The reorganisation of the union movement The following is an interview with Victor Semproni, coordinator of the Executive Secretariat of the Plenum Intersindical de los Trabajadores, which he gave to our special correspondent in Montevideo in March. Semproni was vice-president of the Central Nacional del Trabajo (National Labor Confederation), which was banned by the dictatorship in 1973. He also represented the bank workers union in the CNT executive. He was imprisoned from 1974 to 1979.
Question. Could you go back over the main stages in the reorganization of the trade-union movement under the dictatorship that led up to the present PIT.
Answer. When you discuss the reorganization of the unions, you have to start from 1973. That was when the union movement reached its highest level of organization and unity. For years, there had already been attempted coups d'etat. The powerful CNT had decided, therefore, to respond to any new attempts of this sort by a general strike with occupation of the factories. This idea got well established in the minds of the workers.
However, when the 1973 coup d'etat occurred, the CNT did not call a general strike but only a renewable 24-hour strike. It was the ranks of the union movement that forced the general strike and spontaneously occupied the workplaces. The slogan of an unlimited strike went around by word of mouth.
The general strike held solidly for eight days. After that it started to ebb, and there were expulsions and severe repression. The watchword nationally was not to get into any confrontation with the army. So, when the troops came, the workers evacuated the factories, to return a couple of days later.
The military regime finally responded by banning the CNT and issuing an order for the arrest of its leaders. This massive repression led to the dismantling of the trade-union structures. The fugitive union leaders went into exile, and union leaders on all levels were fired. Some died in prison, under torture. The entire trade-union infrastructure was destroyed. The CNT had 220 member unions, but only five survived the advent of the dictatorship, and in fact they continued more in the form of associations or sporting clubs than of unions worthy of the name. We saw a nearly total liquidation of the union movement.
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Q. Since the movement was so completely shattered, what were the first steps toward the reorganization of the union movement? .
A. The period after 1973 can be divided into three stages.
First, following the ban on the CNT, the dictatorship issued a decree that the unions had to ask all their members to re-sign up. The government was counting on intimidation to prove that the unions were no longer representative.
Nonetheless, the unions rose to the challenge. To the surprise of the military, they signed up more members by name and address than they had before the 1973 coup. This was a demonstration of total support for their militant class-struggle tradition, despite the differences that existed about the orientation imposed on the movement by the Communist Party, differences that were, obviously, sharper after the general strike. So, unable to show that the unions had no mass base, the dictatorship changed its tack and simply went out to wipe them out altogether.
This opened a second phase, five very rough years for the union movement, from 1973 to 1978, in which, under foreign pressure, the regime rigged up "Parity Commissions" as a substitute for unions. These commissions were not at all like unions. But the surviving elements of the trade-union movement tried to move into the most minimal opening. So, they gained control of the Parity Commissions. Another failure for the government! The dictatorship only recognized and gave formal status to the yellow commissions, which were a tiny minority. It found a thousand and one pretexts for not recognizing the great majority of these commissions.
Finally, we went into a third stage. Confronted with all these failures, the regime took a new initiative in 1979-80. Through the navy's intelligence service, it made semiofficial contacts with trade-union leaders The draft of a new trade. union leaders. The draft of a new trade-union code was already in the works. The military claimed, therefore, that they were ready to collaborate with these union leaders to revive the union movement, if they were "democrats" and not Communists.
This liberalization maneuver was met with a categorical refusal from the union leaders. At that time, I was already free. (I had been in prison from 1974 to 1979.) And I participated in a meeting with the bank-workers union leaders. The first thing we demanded was trade-union freedom, without any government tutelage. That was the dictatorship's third failure.
The trade-union code was finally voted into law in 1981. It formalized the fetters placed on trade-union functioning and helped to atomize the movement. The right of the movement to exist was recognized but not its right to act.
The union movement was the only force that opposed the 1973 coup d'etat. So, the military viewed it as their special enemy. That's why they subjected it to 12 so much harassment, repression, and got so many union activists fired. Nonetheless, the new law did make an extraordinary concession. It made it possible to hold general assemblies to elect a provisional union leadership.
These assemblies were supposed to take place under the surveillance of a representative of the authorities. But any worker could be elected, although the Minister of Labor could later censure the elected leadership. No matter, this mechanism gave union work a new legitimacy in the factories. trade Sion you Q. So, you used the dictatorship's trade-union law to get around the repression and get a basis for legal basic organization?
A. We used the union law with the idea of going beyond it. That in fact is what happened. The first year, leading up to May Day, we put the regime on the spot by presenting an official request for a permit to celebrate Labor Day, signed by 50 official union structures.
Theoretically, the law forbade the combination of union structures into industrial federations or across professional lines. Nonetheless, we got an unexpected positive answer. Maybe the government had the idea again that it would show that the union structures lacked authority and representativity. In fact, the May Day celebration was an enormous success. This initiative tapped a deepgoing desire to act and to break from passivity. About 150,000 workers turned out for the rally, pointing up the gap between the extent of the structures actually organized and their ability to mobilize.
The name Plenario was chosen because assemblies of workers across professional lines were not permitted and the union leaders needed to meet together. We negotiated again with the police, who would not permit assemblies but agreed to
"plenary meetings." So, we said, OK, let's make it a plenario, and that's how the famous PIT got started.
Q. Did the PIT come out of the successful May Day demonstration?
A. After this success, there was a period of inaction, due partly to our organizational weaknesses. Nonetheless, we took the initiative of sending a delegation to the meeting of the International Labor Organization (ILO). This was important to establish our legitimacy and gain the solidarity of the international union movement.
The government refused to authorize our delegation, and sent a representative of yellow unionism, the yellowest there was. But the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) supported our move, including our representatives in their own delegation to the ILO.
