Interview with The third congress of the Confederation of Workers Commissions (CCOO) took place in Madrid at the end of June this year. It ratified a strategy of dialogue and open collaboration (called 'national solidarity') in any sort of social contract with the bosses and the government. But the trade-union right wing was split in the elections for the commission executive between the slate headed by the outgoing general secretary, Marcelino Camacho, on the one hand, and Julian Ariza on the other. The battle followed the lines of divisions within the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) itself. (1) At the same time, the right as a whole also had to face a strong challenge from the left.
Furthermore, the outgoing leadership was obliged to resort to a scandalous manoeuvre in order to prevent the discussions on what strategy for the trade-union movement from being reflected in the vote for the commission executive. They did this by holding the elections before the discussion and vote on the resolution on union strategy. This provoked a feeling of dissatisfaction amongst the delegates, and only half of them actually participated in the vote on the resolution.
The trade-union left, which gained a total of nine out of the fifty seats on the commission executive, also acted in a divided way in the congress. On one side was a slate headed by Alfredo Clemente, which represented the positions of the pro-Soviet Communist Party (PC) of Ignacio Gallego. It took a stand against social contracts and in favour of organising workers' resistance. Eight people from this slate got elected. On the other side was the slate led by Joaquin Nieto, supported by members and sympathisers of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR, the section of the Fourth International in the Spanish state) and by the Communist Movement of Spain (MCE), which gained 27 votes and one seat. The intervention of the LCR was based around four major amendments to the
Joaquin Nieto official documents, criticising the orientation of the outgoing leadership and proposing alternatives along the following lines: for an alternative of resistance and class solidarity and defence of living standards; for nationalisation of the banks to solve the problem of industrial redeployment; and against Spanish entry into the EEC.
An agreement was reached between the PC, the LCR and the MCE to jointly defend a series of amendments, each one of which, as a result, achieved 20 to 30 per cent of the votes. But joint discussions nevertheless failed to bring about the presentation of a united left slate for the commission executive elections because of the refusal of the PC to put a second LCR comrade in a high enough position on the slate to stand a chance of being elected. In fact, the PC are trying to achieve dominance over the trade-union left within the CCOO, and to that end they often employ unacceptable methods. This makes it difficult for the LCR to operate a united-front policy. In fact, at the congress of the engineering-workers section of the CCOO, an organisational manoeuvre by the PC prevented the election of an LCR comrade to the leadership of the union federation.
Joaquin Nieto is a native of the Basque country. He headed the slate supported by the LCR and the MCE, which only missed, by one vote, getting a second person elected. Nieto was a member of ETA VI and then of the unified LCR and ETA VI and, under Franco, he was the leader of the CCOO in the construction industry in Catalonia. He has been a member of the Central Committee of the LCR since 1976. In 1984 he was elected to the executive leadership of the CCOO in Catalonia. Below we publish an interview which he gave to Combate, the weekly paper of the LCR, on a balance sheet of the CCOO congress. It was first published on July 10.
Question. Let's start with the balance sheet that you would make of the third congress of the CCOO.
Answer. Essentially, the results of the third congress were negative. A policy of 'national solidarity', which is very different from class solidarity, was ratified. The congress also confirmed a policy of social contracts, institutionalising inter-confederal agreements [between the CCOO and the Social Democratic UGT], as the basis for collective bargaining. These are the most negative aspects of the congress. It doesn't seem to us that these decisions will help the confederation to rebuild its support or organise itself as it could have done if another set of policies had been adopted.
Nevertheless, the congress did have a series of positive aspects of which the most important was to demonstrate how much the policy of 'national solidarity' is gradually losing support within the union. There are more and more sections within the union which are International Viewpoint October 15, 1984 either questioning this policy overall or are rejecting particular inter-confederation agreements. The policy has been a failure and has weakened the union. Union militants are therefore reluctant to support it with quite the same enthusiasm as that displayed by Marcelino Camacho in his report to the congress.
The other positive aspect of the congress was the strength of the union left and within that the significance of our current which, up till now, has been totally absent from any confederation bodies [ie. at the Spanish-state level]. 1. The slate headed by Marcelino Camacho, which gained the absolute majority - five hundred votes and 26 elected - represents the official positions of the current leadership of the PCE, that of Gerardo Iglesias. They defend a strict continuity of the unions' strategy since the Moncloa pact (October 25, 1977) in the name of a 'policy of national solidarity'. In this sense they represent the right wing of the CCOO.
The list headed by Julian Ariza, which included supporters of a minority faction in the PCE led by the ex-general secretary Santiago Carrillo, got 266 votes and 14 elected
Q. The presentation of separate slates for the confederation executive and the differences between what we might call the Camacho wing and the Ariza wing was a salient feature of the conference. Do you think that the latter current is trying to become an alternative within the CCOO?
A. The congress reflected accurately the existing situation. Basically, Julian Ariza's current agrees with the policy of 'national solidarity'. But there are other problems. These two currents reflect what is going on in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), that is obto the executive commission. This current controls the Engineering Federation, the largest in the Confederation, the organisation in the Basque country and other important sections of the CCOO. It argues, for tactical reasons, against a union strategy based on social pacts. In fact, in practice this current has taken decisions very close to the approach of Camacho, like, for example, the signing of the agreement which ended the long strike at Sagunto (see IV, No 55, June 18, 1984). In fact this sector is the most undemocratic and repressive in the whole confederation.
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vious. There is a battle for control of the union, and it was around this problem that the separate slates appeared. To say it was only a battle for the apparatus, however, would be to oversimplity the issue. We must look a little more deeply at things.
