The spectre of a Red-Green alliance 19mAn A spectre is haunting West Germany, the spectre of "Red-Green Chaos." Up and down the country, politicians from the ruling Christian Democratic Party are trying to stem the decline in their vote in state and municipal elections by raising the spectre of a Red-Green alliance that would take the country out of Nato and throw the economy into chaos.
So far, however, all the machinations of the capitalist parties have proved rather counterproductive. In the recent state and municipal elections, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) has generally been able to hold its previous vote or increase it a bit, and the Greens have made clear advances. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats have lost, and their coalition partner, the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) has been able only very seldom to get over the 5 percent threshold required for representation.
In view of the fading of the FDP, it seems more and more doubttul that the Christian Democrat-FDP coalition can win a majority in the 1987 elections. Moreover, it seems quite realistic to expect that the FDP may disappear altogether from the next parliament. Therefore, given the growth in the camp of the SPD and the Greens, there is a growing dispolitical favors (such as codetermination rules in the interests of management in the factories). If the investigating committee comes out with any more revelations about involvement of the chancellor in this bribery scandal, it could lead to the worst crisis yet for the Christian Democrat-FDP coalition.
The coalition government's continual failure to do anything effective to fight unemployment or protect the environment and its awkwardness in handling the Flick affair, as well as its failure on other issues, have led to a marked decline in the vote for the coalition parties in the state and local elections.
Despite its constant attempts to project a profile of its own, distinet even from the Christian Democrats, the FDP has to fear today even for its survival as a parliamentary party. Today, its vote is running between 2% and 4%. It is in danger of being squeezed out in the polarization between the Christian Democrats and the SPD. Its conservatively inclined voters see their interests being advanced just as well by the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, the FDP voters who remain nostalgic for the social-liberal coaltion [between the FDP and the SPD] are going over to the SPD or even to the Greens. Capitalists' choice
Facing such gloomy prospects, the West German capitalists today have four equally dubious options for keeping their coalition in a position to run the country:
— Since an overall majority for the Christian Democrats is unlikely, the FDP would have to be "lent" votes in order to get over the 5% barrier. This, however, could lead to something like what happened in the Hessen state parliament elections in 1983, where the Christian Democrats and the FDP together totaled exactly the same number of votes as the Christian Democrats had got by themselves before.
- Or the Christian Democrats might aim for a great coalition with the SPD. This would have the advantage that it would so weaken the SPD that it might even lead to a split. On the other hand, it would bring a dramatic increase in the strength of the Greens, sharper polarization and extraparliamentary mobilizations.
- Or they might change the electoral law. But after the bribery scandals, this would touch off an explosion of indignation and extraparliamentary mobilizations.
- Finally, they might let the CSU (1) run throughout the country. In this way they could hope to attract the ultra1. There are two Christian Democratic parties in West Germany combined in a sort of federal structure. The Social Christian Union led by Franz-Josef Strauss is a Bavarian party and inclined toward the ultraright. The Christian Democratic Union, which operates in the rest of West Germany, is a more respectable bourgeois conservative party. - IV.
International Viewpoint 26 November 1984 cussion about an electoral alternative Klaus DRAEGER
Since it took office in 1983, the Kohl/Genscher government has lost a lot of its credibility. After the deployment of the Pershing II missiles against the will of the great majority of the population -which produced the first deep crack in the "consensus of democrats" - after the disillusion of broad layers of voters created by the government's brutal austerity policy and its lining up hard on the side of the bosses in the 35-hour week struggle, the Flick payoff scandal has been slowly but surely undermining the credibility of parliamentary democracy as such.
Already in the period leading up to the strikes for the 35-hour week, former minister of the economy, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, was obliged to resign his post because he had granted the Flick concern tax breaks worth billions of German marks in return for contributions to the FDP. In the context of these revelations, it also came to light that the FDP's slide from a coalition with the SPD to one with the Christian Democrats was greased with Flick money, and that this operation was prepared over a long period. Likewise, the information that came out in connection with the resignation of the parliamentary chairperson, Rainer Barzel, a Christian Democrat, reads like a Marxist textbook example of the way that the big companies manipualte parliamentary democracy under late capitalism.
The public debate over the new revelations in the Flick payoff case was launched by a rather brutal remark by Juergen Reents, a Green member of parliament with socialist views. He said, "the road to the top of his party [for 22 in 1987. Petra Kelly, Greens Party leader (DR) Chancellör Kohl] was smoothed by Flick's money." For this remark, Reents was barred from parliament for five days by the assembly chairperson, Richard Stuecklen, a Christian Democrat. Then the avalanche started to roll.
Today, it is clear that Rainer Barzel got 1.7 million German marks from Flick to sweeten his resignation from the post of chairperson of the Christian Democratic Union in 1973. Kohl then stepped into Barzel's place. It is also clear that the chairperson of the Christian Social Union, Franz-Josef Strauss got 1.25 mil lion German marks; Foreign Minister Genscher of the FDP, 1.15 million marks, and that even Chancellor Kohl got 650,000 marks from Flick in return for
right vote on the one side, and at the same time present a more moderate face through the CDU, and thereby prevent any swing by their voters to the SPD. This would create, however, major subjective problems in the coalition and in the two Christian Democratic parties themselves. In fact, in 1980, after proLonged wrangling, this proposal never got past the starting post.
The debate over which path to take will certainly flare up again and more hotly after the state parliament elections in the biggest of the West German states, Nordrhein-Westfalen, in the spring of 1985. So far, the bourgeois camp seems to be in a quandary.
