried out acts of arson and sabotage designed to demoralise the minority community.
International Viewpoint 24 December 1984
The momentum of migration of Sikhs to and Hindus out of Punjab is growing. This is an extremely dangerous development because if it gathers force, it will lead to a de facto Khalistan-type situation which will then provoke the government into an all-out effort to forcibly subordinate Punjab and reduce its "independence" from the rest of India, that is physically repress Sikhs. Even before the latest riots there had been a steady trickle of Hindus leaving Punjab. They have more reason today to feel insecure because of the expectation of a "Sikh backlash" at some time in the future.
Today Sikhs outside Punjab have been shaken as never before. Their sense of being a vulnerable minority is stronger than ever before. To be among "their own kind" in Punjab must seem the logical and natural thing to do, the "safer" alternative at least for each individual Sikh family, even if the collective outcome of such accumulated individual migrations would prove disastrous for Sikhs as a whole in Punjab.
Although there was no immediate "Sikh backlash" in Punjab after the recent riots, as news begins to circulate among Punjab's Sikhs of what has happened elsewhere (Punjab is under army rule with tight censorship) the alienation and resentment between the two comunities will grow, only tempered by the fact that some Hindus also went out of their way to save many Sikhs. The "Sikh backlash" in Punjab, when it comes, is not likely to take the form of Sikh mobs on indiscriminate rampage against Punjabi Hindus, but the form of an escalation of terrorist killings of individuals. If in fact the former were to occur, the consequences can easily be imagined. Even individual terrorist killings might be sufficient to initiate a pattern of future Hindu-Sikh riots that parallels the Hindu-Muslim situation. The events of October 31 to November 4 mark the first time in the history of Hindu-Sikh relations that there has been such mob violence and rioting.
The Sikh community has no leadership capable of stemming the rising tide of communalism. The leaders of the Akali Dal (4) have proved themselves utterly bankrupt in the recent crisis. The top-ranking leaders, although in prison following "Operation Bluestar," could have issued statements from prison condemning the assassination of Mrs Gandhi, dissociating Sikhs as a community from the act of two misguided individuals, calling on the government to fulfil its responsibilities to protect Sikhs and assuring it of its full support in this task during this period of acute crisis, and called on the Sikhs in Punjab to refrain at all costs from any retaliation. Instead, this leadership did nothing. It remained silent.
In their absence, effective leadership of the Sikhs has been in the hands of the principal religious leaders, the five high priests of the Akal Takth in the Golden Temple. One of the more positive outcomes of the recent riots has been the International Viewpoint 24 December 1984
UNDERTAKING
Rioting Hindus in the Punjab earlier this year (DR)
sharp disillusionment among Sikhs outside Punjab with this leadership for their shameful and criminal role during the crisis. Jathedar Kripal Singh, the head priest, first issued a statement condemning the murder of Mrs Gandhi and then soon after retracted this statement "clarifying" that while the assassination was a tragedy he neither condemned nor supported it. Furthermore these leaders indulged in absurd politicking (which could have been left to later) at a time when the most urgent need was to save Sikh lives by cooling tensions and bringing the rioting to a halt, by demanding that the government fulfil its responsibilities and assuring it of all support in this task from the Sikh community at this juncture.
Today the leadership of the Sikh community is in a complete mess. It is unable to provide any perspective of what to do in Punjab or of how to stop the growing dynamic which is polarising the two communities, the migration in and out of Punjab, and all the other factors which presage a possible massacre of Sikhs in the not too distant future.
On the other side of the communal fence, Hindu communalism has become more powerful than ever. Despite the much more aggressive and overt communal ideology of the RSS and its political front organisation, the BJP (the Bharantija danata Party) and the basic communal perspectives of the other bourgeois opposition parties, it is the ruling Congress (I) that is the driving force of Hindu communalism today. This is something that traditional leftists (the CPI, the Communist Party of India, and the CPM, the Communist PartyMarxist (5) ), have failed or refused to grasp. There are obvious distinctions to be made between the RSS-BJP which talks overtly in terms of a Hindu Rashtra, and the Congress (I) which maintains the language of secularism and nationalism. Nevertheless, the Congress (I), simply by virtue of holding power at the level of central government and in the various states, represents a greater actual danger than the potential danger of a "Hindu fascism" as embodied by the RSS-BJP.
