perspectives for the left in India the en bloc support of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Muslims. Only the Scheduled Tribes (STs) continue to back Mrs Gandhi in their overwhelming numbers.
The constitutional rejection of separate electorates for these minorities in favour of a system of reservation and
The general elections scheduled for the end of the year in the world's largest democracy' provide a focus for a whole series of deepening problems of what is in fact the world's biggest neocolonial state.
This second of a two-part series on India in the year of general elections deals with such questions as Indira Gandhi's chances for maintaining strong regime, the role of the regionalist parties, religious and communalist questions.
It also goes in some detail into the recent development of the Indian labor movement and the left.
moreover, deals with trends in Indian foreign policy, in
The article, particular toward Pakistan and the opposition movements there.
M. NAVID
Mrs. Gandhi won a landslide victory in the 1980 elections - over two-thirds of the Lok Sabha seats with 42.5 per cent of the votes. She proved once again that she was the only truly 'national' personality who could appeal to a sufficiently wide cross-section of the Indian people.
But her massive victory could not disguise the growing volatility of voting behavior and the weakening hold of the Congress (I) on minorities, or the fact that if the core non-Congress vote had not been the broken up, Mrs Gandhi would have lost heavily. (1)
The long period of Congress electoral dominance has been based on its support in the Hindi heartland of India - the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachel Pradesh
This heartland has 42 per and Haryana.
cent of all parliamentary seats in the Lok
Sabha and 38 per cent of the electorate.
It is a region with a common language,
16 cultural parochialism and high levels of economic and social backwardness.
South of the Vindhya mountains, India has relatively higher living standards and Dravidian-based languages. The upper south (Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka) have generally favoured national parties. The lower south (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) have generally favoured regional parties and coalitions.
The Nehru Congress relied on gaining a disproportionate share of the votes and seats in the Hindi heartland. Crucial to this strategy was the en bloc support of the core minorities for whom this 'national party' was the one source of justice and protection in an environment where they could not expect justice at the state or district level let alone at the sub-district or village level.
Since the 1967 general elections there has been a marked trend of deteriorating support for the Congress in its various national incarnations, which the 1971 and 1980 elections do not fully reverse.
joint electorate representation for SCs and STs has meant that these communities could not emerge as independent political forces of any real strength.
The SCs, unlike the Muslims, are less heavily concentrated, rarely forming a majority even of the reserved constituencies. They have generally required the support of the majority community. The role played by parties like the different factions of the Republican Party of India (RPI) which are based solely on the SCs in Maharashtra is that of brokers on the level of state politics. They will link up in the appropriate alliances depending on the favours received. Although they are helping to break up the bloc of SC votes otherwise going to Congress (I) they are not an alternative to it at the national level or at Lok Sabha elections.
The 1980 election results revealed that in Uttar Pradesh which has the most SCs of any state, the Janata and the Lok Dal got a high percentage of votes in the SC constituencies. Admittedly the Congress (I) won 61 per cent of all SC votes in the reserved constituencies but a breakdown of this is much more revealing of the true state of affairs. In five states of the Hindi heartland having 49 per cent of all SC reserved seats, the Congress (1) 1 The best electoral analysis, to which much of this is indebted, is "Transformation of Congress Party: Why 1980 Was Not a Restoration", Economic and Political Weekly, May 2, 1981.
International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
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INDIA
obtained only 42 per cent of the seats and an even lower share of the votes.
are no reserved constituencies for India's 85 million Muslims. the 207 so-called Muslim constituencies Muslim electoral support for Congress varies according to the degree of concentration. In those constituencies where Muslims constitute 10-20 per cent of the population there is strong Muslim support for the Congress candidate. Where the concentrations are higher Congress support becomes progressively weaker. these cases Muslim support gravitates to class-based and confessional parties. Obviously, where insecurity of life and prop erty is most strongly felt, allegiance to Changing electoral fortunes
This trend is a cause of real worry to
The electoral reverses in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in January 1983 were an enormous shock to her party. She will continue to benefit from the absence of a 'national' alterna-
But it is a matter of concern that five parties - the Janata, the Democratic Socialist party of Muslim leader H. N. Bahuguna, the Congress (S) of Sharad Pawar, an important Maratha leader, the Janwadi party and the Rashtriya Congress - have formed an all-India United Front, though the unity is very fragile and liable to irreconcilable disruption.
