PHILIPPINES.
iest in the history of the Philippines; 384 people were killed in the last week of the campaign, and 109 of those on polling day itself.
After the announcement of the first results, which were more favourable to
The May elections were rigged and the opposition divided the opposition, President Marcos could not hide his dismay. He revealed the real way he looked at the elections when he stated that the leaders of the KBL must have taken too literally our instructions that the opposition must be allowed to
The election results were announced several weeks after the count, and the de-
A year ago ex-senator Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino was assassinated in the Philippines on his return from exile. minded by people high up in the regime, and carried out by elements in the armed forces. An acute political crisis was opened up, and during the months following 'Ninoy's' death millions of Filipinos demonstrated their opposition to President Marcos in the streets. On the first anniversary of the murder of Benigno Aquino, August 21, 1984, more than one million people again gathered in the heart of Manila, and hundreds of thousands more demonstrated in other towns throughout the country. Through such mass demonstrations, various layers in society were expressing a deep rejection of the presidential dictatorship introduced under martial law in 1972. (1)
These recent demonstrations and the May 14 elections to the National Assembly (Batasang Pambasa) provided development of the crisis and the political forces involved. Faced with the challenge of elections three main political currents emerged; the progovernment current, represented essentially by the candidates of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, Movement for a New Society), created by President Marcos; the moderate largely pro-American opposition which participated in the elections; and the radical popular opposition which is generally lett-wing even revolutionary, and which called for a boycott of the elections on the grounds that they were undemocratic.
It is difficult to make an accurate The opposition exposed many fradulent practices involving electoral registration as well as the counting of votes by the official commission, COMELEC. According to the official results, out of 183 seats up for election, 61 were won by the moderate opposition and 1] by indepen
Thanks to a further 17 deputies nominated by Marcos, the KBL was assured 117 of the two hundred seats in the National Assembly. Some 80 percent of those registered had voted.
Confining oneself to these official results, seem relatively simple. The regime has suffered an indisputable setback, but it still retains a comfortable parliamentary majority and can pride itself on a new electoral legitimacy. before only had 13 seats in the Assembly - gained a significant political victory. On the other hand, the radical opposition, which was calling for a boycott, appears to have been marginalised. A regulated development toward a post-Marcos regime headed by pro-American leaders and isolating the anti-imperialist forces, could now become a possibility. This is just what Washington probably hoped for from these elections.
On closer examination however, it is immediately obvious that the real development of the political relationship of forces is different from what the official results would allow one, at first, to suppose. Moreover, the crisis of the regime, which opened up a year ago, is very far from being resolved, and the dynamic of these mass mobilisations is still very much
The May 14 elections were supposed to play a very important role in the search for a solution to the crisis of the
The American administration, which is very influential in the Philippines, was anxious that the moderate opposition should get enough seats to make it appear to be the force that could bring a peaceful solution to the crisis. President Marcos knew this and was probably resigned to it. However, before the elecprogramme, ventured to say that the opposition International Viewpoint 17 September 1984
This murder was evidently masteran opportunity to assess the assessment of the election results.
the political conclusions
The moderate opposition - which would not get more than twenty seats. The entire machinery of the powerful ruling party - enjoying the resources of the state, as well as those of the KBL -was mobilised to ensure the control of the elections.
Threats, pressures and acts of terror marked the electoral campaign. is compulsory, and the threat of sanctions against supporters of a boycott is a constant constraint. Several militants who called for a boycott were murdered and others injured, as were members of the moderate opposition. In fact, the election campaign was perhaps the bloodlay was obviously used to correct sults that were unfavourable to the re-
This was particularly obvious in the case of Cebu in the centre of the archipelago, which constitutes a traditional bastion of the opposition. though the first results there showed a massive victory for the anti-Marcos the figures announced one week later gave 5 elected for the KBL and for the opposition. Thousands of demonstrators together to the electoral fraud, expressing their anger in front of an administrative
Armed riot police intervened, killing three and injuring eight others.