Thus, in the Bhiwandi riots of May-June 1984 in Bombay (6) the massacre of Muslims was largely the responsibility of the Shiv Sena and the Congress (I), not the RSS. Today it would be impossible to convince any Sikh and understandably so, that while the RSS is communal the Congress is essentially secular - not when the organisation of the recent carnage was undertaken by Congress (I) leaders. What is more, these murderers in the Congress (1) party will not be brought to book or punished by the coterie of top leaders surrounding the new prime minister and head of the party, Rajiv Gandhi. At best these murderers may be denied a ticket for the coming elections. Rajiv Gandhi and his club of "computer boys" are even less capable than Mrs Gandhi of overhauling and cleaning the party of its criminal and lumpen elements. She at least was able to establish a long-term personal dominance within the party that the new prime minister has yet to emulate. Indeed, the deepening communalism of the Congress (I) has to be justified, endorsed and covered up. Thus, Rajiv Gandhi, in his maiden public speech as prime minister, indirectly condoned the communal outbreak when he declared, regarding the death of his mother, that when a giant falls there are bound to be tremors. It is also, above all, the Congress (I) which can provide Hindu communalism with the most effective garb of nationalism. Thus a future massacre of Sikhs in Punjab would be justified as necessary in order to prevent the emergence of Khalistan and to preserve the "unity and integrity of the nation." 4. Akali Dal, founded in 1920, is a party composed essentially of Sikhs. 5. The Communist Party of India was founded in 1928. The Sino-Soviet split in 1961 created different factions inside the party. An important section of the base left to form the CPI-M. 6. See IV, No 57, July 16, 1984.
11
He was followed on the same platform by another Congress (I) leader who launched - obviously with official approval — a tirade against the recently published finding of two Delhi based civil liberties organisations which accused by name a number of Congress (I) leaders of organising and fomenting the riots.
It is precisely this growing communal character of the Congress (I) that has created a dilemma for organisations like the RSS which now have an extremely ambivalent attitude towards the Congress (I). On the one hand the RSS can have no quarrel with the Congress's increasingly communal orientation and practice, which indeed they endorse and support. On the other hand, support for the Congress (I) weakens its own front organisation, the BJP, in which there is already a conflict between the "liberal" minority led by Atal B. Vajpayee which wants the BJP to dilute its strongly Hindu ideology in favour of a more "national" image, and the majority which sees the bonds tying the BJP to the RSS as indissoluble.
But the fact remains that the RSS is increasingly lending its support to the Congress (I), further testimony, if it were needed, of the "vanguard" communal role played by the Congress (I) today. The RSS attitude to the recent riots expressed another ambivalence. The RSS did not condone the riots but opposed them, declaring that Sikhs were in fact an integral part of the Hindu faith and historically its frontier guards for a 1,000 years. This is historically inaccurate; in fact, Sikhism emerged in the middle of the fifteenth century.
However, the point is that the RSS preferred to adopt a more subtle communalism denying the separate religious identity of Sikhs. Why this approach? In effect the Pan-Hindu ideal of the RSS pushes it to try and incorporate minorities like the Sikhs, Buddhists, Sindhis even as it excludes the biggest minority, the Muslims. Were its pan-Hindu ideal to exclude Sikhs then this would undermine another of its principal goals - an "Akhand Bharat" or an Undivided India. While Muslims can theoretically be packed off to Pakistan, where would the Sikhs go if they are to be excluded from a Hindu Rashtra?
Nevertheless, the RSS can be satisfied that the idea of a Hindu Rashtra enjoys increasingly greater popularity. It is of course no solution. Indeed this growing pressure must be strongly combatted. A Hindu Rashtra solves none of the fundamental problems of poverty and social and political inequality. It would not only be fatal for the minorities like Sikhs, Muslims and Christians that make up 15% of the population, but disastrous for Hindus themselves. Quite apart from the fact that the oppressed classes and castes among Hindus would gain nothing, such an outcome would greatly accelerate centrifugal tendencies leading to the break up of the country.
For a Hindu Rashtra would mean in effect the dominance of the Hindi speaking north over the rest of India, a pros12 pect that would then be resisted with inreasing ferocity by its regional victims. It is worth noting in this respect that the recent riots and certainly the killings of Sikhs were essentially confined to the Hindi speaking heartland of India though the grief over Mrs Gandhi's death was nationwide.
