A new stage opens
October 1982 marked the opening of a new stage in Bolivia. An upsurg of struggles culminated in the fall of the military regime put in powe ay enement oria Peop coupemocratic Union (UBP).
The UDP is a coalition comprising the Communist Party of Bolivia
(PCB), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Vice-President
Paz Zamora and the Left Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNRI), wing of the old nationalist party brought to power by the revolution of 1952. The new regime was presided over by Hernan Siles Suazo.
The struggles that led to the downfall of the military dictatorship began in November 1981, when the Huanuni miners mobilized to fight for higher wages and recognition of their union, for a general amnesty and for reinstatement of all the workers who had been fired for political reasons.
In late August 1982, the Mineworkers Union of Bolivia (FSTMB)
Then the Huanuni miners took a new initiative,
In turn, the industrial workers in Cochabamba joined in the struggle, while peasants set up roadblocks.
On September 16, 1982, in response to demands by the miners at Siglo
Veinte and Catavi, the Bolivian Confederation of Labor (COB) issued a call for a general strike. The country was paralyzed.
At that point, the military announced the departure of General Vildoso, who had been made head of state in July 1982. On October 1, the parliament which had been elected on June 29, 1980 - and whose instal lation was blocked by General Garcia Meza's coup — was called into session to ratify the accession of Siles Suazo to the presidency and the formation of a government of the UDP, which had won 40% of the votes
BOLIVIA called a 48-hour strike. going on an indetinite strike.
To better understand the 1982 crisis, it is useful to review briefly the period opened by General Hugo Banzer's military coup of August 21, 1971.
Banzer's regime was in a relatively strong position for a number of reasons. A grave defeat had been inflicted on the workers movement. The peasants were largely neutralized. The prices of raw materials were rising, and Bolivian oil production had started to soar.
Banzer had the support of a social bloc including the mine owners; an agrarian bourgeoisie linked to international finance capital; the industrial, banking and commercial bourgeoisie. He had, moreover, the backing of imperialism.
In this context, Banzer sought to promote a process of restructuring "modernization" similar to that experienced in other Latin-American countries after the late 1950s. This policy brought
Between 1971 and 1976, national income grew on the average 6% a year. Tin remained the country's main product, but its share of exports declined from 44.6% of the total in 1970 to 30% in 1976. At the same time, oil rose from 6% to 25%
Moreover, the smelting of ore started to be done in the country itself, while a International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
1980, and in the installation of petrochemicals industry and a steel industry also began to develop. a boom, to some extent, in the building industry, especially in the capital. Major projects were undertaken to build up the economic infrastructure of the country.
In this period, the semi-colonial socioeconomic structure was brought to a new stage of complexity, with the traditional forms of backwardness and dependence being combined with more modern forms of concentration and penetration of imperialist capital. This involved not just North American capital but Japanese, British and West German as well.
As well as through direct investments, foreign capital penetrated and came to dominate major sectors of activity through loans, the granting of licences, the introduction of relatively advanced technology, the supply of raw materials not available locally and the "aid" offered by international agencies. men were often partners in multinational
This process of modernization rather quickly began to run out of steam. The effects of the world economic crisis that began in the mid-1970s hit Bolivia with some delay, but subsequently they stepped up and multiplied the tensions and contradictions in the Banzer "model." Economic growth was blocked or even wiped out. The political repercussions of
The Banzer regime came to a dismal end, six years after its
The period from the end of 1977 to the military coup of July 1980 represented an interlude, marked by the resumption of mass struggles, reorganization of the workers and peasants movement, and the growth of the UDP, which gained the largest number of votes but not an overall majority in three successive elections (July 1978, July 1979 and June
General Garcia Meza's coup on July 17, 1980, was the response of the most reactionary sector of the military and of the sections of the ruling class most involved in the extralegal accumulation of capital stimulated by narcotics production and traffic. These forces wanted to impose a reactionary solution along the lines of the Argentine coup of 1976.
However, the situation in Bolivia in 1980 was not the same as the one in Arbe made clear that mining is as regards the creation of financial 1978 mining accounted for only 7.3% of the GNP and employed 5.2% of the economically active population.
accounted for 16% of the GNP and employed 45% of the economically active population. (V. J. M. de la Cueva, Bolivia: Imperialismo y Oligarchia, La Paz 1983, P. 1982, 4.7% of the economically active population were employed in tin production, and this accounted for 6% of the GNP. 35% of state revenues derived from the produc-
In Bolivia, tensions and conflicts at all levels.
the following months. Its most significant expressions were the following: A daily, published a series of articles giving au wave of struggles developed, involving al- overall picture of the conflicts that developed most all categories of workers, marked by in the preceding six months.
four years earlier. the workers movement had already begun to undergo a process of recomposition and reinforcement after several years of building up its forces.
begun to develop in the peasant movement. Moreover, the general context in Latin America had changed considerably.
