Mass mobilization and the planned elections
December 1, 1981, and now, in the department of North Zelaya." They apply to those who are presently in jail, whether or not they have been sentenced, as well as to those who are at liberty inside the country, and to those who have fled abroad.
The political considerations that led to
While attempting to isolate the Nicaraguan revolution with an economic and diplomatic boycott, American imperialism is launching increasingly large-scale military actions. The Kissinger committee report on Central
America has just reasserted both the "inevitability" of US intervention in
El Salvador and the analysis that, for the United States, "the use of Nicaragua as a base for Soviet and Cuban attempts to penetrate the rest of the Central American isthmus, with El Salvador as the prime target, imparts a major strategic dimension to the conflict." (1)
The recent decisions of the National Reconstruction Government and
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), such as the amnesty for
Miskitos involved in counterrevolutionary activities, the stepped-up distribution of land to the peasants in the last few months of 1983, and the announcement that elections for a Constituent Assembly and the offices of president and vice-president of the republic will be held on November
4, 1984, must be viewed in this context of increasing danger of imperialist intervention.
Claude DEVILLIERS
The question of Nicaragua's Atlantic
Coast peoples - Miskitos, Sumas, Ramas and Criollos - has become a major theme of the imperialist propaganda campaign against the Sandinista regime. The Sandinista government has been accused of wanting to exterminate these peoples.
At the same time, the contras have made a major effort to win their support. At first, the contras tried to win over a few traditional leaders of the village communities; later, they organized the systematic kidnapping and deportation of entire communities to Honduras.
As a result, a real danger developed that the Atlantic Coast populations targeted by the contras might become completely estranged from the revolutionary
The problem was made worse process.
by the fact that the Sandinista leadership had been caught somewhat unawares by the complex problems that emerged when it attempted to involve these peoples, who were very attached to their traditions, in the process of the revolution and in the sort of mobilizing structures it had set up in other parts of the country. The
Atlantic Coast peoples' attitude towards the Sandinista government is different from that of the rest of the Nicaraguan people because of a series of historical facts ranging from the low level of political consciousness and involvement in the anti-Somoza struggle in their region, to cultural and linguistic particularities, and the extreme poverty left behind by imperialist companies who ruthlessly used the labor of these peoples to cut wood, mine gold and grow bananas, only to move on when these activities became less region. The FSLN rapidly recognized and corrected these errors. statement of Commandante Sergio Ramirez recalled this fact and explained that "We are paying the price of the many mistakes we've made.
Their isolation and backwere traditional things. first problem is to change their consciousness, to teach them the new techniques without rushing them and with a display of respect for their differences. Then things will change of themselves. However, we think that the Miskitos are also Nicaraguans, and we cannot accept that they should live outside the revolution. All we need is to find the right balance." (3) Amnesty for Miskitos
By now, the Sandinista revolution's record on this issue is quite positive. The Atlantic Coast peoples already enjoy a series of social gains such as literacy, the reestablishment of their traditional village organization, and the land reform which has turned over fertile lands to them and enabled them in 1983 to increase their revenue and improve their crops. The Miskitos who were removed by the FSLN from the fighting zone near the Honduran border and settled further inside the country in 1981, "are now living better and more happily," says Sergio Ramirez; "at this point, they would rather remain in their new settlements" where they have access to a whole series of social facilities (sanitary equipment, doctors, schools) that their traditional isolation had deprived them of. (4) This positive balance sheet is confirmed by the this decision are a good illustration of the FSLN's approach. One of the points made is that "the situation of counterrevolutionary aggression prevalent in their region, their centuries-long underdevelopment, the exploitation they suffered and the delays in establishing communication networks there, have made these populations easy victims of manipulation, deception and subjection through terror at the hands of counterrevolutionary bands." (5) This analysis and the measures taken represent a demonstration of political strength by the Sandinista regime. They are all the more remarkable for having been taken at a time when Nicaragua is facing a vicious imperialist aggression.
As of now, hundreds of Miskitos have benefitted from the amnesty, either by being able to return from Honduras or by being freed by the Sandinistas. Moreover, when some of these communities expressed their desire to return to Nicaragua, the contras initiated a series of new raids designed either to kidnap Miskitos, such as the December 20 raid against the Francia Sirpe community, or to massacre them, such as the January 6 attack which killed 200 Miskitos of the Mokoron settlement in Honduras as they were attempting to reach Nicaragua.