When our representatives returned, the government refused to let us organize a reception, which would have turned into a trade-union demonstration. It was then that we organized a "round table" (provisional leadership) of the PIT, with a representative from each national union, twenty members, and a provisional secretariat of seven members. On the basis of this structure, assemblies arose in nearly all the enterprises. They also formed in the public sector, where they were explicitly banned by the union law. These assemblies took various forms (civic associations), or came out directly as union assemblies where the relationship of forces permitted it, as in ANCAP.
In September 1983, the reinforced union movement took the initiative again. At first with modest actions, such as ten minute strikes, that gave the movement a chance to regain its confidence. On November 9, we held a demonstration that was harshly repressed by the police. The struggle demonstrated the PIT's authority, even in the public administration, despite the risk of sanctions.
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International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
You have to remember that public workers are divided up into three categories. The first are the respectable ones.
The second are officials whose promotion is blocked. And the third are the black sheep of public administration.
It should be added that after August
1983, the reorganization of the unions combined more and more closely with the general process of reviving mass mobilization. The point of departure was the initiative taken by the "Peace and Justice" association on the occasion of the
Uruguayan independence day, August 25.
It organized a fast, which it presented as a moment of reflection for the people, so that every Uruguayan could think over the question: "What should I do today to help bring about the change Uruguay needs?"
Through the 15 days of the fast, there were constant discussions with the hunger strikers. The action ended on August
25 with a massive turning out of lights and a vast pot-banging concert (cacerolzao).
After that the PIT participated actively in the mass movement, alonside the students, "Peace and Justice," the professional associations and the political parties. Thus, the legal traditional parties suffered from a contradiction. A considerable part of their electoral base were workers. But the regime's economic policy led to disaster. In ten years time, wages lost 60% of their buying power, production was in free fall and commerce was strangled.
So, the traditional parties had to ride the mobilization to a certain point. But they did not want to go so far as to organize street mobilizations, for fear of losing control. They wanted a limited and controlled protest to put pressure on the regime over a negotiated loosening up.
We workers saw mobilization as our only guarantee, and we wanted to continue. The social movements, including the PIT, thus called two protest actions, on December 24, and 31, 1983, without the traditional parties. Some parties, not all, joined in. The Colorado Party then expressed its concern, saying that no moves should be made in January because the army was reorganizing its hierarchy. It was fundamentally the pressure of the activist base that forced through the call for a general strike on January 18, 1984. This was necessary to draw in even sections of the PIT that were hesitant.
The strike call, moreover, reflected the need to gain a better relationship of forces in order to confront the problem of wages being frozen and the charges for public services going up. Since the start of January, there had been social conflicts, factory occupations.
The PIT then called an assembly in solidarity with the sections of workers involved in struggle. It was this assembly of all the unions that put pressure on the national union leaderships, some of which were less than enthusiastic about calling the January 18 action. This general strike, International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
300,000 people against the dictatorship in Montevideo, November 1983 (DR)
the first in ten years, was an enormous success. It was marked by strong support from the workers but also by the backing it got from other strata of the population.
Q. What perspectives opened up after the January 18 action?
A. After the January 18 strike, we continued to discuss the perspective of a still bigger struggle, a "great national day of protest." But the traditional political parties did everything they could to hold this back. So, now we are seeing a proliferation of different sectoral or local initiatives - a demonstration for amnesty, the March 8 Women's Day demonstration, strikes, etc.
Q. Elections are to be held in November. Many recent examples, including Spain after Franco's death, show that the bourgeoisie often tries to offer a certain "democratic institutionalization" in exchange for a "social pact" that involves the workers accepting the burden of the crisis. What would be your reaction to such a pact?
A. This question of a "social pact" is the subject of argument. Personally, I don't want to talk about any pacts. But even if we have a revolutionary position, some sort of social accord is necessary. The ideal, of course, would be to directly undertake a revolutionary project, to liquidate not only the dictatorship but also the bourgeoisie and capitalism.
The only problem is that today we have no instrument for accomplishing this. The "class-struggle" left is not able to take power. We are heading therefore for a process of transition, because I doubt that the government that comes out of the November elections will really be a democratic one. But just having an election is a step forward, and it opens up important possibilities by comparison with the present situation.
But what sort of question will come up if this liberalization does not go hand in hand with a social accord? The bourgeois parties are going to come to power. The government is going to have to confront the social situation. We risk an escalation, new chaos and the closing of the opening. On the basis of the strength of the social movements and the relationship of forces, we can put forward some precise and vital demands, such as, for example, trade-union freedoms and full political rights, amnesty for all political prisoners and a change in economic policy involving a bigger part of the national income going to wages.
If we could get agreement on these three questions, we could extend the discussion to the big national questions. For the Uruguayan workers, an accord meeting these three points would be a framework for a viable transition.
Through such a social accord, we would have to aim to bring to the negotiating table an alternative position on the sort of society we want. This confrontation must be an opportunity for us to undertake a big ideological struggle to raise the consciousness of the working masses by openly and publicly taking on the bourgeois parties.
We must establish a great national debate to break the mechanism that is leading the majority of the workers to vote again for the traditional parties, the Colorados and the Blancos. The negotiation I am talking about can serve as a springboard for challenging the bourgeosie in the eyes of public opinion.
Q. A last question. How do you see relations between the PIT and the banned CNT?
A. The trade-union movement that exists today is in fact the CNT. There is only a problem of names. It will be resolved as soon as we have the freedom to give the union movement a program, to elect its leadership and to choose a name. There is no danger of division. The Uruguayan trade-union movement is united. We have a plan for organizing, despite the formal banning of the PIT
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