The CP leadership made no mistake in taking this occasion to quietly withdraw from the government. No matter that the economic policy of the new Beregovoy government followed in a direct course that of Mauroy-Delors. (7) This government reshuffle was just the opportunity they had dreamt of to announce that, as the government's policies were not in the workers' interests, the CP would no longer participate.
You can think what you like about the sincerity of all these speeches, the most important for many CP members was the relief that they would no longer have to take responsibility for such policies, whether they were signed Mauroy
And, given the situation of the CP, it was vital for the leadership that the activists and the fulltimers got a little 'relief before the XXV Congress. played by the CP and its desire to downplay its withdrawal from the government, there is nevertheless an importance in the change. Not because the governsubstantially changed, but because it testifies to the fact that the political equilibrium has already changed and that the field is open for other, deeper, changes. And because, although the CP first talked of support without participation' to the government, the conditions now exist for another not unity but attacks on the Socialist Party, the only result of which would be to divide and demoralise the
We can be certain that, for its part, the Fabius government will not be slow in giving the workers reasons for dissatisfaction with the government Socialist Party that supports it. has two key words, 'modernisation'
The first means purely and simply to align with the needs of capitalism. guise of 'modernisation' it means to force the workers to accept the imperatives of capitalist competition, that is redundancies, deterioration of working condiflexible working hours, questioning of social gains, and a drop in buying power. No more, no less!
This policy, already put into practice by Delors and Fabius when the latter was
The CNAL, founded in 1953, is a coalition of trade-union and workers' organisations private education introduced by the right and for the defence of public education.
But this was at the price of worsening the character of the Constitution presidential powers, if his proposal should be put into practice. presideneganoy is minister for eareomy in th
Beregovoy is minister for economy in the new government, replacing Jacques Delors.
International Viewpoint October 15, 1984
industry minister, meant tens of thousands of redundancies in the steel, shipbuilding and car industries. With Fabius as prime minister this will continue and
This is announced openly and proudly. For Fabius it is not a case of promises of May 1981, as it was for Mauroy, but not even mentioning them...
The second key word of Fabius, that of 'uniting' bears witness to the fact that the function of the Fabius government in Mitterrand's project is to find an current policies in terms of new political
This is what is hidden behind the buzz word for this autumn: "detente', a relaxation of political tensions.
It is true that, as many opinion polls shown, Fabius is very popular. With the bosses and the right wing above
His invitations to the parliamentary representatives of the opposition to participate in this or that governmental commission are, today, being politely
Yesterday they would have only with sniggers and sarcastic remarks, but there is no doubt that tomorrow they will be accepted.
The 'detente' game is at the moment only attractive to individuals on the right. The official leaders are careful not to step into this trap. At a time when Le Pen is harnessing the radicalisation of their base they would not consider lowering their guard or sweetening their tone. Thus, Jacques Chirac, leader of Rally for dissolution of the National Assembly at to overturn the left majority.
Nevertheless, behind their arrogance, the right's weaknesses are obvious, as is shown by the divisions within it, and the fight over leadership eyes turning tial elections, is not cooling off. the right is confronting problems that it can not easily resolve at present, and to which it cannot find common answers. Problems for the right
The first of these problems is the 'Le Pen affair'. The right is the majority today, if the National Front's votes are counted. In these conditions, if it made an agreement with a formation that campaigns on racist and fascist themes, it would open itself up to denunciations of an alliance made with totalitarians, and see a fraction of the opposition disengage itself and look for an alliance with social democracy. On the other hand, if it broke all ties with the National Front, it would run the risk of finding itself the minority, and seeing the contagion of fascism spread even within the ranks of the traditional right parties. In short, a dilemma that the big bourgeois parties will have a lot of difficulty in overcoming.
The other problem for the right is to determine what should be the attitude of a possible right-wing majority after 1986 International Viewpoint October 15, 1984
Mitterrand and his new government (DR) to President Mitterrand, whose term of office only ends in 1988. that is that much more difficult because, beyond the inherent difficulties, there is the fact that the president has two possibilities for complicating the situation.
The first that is sometimes brought up, is that of a referendum on reducing the legislative and presidential elections at the same time; that is, to bring forward the latter. The second, which is already being prepared, would be to modify the electoral law to introduce a certain measure of proportionality into the national representation.
Such a step would modify the polarisation of political life engendered by the system of voting that shaped parliamentary life under the Fifth
This would encourage the development of left' layers, which could be the means of an opening to the right, it desired
If Mitterrand's think tank is so rich in producing possible ideas for changing the rules of the game, it is because the match is far from over. The three years of a class-collaborationist governmental policy are weighing heavily in their demoralisation
'detente' or not, the relationship of forces between the classes that was expressed electorally in 1981 has not been radically reversed, and it would be going too far to conclude that
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the situation now exists for redealing the political cards.
This, in the last analysis, explains the right-wing leaders' suspicion of Mittercate also the government's proposals will not pass without provoking some reac tion and running up against some major obstacles among the workers and, therefore, within the workers' parties.
The alert commentators of the Paris daily Le Monde, a journal that gives unqualified support to the left government and finds the president's projects nevertheless hesitate to underline the risks. Marie Colombani wrote recently, The additional difficulty is that triptych: new government, new policy, new majority; is incomplete, the new majority is missing.' (8) And the day after Laurent Fabius' first major television appearance another commentator, thought immediately comes to mind, in this 'new deal' what has become of the great hopes raised by the emergence of a new majority at the polls in 1981?.