General Garcia Meza had the support of only a section of the ruling classes. had to contend with the distrust of the imperialists, who did not accept him as more than a temporary interlocutor. petty-bourgeois strata, whose hopes of being able to enjoy the benefits of a "consumer society" had been dashed. And he failed to crush the workers and peasants opposition. Garcia Meza's reign lasted only a year, after which he was replaced by General Celso Torrelio at the head of the junta, and Torrelio in turn made way for General Vildoso in July
So, what is called in Bolivia the 'democratic process" began in an atmosphere of rather broad consensus. The basis of this was a political compromise that involved respect for the results of the 1980 elections, the accession of Siles Suazo to the presidency and the convocation of the two houses of parliament elected in was the result of an extremely unstable situation, which worsened with the government crisis of December 1983. (2)
Over this entire period, we can distinsuccessive stages in the social and governmental crisis:
The period from October 1982 to the beginning of January 1983 involved a reorganization and realignment of the various social classes and strata and of the various political forces. The popular masses took advantage of the favorable conditions created by the "democratic process" to rebuild or reinforce their or-
They were favorably inclined toward the UDP. That was because they were not mobilizing actively.
Under the pretext that the military regime left it a disastrous situation to deal with, Siles Suazo pushed through a series of economic measures resulting in an increase of about 60% in the cost of living.
A second phase lasting from January to March 1983, which was opened up by a political crisis. The MIR walked out of the government. Despite the demagogic operations indulged in especially by the party's leader and the vice-president of the country, Paz Zamora, this move gave the conservative and reactionary forces more room to maneuver.
CONTRA
1980. The UDP got only a relative majority, however, in 1980. It is in a minority in the Senate, and has a majority of just two seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The bourgeoisie and the army accepted the installation of Siles Suazo for two reasons. On the one hand, they feared an
It is after this that a perspective began to loom of a "constitutional" coup d'etat, that is, ousting Siles Suazo by means of a vote of the two houses of parliament. This threat has not materialized so far but it offers a means for applying pressure and even for blackmail.
uncontrollable explosion of the MPOSICI movement (it should be remembered that the miners initially rejected the compromise and continued their strike). On the other hand, they could use parliamentary means to keep a rein on the president and prevent him from taking any steps they considered unacceptable.
Before the compromise was accepted, the mass movement was demanding immediate elections, and the miners in particular were insisting on a guaranteed cided to continue their strike despite the decision of the COB leadership to end it, the confederation's veteran leader, Juan
Under the full lash of the economic crisis, the popular masses gradually came to take a different attitude toward the government. They started to mobilize again, to organize strikes and even factory occupations, to discuss perspectives and methods of struggle in trade-union congresses and assemblies.
In March 1983, the government adopted a series of economic measures that offered only partial concessions to the
They provided for wage re adjustments when prices rose by over
The discontent of the working masses grew, and the government was
Huanuni miners — in the vanguard of Bolivian working cla
Lechin, threatened to resign.
more and more militant forms of mobilileft the FSTMB leaders free to decide on zation. The FSTMB launched an offenthe future of their struggle, giving them a sive, occupying the headquarters of the vote of confidence.
The FSTMB then de-
Bolivian Mining Corporation (Comibol)
1983, continuing until August 21 of the cided to end the action.
to force the
In this respect, the UDP government, workers majority in the comanagement working masses, the COB took its disand, in particular, Siles Suazo have played boards it proposed for running the natance from the government. In a statea Bonapartist role. They derive a certain tionalized mines.
strength from the fact that since what mobilization and politicization among the would follow Siles Suazo is an unknown, lowing the line of the imperialist banks peasants, which was reflected in the sec nobody is in a hurry to oust him.
ond congress of the peasant confederaand the International Monetary Fund"
The various political organizations and and of adopting measures benefitting tion last July. (4)
blocs prefer to defend their interests by the privileged at the expense of the bringing to bear all sorts of pressures to extract concessions or to force the abandonment in practice of government measprocess of radicalization that spread in ures they do not like.
In fact, the first 15 months of the
UDP government, from its formation to the end of 1983, were marked by growing new internal conflicts, especially among the various factions of
Under the pressure of the ment adopted by its April 5 plenum, the confederation accused the regime of "fol
This was the opening gun of a new government to accept a
There was a rise of
International Viewpoint, No 45, Jan-
Cf. the POR-Combate document publish-
In July 1983, Presencia, the main La Paz
There were 554 methods of struggle were the
International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
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EMPRE MINERA HUAN DEL
BOLNARA
BEN E
VELGE
KUNI
I-LAS
ONES
class (DR)
This situation led to a new political crisis much graver than the one of January 1983. Despite all attempts at conciliation, an open split developed between the MIR and Siles Suazo. In this context, the COB and the Bolivian Confederation of Working Farmers (CUTCB) demand. ed a role in running the country, in the framework of a cogovernment. On August 2, the COB organized demonstrations throughout the country. Thrown onto the defensive, President Siles Suazo demost diverse, going from declarations of a state of emergency and strike warnings, to strikes, general work stoppages in cities and regions, blockades on the main highways and railroads and in the airports. On the struggles and demands of the miners, see IV. No 28, April 18, 1983 and No 34, July 11, 1983. On congress of the CUTCB, see Inprecor, No 160, November 7, 1983. International Viewpoint 12 March 1984 clared that he was ready to negotiate with the COB on giving it a role in the gov-
It was hard to tell if Siles was trying a tactical feint, or whether he really intended to conclude such an agreement. Nonetheless, his statement produced a further radicalization of the situation. political and social forces mobilized and took strong positions.