It is significant that the regime kept its majority in those rural areas where there are no communist guerrillas operating, where the patronage system is strongest, where high-ups in the KBL are most influential and where it was hardest for the opposition to monitor the conduct of the poll. It is also significant that the opposition captured 15 out of the 21 seats in the capital, Manila, despite the exertions of the president's very powerful wife, governor of Greater Manila. More than anywhere else, conditions here combined to ensure the regu-
Under pressure of the crisis, divisions appeared within the government and the Cesar Virata, who had the support of the World Bank, was overtly criticised by businessmen around Marcos. Council of State, rivalry between generals Ver and Ramos was reinforced.
In this context Marcos has been able to maintain, even reinforce, his personal presidential powers. Before the election he claimed for himself the right to nominate 17 members of the National Assembly in addition to the 183 elected.
Generally speaking, the October Constitutional Amendment No. 6 gave Marcos the power to legislate by decree, if he feels that the National Assembly 'fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter that for any reason in his judgement requires immediate action'.
It is therefore in this context of elections that were neither free nor 1. For a general analysis of this crisis see International Viewpoint, Nos. 37, October 3, 1983; 38, October 17, 1983; 49, March 26, 1984.
Quoted in Solidaridad II, News Supplement, June 1984, p. 1.
19
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democratic and in the framework of a regime with a presidential dictator that the May 14 election results must be assessed. The polls confirm that a significant proportion of the population went into opposition to the president after the assassination of Benigno Aquino, and that they are still. But to understand how this mass opposition has manifested itself both through the success of the militant campaign for a boycott and in the electoral success of the candidates of the United Nationalist Democratic Organisation (UNIDO) and the Philippine Democratic Party - Lakas ng Bayan (PDPLaban), it is necessary to re-examine what unites and divides the anti-Marcos forces, as well as the development of American policy in the Philippines. (3)
The JAJA was run by people with progressive sympathies, but according to ex-senator Jose Diokno, the president of its executive committee, it drew toorganisations, and through
AJA is organised arend seven the
democratic demands, and has played the role of rousing and politicising large sections of the urban population.
KOMPIL is essentially a middle-class organisation whose centre of gravity is less on the radical side. 1984 they symbolically elected a council of 15 members as an alternative to the
Among them was Horacio Morales, formerly a top civil servant and now serving a prison sentence for being president of the undergound
• visionally avoided and unity re-established though a campaign called "Boycott
: This made participation in the elections conditional on the realisation of six basic democratic demands including the freeing of political prisoners and the lifting of the special powers of the presi-
The break-up of the united opposition occured anyway when the 'Boycott unless... campaign came to a conclusion on St. Valentine's day three months before the May 14 elections. Basically, the regime rejected the six democratic demands put forward by the united opposi-
At a mass rally organised in the form of a night-long vigil, the popular, antirevolutionary democratic sections of the opposition announced the opening of their campaign for a boycott. But in the days that fol-
PASAY~ NINOY
UNIDU
FR
BUR MIN lowed the vast majority of the bourgeois formations in the traditional opposition, mainly organised in UNIDO, opted for participation in the elections.
The Marcos regime and, with it, Washington, had thus scored a point, with the opposition henceforth fighting amongst themselves. The chaff could now be separated from the grain, or the pro-American opposition forces from the imperialists. It was precisely with this in mind that the decision to hold parliamentary elections had been taken in the
The opposition divided on this issue for some important reasons. The split ran vertically along social and political
Basically, the vast majority of the traditional bourgeois opposition groups, business people from the financial centre of Makati (the 'city' area of Manila) and
Mass commemoration of first anniversary of Aquino death (DR)
The mass opposition to the Marcos regime did not begin with the assassination of Benigno Aquino. It came to the fore a long time ago in the growth of an anti-dictatorship movement from within the Church and the development of the underground revolutionary movement including the Philippine Communist Party (PCP), the New Peoples Army NPA)
Democratic (NDF). But after the murder of 'Ninoy' the movement rapidly broadened both politically and in terms of social composi-
The urban petty bourgeoisie and an important section of the business milieu became openly critical and took
For a period of several months, all the various social and political components of the movement found themselves side by side in the huge demonstrations, raising the dictatorship and front organisations were built, such as the Movement for Justice for Aquino, the Justice for All (JAJA) group and the Philippine Peoples Congress (KOMPIL). On the organisational level these groups represented the whole political spectrum from the pro-American sections of the bourgeoisie through to the anti-imperialist, revolutionary left. 20
Also among the deputies was Jose Maria Sison, imprisoned for being president of the CPP; and Father Conrad Balweg, who carried out his functions as a priest in the guerrilla movement led by the CPP.