Even more threatening though, is the Lok Dal-BJP electoral alliance under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). These two parties, having as they do, a social base in the emerging 'intermediate' castes will be the biggest threat and competitors to Mrs Gandhi in there are now signs of a possible shift in her basic electoral strategy from reliance on the core minorities to wooing the Hindu caste vote. favourable circumstances and conscious effort by her have suddenly made this look like a viable strategy. Given her de-
Dr Farooq Abdullah, son of the legendary Sheikh Abdullah, emerged triumphant. Kashmir is a majority Muslim state having a unique constitutional status in the Indian union, and Muslims traditionally support the National Conference. Abdullah's victory was not a surprise. But what was surprising was the sweep victory of the Congress (I) in the largely Hindu populated Jammu region of
Here, the BJP was completely swept away and the Congress (I) emerged as a strong and united opposition to the National Conference in the state assembly. With the Akali-led agitation in Punjab sure to consolidate the 48 per cent of Punjabi Hindus behind the Congress (I), Mrs Gandhi can suddenly see the advantages of relying on the caste Hindu vote if only she can extend this new development to the key states of the 'Hindi heartland', Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The pointers are there but it is still too early to say whether Mrs Gandhi will succeed in the effort to consolidate the caste Hindu vote behind herself. The elections itself will provide the decisive with Assam, Punjab, Sri Lanka and Pakistan in various stages of turmoil, she is plugging the message of unity, disruption by anti-national forces pitted against her and the need for strong leadership (i.e. herself) at the Centre.
This was the theme of the AICC (1),
Congress (Indira), meeting in Bombay in October 1983. On one hand it was a preparation elections with the basic themes for a future manifesto aired in front of the party collective. other it was a carefully orchestrated effort to promote the stature of Rajiv Gandhi as the future successor to the
When are the elections likely to be held? Mrs Gandhi has publicly stated that elections ahead of schedule can be ruled out. But this is not necessarily the measures like the nationalisation of 13 ailing textile mills to save 45,000 jobs, the declaration of a one-off bonus to central government employees, which will cost the exchequer roughly 20,000 mil lion rupees, raising the minimum wage in 29 sectors of the economy (implementation is, of course, an altogether different issue) suggest the opposite. But the timing of the elections is not the central or crucial issue. To win them, whenever they may be held, Mrs Gandhi needs one of the states in the upper south, either Karnataka or Andhra Pradesh. The stock of the Congress (I) in Karnataka is low and sinking lower after the revelations Congress (I) attempts to buy over opposiProbable national victory
In Andhra Pradesh the chances appear
The popularity of the Telegu Desam party of chief minister N. T. Rama Rao is falling after his failure to meet pre-election promises, his ham-handed treatment of the grievances of government employees and his tolerance of nepotism and corruption. The Congress is far from replacing him, however. But overall the circumstances may be increasingly propitious for modation of sorts between Telegu Desam and the Congress (I). The Congress (1) victory in the Peddappaly by-election (November 1983) which was previously held by Telegu Desam is a significant
It would probably be along the lines of of, say, half the Lok Sabha seats in the state to be given to Congress candidates in a joint electoral campaign, in return for which the Telegu Desam can reign supreme in the legislative assembly, and can have the solid financial support of the Centre, always an important carrot for all state governments. In Tamil Nadu the Congress (I) should be able to secure an effective electoral arrangement with the ruling AIADMK, headed by chief minister M. G. Ramachandran.
support in the core minorities, Left students demonstrate their solidarity with Cambodian people (DR) she has had to try and develop new con-
The Delhi municipal and itan council elections in February 1983 were the first indication of a new stirring in the wind. Delhi, a Union territory with a very high proportion of urban traders and petty bourgeoisie, has traditionally been a stronghold of the Jana Sangh/BJP who were widely expected to
Instead they suffered a serious and
CRIALIS win.
surprising defeat at the hands of the Congress (I) although just a month before,
INDIAN YOUTH A
Mrs Gandhi had been dramatically defeated in the south. Sikhs in the capital
DEMONSTRATIONIN SD) D by and large disregarded the call of the
Akali party spearheading the Sikh agitation in Punjab to vote against the Con-
THE HERDIC PEOPLE UF G
But the main reason for this gress (1).
remarkable victory was a sizeable shift of petty bourgeois caste Hindu votes from the Jana Sangh/BJP to the Congress (I).