On August 9, the COB presented an economic plan calling for a series of urgent measures. If adopted by the government, it would have meant a drastic change of course. The Confederation of Private Industry called a special assembly, which vehemently opposed the COB's proposals and appealed for a national dialogue involving everyone to draw up a program for national salvation."
The IMF let it be known that the scheduled visit of a delegation had been postponed until the political situation had cleared up. Sections of the military also sent up an alarm signal through a statement by a former president, illa, who in fact belongs to the moderate wing of the military. Finally, the conservative counteroffensive achieved its objective. On August 21, Siles Suazo rejected any cogovernment with the COB.
A fourth phase then developed going from the end of August 1983 to mid-December, when the latest government crisis erupted.
On August 30, the COB organized a new mobilization. After rejecting COB participation in the government, Siles Suazo did not want a major confrontation with the workers organization. made some concessions. On September 9, several weeks after the deadline of July 31 that had been set by the miners, the president approved a decree calling for a workers majority in the comanagement boards in the Comibol.
On September 22, Siles Suazo signed an agreement with the CUTCB, which had renewed mobilizations for its de-
Other agreements were reached following this, notably with the COB on reorganizing the transport system. However, in most cases the government did not keep its commitments. It sought, on the other hand, to use the comanagement in the Comibol above all as a means for getting the workers to pay the price for the nationalized mining corporation,
For its part, the right was becoming more and more aggressive. It was taking better advantage, from its point of view, of the relationship of forces in parliament, in particular in the Senate, harassing the government by the continual posing of formal questions.
With the complicity of the army, the demagogic operations about alleged plans for guerrilla actions, based either on invention pure and simple or the blowing up out of all proportion of insignificant For example, on October 26, about a dozen young people, including some from other Latin-American countries, were arrested on the charge of plotting to set up a guerrilla focus in Luribay, in the department of La Paz. The aim of the reactionary forces was to force the government to take repressive measures against the far left, and to discredit the left of the MIR, one of whose leaders, Rospigliosi, is presented as an accomplice of the guerrillas.
The employers organizations "civic" committees of a dubious character have continuously assailed the government and blocked the implementation of its decisions. For example, for a whole period the bosses refused to pay the workers for Sundays, although the government had decided to make this a paid day off. Likewise, in November, they refused to readjust wages when prices rose by clearly more than 40%.
All these campaigns have had little effect on the activity of the masses. The political objective of cogovernment was put in abeyance after August 21, and the demand for a minimum wage and sliding workers struggles and mass mobilizations now focus on partial demands and de-
The miners, with the Huanuni workers out in front, are still in the vanguard. At the end of September, they launched workers have gone on strike, notably in
The peasants have mobilized several times. The public transport, bank and hospital workers, as well as the over-the-road drivers, teachers and doctors, have also become involved in struggles. They have resorted to tougher and tougher forms of action, sometimes continuing for weeks, to win their demands, have been basically for higher
The economic steps the government took on November 17, including a higher official rate of exchange for the dollar and big increases in the prices of a series of staples, were an additional spur to mobilization. The small business people also fighting for their specific de-
- In mid-December, finally, a new phase opened in the politicization and centralization of the struggles. The government resigned after a vote of cencalled for a strike after the November 17 measures, fearing now that the struggles fragmented and tend to get out of hand, resumed this call on a general strike on December 13-14, which
After a governmental crisis lasting several weeks, Siles Suazo reshuffled his cabinet, reconfirming most of the former ministers in their posts. time, the COB resumed mobilizing. hunger strike was organized, first in La and then in other cities as well. Thousands of union leaders and activists participated in them.
Important gains were also achieved as the result of an agreement with the gov-
They included a 57% wage increase, a four-month freeze on the prices of staples (sugar, flour, rice and cooking
oil), the organization of supply to the poor neighborhoods, the placing of the gold mines under the Comibol (and therefore under comanagement boards with a workers majority). On the other hand, the demand for a minimum wage with a sliding scale was not accepted.