The unity of the opposition was called into question for the first time when the regime announced the elections to the National Assembly. The popular sections of the opposition opted for a position of boycott straight away. In particular, this was the position of the Nationalist Alliance (whose president and spokesperson is Lorenzo Tanada, a man with a long and respected record in politics), which draws together various mass organisations. (5) In contrast, UNIDO tended immediately toward participation. A split was pro-
UNIDO (English initials for the United Nationalist Democratic Organisation) draws together 12 political formations of the traditional
The PDP-Laban (Philippine Demo cratic Party - Lakas ng Bayan) took up the old torch of the Laban Party launched by Benigno Aquino in 1978. Apart from Aquino's widow. Corazon, the leaders of this party are business-
UNIDO is led by traditional politicians like Salvador Laurel and
But also in the moderate opposition there are politicians who enjoy local positions like Narciso Pimentel and Homobono Adaza in the Isle of Mindanao 4. Interview published in Veritas, December 18, 1983. 5. The full name of the Nationalist Alliance
Aquino's widow 'Cory', Corazon, sup ported participation in the elections
Supporters of the boycott included -apart from Butz, Aquino's brother (himself a businessman) and a traditional politician like ex-senator Manglapus, as well as the leaders of the Liberal Party in exile in the US - the Nationalist Alliance; the mass organisations, such as the independent unions and the popular associations; nationalist leaders crats, such as Jose Diokno; and the prolike the Movement for Sovereignty and Democracy (KAAKBAY). (6)
It is possible to identify four basic differences that explain the deep division which opened up inside the opposition is the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom
English initials or NA, abridged). It is basically made up of different regional alliances which in turn group together local mass organisations (unions and other associations) in a general class strug gle direction. Officially launched after the assassination of Benigno Aquino, it was in fact well on the way one or two years before that. 6. The movement Sovereignty and Democracy (KAAKBAY) is organised around a clear anti-imperialist platform and exists essentially in Manila among intellectual circles. Exsenator Diokno is one of the leaders. It is not a political party but a movement which aims to contribute toward organising a particular sec tion of society.
International Viewpoint 17 September 1984
JUSTICE FOR NINOY JUSTICE over the May elections. The traditional bourgeois groupings organised around UNIDO are weak in structure and do not have an organised mass base. On the terrain of the mass struggle, they are fighting a losing battle against the left anti-imperialist forces. In fact, they needed the elections, since they are essentially elec-
ALL VICTIMS OF POLITIC toral formations. On this terrain they could revitalise their forces.
SICLE MILITARY TERRORIS imperialist left, on the other hand, was not able to make an effective intervention in the framework of elections that were controlled by the regime.
At another level, the bourgeois opposition was more easily satisfied with the electoral perspective defined by a regime from which it is merely seeking limited reforms such as the replacement of the political monopoly of the KBL, the removal of Marcos-clique businessmen from certain economic positions, etc.
The nationalist left, however, from its non-communist wing - personified by exsenator Diokno - right through to the CPP, is aiming for a real change in the regime. This involves achieving a position of strength based on social struggle and to repression. The boycott campaign was decided within this perThe development of US policy
Splits in the opposition became more inevitable at the beginning of 1984 as the economic crisis began to bite. The workers, represented respectively by UNIDO and the independent unions, obviously did not respond in the same way to the social and economic problems posed. At the end of 1983 and beginning of 1984 the situation in the country was no longer only dominated by the political consequences of the murder of Benigno Aquino.
