The amnesty -a victory for Solidarnosc Throughout the spring the Jaruzelski dictatorship did all it could to convince the seven Solidarnose leaders and four KOR (Workers Defence Committee) activists to accept exile. In this campaign the regime used not only the good offices of the Catholic hierarchy but also those of the Nato secretary general. The response of the eleven was to say 'No' • They wanted to either be tried or set free at once, and not to have to leave Poland.
Finally, the eleven won. The trials were not concluded and the accused were not forced to board an aeroplane heading west. They were set free after two-and-a-half years of detention without any judgement being pronounced. Solidarnosc activists in general consider that this great victory was won because of the successful boycott of the June 17 municipal elections, which showed the regime that it still had ten million opponents, by showing that Solidarnosc still had ten million sympathisers.
text for keeping Bogdan Lis, whom the Solidarnosc leadership put in charge of relations with Western trade unions, along with his deputy Piotr Mierzejewski. Then there is 'terrorism', which is the accusation against seven miners from Lubin who are still imprisoned because they are accused of having prepared retaliatory actions after the killings by the militia there on August 31, 1982. There is also 'using religious ceremonies to attack the state', if the sentence is longer than two years. But the two priests held on this charge have been released as the tribunal admitted that the charges against them did not warrant more than two years in prison. Limits of the amnesty
Another charge excluded from the amnesty is that of 'using enterprise facilities for material benefit' ?, that is, using workplace facilities to print leaflets. Six steelworkers from the Huta Katowice works are still in prison on this charge. Thus, at least a score of Solidarnosc activists are still behind bars.
For the Solidarnosc militants who went into clandestinity or abroad, they can only benefit from the amnesty if they give themselves up and restore the misused property' (machines, union funds, etc.). In addition, the law states that they could be prosecuted later if new (unacknowledged) facts concerning their activity come to light. In other words, the amnesty does not apply to them. In Poland everybody remembers the trials of those members of the resistance who gave themselves up on the basis of a similar amnesty after the Second World War.
"The amnesty is in fact a conditional and collective suspension of trials and sentences,' wrote an underground Solidarnose weekly newspaper in Warsaw. (1)
"The proclamation of the amnesty was a purely tactical act on the part of the authorities, but it shows that our activity forced the regime to adopt a tactic that weakened its position vis-a-vis its allies," was the judgement of a bulletin from Silesia. (2)
The Solidarnosc leadership from Lower Silesia stated that 'the determined and persevering attitude of the people forced the rulers to declare the amnesty'. (3)
"The amnesty is only one stage in our struggle,' announced the journal of the Fighting Solidarnosc organisation. (4) This assessment is shared by the vast majority of the underground press. In general they emphasise that, after the slap in the face delivered by some 40 per cent of the electors who boycotted the June 17 elections, General Jaruzelski had no 1. Wola, No 24, August 6, 1984. 2. Wolny Robotnik, No 20, July 1984. 3. Z Dnia na Dzien, No 28/330, August 12, 1984. 4. Solidarnosc Wlazaca, No 17/84, August 12, 1984.
Cyril SMUGA
The amnesty finally proclaimed on July 22 allowed for the release of the great majority of political prisoners, and all the well-known figures among them except Bogdan Lis. It was preceded by much toing and froing among the Polish bureaucrats. The amnesty's opponents in the corridors of power did not give up until right at the last minute.
In fact, four deputies went so far as to vote against the amnesty in the Diet, and eight others abstained. The fact that the trial of the KOR members opened just one week earlier, and that a trial of Solidarnose leader Andrzej Slowik opened on July 14, just before the end of his sentence, in which he was accused of 'insulting the prison commander' show that those within the dictatorship International Viewpoint October 15, 1984 who favour stepped-up repression fought for their position right to the end.
The amnesty law itself was a good illustration of the bureaucracy's juridical methods. It only allowed a 'total' pardon to the former bureaucrats of the Gierek team who had been condemned by the tribunal for the embezzlement and misappropriation of funds that they had carried out over the preceding decade. For the Solidarnosc members, the amnesty was conditional. The benefits of the amnesty will be withdrawn from all those who get involved again in political activity before the end of 1986. In other words, they have been released on probation.
As if this was not enough, there are a certain number of political offences not covered by the amnesty. These include 'high treason'. This is the pre-
Solidarnose can still mobilise widely (DR)
other choice than to make some concessions.
The demand for the liberation of the political prisoners had become the principal demand not only of the underground union movement but of very wide layers of the population. Thus, this theme, popular even among those who had not been actively involved in the struggle, gave the clandestine union structures a very wide audience.
By moving to the release of the vast majority of political prisoners, the dictatorship wanted to deprive its opponents of this audience. Jaruzelski thus admitted, at least implicityly, the failure of his policy of increased repression.
In fact, despite a noticeable increase in arrests, despite heavier and heavier sentences pronounced on those arrested, the underground structures of Solidarnose were not weakened in the first six months of the year.
On the contrary, they showed themselves capable, particularly in the campaign for the release of the prisoners and for the boycottt of the electoral farce on June 17, of mobilising the mass of activists and, indeed, well beyond.