Thanks to their new struggles, the peasants won the right to sell their products directly, to import agricultural machinery and to organize their system of transportation. But they have not gotof the new minister of whom they consider per-
For their part, the industrialists decided in a special congress to halt production in their factories for 48 hours in protest against the government's decisions in the economic field. and social crisis remains open.
and political flicts have developed against the backof a continuously worsening economic situation. In 1982, the Gross National Product dropped by 7.43% by comparison with the previous year. The annual rate of inflation went well over 220%. The foreign debt exceeded 2.5 bil-
In 1983, there was no major change in this situation. The same tendencies continued to operate. In addition, the country was also hit by natural disasters, with drought in some areas and floods in others. A third of the country was affected, with the losses totalling about a bil-
The official figures for 1983 have not yet been released. According to year-end estimates, the GNP decreased by 10% in the past year, with the per capita product falling by 25% since 1979. Over all, the economy of the country has fallen back to the level of twenty years ago. In 1983, the annual rate of inflation reached 300% According to the COB, in last July the buying power of workers had already declined by 57% from the level of October
It should be pointed out in particular that the crisis of tin production remains extremely grave. According to the Bolivian bourgeois press, Combol's production has fallen to the 1962 level. For some minerals the drop is even steeper, 36% for tin, 33% for silver, 27% for lead, that is, below the 1952 level.
The financial losses were already on the order of 45 million dollars in 1981 and reached 133 million dollars in 1982. Bolivia is in danger of losing its place as the world's fourth largest tin producer to
The crisis of the ENAF (the national smelting company) is no less significant. The ENAF started operating in 1977-78, this being hailed at the time as a great the economic history of the country. In the past year, this trust came to the brink of catastrophe, and in July 1983 it needed 65 million dollars to get production going again. It is estimated to have run up a total deficit of 100 million
The new oil industry also fueled the most extravagant hopes at the start of tional oil company, YPFB, is paying the price for a policy of pillage and selling on the cheap that has directly or indirectly benefitted the foreign companies. At the same time, it is having to pay for maintaining a low "political" price for gasoline on the national market, which amounts to a dead loss of 11.10 dollars on every
As for industry, it has remained in a
The building industry in particular has virtually collapsed. difficult to evaluate exactly effects of the economic crisis have been on employment. There is no doubt that unemployment and under-employment are growing steadily. given by various sources differ, and are clearly not precise. Some estimate that are 200,000 unemployed workers and 800,000 underemployed working people.
According to other sources, the rate of unemployment rose from 5.6% of the economically active population in 1979, to 7.4% in 1981, and 12.4% in 1982. It is estimated to have gone up further in
According to the statistics private enterprise, utilization of industrial capacity stands at 50%.
we should not underestimate the effect on the Bolivian economy of racketeering, such as drug trafficking, smuggling and the theft of ores. In the Santa Cruz region and still more so in Cochabamba, there are veritable free zones where drug trafficking goes on without any controls or limits.
The minister of the interior himself was able to get a look at this situation in one of these zones, when he went incog nito to the village of Shinhota in the department of Chochabamba.
Obviously, it is difficult to know how much money is involved in this traffic. According to some estimates, the foreign currency obtained by this means amounts to double that brought in by the sale of tin. Others have calculated more precisely that in 1981, drug sales abroad brought the traffickers a return of 1,336 millions the Bolivian press, including Hoy of December WEIG
As regards tin, FSTMB sources con Even the Huanuni mine, the the million dollars into the red every month. fant met tal cause song period risie necessare technical renovation has not been carried out, and this has brought on a considerable increase in the production costs. has drained off resources into the private secEscobar in the political weekly, Aqui, over the equivalent of 18 billion dollars worth of ore, 80% of which went to private firms through the intermediary of the state. cessive governments have not kept their finan-
Finally. it should be noted miners are working and living in conditions that are not conducive to productivity.
Le Monde of January 31, According to the figures provided by the
In a remarkable study, Rene Bascope Aspiazu writes that there are three main dates in the economic history of Bolivia - the start of silver mining in 1545, the start of tin mining in 1904 and the start of the cocaine business under Hugo Banzer in 1976. Pablo Ramos has also stressed the role of the coca-dollars.
It is true, as Bascope shows, that the attempt to integrate the "criminal" economy into the state's financial and economic system finally failed. Nonetheless, the coca-dollars are continuing to enrich certain social strata, especially in some regions, and Bolivians belonging to the ruling classes have hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars coming from the drug trade invested in US banks. In any case, this represents an important econcase of smuggling, only food products such as sugar, on a considerable scale of petroleum and its derivatives, as well as gold. On top of this, a lot of automobilies are brought into the country illegally.
According to the prefect of La Paz, where a bread shortage lasted for weeks, 3,000 kilos of bread were shipped illegally to Peru every day last July. Moreover, 10,000 litres of kerosene are smuggled to Peru every day. The better part of the rubber and chestnuts produced in the country are also exported illegally.
In the course of a single year, it is estimated that 20,000 automobiles were brought into the country illegally (the total number of vehicles registered was 177,000 in 1982). In 1983, it is estimated that the amount of gold smuggled added up to 41 million dollars worth. According to calculations by the union leaders, in Huanuni, for example, where in the past monthly production was around 500 tons and has now fallen to 200 tons, about 100 tons are stolen.