It seems that the political impact of this decision has been largely positive for the revolution, even though there does exist a risk that the contras may be able to use the amnesty to "legally" infiltrate Nicaragua, and that the bourgeois opposition may gain some leeway in its attempts to attract the political support of these communities. The Sandinista leadership understands that the problems of differing levels and rhythms of involvement of different layers in the revolution, a consequence of the social, cultural and political diversity of the Nicaraguan masses and of the social weight of the non-proletarian layers, cannot be resolved by the amnesty alone. Sergio Ramirez pointed this out when he said: "The amnesty has already produced some good results. Many Miskitos are coming back but the amnesty will not be enough." (6)
This type of problem was also reflected in the definition of the land reform: 1. Quoted in Intercontinental Press, New York, February 6, 1984. 2. See Inprecor (IV's French-language sister profitable.
The Sandinista leaders' unprepared. the relative importance of their war drive
10 fact that the contras have downgraded publication), No 155, July 18, 1983
Le Monde, February 15, 1984. 4. Idem. 5. Barricada, December 2, 1983. 6. Le Monde, February 15, 1984.
International Viewpoint 26 March 1984
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NICARAGUA
SANDINO VIVE
Election date was announced on the fiftieth anniversay of Sandino's assassination (DR)
DITIMI
VENCT the social weight of the peasant layers and the focus of the contra propaganda addressed to peasants led the Sandinista leadership to proclaim the "inalienability" of the land distributed to peasants, as well as of the land of "patriotic producers who respect the revolution." The reason for this move was a sentence at the end of the land reform titles granting land which stipulated that land was state property. The contras had used that sentence as grist for their anti-government propaganda mill. At the same time, a discussion has been initiated regarding the conditions under which land reform titles can be sold and on the specific limitations that should be imposed on potential purchases of such land to avoid the reconstitution of large estates.
During the last months of 1983, in the midst of overt imperialist aggression, the distribution of land to the peasants has been stepped up. This also represents a decision to confront a big challenge to the Sandinista revolution. top 5 percent of landowners owned 41 percent of the arable land in estates of over 350 hectares (864.50 acres), while the bottom 70 percent of agricultural producers farmed arable land on plots of less than 7 hectares (17.3 acres), and one third of the active population - that is 80,000 families - were landless and jobless. (7) The land reform had to solve the problems of the two latter categories of the rural population. 1983 decisive year for land reform
The first decrees after the fall of the dictatorship confiscated the lands of Somoza and then of the Somocistas. This first phase saw a little over one million hectares (2.47 million acres), i.e. 20 percent of arable land, turned into an Area of People's Property (APP) and redistributed in the form of state enterprises since most of the former estates had been International Viewpoint 26 March 1984
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large sugar-cane and coffee plantations that the Sandinistas did not want to break up. This meant that the state gained control of a decisive sector of the second phase of the land reform began in July 1981 with a decree expropriating lands that had been abandoned, left to lie fallow or underutilized. It began to satisfy the democratic demands of the many landless peasants for access to small land ownership. By the end of 1983, over 350,000 hectares (864,500 acres) had been expropriated under this decree and distributed to 22,000 peasant families either individually or as part of cooperatives.
These reforms have already profoundly transformed the structure of land ownership since the largest landowners now own 12 percent of the arable land, as opposed to 41 percent in 1978, and the small landowners have received an additional 65 percent of arable land over and above what they had in 1978.
The distribution of land was considerably stepped up during the last months of 1983, amounting to what can be considered a third phase of the land reform. In 1983 alone, 250,000 hectares (617,500 acres) of land were distributed to the peasants, i.e. two and a half times more arable land than was distributed be-
1981, and the end of Land distributed in the last 41 days of 1983 represents 30 percent of all land turned over to the peasants since
It should be noted here that of the 250,000 hectares distributed in 1983, only 175,000 (432,250 acres) came from newly expropriated land; the rest came from the APP which will be further reduced in 1984 according to existing plans.
Nevertheless, 1983 can be described as the year of a decisive step in the implementation of the land reform, despite the imperialist war against Nicaragua. This is confirmed by the fact that the distribution of land was complemented by a moratorium on the debts owned by more than one third of peasant cooperatives and individual peasants to the state.
