GULF WAR NICN
Tension and manoeuvres grow in Gulf war Diplomatic and military moves have been speeding up in the Persian Gulf area as the momentum has built up in Iran for another big push into Iraq.
On Friday, June 8, the Iranian government issued an appeal for all persons with military training to report to mobilization points before Thursday, June 14. For some weeks, there had been reports of volunteers leaving for the front.
On June 1, the Iraqi military reported that Iranian forces had begun new attempts to infiltrate the marshes in the Basra area, in particular around the Majnun Islands. It claimed that "ten enemy landing attempts the biggest play to the clash, describing the American technical assistance involved and portraying the military confrontation as larger and potentially more serious than the Saudis did.
According to the US authorities, a major air battle was averted when eleven Iranian fighters on their way to join the fight turned back.
US officials failed, if they tried, to conceal satisfaction at the confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabai.
The International Herald Tribune (June 6, 1984) quoted a "Washington source" as saying, "This was a big psychological breakthrough for the Saudis." The paper commented: "US officials have expressed irritation with what they viewed as Saudi Arabia's reluctance to take a leading role in protecting Gulf shipping against air Tearing instead a cail on autside hip, pre- attacks, pre-
The Paris daily Liberation, which is well informed on the Middle East, commented on the US reaction:
"The Pentagon specialists are not bothering to hide their satisfaction and relief at seeing Saudi Arabia *finally agree' to confront the Iranians."
When attacks on Gulf shipping first escalating in May, the US authorities stressed that in order to defend the oil routes, the American forces would need bases on the Arabian peninsula. That is, they used the danger to the oil trade to step up the pressure on Saudi Arabia to accord them bases, a step that the Saudis are obviously reluctant to take. US plans for Saudi Arabia
In the June 2 Christian Science Monitor, a paper known to be a faithful reflector of State Department briefings, a staff writer described the key strategic problems for the US in the Gulf war as follows:
"The military balance of power in the troubled Persian Gulf region increasingly focuses on a kingdom with modern weapons but little experience or appetite for conflict and a Goliath of sorts that is forced to remain on the sidelines.
"The first is Saudi Arabia and the second is the United States.
"As military analysts look at the threats that continue to spread from the Iran-Iraq war to neighbors in the Middle East and beyond, they see a situation in which theoretical military advantage is not necessarily the key determinant.
"If Saudi Arabia were to jump wholeheartedly into the war against Iran, it might easily tip the balance in Iraq's favor. And if the US had only sporadic attacks on Gulf shipping to worry about, it could do the same. But geography and geopolitics are complicating the issue for both countries....
"The main dampers on US military action are lack of an invitation from friendly Gulf states and the prospect
3 have been annihilated." have been annihilated.
After the mobilization appeal, it its new assault on the anniversary Ramadam, 661 A.D. (June 19). Gerry FOLEY
In its June 1 issue, the Iran Times (an independent Persian-language weekly serving all the overseas Iranian communities) reported that the Revolutionary Guards had been demanding a new offensive because "there are now sufficient human and moral resources, and the marshes in the Basra area are dry."
The response of the Iranian regular military reportedly was that these conditions had existed also during the previous assaults but that the end results had been defeats and heavy losses.
In his Friday sermon preceding the mobilization order, Mullah Khamenei, president of the Islamic Republic, issued a new warning to the Arabian peninsula states in particular to back off from supporting Iraq:
"Put pressure on Iraq so that it will stop setting the Persian Gulf afire. If you think that after all the help you have given Iraq that it will not listen to it, then stop helping it. Stop offering it your money and your propaganda; get out of this war. We have nothing against you. If you continue, if the countries in the region do not want to recognize the power of the Islamic Republic, if they do not want to be reasonable, we will be International Viewpoint 18 June 1984 seemed likely that Iran would launch of Imam Ali's murder on the 19 of justified in moving against all those who oppose us."
Despite these threats, however, the Islamic Republic Khamenei represents has moved notably cautiously during the countdown for its long promised "final offensive."
The outstanding example was when interceptors guided by US Awac radar tracking planes and refueled in the air by other American aircraft shot down two Iranian F-4 fighters over the Persian Gulf on June 5.
The Saudis played down the incident, reporting only that an unidentified aircraft had been shot down. The Iranian propaganda machine remained silent. The first notice of the event was the report on Iranian radio June 7 that a diplomatic note of protest had been delivered to the Saudi government. The note in question contained only a vague threat:
"The Islamic Republic of Iran warns that if such an act is repeated, and if Iranian planes, whose only mission is to stabilize the region, are again attacked, the Islamic Republic will respond severely."
Interestingly, it was "diplomatic sources" (International Herald Tribune, June 6, 1984) in Washington who gave
that the Soviet Union could be drawn in if Iran were to become any less stable than it already is.
"We are not in a position to dictate or to conciliate, since we have no relationship with Iraq," Dr Brzezinski said. "The Soviets gain if we do nothing or if we do something on our own.
"Still, attention in Washington is focusing on the military balance in the Gulf and efforts to tip that balance in Saudi Arabia's favor."
The US strategic aims at this point seem rather clear. Washington is anxious to prevent an Iranian victory, but it puts this in the context of extending the gains it has already derived from the Gulf war - that is, to deepen the conflict between Iran and the Arab states and in the process to force Saudi Arabia to accept a closer relationship with, and greater dependence on, the United States.
The Islamic Republic's stated aims remain to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. What the ruling Iranian group actually expects and how far it is prepared to go, of course, are unclear. It itself probably cannot entirely determine the pace of events.
The argument between the military and the Pasdaran is evident. All of the moral and material pressures in the mass organizations created by the Islamic regime are for continuing and escalating the war.