In other words, more than in other countries, there is a full-fledged parallel
It should be added, that even within the legal economy there is more and more commercial and financial speculation linked to inflation, rising prices and the dual exchange rate for 1,964,000 persons out of a total population of
Of these, 1,355,400 are non300,000 in the private sector. It is also necessary to take into consideration a large number million Bolivians abroad According to recent 1945, or 40% of the economically active pop-
Rene Bascope Aspiazu, iana, Pablo Ramos, La Paz, 1980. Bascope, there is a close link between the crisis in cotton production and the boom in the drug but on Importers who get currency at the official rate and use it, in part at least, to speculate on the and then sell them at a price established on the basis of the rate of exchange in
International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
VICTORIA
ALT
ZONA MORE
All these factors tend to break down the fabric of the economy. And this has repercussions not only on the standard of living of the masses but at the same time produces wrenching conflicts within the ruling classes. For example, clashes are multiplying between the private sector and the state sector, between the representatives of industry and agribusiness, between some entrepreneurs and banks, and even within these various
Thus, the private entrepreneurs accuse the state of wasting its resources. cording to them, over the last twenty years, the state's investments have roughly equalled those of the private sector, which accounts for 80% of production. The owners of small and medium-sized mines are constantly complaining about the conditions imposed on them. sharp conflicts, marked by the publication of communiques published in the big press, recently shook Unagro, one of the largest sugar companies.
differentiations wrangles reflect this reality. The conservative forces are at the moment pinning their hopes mainly on an alliance between the Nationalist Democratic Action party (ADN) founded by General Hugo Banzer and the Historical Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNRH, the right wing of the old MNR) led by Paz Estenssoro and their various appendages.
However, while these two parties act together to obstruct the UDP government, they do not have a common plan for the medium term, inasmuch as each claims to represent the real alternative leadership. What is more, inside all these bourgeois parties and blocs, there are contending tendencies, cliques and rival pres-
In this context of economic and social breakdown, the Bolivian bourgeoisie is more incapable than ever of producing a party to represent it on the national scale. The major role that the employers organwell, is moreover, a striking confirmation International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
UDP
Crowds greeting president Siles Suazo (DR)
Siles Suazo is taking advantage of this power because of the absence in the short run of any concrete alternative to him. But his main base, the UDP, has been seriously weakened by the departure of the MIR, a formation of petty-bourgeois origin with a vaguely socialistic ideology. At present the MIR is playing a more and more dubious role, one that in fact benefits the reactionaries. The UDP is now tending to break down.
Siles Suzao can only really count on the support of two parties, the MNRI and the PCB, apart from the phantom Christian Democratic Party (PCD), whose representatives have been included in the
The president's party itself, the MNRI, is extremely heterogeneous. goes from conservatively oriented personalities, to political adventurers deeply implicated in support for the November 1979 coup, to representatives of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie and workers and popular leaders. The various chiefs battle publiely, sometimes even resorting to physical violence. There is almost no common organizational framework.
As for the "party" of the "criminal" economy, it has very powerful means for putting on pressure, corrupting people and applying blackmail. "party," moreover, does not lack a social base, inasmuch as the sectors involved in the production, initial refining and trafficking of cocaine, as well as in smuggling, are by no means a tiny minority of the popu-
The smugglers, for instance, can count on the support of the merchants who sell contraband merchandise. ago when the workers at a shoe factory mobilized against smuggling, which was their jobs, they ran up against the resistance of a layer of shop-
The drug traffickers, for their part, try to get the support of the layers of the peasant population who, while exploited fear that the international schemes for destroying the coca plantations would condemn them to destitution.
These big drug traffickers have very great resources. The fall of the military regime did indeed weaken them. But they are nonetheless able to defy the state power and plot against the precarious democratic institutions that exist today. (9)
The question arises, therefore, whether the present crisis may end in yet another military coup d'etat. It goes without saying that there are always in Bolivia, individuals both inside and outside of the military, who are preparing for this eventuality. Nonetheless, a military coup d'etat does not seem to be on the agenda in the immediate future for three basic
First of all, after nearly twenty years of military-dominated government, the military are very badly discredited, even in the eyes of the ruling classes and the petty bourgeosie. Secondly, the working class has regained all its political and organizational strength. In particular, the of the peasants has changed radically since Banzer ushered in the perFinally, the Latin-American situation in general, and in particular in the countries of the Southern Cone, is not favorable for such military solutions.
The economic evolution under the Banzer regime brought some modifications in the makeup of the working class and other layers of the exploited population. Specifically, the percentages of industrial and building workers grew relative to that of the miners. among the miners, themselves, the percentage of those working in the privately owned small and medium mines increased. (10) The growth of agribusiness increas ed the number of agricultural wage earners, while the poor peasants sunk deeper
Service workers became The weight of the so-called modern petty bourgeoisie increased relative to that of the traditional petty
The economic crisis has blocked, or considerably slowed down, these ten-
Industry and construction have been hard hit. The peasants have gotten
The disinherited masses have grown. So, the miners continue to be the most solid contingent of the proletariat, benefitting from considerable internal cohesiveness and geographical concentration.
However, it should be recalled that this geographical concentration is both a
A symbolic episode occurred in July 1983. A very well known trafficker, asked for a meeting with President Siles Suazo.