All political and social movements had to respond to the devaluation of the peso, the discovery of the misappropriation of funds by the regime and the increasing intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in determining the economic direction of the country. They had to turn their attention to the external debt, the increase in inflation and to the bankruptcies, real or fake, of thousands of firms, to tens of thousands of problems began to loom as large as the political ones.
Finally, the opposition was divided on the question of what attitude to take toward the US. The bourgeois opposition got some important guarantees from Washington and the American embassy in the Philippines. They knew that the American government could help them take advantage of the legislative elections. The anti-imperialist left, however, knew that Washington saw them as the enemy who had to be isolated and combated and that the elections were organised with this aim in mind.
For several years now, the American International Viewpoint 17 September 1984 administration has been divided on what policy to adopt vis-a-vis the Philippines which, more than any other country in South East Asia, is directly influenced by Washington. Should they be content to support Marcos unstintingly, or given the strengthening should they prepare actively for a democratic reform of the regime?
Benigno Aquino represented the best card that could have been played in a game of reforming the regime, and in setting the stage for the post-Marcos
It is probably for this reason that Aquino returned to the Philippines, and also why he was killed the moment his
Aquino's murder, Ronald Marcos to the hilt had apparently won the day. But the crisis that opened up as a result of this murder has forced the White House to modify its attitude slightly. The massive entry into opposition of sections of the business community -Aquino having been one of them - had many implications. First, on a national level. there was the rapid erosion of the social base of the regime. internationally, there was the crisis of confidence that this shift in the business community engendered in a regime already up to its neck in debts.
In this context, the growth of the NA and the CPP, as well as the NDF, became especially worrying to the US. At the same time, however, the strengthening of the anti-communist wing of the opposition movement provided a responsible' channel for the democratic sentiments of the masses which had been brought to the fore by the murder of
In the US, the Philippine National plained from this point of view. They were supposed to pave the way for the reintegration into political life of the country's dynamic business community and middle classes, who had been frozen out of it by the monopoly held by the American opposition could be pried
September 1983 protest demonstration (DR) away from the revolutionaries, and a bourgeois elite established that would be able to consolidate the government and fight effectively against the communists at the same time. This view was clearly expressed by a member of the American House of Representatives, Solarz, who declared on October 24, 1983: I think that these [May 1984] elections may well constitute a historic watershed in the history of the Philippines. At a time when there is growing support in that country
Communist-dominated People's Army...this may well be the last demonstrate Filipino people that peaceful change is possible in their country.' (7)
John Monjo, joint undersecretary of state for East Asia, stated equally clearly responsible Philippine leaders from the government, the opposition, and the private sector will make the extra efforts to electoral process a genuine milestone in the political normalisation
If this elections is successful, it could be the vehicle for bringing into democratic political life a whole new generation of office holders.' (8)
One of the big problems faced by the American administration in the Philippines is the continuing political vacuum brought about by a family dictatorship imposed on the country by the Marcos clan. As some journalists of Far Eastern Economic Review wrote, 'many potential young leaders during the martial law years opted to take up their struggle in the hills with the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines rather than face through legal means.' (9)
Congressional Record, October 24, 1983. Cited by Walden Bello and Edward Herman in
" stencil, p. 6. •Statement before the House Foreign Affairs on East Asia 7, 1984, p. 10, quoted by *Marcos stays in the driving seat', Far Eastern Economic Review, June 21, 1984, p. 29.
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CLING DULAG DR. BOBBY delo PAZ R
therefore, the May 1984 elections were placed in the context of a systematic policy of counter-insur-
It was in this context that the opposition received the necessary guarantees for its participation in the electoral arena. But in order to understand the relative success of the campaign, it is necessary to take into account the different reactions of the population to the possiblity of an election where oppositionists could have been elected in large numbers. In fact, it is only in this way that we can understand the simultaneous development of two large opposition currents, one which was principally anti-communist and the other anti-imperialist.