Furthermore, the longer the war goes on and the greater pressure it puts on Iraq, the more decisive moves become a military necessity. The Iranian government representatives and press have been saying, for example, that the only effective answer to Iraqi attempts to disrupt Iranian oil exports is by a big escalation in the land war.
On the other hand, the attacks on tankers carrying Iranian oil seem to have been having an uneven effect. Exports, which were halved at the start of the campaign, from 1.8 million barrels a day to 0.8, were reportedly back up to 1.2 to 1.4 million barrels a day by early June.
The enduring effect has been to swell the insurance rates enormously, offering the imperialist companies a bonanza as long as the attacks remain sporadic, even if numerous.
The Iranian propaganda buildup for the offensive has been notably muted by comparison with the previous big onslaughts. Despite the mobilization order and the massive numbers massed on the Iraqi front, it was not clear in advance of the expected Ramadan offensive how ambitious the Iranian objectives were. It could be simply to make further tactical gains, as in the previous offensive, and to maintain the credibility of the war for the Iranian masses, and in particular the base of the Islamic regime.
The credibility of the war and the "advance of Islam" are particularly important to those layers that benefit from the institutions created by the Islamic Republic and to the unity of the whole clerical machine.
The recent elections for the Islamic parliament were marked by sharp divisions among the clerical factions and personalities. The results were annulled in some places and Khomeini had to make appeals for the interested parties to respect the electoral tribunal's decisions, "for the sake of Islam."
Since the elections, an argument has developed among the clergy about how far to carry the rules on "female modesty." For example, a Friday or two before Khamenei's sermon on the war, his subject was the dangers of oncoming summer weather and the tendency of women to cover themselves less carefully:
"Why are they unheedful of the feelings and passions of men. Don't they know that men will become nervous? Don't they know that brother and sister Hezbollahis members of the "Party of God"] will react?" (Iran Times, June 1, 1984.)
On the other hand, the more liberal wing of the clergy has been complaining about zealots who carry the separation of the sexes in education to the point of building walls to separate male and female students.
In this atmosphere, continuing the crusade is obviously important to maintain the coherence of the clerical system and the morale of its devotees.
In the recent period also, the repression against the Tudeh Party has continued to deepen, accompanied by more "confessions" of imprisoned Tudeh leaders.
For example, in early May, the Islamic regime put Ehsan Tabari, the leading theoretician of the. Tudeh party on TV. He repudiated his life's work. The Iran Times of May 11 reported (in English), "He said his works on Islamic history and philosophy should be discarded because they were based either on foreign sources - Zionists, imperialists or Marxists with their own axes to grind -or on Iranian sources who toadied to the shah or were the agents of freemasonry."
Tabari said over TV that he had suffered a stroke in prison and had come to his new understanding only after a long period of reflection in his prison cell. He made a special attack on the Soviet Union, saying that the World Council for Peace, which he described as a Soviet creation, had never condemned Iraq for attacking Iran. Soviet press on Iran
The May 30 Izvestia carried a statement in response from the exile leadership of the Tudeh Party which said, among other things, "The ruling regime in Iran, which is wracked by a deep political and social-economic crisis produced by the continuing destruction of the Iran-Iraq war and the inability of the regime to run the affairs of the country, ran into opposition from the popular masses in the Majlis elections. In order to distract the masses from the sorry state the country is in, they are preparing a new evil operation.
"The Iranian courts are preparing a wave of trials against hundreds of Tudeh Party members. d In order to whip up an atmosphere of terror and to suppress expressions of mass discontent, they intend to sentence arrested Tudeh Party members to death. The recent TV spectacular organized with the help of former agents of the shah's secret police who are now in the service of the Islamic republic indicated the beginning of this bloody plot."
Nothing appears in either Izvestia or Pravda on international political questions except by express decision of the Soviet bureaucracy. In general, the Kremlin does not let repression of local Communists become a stumbling bloe in relations with regimes with which it seeks good relations.
In the present context, the appearance of such an article almost certainly reflected antagonism by the Soviet leadership toward the Islamic Republic on foreign policy questions.
In recent weeks also, Yasser Arafat has travelled to the Far East to try to persuade the North Koreans and Chinese to stop selling arms to Iran. He has declared the PLO's demand for peace "with no annexations of Arab land."
Furthermore, in the last few weeks, an • Iranian delegation travelled to the Soviet Union for talks with the Kremlin leaders. The upcoming Iranian offensive must certainly have been on the agenda. The Soviet Union could easily
International Viewpoint 18 June 1984 sporadic, even it numerous.
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Furthermore, the Gulf war is one of the main points on the agenda at the imperialist London summit.
Most recently, the Iranian and Iraqi governments for the first time accepted a limitation of the hostilities under international control. They agreed to a truce on bombing civilian targets beginning June 12 under UN supervision.
In the context of all these maneuvers and pressures it is obviously dangerous to make any assumptions about what direct and indirect protagonists in the Gulf war will do now. But the basic terms of the conflict and the stakes remain clear.
The Iraqi people remain united behind Bagdad against what they see as an attempt to conquer their country. Arab nationalist sentiment is overwhelming against the Iranian invasion. The Iranian military operations are no longer a defensive war in any sense, but a political adventure. The fundamental course of the conflict has been to favor imperialist reinsertion in the area and a rightward development in Iran.
The tasks of socialists and anti-imperialists also remain clear. They are to oppose the continuation of this war and to oppose the imperialists maneuvers to regain a foothold in the region. The opposition in the US congress to Reagan's moves to insinuate American military forces into the confict, through increased support for the Saudis and escorting tankers in the Gulf, reflect the pressure of antiwar feeling in the United States and at the me time the extent to which the imeralist powers have become discredited as peace keeping forces.
all Viewpoint 18 June 1984
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