Suarez then defied the govern warning that he had even airplanes equipped with missiles to defend
At the same time, the minister of the had "an economic and military cases exceeds the capacities of the state itself." (Presencia, July 5, 1983.)
This has gone hand in hand, among other things, with the growth of the capital. most spectacular manifestation of this growth
"El Alto" neighbormore than 200,000 inhabitants, mostly workers and "marginals."
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strength and weakness of the Bolivian proletariat. It is a strength insofar as it facilitates general mobilizations of the miners, and from time to time the mining regions get out of direct control by the central government. But it is a weakness also in the sense that the miners are rela-
ORGANIZACIONE:
tively far removed from the political center of the country, and they cannot bring
FEMENINAS their weight to bear on the third major pole in the country, Santa Cruz, traditionally the bulwark of the most reactionary forces and the cradle of coup d'etats.
FOULARE
An economic crisis that is having unprecedented disastrous effects and increasingly bringing a breakdown of the social fabric may in the long run also have negative effects on the fighting potential of the masses. In fact, it has caused a certain disarray among the poorly politicized strata of the disinherited masses. And it has also created centrifugal tendencies and conflicts among different categories of workers. (11)
Nonetheless, this crisis has arisen and developed in a context that, since the end Women's organisations joined the hunger strike (DR) of 1977, has been generally characterized by a rise of the mass movement. In fact, the combativity of the working masses and poor peasants has been exhibited many times in a spectacular way, and it has gone hand in hand with a growing awareness of the political issues.
This process has been reflected by the COB resuming a key role. As in its most glorious days, this organization today is not just a trade-union confederation embracing the great majority of the workers. It is also taking up the defense of the workers' interests on the political level, especially on the local level, where it offers an embryonic alternative power.
The departmental headquarters of the COB, as in a city such as Santa Cruz, for example, are visited all day long by delegations not just from workers but from citizens in general, who raise all sorts of problems that might seem to be in the sphere of the political authorities rather than that of trade-union leaders. What is more, the unions have taken action on several occasions, including organizing industry; distribution and sale of staples through state workers organizations and people's stores; comanagement, with a peasant majority, of all rural development programs financed by the state; the setting up of a Fordevelop and control imports and exports.
Over and above some vague formulations and the maneuverist intentions of some trade-union leaders, the COB program amounts to a program of transitional demands. The fight to achieve them would stimulate a process of anticapitalist mobilization.
The evolution of the peasant masses and their organization is still more sig nificant. The 1953 agrarian reform eliminated the traditional big landlords and distributed the land to the peasants. It is true that this did not bring a notable improvement in their standard of living and still less a real solution to their problems. Nonetheless, the peasants supported the MR regime of Paz Estenssoro that had cluding the extension of labor legislation to categories of rural workers formerly not covered. What is more, the CUTCB has very clearly declared its independence of the government and the bourgeois parties, demanding a share in cogovernment as an independent force with the same status as the COB. (12)
The significance of the idea of cogovernment proposed both by the COB and the CUTCB should be highlighted. The formula as such could be discussed, and if it is put into practice, it could not be excluded a priori that it might lead to class collaboration. It is true, moreover, as Juan Lechin noted for his owns reasons, that the idea is not entirely new. It was proposed before in the 1950s and in 1970-71.
However, in the first case, the result was the participation in the government of leaders of the MR left, as representatives of the COB. In 1970-71, the COB supported the government of General Juan Jose Torres without participating in it. In other words, the workers organizapickets, to control prices and punish taken these steps, and subsequently the tion gave up its class independence. speculative traders.
After a period of wait and see, the COB adopted an attitude of challenging the UDP government, even going as far as open opposition. It was the FSTMB that waged the first major political battle, advancing the demand for a workers majority on the comanagement bodies running the mines.
This demand, in fact, went beyond both comanagement and workers control based on the right of veto, a right that the miners won in the 1950s. It involved the workers having the right to take over running the enterprise. And this demand was backed up by direct workers action, that is, occupation of the Comibol offices.
In August, the COB leadership presented a program of economic measures. They included the following: a decisive voice for the workers in the government through their union confederation; workers-majority comanagement in state and 18 majority of them remained passive during the big political crises.
The essential new element in recent years is that under the impact of growing impoverishment and repression, the peasants buried Banzer's Military-Peasant Pact. This shift can be dated from January 1974, when Banzer ordered a massacre of the peasants in the Cochabamba region.
more peasants have joined association, the CSUTCB, which was formed in 1979 and is now included in the COB. They began to play a growing role in social and political conflicts. The second congress of the clearly reflected the politicization of very broad layers of peasants and the emergence of young cadres with a strong fighting spirit.
Some peasant struggles have already won victories. The government has been obliged to make certain concessions and some major gain: have been achieved, in-
Today, the demand for cogovernment implies specifically that the COB and the CSUTCB do not consider themselves to be represented by the UD and President Siles Suazo but that they want to represent the workers and peasants in the government themselves in an independent way.