In the Kashmir assembly elections that followed, the National Conference led by
International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
17
The timing of the elections may make ica continuing to regard Pakistan as a unequivocally hostile terms to reports strategic ally' in the region (especially that President Jayawardene was seeking a ditterence to the margin of Mrs Gandhi s victory but the most probable outcome of the coming elections is her victory
She will not get the two thirds majority of 1980. She may even be denied an absolute majority by a small margin, requiring a coalition with one or two small regional parties, but when all is said and done she remains the only 'national' leader capable of get-
La cross section of votes from all stratas and classes in India society. Once again it would be a victory because of the absence of any other national alternative.
Once again it would be a victory for her way halt the erosion of the Congress (I) or resolve the crisis of bourgeois political the elections could be a decisive pointer to the future. If the decline in Congress (I) popularity is particularly steep, then the possible emergence of the Italian syndrome' of changing at the Centre, which was much talked about in the months preceding the 1980 elections, will once again become a feature of political debate. Alternatively, a good showing by one of the opposition groupings, e.g. the NDA, will give rise to hopes of another 'national' alternative emerging. In brief, the 'crisis' will have become more acute. Bid for Indian hegemony
Indian foreign policy has been strongly determined by its relationship with two countries - China and Pakistan. since the Bangladesh war of 1971 and victory against Pakistan, the driving ambition of the Indian state has been to dominate South Asia and to be acknowledged as the dominant power of this re-
Mrs Gandhi has been the most relentless and astute spokesperson for this
The chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) fell to India during her premiership. She has sought to utilise to enhance her prestige at home and internationally. But it plays a second fiddle to her primary aim of keeping the South Asian region free of superpower hegemony' i.e. keeping it free for the NAM with its declared principles of mutual non-interference and equality between independent, nations, does not at all square with the covert Indian ambition to establish its hegemony over South Asia.
The principal rival to the Indian state in South Asia has, of course, been Pakistan. In one sense, the 1971 war decided the balance of power between them. India was irrevocably the more powerful force. But despite Bhutto's genuflections in this direction, he and his successors have tried to sustain the competion and rivalry by forging a strong link between Pakistan and the Arab world. There has been the so-called Islamic bomb produced by Pakistan, funded by some of the Arab regimes, presumably for their own use as well. With the United States of Amerafter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and the indications of a strong link between China and Pakistan (there is strong evidence of the former giving crucial help to the latter in making the nuclear bomb), the Indian government is distinctly unhappy about Pakistani temerity.
Within the Indian foreign policy establishment, there have long been two camps so to speak. One has favoured the breakup of Pakistan. The other has feared that such a break-up, especially if it resulted in the creation of radical regimes e.g. in
This would constitute a greater danger than a united Pakistan, albeit one hostile to New Delhi, but in of acknowledging the realities of power on the ground and thus moving towards greater accommodation with the Indian state. Events have, in a sense outstripped this perspective.
the recent outbreak of mass resistance against the Zia regime, in the Sind province of Pakistan, it is clear that the eventual break-up of Pakistan can only be a matter of time, even if there were to be an interregnum of PPP (the Pakistan
People's Party of former premier Bhutto, now led by his wife and daughter) rule.