Plans for this year project the distribution of even more land than in 1983. Commandante Bayardo Arce, the FSLN Political Committee coordinator, announced that 500,000(1,235,000 acres) of land would be distributed as part of a program due to start on February 18, with grants of 35,000 hectares (86,400 acres) to the peasants of the Palacaguina zone of the Madriz department in the north of the country. By the end of 1984, one million hectares (2.47 million acres) should have been distributed to the peasants in a country whose total surface is 130,000 square kilometers (50,780 square miles). (Nueva Nicaragua Agency, Paris, February 23, 1984.)
The stepped up implementation of the land reform was accompanied by increased mass mobilization and political intervention occasioned by the debates going on in the Council of State. Commandante Jaime Wheelock said on December 9, 1983, that "We have over 600,000 militants in the people's organizations. I believe the Sandinista Front is the strongest political organization in Nicaragua. From the point of view of moral and political power, we might even have the strongest organization ever in Nicaragua or Central America." (8) The fact is, for a country of 3 million people, the membership figures of the various mass are quite impressive: 40,000 in the Rural Workers Association (Asociacion de los Trabajadores del Campo - ATC); 90,000 in the Sandinista Workers Confederation (Central Sandinista de los Trabajadores - CST); 70,000 in the Luisa Armanda Espinosa Nicaraguan Women's Association (Asociacion figures are taken from Nicaragua weekly telex release of the Managua Central American Historical Institute (IHCA), January 29, 1984.
Intercontinental Press, February 20, 1984. 11
de las Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Armanda Espinosa - AMNLAE); 30,000 for the July 19 Sandinista Youth (Juventud Sandinista - JS 19), several thousands of whom are involved in the volunteer brigades harvesting cotton; 500,000 in the 12,000 Sandinista Defence Committees (Comites de Defensa Sandinista -CDS); and 70,000 in the Farmers' and Livestock Raisers National Union (Union Nacional de los Agricultores y Ganaderos - UNAG). (9) This mobilization extends to the military front, with the organization of the Sandinista People's Militias (Milicias Populares Sandinistas — MPS) that have recruited over 80,000 people on a volunteer basis, while another 10 to 15,000 have joined reserve battalions. A draft (Servicio Militar Patriotico - SMP) is also being established, all to back up the 20 to 25,000 strong Sandinistas People's Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista - EPS).
These figures alone do not convey the full scope of the people's mobilization in Nicaragua. This mobilization has also been reflected in the intervention of mass organizations into the Council of State debates, as occurred when the AMNLAE stepped into the discussion of the Law on Education, in October 1982, to demand that the rights of unwed mothers taken into account, or when it entered the debate on the draft to demand that women be allowed to participate in the active division of the patriotic military service, on a voluntary basis, contrary to the initial conscription law which had exempted them from the draft. Clearly, the Council of State is not only the gathering place of the representatives of the toilers' mass organizations but also an arena for real political debate around the various laws being considered. This is the political achievement that the projected Constituent Assembly is expected to embody. At least, this is how the organized popular masses of Nicaragua view the elections scheduled for next November 4.
The exact procedures for these elections are only beginning to be formulated. The first decrees announcing simultaneous elections for the offices of president and vice-president and to a 90-member Constituent Assembly, were published in early December 1983. They specified that candidates would be elected by universal suffrage and for a term of six years. The president and vice-president would be chosen in a nationwide ballot, the Constituent Assembly members through regional votes on the basis of proportional representation.
The first two years of the Assembly are to be dedicated to drafting a Constitution, the next to legislating. The decrees also strip leaders of counterrevolutionary organizations, those convicted of counterrevolutionary actions and not amnestied, supporters of the restoration of a Somocista or similar regime, and advocates of foreign intervention in Nicaragua, of voting and eligibility rights. They establish the right to vote for eighteen-year olds. On February 21, 1984, on 12 the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of Augusto Cesar Sandino, the "general of the free people," and a day of national mobilization of the CDS, the date of the elections was officially announced: November 4, 1984.