Thus, this demand helps the masses to understand the class nature of the conflicts and the political issues. It has an anticapitalist potential. The Bolivian 11. A conflict developed among the state functionaries who demanded an undivided workday. The COB was ill-inclined to support category that seemed relatively privileged. Various organizations have also taken positions opposing the road blockages. This method of struggle has been adopted not just by the peasants, but also by other categories. 12. Painful experience with the MNR and the military regimes led the peasant cadres and leaders to distrust all political formations, in cluding those that identify themselves with the workers movement and revolutionary ideas.
International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
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wrong conception is far ant confederation more dangerous, inasmuch as those who mands that represent a step forward.
bourgeois and imperialists have, in fact, understood this, and they reacted violently during the crisis of August 1983.
The first question that can be posed is whether there is at the moment a prerevolutionary situation in Bolivia. On the basis of the elements indicated above, if we apply the traditional criteria of revolutionary Marxists, the answer can only be affirmative. It is undeniable that since 1952 the present crisis is unprecedented, and is tending to worsen on all levels. It is leading to a radicalization and politicization of the masses marking a qualitative advance over every previous period.
This radicalization and politicization have been reflected in the actions undertaken and the positions adopted by the big trade-union organizations. extent, however, these positions have been imposed by growing pressures from the ranks, which have even in some cases gotten out of the control of the leader-
Thus, the COB has been under constant pressure from its larger member unions, such as the FSTMB and the in-
Announcing the 1982 election results to the people (DR) dustrial workers federation. for severe criticism for holding back the mass mobilizations in the crucial weeks of
The FSTMB itself has been outflanked several times by its local organizations. Already in October 1982, the miners remained on strike even after the COB had decided to suspend the action. More recently, in September 1983, the miners launched a new mobilization, against the advice of Juan Lechin and independent of any decision by the national leadership of the FSTMB. In fact the FSTMB national leadership was accused of wanting to isolate the Huanuni miners' leaders.
In Huanuni, in fact, the unionists voted against workers-majority comanagement for fear that it would lead to class collaboration, and the provisional co. management boards have not been set up. It should be noted, however, that this majority against the comanagement proposal was the result of a convergence between the opposition of the extreme left and the Communist Party, the latter be-
La workers' majority on the co-
This article cannot attempt to answer all questions tionary Marxists have to deal with. They are organized in the United Revolutionary Workers Party (PORU) and have defined their conceptions and orientations in the documents adopted by their unitication congress in July 1983. (13) It should be noted, however, that at this stage two wrong conceptions still exist in the workers movement.
The first is represented by the Revolutionary Workers Party of Guillermo Lora (POR-Lora), which makes proclaiming the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat the central axis of its politics to-
This leads to dogmatic propagand-
The second International Viewpoint 12 March 1984 defend it, first of all the Communist Party, uniike the POR-Lora, have a mass
It consists of building up a whole theory of the "democratic process" putting it in the framework of revolution by stages. This is the ideological justification the CP advances to explain its participation in the UDP coalition and the Siles Suazo government.
In a debate on the "deepening of the democratic process," one of the CP's leaders, Ramiro Barrenchea, explained
"the people's democratic anti-imperialist plan is a state-managed economy meeting the needs not only of the working class, peasants and urban middle strata, but also of broad sections of the bourgeoisie not dependent on the imper-
Barrenchea specified, that this was a "composite program of a composite government." (14)
However, on the basis of an analysis of the economic and social depth is not denied by anyone, the conclusion you have to come to is the follow-
No real change can come about without the adoption of such measures as nationalizing the medium-size mines, the key industries, the banks and the big trading networks, without a new agrarian reform, without the destruction of a state apparatus that even after the April 1952 nationalizations remained fundamentally in the service of the ruling classes and operated the nationalized economic sector for the profit of the private sector, including both Bolivian and international capitalists. Anticapitalist structural transformations are required.
peasants struggles must, therefore, be focused around transitional demands. It is in this area, much more than in characterizing the nature of the revolution that clarification is necessary.
Both the workers unions and the peashave advanced de-
But in the last analysis their real content will be determined by the general dynamic of the mobilization of the popular
For example, the proposed basic agrarian reform law presented by the CUTCB is based on the local peasant community. It this law were passed and applied by a government representing anticapitalist working-class and peasant forces, the centrality of the peasant community would set in motion a process of marginalizing the capitalist enterprises, even though the letter of this proposed law provides for the continued existence of such enter-
If on the other hand, the new agrarian reform is carried out without a qualitative change in the social and political framework, capitalist agriculture will remain fundamentally intact and restruc turing on the basis of the peasant communities will not enable the peasants to improve their living conditions substan-
As for workers-majority comanagement in the Comibol, it also involves dangers. If it is looked at from the standpoint of maintaining the status quo, it will either remain dead letter or it will threaten to lead the miners and their representatives to accept the logic of capitalist productivity, that is to accept a stricter austerity policy as the only way out of the economic crisis.