This fact may or may not have crystallized in the thinking of the Indian foreign ministry, but Mrs Gandhi (really her own foreign policy maker) has been determined to draw what advantages she can from the turmoil in Pakistan. India's border, and the lesson of this cannot be altogether lost on the US
There is a common thread that unites Indian reaction to both the turmoil in Sri Lanka and in Pakistan. Forsaking the supposed role befitting an ordinary member of the NAM, let alone its head, the Indian government has made pronouncements which are examples of deliberate interference in the 'internal affairs' of the
The angry rebukes of both President Jayawardene of Sri Lanka and President Zia of Pakistan are in this respect quite accurate. It is, in a sense, the coming of age of India as the regional power of South Asia. Mrs Gandhi's partisan statements about what was happening in the two countries amounts to a much more self-conscious articulation of a much more assertive regional foreign
This is particularly noticeable in the case of Sri Lanka which suffered large-scale anti-Tamil riots recently. from allowing Sri Lanka Tamil leaders refuge in the south, the Indian reaction this time is very different from its behaviour in 1971 when the JVP rebellion in Sri Lanka took place. host of nations including India, Pakistan and the superpowers chipped in with help of one kind or the other to prop up the ruling Bandaranaike regime. the Indian government made it clear that it would not tolerate any interference by an outside country in Sri Lanka affairs. New Delhi reacted very sharply and in western help, including the possibility of using British troops to keep control over the deteriorating law and order situation.
This was not merely a matter of Indian sympathy for the plight of the Sri Lanka
Previous Indian behaviour, in particular the infamous Shastri-Shrimavo pact of 1964, are evidence enough of basic Indian callousness in this respect.
Though domestie considerations about the negative impact of Congress (I) popularity in the state of Tamil Nadu if Mrs
Gandhi failed to adopt a forthright stand were important, the main reason for Indian intransigence was the conviction that it had to be seen to be involved in resolving the Sri Lanka crisis if its present credibility and future authority as the region's premier power was not to be jeopardised.
With respect to China and the superpowers, optimism early on in Mrs Gandhi's term has given way to more sober attitudes and appraisals of the possibilities of an improvement in mutual relations.
late 1981 she refused, despite strong
Soviet pressure, to go to the USSR on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty first signed prior to the outbreak of the Bangladesh war in December 1971. By the beginning of 1982 it was clear that Mrs Gandhi was preparing to take an important initiative to improve her relations with the US. Relations with US, USSR
The essential contours of Indian foreign policy were established in the late
There is a conscious tilt towards the USSR for political-security reasons (the Sino-Indian war of 1962 when India sought western help being the only exception). There is a growing interest in improving its economic relationship with
The Soviet tilt was necessary because of its diplomatic support for the Indian stand on the Kashmir question; the fact that Pakistan was generally the preferred ally of the US (India was too large and powerful a country to accept the kind of status that the US would demand in a Third World ally); and until at least the late 1960s Soviet economic aid was vital for building un the public
After the establishment of this industrial infrastructure, the decisive defeat of Pakistan in 1971 following two indecisive earlier Indo-Pakistan wars, the preconditions for a limited turn towards the US on the part of the Indian state was established. This tendency could only be strengthened by the pattern of capitalist economic development in the country, the greater need for advanced western technology and by the fact that the invasion of Afghanistan had brought the Soviets uncomfortably nearer the borders of what the Indian state would like to consider its own 'sphere of influence. With the USSR carrying on with its own overtures towards China and Pakistan, Mrs Gandhi has also felt
International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
the need to somewhat broaden her own options.
But despite the great fanfare with which Mrs Gandhi's 1982 visit to America was received, the concrete result of that initiative has been extremely limited, no momentum of the kind Mrs Gandhi was seeking was sustained. The basic reason for this is the American preoccupation with Pakistan as a front-line state against Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and as a potential ally in the Gulf, and therefore the need to militarily (via heavy armament sales) and politically prop up General Zia. Though it is possible to have a qualitative improvement in US-Indian ties, it would have to be preceded by a shift in Washington from 'strategic' and multilateral preoccupations towards greater emphasis on the bilateral' advantages of its link with India.