With the political crisis precipitated by the murder of Aquino, the field was suddenly wide open for much broader development of oppositional forces. New of the population mobilised, force ready to organise them immediately. The CPP and the NDF were unable to do this, because of the undernature of their operation and their small number of cadres amongst the middle layers, as were the other left antibecause of their limited forces on a national level.
Neither could the traditional bourgeois opposition parties take the leadership because they belonged to the past, and whole had been reduced electoral formations, marginalised by the regime. A huge vacuum was thus opened within which all the opposition groups could grow simultaneously, each on their own patch. The growing opposition
An electoral perspective had varying significance in different regions of the country and amongst different layers of
Apparently, in the guerrilla for example, the boycott was massively supported. In fact, to the majority of workers and peasants, the election never meant very much, apart from a legal obligation and above all an obligation to the local bigwigs, who were usually members of the KBL.
Amongst important sections of the urban middle classes, however, there isted a tradition of, and an aspiration for, electoral democracy. The Philippines had the most lively electoral tradition of all the countries in the region, even if it was
The introduction of martial law cut short the free' contest between competing parties and imposed the stifling regime of a family dictatorship. Since martial law the desire to participate in as free elections as possible was seemingly very strong amongst these urban middle layers. And this certainly played a role in the success of UNIDO and PDP-Laban.
The strength of this sentiment for free elections is also attested to by the activity of another organisation, one that played a key role observing the polls - the Na22 tional Movement of Citizens for Free Elections (NAMFREL). (10)
Despite the threat of repression, they had about 20,000 people actively taking part in monitoring the ballot boxes on polling day and this certainly forced the practices in a number of places, such as
NAMFREL took on the image of a movement which went well beyond political parties that were standing candidates. This is something that has to be taken into account.
judge the success of the boycott campaign, it is important to stress that many supporters of this action fully understood this sentiment for voting. Randolf David, a lecturer at the University of the Philippines and leader of KAAKBAY explained on January 7, 1984: 'I think it is safe to assume that indeed many of our countrymen would like to participate in the May Batasan [Assembly] elections because they want to translate into a concrete act all the resentment and anger they have felt and tried to express in numerous rallies and truth fora, especially after August 21. Moreover, many of our countryment are convinced that under the present circumstances, the Opposition has a great chance of winning a majority of the seats in the Batasan, and given such a majority, that it will then be possible to dismantle the Marcos dictatorship'. (11)
But the supporters of the boycott put forward two main arguments in response to those who called for participation in
Firstly, the regime would maintain sufficient control of the elections to ensure their majority, even if the opposition were to return a signficant minority of seats. Secondly, they pointed out that the purpose of the elections was to divert popular anger, directing it toward the ballot box in order to set the stage for an American solution to the crisis which the Marcos regime was under-
The primary objective of the boycott therefore, to keep up the mobilisations on the streets and to promote the political education of new sections of the masses that these actions
In terms of making a political impact in the urban centres, opposition scored well during the campagin. To some extent, it probably even temporarily rolled back the influence of the NDF and the anti-imperialist forces. 10. The citizens national movement for free elections (NAMFREL) is directed mainly by Jose Concepcion, ex-president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. with the support of the Makati Business Club of Enrique Zobel, the Coalition of Organisations for the Restorin Solidaridad II, News least what Communist Party caders said to Guy Sacerdoti in Red Army on
Eastern Economic Review,
However, from the standpoint of actively broadening the mass movement, the boycott campaign seems to have given genuine encouragement to certain important mobilisations. For example, between March 1 and 7, two columns of demonstrators from the south and north of Luzon Island converged on the capital. On their arrival the march had grown to 100,000 peasants and Manila gathered together for a huge
On May 1, in the largest meeting of workers since the second world war, 60,000 workers assembled in the capita in response to an appeal by the May 1 Movement (KMU) (14) and the Nationa Coalition of Workers Against Povert: (PKMK). This, moreover, was despite the fact that the independent union opposition leadership had been severely weak. ened by the repression unfolding in the last two years. This repression had led to the arrest of Bert Olalia who died in 1983, not long after an eight-month spe
The plethora of mass marches in the last six months has opened up contact with many villages and small towns and mobilised large numbers of people.