There are several indications that the Sandinista leadership also hopes to use this electoral process to hold off, at least temporarily, the threat of a direct imperialist military intervention. The very choice of the date, scheduled for two days before the US elections can be interpreted in this light. The same seems to apply to Commandante Humberto Ortega's statement that 'the electoral process cannot be separated from the Central American developments and the aggressions perpetrated by the United States and Honduras against us," (10) or the January 4, 1984, Council of State decision, to indefinitely postpone the debate on the draft law on the organization of elections, following a series of contra air raids launched from Honduras and claimed by the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses -FDN). Mass organizations influence debate on election law
But by January 6, the Council of State had already reconsidered this decision. The Sandinista leaders have repeatedly made the point that the scheduling of elections could be jeopardized by aggression or aerial bombardments. At the same time, the FSLN remains conscious that "Washington only projects a military solution (and that) the United States will never accept the legitimation of Sandinista power through elections" Sergio Ramirez recently stated. (11)
The domestic bourgeois opposition, although it had been tirelessly calling for elections over the last two years, immediately disassociated itself from the elections when they were actually announced. It particularly decried the fact that the election law "explicitly forbids political leaders who are outside the country from participating in the elections." (12) The "Ramiro Sacasa" Democratic Coordinating Committee — a coalition of the borgeois opposition parties (Constitutional Liberal Party, Social-Democratic Party, Social-Christian Party), the Cosep (Supreme Council of Private Enterprise), and two trade union confederations, the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation and the Trade Union Unification Confederation - waged its campaign around the following issues: For a separation of party and state; amnesty for "all" Nicaraguans; for giving Somocistas the right to vote; for setting the voting age at 21; for removing the right to vote from the military; and for holding the elections to the Assembly and the Presidency on separate dates... As of now, then, the bourgeois opposition is moving towards a position of boycotting the elections, but this perspective has not been adopted unanimously.
The mass organizations have reacted against these criticisms and mobilized. Many articles in the FSLN's organ, Barricada have reported these popular reactions. As a general rule, they present the elections as an institutionalization of the revolution, "another battle the people must wage to legalize the power it conquered on July 19, 1979." 'A report published in the January 26 Barricada gave extensive coverage to the workers' reactions.
One of those interviewed said: "I don't want elections, things are good as they are;" another: "I think the elections will strengthen the revolution even further. We, the workers, will answer the bourgeoisie by supporting the Sandinista Front."
The election law has already become a major challenge for the organized Nicaraguan masses and their leadership, the FSLN. On January 19, the CST's general secretary announced that this body would help organize "a national mobilization of the working class to guarantee that the draft election law for Nicaragua corresponds to our hopes."
The Sandinista Youth has also entered the fray with a campaign to lower the voting age to sixteen. On January 31, 600 officers of the capital's CDSes met in Managua and came to the conclusion that the voting age could be lowered to fiteen. Youth have demonstrated on this issue, and the JS-19 has launched a petition to win the right to vote for sixteenand seventeen-year olds under the slogan: "We are building the country, we want to vote." Speaking at the February 21 rally, government coordinator Daniel Ortega announced that he considered 16-year olds had won their right to vote by their massive participation in the revolution and legislation to this effect would be recommended to the Council of State. This body is meeting daily to draft the new electoral law and is expected to complete its work by mid-March. The latest reports are that the election period will start in mid-May with most aspects of the state of emergency being lifted by that time. Political parties that run a full slate of candidates will receive 600,000 dollars in state financing. To be on the national ballot they must collect 5,000 signatures. (13)
The way in which the masses are approaching this test of strength very clearly demonstrates their unwillingness to relinquish the slightest bit of their hard-won power. This was clearly stated by the CST general secretary: "These elections will institutionalize the power of the workers,...we are going to make sure that not a single firm, not a single factory, not a single bank, not an inch of territory can be taken out of the people's hands. We are going to make sure that the bourgeoisie will never return to power." (14)
• 9. Barricada, December 26, 1983. 10. Le Monde, February 7, 1984. 11. Idem, February 15, 1984. 12. La Prensa, January 17, 1984. 13. Intercontinental Press, March 19, 1984. 14. Barricada, January 19, 1984.
International Viewpoint 26 March 1984
everywhere. They face high youth unemployment. • There is no industrialization. And even agriculture is being taken over by outsiders. And this was aggravated by the suppression of their own national aspirations.