India's relations with China have improved perceptibly but they do not amount to a significant thaw. The unresolved border dispute is the major reason, especially since the Chinese are now less prone than the Americans to underestimate the degree of Indian independence from the USSR. China has proposed a 'package deal' whereby mutual claims are resolved on the basis of the line of actual control. The Indians have suggested a sector-by-sector approach which the Chinese have now come close to accepting Time is the most significant factor for what is most important: from the Indian point of view, the creation of a climate of opinion whereby concessions of territory once-claimed as Indian to the Chinese will not be seen by domestic opinion as a betrayal. Without such concessions there can be no resolution of the border question. In the meantime both sides are emphasising the need to improve other aspects (cultural exchanges, trade, etc.) of bilateral relations and to keep the momentum of border talks going.
The mass reformist parties of the left, the Communist Party of India (CPI) International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
Trade unionists on the march (DR) and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) are, in their separate ways, stuck in the ghetto. The CPI is a party on the wane. Its electoral support is scattered. Its influence through partycontrolled unions on the urban workforce is declining. Its trade union federation, the All-India Trade Union Congress, no longer dominates the Bombay textile workforce. The party has already split between the pro-Dangeites (S. Dange was a former politburo member and the CPI's most prominent trade union leader) who favour a close alliance with Mrs Gandhi and have formed a separate rump organisation, the AICP (All-India Communist party) and the parent body, the CPI. But even within the parent body there is a serious cleavage between those who would like to pursue the formation of an anti-imperialist patriotie front' i.e. an alliance with Mrs Gandhi's Congress (I) against 'communal forces' ie. the BJP, and those who accept the official policy of a 'left and democratic front', the code name for a popular electoral and agitational front with other bourgeois parties (except the BJP) against the 'authoritarian' Congress (I). Officially, the CPI is also for forging closer ties with the CPM with a long-term view of uniting the communist movement. Convergence of reformist parties
There are a number of reasons why the CPI has adopted this strategy. First, after the experience of the Emergency it has become wary of the Congress (I)'s domestic policies which it sees as promoting capitalist and 'authoritarian' trends. Second, there is now almost an identity of CPM and CPI positions regarding international issues, with the CPM generally endorsing the Moscow view. Third, the CPI recognises that it is now much the weaker of the two main communist parties and where else is it to go if it is to extend its influence?
But for the same reason, the detractors of the official CPI policy are opposed to too close an identification or cooperation with the CPM which it fears would easily dominate it if now swallow it altogether. Furthermore since no section of either of the two communist parties disagrees with the basic thrust of Mrs Gandhi's foreign policy which they and Moscow assess as basically 'progressive', these CPI dissidents believe that the emphasis must be on maintaining a strong centre against 'anti-national' forces whether external or internal. In the case of the Assam and Punjab agitation the CPI and CPM do not have fundamental differences with Mrs Gandhi's stands. Thus, with some help from Moscow, the CPI dissidents would like to push the party away from the CPM towards the Congress (I) and away from the 'left and democratic front and the CPM.
Their position has of late deteriorated, largely as a result of the Yogendra Sharma affair. Sharma was expelled from the CPI politburo and removed from the editorship of two party publications after it was discovered that he had acted as a courier for Mrs Gandhi to Moscow. The Indian prime minister had asked Sharma to carry a personal letter to the Soviet chief, Yuri Andropov, in which she implicitly asked Moscow to use its influence with the Indian left to get it to support her rather than join hands with what she described as a rightist onslaught. It was extraordinary that both Mrs Gandhi and Sharma should behave in the manner they did. Even the supporters of the pro-Mrs Gandhi-Sharma line in the CPI had to disassociate themselves from the affair, which the leader of the CPI, Rajeshwar Rao skillfully used to bolster his position and to strengthen the official line of the party. Declining radicalism of CPM
Apart from a rhetorical line of forging a closer relationship with the CPM at the level of their mass organisations, the CPI has a totally electoralist strategy and really nothing else. The CPM as a regional force holding power at the state level (West Bengal and Tripura) has two basic strategic orientations. One, is to consolidate its regional hold in West Bengal/ Tripura through somewhat progressive programmes in the rural areas (Operation Barga - registration of sharecroppers) and reasonably efficient administration of the state. What this means is that it must also seek to accommodate and win over the 'intermediate castes/classes' especially in the countryside i.e. the aspiring kulaks. The CPM government, therefore, had to set limits to its programme of rural reforms. Indeed, even Operation Barga can be interpreted as an ameliorative measure which eases the transition to capitalist development of agriculture. Also, as part of its policy of strengthening its regional dominance it seeks to join up with other regional forces against the Centre so as to weaken the latter's powers and strengthen those of the states. These
19
aims lend additional weight to the pursuit of a left and democratic front' against the 'authoritarian' government of Mrs Gandhi.