Because of the economic crisis, strikes have taken place under very difficult conditions. Take the example of the free zone of Bataan near Manila. sion of activity here was extremely severe and is supposed to have provoked a flying unit of the NPA which specialises in small, lightening strikes to kill a Police Chief, Tomas Karingal. He was accused of giving the order to open fire on a picket line, thus killing two workers and seriously wounding ten others.
If the role of the CPP in this execution is confirmed, this would seem to indicate that the NPA has decided from now on to launch punitive operations in limited numbers in the main urban centres of the country. They had refused to
In general the forces of the NPA are thought to have continued to grow in a significant way in recent
During the period of the elections, the NPA forces were most active in the islands of Mindanao in the south and Luzon in the north.
To look at the election just in formal terms, according to official figures 9.5 million people did not register or did not turn up to vote. A further two million are estimated to have placed blank papers in the ballot box.
The results of the May 1984 elections point up once more the difficulty of June 28, 1984, p. 40. For the development of the NPA in the south of the archipelago see also: Rodney Tasker, "Elusive law and order'. 14. Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) or the May 1
The National Coalition of Workers Poverty (PKMK) is a regroupment of union federations including most importantly those federations affiliated to the World Federation of Unions (FSM) like
The fact that the PKMK put out a call to the May 1 organisation shows a new dynamic toward unity in the union move-
International Viewpoint 17 September 1984
uniting behind a single perspective and under a single revolutionary leadership both sections of the masses of workers and peasants for whom elections have little or no relevance and others, mainly in the urban centres, for whom participation in elections represents a genuine
RESTORE FREEDOM aspiration. In this framework the CPP
OF SPEECHe is said to be discussing what policy to follow in the elections for mayor and governor due to be held in 1986.
But much will depend in any case on the general development in the situation over the coming
Washington's year.
policy, which aims to reform the regime and at the same time ensure its continuity and unite a divided bourgeosie, will come up against some real
Firstly there are problems inherent in the regime itself. The barons of the RESTORE FREEDOM Marcos clan do not seem ready to con-
ASSEMBLY !! cede a signficant slice of their power to their political and economic competitors. On the contrary, a man like Eduardo Cojuangco, for example, is consolidating his headed up for several years a coconut production and distribution empire, he has recently taken control of another of the country's biggest businesses, one that was owned by the traditional bourgeoisie of Spanish origin - the San Miguel
Along with its financial resources, he also got its extraordinary distribution network which spans the whole country. Deepening crisis since elections
But American policy will also founder
Demonstration against the Marcos regime in November 1983 (DR) on economic obstacles. At the behest of the IMF, the Philippine government has just devalued the peso which is now floating at three different rates; 18 pesos to one US dollar on basic commodities, 19.80 pesos for other legal transactions and 24 pesos on the black market. In all probability, a further devaluation will occur between now and the end of the year. The spiral of inflation, however, is taking on dramatic proportions for the working population. The price of all basic commodities jumped by 20 to 30 per cent following the 26 per cent rise in the cost of petrol on June 6. Even those goods whose prices are controlled, such as rice and dairy products, rose by 12 per cent. On a yearly base, inflation is now breaking the 50 percent mark.