In the camp of the opposition parties, the Greens have so far been the main gainers from the government's crisis. This started in the state parliament election in Baden-Wuerttemberg in April 1984, where they got 8% of the vote. Then they scored important gains, 3% to 4% on the average, in the European elections and in various local elections, getting 5.4% in Rheinland-Pfalz, 5.3% in the Saarland and 9.3% in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
The Greens have also managed to extend their influence among industrial workers, where their vote hitherto had corresponded to their general average, that is, 5% to 7%. In the local elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen, and in particular in the cities of the Ruhr, they got above their average. For example, in Dortmund, they got 10.7%, and 12.5% in Muehlheim/Ruhr. Their average in these local elections for the state as a whole was 9.3%. Governmental alternative
In opposition, the SPD has not been able to garner much new support. And what it gained from the Christian Democrats on its right has been almost entirely cancelled out by what it has lost on its left to the Greens. With an indecisive policy, continually hopping from one foot to another, the SPD has not been able to gain much credibility. For example, it opposes deployment of the new missiles but accepts conventional armament and Nato. It is for shortening the workweek, but couples this with an austerity policy and wage reductions.
In the local elections in NordrheinWestfalen, the SPD did emerge as the strongest party, with 42.5% of the vote. But it lost about 250,000 votes to the Greens. In the Baden Wuerttemberg state parliament elections, with 32.5%, it kept its vote at the 1980 level. But in the European elections, it lost 3.6%.
While it is becoming clearer and clearer that the government coalition is in danger of losing its majority, the SPD is not heading toward an overall majority. So, intense discussion has begun both in the SPD and the Greens, but especially in the latter, about a governmental alternative. International Viewpoint 26 November 1984
The SPD is trying to dance around the issue. The majority position is to present "touchstones" for collaboration with other parties, without committing the party to any definite coalition option. Its four touchstones include the following points:
"Disarmament, reduction of arms expenditures and a policy of detente, based on a democratic army and integration in Nato.
"A fight against unemployment and to maintain the basic features of the welfare state.
"Modernization of the industrial society in accordance with the needs of the environment whatever that may mean.
"Liberal domestic policy, culture for all, and defense of the European identity."
Since its convention in Essen in May 1984, the SPD right wing has been lying rather low. Only in Nordrein-Westfalen is it openly expressing its dreams about the possibility of a great coalition with the CDU. (For example, the SPD right-winger and chairperson of IG-Bergbau and Energie [Mining and Energy Workers Union], Adolf Schmidt, has said: •We have to seek a basic consensus between the SPD and the CDU.") It is all too obvious what an explosive impact taking such an option would have on the party ranks, when you consider that about a third of the SPD membership is for collaborating with the Greens.
Younger Social Democrats identified with the SPD left wing such as Oskar Lafontaine and the former chairperson of the Young Socialists, Gerhard Schroeder, have taken a cleverer tack, one that offers more possibilities for success from the SPD point of view. As candidates at the head of the Social Democratic slates for the state parliament elections in Saarland (Lafontaine) and Niedersachsen (Schroeder), they have come out strongly for a Red-Green alliance, but only on the condition that the Greens participate directly in SPD-dominated governments.
In this way, they are trying to bring about a differentiation in the Greens and entrap them in a moderate Social Democratic reform policy. In Niedersachsen, the state leadership of the Greens has already accepted Schroeder's offer, and declared is willingness to accept ministerial posts in an SPD-led state government in 1986.
In the Greens, the main dividing line in the discussion is between those who advocate a coalition with the SPD and those who are prepared to "tolerate" an SPD government, under certain circumstances, which means voting for an SPD state permier or chancellor and for the budget such a head of government presents.
In the state of Hessen, the first experiment in "tolerating" an SPD government, in this case the SPD minority government of Holger Boerner, is already in danger of going on the rocks. In return for some small reforms in rights for foreigners, subsidies for alternative projects and women's centers, and environmental protection, the Greens voted along with the Social Democrats for a budget that included, among other things, financing out of tax money for a plutonium factory owned by the NUKEM and ALKEM companies in Hanau near Frankfurt.
This factory is soon to be authorized to start production, and the NUKEM firm, with the capacity for processing 6.7 tons of uranium, could also produce atom bombs. So, the Greens, under pressure from their ranks, are threatening to stop tolerating the SPD government. If the SPD does not give in, then the Greens in Hessen, who are known for being in favor of coalition, will have to let the alliance go aground on this question. Active participation
The federal leadership of the Greens decided after Oskar Lafontaine's offer of a coalition to the Saarland Greens in general not to seek participation in governments. The spokesperson for the federal leadership, Rainer Trampert, explained the basis for this decision as follows in the illustrated magazine Stern.
"The general problem is that we would have to take responsibility. We would probably have about a 2 percent influence on the setting of policy objectives and have to share responsibility for the 98 percent of policy that we don't want. In this way, we would lose our function, which is to put pressure on other parties for reforms. This would also destroy our role in movements against militarism, ruining the environment, exploitation and oppression."
Against this there is the position of the former spokesperson of the Greens' parliamentary fraction, Otto Schily, who is aiming for a "share in framing reforms" as a junior partner in a Social Democratic government.
After the breakup of the current they built up around the magazine Moderne Zeiten, which was the only one that claimed to be socialist, Trampert and Thomas Ebermann of the Green-Alternative Slate in Hamburg set themselves the goal of blocking with the party center grouped around fraction spokesperson Antje Vollmer to halt the "creeping Social Democratization" of the Greens.
What they want is to escalate the political conditions for tolerating an SPD government and to justify a break with the SPD on the basis of environmetnal questions (e.g., no acceptance of any share of the responsibility for nuclear power plants). In December, a conference of the Greens is to decide the question of their attitude to the governmental question.
Without active participation in the discussion on the governmental question and the 1987 elections on the part of the most dynamic side in this debate, socialist politics will be doomed to sterility and insignificance in West Germany for at least the next two years. _•
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