The CPM stand on regional movements like Punjab agitation is somewhat different from that of the CPI. Even where it is in broad agreement with the Centre (as on the Assam situation) it will also tend to be more critical of it than the CPI. In general, however, the CPM favours regional struggles against the Centre because these help to divert Mrs Gandhi's attention away from West Bengal and the state Congress (I) attempts to unseat the CPM government there (Congress (I) is the second most popular party in West Bengal).
The year 1977, when the CM came to power for the third time in West Bengal, was a turning point of sorts. Before this it had served in two coalition governments as the senior partner - in 1967 for nine months and in 1969-70 for 18 months. But in the 1977 anti-Indira wave it acquired an absolute majority in the legislative assembly and formed a left front' government which it dominated It has been in power ever since — an unbroken reign of six. years which has left a strong effect on its strategic perspec-
In the past, the ambiguity of the CM's programme and actions meant that it could not be simply dismissed as reformist. To a large number of people its revolutionary credentials were still legitimate and it did encourage serious class struggle in many areas. However, it is abundantly clear that the CPM is becoming conservatised. administrative power have further butstructures and made it more concerned with proving its capacity to maintain 'order' so as not to provoke serious response by the Centre (e.g. a declaration of President's Rule in the state) than with the promotion of the demands of sections of its social base, for example, the urban working class. Indeed, part of the reason for its declining radicalism is the broadening of its social base both in urban and rural while previously its support was much more concentrated in the millions refugees from East Bengal (now Bangladesh). This uprooted strata comprising workers and a very large layer of unemployed lower petty bourgeoisie had always imparted a more radical thrust to the CPM. The CPM is now more keen on establishing its 'respectability' than on promoting the 'class struggle'. In fact, it is doing everything possible to reduce days lost due to strikes so as to encourage private investment from domestic capitalists and multinationals in order to reverse the position of the Calcutta region as a declining industrial centre.
Its second strategic preoccupation is to regionally consolidated base launch a systematic drive to increase its influence in the 'Hindi heartland' of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, particularly the more backward areas where it might hope to capitalise on the conditions of poverty and brutal, overt exploitation. The CPI has more of a cadre presence in these and closer CPI-CPM relations should benefit the latter's efforts in this
Agitational and not merely electoral politics is in this case of rather
So far, however, it has failed to make any breakthrough. It remains really only a regional force in Bengal. The ML movement
In Kerala, the politics of caste and religion rule out anything but a shifting rearrangement of ruling coalition governments. And in West Bengal, the Congress (I) is the second largest and fastest growing party. The CPM's perspectives do not go beyond assuring itself of another five year term in the next legislative assembly elections, and establishing itself as a strong, if not the strongest, component in any left and democratic front' that might eventually be forged. Its ideological formulations remain trapped within the framework of a two-stage theory and preparation for the 'people's democratic revolution'. Its practice based on the ready acceptance of India as a functioning bourgeois democracy and an electoral and coalitionist strategy for expanding its influence.
The ML (Marxist-Leninist) groups of Maoist origin who were responsible for the Naxalite upsurge continue to exist. Indeed, according to an important secret study by the government (quoted by Kuldip Nayar in Free Press Journal, Aug ust 25, 1983) there has been a substantial overall increase in membership of Naxalite groups in the post-1980 period. They number approximately 35,000. But they are scattered and quite incapable of uniting The study cites the existence of 38 'identifiable factions, the major ones being: the S. N. Singh group, the AntiLin Biao faction, the Chandra Pulla Reddy group, the People's War Group, the Pro-Lin Biao faction; and the Central Reorganising Committee'. These groups have a presence in more than one state and account for around 75 per cent of the total membership.