Political issues underly the battle for control of the apparatus. The policy of 'national solidarity' has been a failure. The consequence of this failure is that all sides are thinking again about the policies of the union. Whilst some think it is necessary to settle into this strategy of social pacts, others doubtless believe that at the moment it would be better to try to regain some forces, or that with the PSOE (Socialist Workers Party of Spain) in government, social pacts are not the most appropriate policy. There are others who are just more sensitive to the pressures which exist in the more important sections of the union against this orientation and who want to maintain their links with these sections. Julian Ariza is aware that there exists within the union a desire to see the growth of a left opposition.
If the supporters of the Ariza current were really to the left, if they would seriously challenge the policy of 'national solidarity' , we would be delighted, and we would work with them. But the problem is that this is not the case. Their criticism of the inter-confederation agreement is very weak. For example, they recognise the dire consequences of the AI (inter-confederation agreements), but they don't take into account the fact that the results of the ANE (national work agreements) were worse or, at any rate, as bad. (2)
In conclusion, therefore, this current relfects some things that are going on in the union but they remain faithful to the traditional policies and it is unlikely that they will lead a leftward shift of the CCOO.
Q. Nevertheless, there was no united left candidate either. Why not?
A. It would have been logical for the left to have presented a joint slate for the congress because this opposition has worked together in the union and should continue to do so. Also it would have been good for the mass of trade unionists to see a strong and united opposition. But that is only one aspect of the problem. There are many other things....
Everyone is included in this left opposition. For some time we, that is the LCR, have constituted a relatively large left opposition. We contributed a great deal to the discussion and debate that eventually led to the presentation of the Alfredo Clemente slate. We, therefore, have a rightful place within the opposition. Now, I won't say this place was refused us, but some people wanted us to appear as just supporters of a left opposition organised around Alfredo Clemente and his current. Of course we support this current, but we are not just an auxiliary force. 18
This was the main problem, which then came out on the organisational level in the disagreements we had [on putting together a common slate]. We have had many union conferences where unity was achieved, where everything went well and where we gained excellent results. We have had others where, unfortunately, unity was not possible. In other conferences where we appeared united, this unity was based on our renunciation of any real role in the opposition, when we limited ourselves to supporting other currents. This was the case in the engineering conference of the CCOO. We cannot continue in this vein. For there to be a real basis for unity among the trade-union left, it must be clear that we are all an integral part of it.
Within this trade-union left there is a lot of convergence but also disagreements, with different ways of looking at things. For example, on the question of social pacts, there are always different points of view. Whilst we believe that in the current situation the bourgeoisie and the bosses will seek to re-introduce pacts like the Moncloa pact in order to prevent the workers fighting back, others in the trade-union left are open to the possibility of making such agreements. On other issues, like democracy in the unions or on the organisational level, we have always had different opinions. This is only natural. A trade-union opposition cannot be monolithie. It is heterogeneous, not only because different political currents exist within it but also because the union opposition we need to build cannot be monopolised by one particular section.
Q. What could be the future repercussions for the opposition of the lack of unity at this congress?
A. It is obvious that if we had been united, our cooperation would have got a stage further forward. We did not achieve that unity, but that does not rule it out for the future. It would be an error if comrades thought that. Because now the organisational frictions are over. What remains are the questions of union activity and here we have a lot of agreement. We must get agreement in this area and I'm sure we will manage it. Because they need it, the union needs it and any strong left opposition needs unity.
We are on favourable terrain. In places where there are problems constructing slates, or if we cannot agree on general issues, but have some agreement on how to lead the struggle in the factories or within the union, it would be very negative to take a sectarian attitude, and for our part, we will not do that.
Q. And what about the unity with the MCE? What do you think about that?
A. We have made a lot of headway in the last period toward unity with the comrades of the MCE, starting from the Catalonia conference of the CCOO and beyond. This unity could grow. It is obvious that our points of agreement are more solid and that we share some experiences, some problems and a similar orientation within the CCOO. But it is not the same where the MCE is not in the union. Here we must look for unity of a different sort, which is not as easy or as natural to achieve as in the Workers Commissions.
Q. It is clear that in trade-union activity and in day-to-day trade-union life the LCR is not without some influence. Now we are present in the leadership of the CCOO. How can revolutionaries use this position to advantage?
A. First of all, the fact that we have gained a position on the executive of the CCOO shows that our strength within the union is certainly not declining. If we compare the number of delegates we had in the previous congress to what we had in this one, we can say that we are stronger. That is important because the last few years have not been easy for revolutionaries working in the CCOO. In fact, they have been very difficult, firstly because the situation was rough for the Workers Commissions themselves, and secondly because the weakening of the policies of the union coincided with a decline in union democracy.
During these years, people could have decided that it wasn't worth working in the CCOO and that it was too much effort for poor results. What we have proved is that even in difficult times, if you intervene with a clear goal for the future, you can end up by widening your audience. People are more receptive to our ideas now and we have gained a certain respect because of how long we've been active.
It's important to understand that people don't just judge us according to the number of delegates we have at the congress but because of the work we have done in the factories. Here our co-thinkers lead sections of the union and the shopfloor committees with the full confidence of the workers. In the end, I think that our gaining a seat on the executive means that we are not just a minority current, but a force that can grow and carry more weight within the union.
Anyway, we must not let our imagination run away with us. At the end of the day, executive committees are a bit like parliament, and the body which really decides the daily direction of 2. The union organisations make annual wage agreements with the employers, which have different names each time: the Management Inter-confederation Agreement (AMI) of 1979 and 1980, signed by the General Workers Union (UGT) and the CCOO; the National Employment Agreement (ANE) of June 1981, signed by the UGT and the CCOO and the Inter-confederal agreement (AI), signed in January 1983 by the UGT and the CCOO. Although inflation was estimated at 14 per cent this agreement only envisaged a wage increase margin of between 9.5 per cent and 11.5 per cent.
International Viewpoint October 15, 1984