According to the reports in the clandestine press, some 10,000 people took part in the poll-watching in Warsaw, which enabled the underground leadership to make a rapid announcement of the estimated rate of participation. Similar operations took place in all the big cities and many other constituencies. The bureaucracy's tactic
There is no doubt that the Jaruzelski government, by conceding partially on a major demand of the movement, hoped to calm things down and pacify those who were particularly sensitive on this question. This 'humanitarian' act as it was called by the official press, also doubtless made it possible to renew attempts to collaborate with the Catholic hierarchy, and demand that it deal more effectively with those priests who come out too openly in favour of Solidarnose.
No doubt Jaruzelski had in mind the amnesty given by Gierek in 1977 - which led to the release of those sentenced during the 1976 strikes and of KOR militants - which at the time, for at least a year, weakened the impact of the opposition.
"The regime is banking on the idea that, while the active opposition will come out strengthened, that perhaps the amnesty will pacify a section of society. But, there are still all our demands, apart from the amnesty to win, wrote a clandestine journal in Warsaw. (5) The junta needs such a respite, as it is going into a new attack on the workers' standard of living.
In fact, and the official media do not hide it, the economic results of the last three years are disastrous. Despite a definite drop in consumption, despite successive price rises, the market remains unbalanced and production is still far 12 from reaching 1980 levels (the year when a more or less general strike gave birth to Solidarnose).
What is more, despite numerous directives and resolutions at every level, the bureaucracy has shown itself to be incapable of slowing down the rate of investment or of changing its structure. Financing investments takes 3 billion zlotys per year (price fixed in 1982) while it was planned to only devote 1 billion per year to this during the period 1982-85. In addition '90 per cent of investment goes to the development of the means of production' (6), while the plan was to prioritise the consumption sector. Solidarnose is still active
Given the government's inability to force the different industrial lobbies to accept a drop in their share of investment in the division of the national income, an inability tacitly admitted in the official press, the bureaucracy is today planning a new reduction in consumption. It needs this to get the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, which Poland wants to join) and of the Catholic hierarchy for its austerity plans. The amnesty also has to serve as a token of the regime's stability to these institutions. Their eventual support will help the junta to present this austerity policy as the only possibility.
However, whatever its projects, the regime still only has limited room for manoeuvre. The amnesty is seen by everyone in Poland as a victory for Solidarnosc. The prisoners' return was greeted everywhere by massive gatherings, and the masses that were held then turned into rallies in many towns.
Wladyslaw Fransyniuk, who had been the leader of the clandestine Solidarnose organisation in Lower Silesia for ten months after the military crackdown, managed to shake off the police just after his release, and met the underground leader Zbigniew Bujak. Together they signed a declaration calling for the struggle to continue.
On his return to Wroclaw, Frasyniuk was feted as a national hero by thousands of people gathered to celebrate mass. The police brutally dispersed this assembly. In Warsaw, 7,000 people gathered in the church of St Stanislas to greet the freed activists from KOR and Solidarnosc. The latter addressed the crowd during the mass.
Where demonstrations had been organised by the underground leadership on August 31, as in Wroclaw, to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the Gdansk strike, they were massive and militant. It should be noted that after the August 31 demonstration the authorities in Wroclaw tried to impede the activity in the city by arresting, and sentencing to two months in prison, Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Jozef Pinior, another recently amnestied union leader.
In addition, and the clandestine press is unanimous on this point, Solidarnose does not want, by means of a concession from the regime, to find itself forced to accept any • truce or ceasefire. "The union's activity in every form must develop, openly or in clandestinity in order to put pressure on the regime and mobilise the people, particularly the workers' , wrote the organ of the Workers Inter-Factory Committee of Solidarose in the Warsaw region (MRKS). (7)
"Thanks to the amnesty we can easily fight for trade-union pi more openly and more widely read in another bulletin of (8) It is in this framework amnestied leaders publicly meeting of the members of the leadership of Solidarnosc elected the introduction of the state of wa
In its declaration of July underground leadership of S (TKK) wrote, "We can only rights by imposing them. In places we need a stronger and union movement, acting as ope possible but, as it has been up to now necessity based on clandestine structu The TKK considers that the clande union commissions in the workpla must broaden their activity and find be forms of public activity in defence workers' rights. Such activity, backed up by distribution of the press, discussion and education groups, broadened by inter-factory relations, will make it possible to completely rebuild our union.' (9
The first steps along this road have already been made. In Wroclaw, the former underground leader of the region, Jozef Pinior, and the leader of the workplace union commission, Wladyslaw Mekarski, made a long visit to the Mostostal factory shortly after they were released. They held general meetings in each workship, catching both the police and the factory bosses visibly unprepared.
Faced with this orientation on the part of Solidarnosc, the Jaruzelski regime has some difficulties. It cannot, without denying itself what it hoped to gain from the amnesty, proceed to massive widespread repression of the freed activists. But neither can it leave them free to act. It seems to have opted - as the arrests and sentencing of Frasyniuk and Pinior (although the benefits of the amnesty were not withdrawn from them) testify - for guerrilla warfare against those who act openly: arrests, searches, light sentences. However, this leaves a wide field of action for the union.
While the amnesty has opened a new situation in Poland, it is not, as has been seen, a sign of increasing stability. The evolution of the balance of forces in the year to come will depend in large measure on Solidarnose's capacity to organise the struggle against the new austerity measures. 5. Robotnik, No 68, July 23, 1984. 6 Zycie Gospodareze, No 48, November 27, 1984. 7. CDN-Glos Wolnego, No 80, August 20. 1984. 8. Wola, No 24, August 6, 1984. 9. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No 95, July 1984:
International Viewpoint October 15, 1964