Under the pressure of an external debt of 25.6 billion dollars and the IMF's directives, the government's policy can only become more represssive. There is much disquiet in opposition circles about a phased implementation of an 'Operation Mad Dog' in the Philippines modeled on the notorious Phoenix Plan in Vietnam. This would entail the selective assassination of those oppositionists deemed dangerous to the government. Recently, a special police unit reorganised on June 18 by President Marcos summarily executed in one week 24 people who were deemed by the police to be common International Viewpoint 17 September 1984 criminals. In fact, the chief of that same force, Major General Prospero Olivas has let it be known that the people killed were members of the NPA and fundraisers for the communists. (15)
The three months since the elections have been filled with events confirming the prognosis that the crisis of the Marcos regime, far from being on the road to a a solution, is worsening.
pressure to do so, President Marcos has still not taken a single practical step to open up the political
While Cardinal Sin, the archbishop of the Philippines, calls for reconreciprocal forgiveness tween the regime and 'our brothers in the hills' (16), the army is engaged in massive military operations against the guerrilla forces, particularly in the north of Luzon. The police have been brutally repressing demonstrations, including that which took place on the day the National Assembly opened. The new Marcos government is as similar to the previous Council of Ministers as two peas in a pod. Imelda Marcos, wife of the president, is present as minister for housing and the quality of life. Cordially hated by large sectors of the business world, she had promised to withdraw from the government.
There is increasing tension between the 'technocrats' (represented by Cesar Virata, the prime minister) and the businessmen of the Marcos clan. The economic crisis is deepening, destabilising the country's economic system. The government has had to go to the aid of several banks threatened by bankruptcy including the Banco Filipino; small savers, panic-struck by alarmist rumours of bankruptcy, withdrew their money from the bank.
The official National Assembly has no credibility, and the "street parliament' has retaken the initiative. After the May 14 elections, the organisations campaigning for a boycott had to respond to the electoral enthusiasm evinced by certain sections of the mass opposition. • While emphasising the success recorded by the boycott movement, CORD noted that, 'it cannot be denied that the dictatorship has succeeded to a certain extent in projecting its own stability' In fact, 'the regime has succeeded to a certain extent 15. Le Monde, June 28, 1984. 16. Le Monde, August 23, 1984.
23
AROUND THE WORLD in dividing the democratic movement through the Batasan Pambansa elections.' (17) As for the Nationalist Alliance, noted that, "The struggle to end the life of the US-Marcos dictatorship is a long and arduous process....It is important to remember that the decision to boycott the elections meant the continuation of the militant activities that rocked the stability of the present regime after the Aquino assassination.'
The Nationalist Alliance considered that the boycott More than 600 at international movement had been a success on three levels, 'education, organisation and lead- revolutionary youth summer camp ership training. On this occasion the "people's organisations' experienced quantitative and qualitative growth'. (18) Positive effect of boycott campaign
The declarations from the organisations that led the boycott movement thus reflected the impact - in the urban milieu - of an electoralist perspective. But, above all, they underline that it is on the terrain of mass struggles that the boycott campaign must be judged. very positive balance sheet made of the intense activity during the boycott campaign was also quickly confirmed.
The anti-imperialist left was able to go back onto the initiative once the elections were over. There were successive sometimes assembling tens of thousands of people. again to the 'street parliament'
This new wave of activity since the elections culminated on August 21, 1984, the first anniversary of the assassination of Benigno Aquino. The bourgeois opfound themselves once more side by side, the yellow of the 'Aquinistos' mixed with the red of the trade unions and student organisations in a huge gathering of one million people in Manila. Similar gatherings were held simultaneously at Cebu (in the centre of the archipelago), at Baguio (in the north) and Davao (in the south) and elsewhere.
These very disciplined, morster demonstrations expressed the extraordinary depth and dynamism of the anti-dictatorial sentiment that animates the population of the Philippines. On this occasion the regime preferred not to use the
But in many place - like on Negros, the sugar island - the repression became ferocious. Peasants bodies are now being found horribly mutilated, the heads missing.
This is no longer repression, but terrorism. Given the rise of the mass struggle and the appearance of military terror, increased support to the people of the Philippines should be offered by all progressives and anti-imperialists throughout the