time, it was aimed at scoring some points in the competition with the other counterrevolutionary forces, in particular the FDN. In the wake of the occupation of San Juan, Pastora's brother, Orion, spokesperson of the ARDE, told the press
A very dangerous stage has been reached that there could be no unification with the FDN unless it was purged of former Somocista criminals and unless it drastically changed its methods. (Corriere della Sera, April 19.)
Over and above the statements, it is clear: 1) The CIA has decided also to play the Pastora card; 2) Through its
A little more than two years ago, in March 1982, the Nicaraguan government declared a state of national emergency. This was in response to the escalation of counterrevolutionary attacks to a much higher level than in the preceding years.
Since then, the aggressions against the
Sandinista regime have grown at a quickening rate.
According to official accounts, such as a report made by Humberto
Ortega on December 28, the increase in attacks can be summarized as follows: "Air operations" grew from 275 in 1982 to 620 in 1983, operations" from 24 to 169, and "infiltrations" and "other military provocations" from 69 to 108.
The number killed was already over a thousand on the side of the revolutionary forces, while the counterrevolutionaries were said to have lost 1,824.
During the first months of 1984 and in particular in recent weeks, the escalation has assumed still more spectacular
It is difficult, for obvious proportions.
reasons, to give precise figures.
But acaccording to Nicaraguan government sources, the counterrevolutionary forces number about 8,000, of which 5,000 are inside Nicaragua. According to imperialist sources, the number is 12,000 to
15,000.
In any case, in a recent press conference, the three Sandinista commanders -
Joaquin Cuadra, Lenin Cerda and Julio
Ramos - declared that the counterrevolutionary offensive underway was "the biggest"
and the "most savage" since the start of the conflict. (1)
The counterrevolutionary assault is being waged in three sectors.
In the north, the ex-Somocistas of the FDN are stepping up their harassment actions and
They have penetrated more their crimes.
than a hundred kilometers into Nicaraguan territory, and they are active in particular to the east of Matagalpa. In the northeast, and especially along the Atlantic coast between Puerto Cabezas and the Honduran frontier, the Miskito Indian forces led by Steadman Fagoth are oper-
Other Miskito forces under the action in San Juan del Norte and its presence in other zones along the Atlantic coast, ARDE has acquired a greater weight in the counterrevolutionary front. 3) The Pastora-Rebelo duo can play a more dangerous political role in particular insofar as it can much more easily get a hearing from certain bourgeois political forces and Social Democratic parties in Western Europe (this was the aim of the recent tour that Alfonso Robelo did in Europe while the San Juan del Norte ating. leadership of Brooklin Rivera are collaborating with Eden Pastora's ARDE in the south.
In fact, the most distinctive feature in Managua demonstration against US invasion, October 1983 (DR) recent months has been precisely much more intensive and systematic activity by the ARDE. For a whole period, Pastora complained that he was not getting aid, and therefore was not in a position to undertake effective actions. This situation has changed quite radically since the beginning of the year.
The ARDE has gotten a lot of materiel from the CIA. "Today," the Corriere della Sera correspondent wrote on April 19, "the ARDE depots are full of arms of all sorts. We have seen even bazookas and International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
M-79 rifles that can destroy machinegun nests. In San Juan del Norte, the ARDE even used Sam 6 and Sam 7 missiles. • We have seen modern American helicopters. Obviously, there is no lack of means."
The San Juan del Norte operation, which has been given ample play in the international press, had more of a political than a military significance. The ARDE wanted to demonstrate that there are highly vulnerable zones that can be temporarily occupied. At the same operation was going on).
In addition to the counterrevolutionary operations on three fronts, there is the mining of the ports. The internation•al press has drawn attention to the repeated attacks against the port of Corinto on the Pacific Coast. The most serious of these forced the temporary evacuation of 2,000 persons and destroyed 6.5 million litres of gasoline. 1. See in particular, Le Monde, April 14, 1984, and the International Herald Tribune, April 21-22, 1984.
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NICARAGUA
"Conta- bourgeois parties have directed against it
More recently, an April 5 dispatch by the Agencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN) reports, the port of Benjamin Zeledon on the Atlantic coast was "completely destroyed," while the ports of Puerto
Cabezas on the Atlantic and Potosi on the Pacific coast also came under attack.
US warships were in Nicaraguan territorial waters at the time of these attacks.
According to ANN again, "with the mining of the main Nicaraguan ports at the end of February, the CIA has imposed a veritable naval blockade of Nicaragua.
This follows the failure of air and sea attacks on Nicaraguan installations."
All of these attacks have failed to dent the military and political strength of the
Sandinista regime. But the counterrevolutionaries have shown that they are in a position to strike hard blows, to establish themselves in zones of the country, and to achieve operational superiority at chosen points, especially in attacks on the local militias, which have proved to be less well armed and trained than the dora must be more dynamic," Sergio Ramirez announced on March 23.
Three weeks later, the ANN wrote: "The moves by the Contadora Group are proceeding very slowly because of the character of this bloc, which functions on the basis of consensus. Its activity has assumed a still more vague character as a result of the opposition frequently shown by the American government." (April 5.) think, with some basis, that the US objective in regard to Nicaragua was to keep increasing the pressure to force the Sandinistas to take their distance from the Salvadoran revolution and thereby facilitate a political solution acceptable for the counterrevolution. It was also possible to think that there would not be any open imperialist aggression in Central America before the US elections in November.
The evolution of the situation now casts doubt on any such assumptions. is significant that Le Monde's Washington correspondent has written: the intermediary of forces that have been reduced to the status of auxiliaries, the US has become involved de facto in a war against revolutionary Nicaragua." (April
A mechanism has now been set in motion that can get out of the control of those who launched it, major military confrontation on Nicarvery dangerous stage has been It would be a grave error for the solidarity movements throughout the world to fail to fully appreciate this.