If, on the other hand, the workersmajority comanagement in the Comibol is conceived of as a transitional demand, the starting point for the miners will be an understanding of the need to break down the obstacles represented by the capitalist mode of accumulation and the socio-economic options imposed by the bourgeois governments, including
Cf. IV, No 37, October 3, 1983.
Cf. Unidad, the organ of the Bolivian CP, the first week of March 1983.
litical composition of the leadership, Juan ary party is no longer posed. To the con-
MNR governments in the 1950s, and they will be led to pose the question of power.
Finally, the question arises, by what instruments can the workers and peasants fight effectively in pursuance of a revolutionary perspective of taking power. In this respect, the traditional contradiction between the strength of the trade-union organizations and the extreme weakness of the political ones has not been overcome.
The emergence of the UDP in the 1970s as the centralizing pole of the workers and peasants struggles could have created the impression that a new phase was opening up in this respect. But the UDP was only an electoral coalition of different social forces. Today the great majority of the exploited masses do not see it as an instrument for their actual struggle.
On several occasions, political-ideological currents have raised the idea that the COB itself could lead the struggle for the seizure of power. Such a concept has been outlined, for example, by Filemon Escobar, a miners' leader who for a long time identified himself with Trotskyism. He presented this view in an article published by the weekly Aqui in late February 1983.
This means, in other words, that the COB could simultaneously play three roles — its own role as a labor confederation, the role of an organ of dual power and the role of a revolutionary party. This is a hypothesis that revolutionary Marxists are not prepared to accept. First of all, there is no experience of a victorious revoluton to confirm it. All revolutions have demonstrated the need for a specifically politieal instrument for leading and organizing the masses. In this respect, neither the Cuban nor the Nicaraguan revolution is an exception.
Secondly, the COB had a strength comparable to what it has today in the period following the insurrection of 1952 and in 1970-71, that is, in previous crucial periods when a struggle for power was on the agenda. However, it not only did not take the leadership of these strug. gles but proved incapable of preventing the reconstruction of the semicolonial state and the installation of General Banzer's authoritarian regime.
On April 29, 1980, the COB signed a nonaggression pact with the military general staff. It involves a mutual commitment to respect the verdict of the June 1980 elections, not to interfere with the activity of the COB and to respect the military institutions. Nonetheless, this did not prevent General Garcia Meza's coup d'etat on July 17.
The problem arises in still more concrete terms. As a general rule, the COB has adopted political orientations reflecting those of the parties whose members played the decisive role in its leadership, in turn the MNR, centrist formations and the Communist Party. Today, the majority of the leaders belong to the CP, which has a very great weight, even in the FSTMB.
It is true that independently of the po20
Lechin has played the main role in leading the COB. But Lechin was not born yesterday. Is there any need to recall what he did in the 1950s when he was still a member of the MNR to canalize and hold back the revolutionary struggles?
Later Lechin became vice-president of the country in 1960, at the height of the "normalization" conducted by the MNR regime. In 1970-71, he supported the government of General Torres. In 1980, after agreeing to stand as the candidate of a front of workers organizations in the June elections, he backed out at the last minute. In July 1980, he even agreed to appear on TV to call on the workers to end their strike against General Garcia Meza's coup d'etat.
Although the peasant leader, Genero Flores, has not had the same sort of checkered career as Lechin, he is nonetheless a figure not without political ambiguities. He represents the fighting spirit of the peasants and had an influence on the adoption of the CUTB's present positive orientations. But he remains a member of the Tupac Katari Revolutionary Movement (MRTK), a movement with gradualist, reformist conceptions.
In conclusion, there is no question of challenging or minimizing the role the COB has played over the recent months and the role that it will continue to play in the coming stage of mass mobilization. But it does not follow from this that the task of building the revolutiontrary, the Bolivian revolutionary Marxists consider it more urgent than ever.
The COB congress scheduled to open this May 1 will, therefore, be an impor tant test. The COB can and must play a key role in organizing and centralizing the workers struggles, as well as those of the peasants and other exploited layers of the popular masses, for their immediate demands and for transitional demands. What is no less important, it must lead them in organizing self-defense against any threat of a military coup d'etat.
However, the COB will only be able to accomplish these tasks if it overcomes its weaknesses and contradictions. It has, in particular, to develop structures and a mode of functioning that will enable the ranks to express their will democratically at all times. It must also renew its leadership by advancing cadres who have proven themselves in the struggles of recent years and who are capable of breaking from all that there is negative in the traditions of the COB. This means especially combating spontaneism, organizational looseness and maximalism in demands which, on the one hand, reflects the lack of a consistent revolutionary orientation, and, on the other, the gap between the verbal declarations of the leaders and their real practice. It means also building the means for beginning to overcome the ill-preparedness of the workers movement to face decisive confrontations.
International Viewpoint 12 March 1984
year. But at the same time a policy of intensive recruitment was followed, increasing staff by 9 per cent per year. Adjusted for inflation, the amount paid in salaries in 1982 was the same as that in 1980, while the number of government employees had grown by 18.5 percent.