The example of non-secular Pakistan is a salutory one. An Islamic, avowedly non-secular Pakistan as it was created in 1947 meant in effect the dominance of the Punjabi speaking part of west Pakistan. Which in turn led to the break away of Bengali east Pakistan in 1971 and to growing hostility and resistance of Sind and Baluchi counter-nationalism in the west. A Hindu Rashtra would be the prelude to the balkanisation of India. Anti-communal front
Objectively speaking, the increasing communalisation of Indian society and of the state represents the single greatest danger facing the country. Combatting this communalism is the major priority for this period in Indian history. How is it to be done?
There is not a single bourgeois political force that can claim to be essentially secular and non-communal let alone anticommunal. The communist left, the CPI and CPM although not above playing communal politics as part of the electoral game are fundamentally secular. But their ability to present themselves as an alternative pole in the struggle against communalism is decisively vitiated by their adherence to the view that the ruling Congress (I) for all its "authoritarianism" is a secular alternative to the communal RSS-BJP.
This stems partly from their misguided understanding of the role of the Congress during the national freedom movement, and partly from their assumption that the national bourgeoisie is secular, and it is above all the Congress (1) that represents this national bourgeoisie. It fails to realise that this national bourgeoisie is principally committed to preserving the national market, that is the nation, and in the face of a Sikh communalism gravitating towards Khalistan will fully endorse a communal onslaught against Sikhs by the "secular" ruling party in order to *preserve the nation." The CPI and CPM perspective can condone and justify such an outcome; it can do nothing to prevent it.
Thus both the CPI and CPM mourned the death of Mrs Gandhi as the passing away of a truly nationalist and secular figure willing to stand up to internally destabilising forces like the Khalistanis who are aided and abetted by foreign reactionary forces, for example American imperialism whose most courageous and principled opponent on the world scale is of course the Soviet Union, to which both parties are now very close. Incidentally, the USSR has been consistently putting pressure on the CPI and CPM to support the "progressive" Congress (I).
The CPI and CPM are unable or unwilling to recognise that the real danger comes not from the possibility of a Khalistan emerging, but of a genocide of Sikhs in Punjab by the Indian state as communal forces on both sides become strengthened and the two communities polarised.
Thus the CPI and CPM hailed the "smoothness" of the changeover in Congress and government leadership and committed itself to strengthening the forces standing for "the unity and integrity" of the country, even as it seeks to electorally oppose the Congress (I) in the coming elections.
All of which makes the task of setting up a nationwide anti-communal front which opposes the communalism of all bourgeois parties absolutely vital. This is something that will have to be built from scratch through the coming together of individuals and groups able to recognise the acute communal danger and the absence of any political force capable of combatting it effectively.
Such a front (initial efforts have been launched in places like Delhi and Bombay) must necessarily be independent of existing political parties, including the CPI and CPM. It must develop a programme which provides hope and perspectives to minorities like the Sikhs and Muslims. Such a front must demand that the murderers of the Congress (I) be brought to trial and punished (the Congress (I) has ordered a major probe into the assassination of Mrs Gandhi but not into the behaviour of its own members and leaders during the recent riots). Only this will serve to reassure the Sikh community somewhat and to expose to a larger audience the fact that the Congress (I) is the driving force of Hindu communalism.
Such a front must vigorously oppose the Khalistanis and the Akali Dal brand of Sikh communalism. It must vigorously oppose other Hindu and Muslim communal organisations. It must point out the dangers inherent in the concept of Hindu Rashtra. It must oppose the growing trend of migration in and out of Punjab. It must oppose the government's systematic and conscious attempt to reduce the numbers and proportion of Sikhs in the police and armed forces. It must challenge the flawed official secularist ideology inherited from the national movement which does not sufficiently separate affairs of religion from affairs of the state.
Such a front must concretise specific demands around each one of these perspectives and agitate vigorously around them. Only such a many-sided and collective opposition to all communalisms can offer the promise of a better future and a leap backward from impending insanity. The creation of such a front is the prime responsibility of this period and must be undertaken by «ll radical, progressive and revolutionary forces in the country. The Inquilabi Communist Sangathan, the Indian section of the Fourth International, commits itself firmly to this endeavour.
International Viewpoint 24 December 1984
POLAND ROLAND