In short, there is a long way from thinking up a project to putting it into
Behind the politicians' calculations and manoeuvres, deep social and political changes are at work, expresson the one hand by abstentionism, the electoral collapse of the CP, and the general crisis of the workers' organisations and, on the other, by the rise of the National Front and racism. unknown, and the decisive question, is if and how the working class is going to intervene in the political arena, will use its own methods, those of class struggle.
Le Monde, September 4, 1984. 9.. Le Monde, September 7, 1984.
23
"We call for support for the FLN"
represent the Party. But the social sector that they represent in the National Assembly will remain the most impor tant thing.
In this way, if elected representatives shift from one social sector to another, they will also have to change their mandate in the Assembly, because they should represent the social sector
Interview with Silvio Prado, responsible to the FLN for international relations
A representative of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was of the political bureaus of the European secinvited to a recent meeting tions of the Fourth International to explain the situation in his country and the dangers of an American intervention.
Silvio Prado was in Europe, for which he is responsible to the Department of International Relations (DRI) of the FSLN. He accepted the invitation because, as he himself explained, his host organisation 'is a component part of the solidarity movement'.
At the end of a day of discussions, during which the Sandinista leader put forward the FSLN's analysis of the situation in his country replied to questions about the Nicaraguan revolution and the political positions of the FSLN on various subjects, Silvio Prado granted clusive interview to International Viewpoint which we publish below.
What are the stakes in the
November 4 elections and what significance do the FSLN attach to them?
In general, we have always placed elections in a secondary role.
FSLN has always said that they were not the most important thing.
most important thing for the people of
Nicaragua is the defence of the revolution.
It was in this framework that we began the preparation for the November knowing that the right would not be interested in participating. We had decided, however, to give them the greatest possible facilities for taking part.
from the outset, we
Nonetheless, that specific instructions had been given that the Coordinadora should not participate. (1) Because, from their standpoint, if they did take part, that would legitimise the defeat of the right in the elections, and thereby accord the
FSLN a fully legal victory.
Who is interested in these elections?
Not the right, obviously. The elections would only interest the right insofar as they gave them an opportunity to prewas totalitarian and was trying to stop them from partici-
However, we are going ahead with the elections because we have been promising this to the people since the triumph of
July 1979. Even in 1969, when the first programme of the FSLN was adopted, we had promised the people that when we won we would hold elections.
It is not, therefore, true to say that we decided to call these elections under pressure form the Socialist International.
This is false. We took everyone's advice into consideration - from all countries and from all friendly forces.
are holding elections, it is to suit our-
- In the Council of State, the mass organisations influence their representatives directly. They have also been able
24 and an exto play a certain role in the debates on issues concerning them. system of representation in the future Assembly mean a change in all that?
The doubt you express in that question comes from the fact that you don't fully understand the history of the FSLN and the real and concrete links that it has with the mass organisations.
First of all, the representatives of the mass organisations that have been on the Council of State up until now, that is, the delegates of the mass organisations, are all Sandinistas, all members of the
This is not by chance, this is because the leaders of the people were Sandinistas, and that is true in all sec-
In the future National Assembly, there will be FSLN deputies who will be members of the mass organisations.
What will change a bit is the character of the representation. Before, the delegates represented their mass organisation, and now, they will they belong to.
While an important section of the economy remains in private hands, we are seeing a political shift by those sections of the bourgeoisie who supported the revolution towards the armed counter-
This is creating a rather contradictory and transitional situation. this framework, how do you see the future of the mixed economy?
The mixed economy has a basis in Once again, it is history that the middle layer of peasants and the rich peasants have had an anti-Somoza, even revolutionary position and we want to keep them on our side. and origins make them different, and we must win them to the revolution.
Many of them were latifundistas and landowners, and they gave their land to the revolution at the time of the victory. In some cases we set up military schools on their land. There were guerillas on their land, and some of them gave their land to the revolution, even before the victory of July 1979. They knew what they were risking
What is happening amongst other sectors, the non-patriotic sectors? Some of them were anti-Somoza up to a point, because Somoza represented a rival, not just a political adversary but an economic one. As he accumulated more and more wealth, gained a monopolistic grip on economic life, Somoza became an enemy to some sections of the bourgeoisie. That is why they opposed Somozism, not because they were profoundly
It is this process which explains the appearance of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) and other opposition parties, Alfonso Robelo, etc. Their tactical interests demanded overthrow of Somoza in order to improve their position and increase their profits. They thought, wrongly, that the revolution would allow them this. They were mistaken. They were completely mistaken, because the revolution did not leave them one single inch for enriching themselves. And when Robelo realised that the revolution was a serious business, that it was a deepgoing, social revolution that would not
The Democratic Coordination "Ramiro Sacasa', which has refused to participate in the elections, regrouped certain bourgeois opposition forces including the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC), the Social Democrat Party (PSD), the Social Christian Party (PSC), the Superior Council OI Private Enterprise (COSEP), the Workers' Central of Nicaragua (CNT) and Central Unified Trade Unions • (CUS).
International Viewpoint October 15, 1984
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