There is a common commitment to armed revolution, an increasing disillusionment with post-Mao China, a hostility to "Soviet social imperialism' and an ideological acceptance of India as a 'semifeudal, semi-colonial' country requiring a 'new democratic revolution'. Flowing from this are certain weaknesses in political practice — a lack of balance with regard to the evaluation of the Indo-Soviet connection and a corresponding underestimation of the degree of independence of the Indian bourgeoisie and state; a manipulative attitude to the question of electoral participation and alliances which can oscillate from total boycott of elections to opportunist alliances with rightwing groups; a consistent failure to grasp the dynamic of Indian economic develop ment and, therefore, the ready assumption that the economy is in crisis and what is needed in practice is to provide the trigger' (even if the 'mass annihilation of class enemies' theory is no longer widely accepted) to unleash the revolutionary fury of the oppressed masses; a strong rural orientation despite growing recognition of the importance of mass among the urban working class. This orientation flows naturally from the "semi-colonial, semi-feudal' thesis.
But these generally common features should not be allowed to disguise impordifferences in practice groups or the fact that some of these groups, despite the weaknesses of their ideological formulations, continue to act 'progressively'. Thus ML groups organise landless labourers in certain areas to fight for minimum wages, employment in public works programmes, and in doing so take on the rural rich and 'middle' peas ants which theory would suggest are allies against the feudal' landlords. cultural fronts (in Kerala) have played a positive role in small towns, in raising public consciousness over issues like corruption, and even somewhat adventurist
International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
activities of setting up 'people's courts' to dispense ready justice to employers known to be corrupt and exploitative have definitely been popular.
But useful though these activities have been, the ML, by and large, even its most lucid and 'progressive' elements, lack any organisational perspective for consolidating and extending the activity of the urban and rural oppressed. Little or no thought is given to the forms that such activity might take, such as unions under the control of its members. Serious attention is not given to the promotion of a united front of the far left, as well as of the left in general, based on a common action programme. Thus, despite a temporary growth in membership (which should not disguise the wide disparities in theory and practice), the ML movement, if it can be called that, is as a whole trapped within its own ghetto. Growth of anti-Stalinist left
Within this dominant milieu of the Indian left, however, it is worth noting small but important changes within the last six or seven years. The collapse of the early Naxalite promise of an immediate and successful revolution, the rightward drift of the CPM have also promoted the rise of a variety of 'independent' Marxist groupings whose lineages are equally varied. Some have broken away from Stalinist origins in the CPM and the ML movement. Others have emerged from the limited but nevertheless real radicalisation of the Catholic and Protestant church in India. The effects of this are to be seen, for example, in tribal areas (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra) which have always been an arena of Christian missionary activity, and where new Marxist groups have sprung up with leaders who have effectively severed their previous relationship to the church. Yet others are gravitating towards Marxism after the break-up of the one-time Socialist Party in the postJanata period. Among a small section of students in major universities where access to Western Marxist literature and ideas is greater an anti-Stalinist trend has emerged.
In brief, within a large section of the left there is now much greater openness to new ideas, a greater reluctance to carry sectarianism to the point where anti-Stalinist thinking or groups are simply dismissed as counter-revolutionary. They may be wrong but that is not the same as saying they are counter-revolutionary in thought and practice. Events like the degeneration of the Chinese revolution, the rise and fall of Solidarnose in Poland, Afghanistan and the Indo-Chinese wars have all had their impact in challenging the absence of self-doubt that has traditionally marked the groups and parties of the Indian left. There is a distinct geography associated with these developments. In the eastern part of the country (West Bengal), traditionally the bastion of left politics and where the left has a mass influence, traditional modes of International Viewpoint 27 February 1984 thought and debate continue to operate. It is in the west, e.g. Maharashtra, that the left is engaged in more advanced disvanced material conditions of the western region - the relatively high rate of industrial growth, ern industrial workforce with newer kinds of problems to which older parties and unions have little to contribute, and where potentialities for participation in the democratic process are considerable - that explains this. Similarly, it is hardly surprising that among groups operating in the hinterland, discussions about the bourgeois democratic character of the Indian state should seem much more un-
Traditionally tight-knit underground structures survive and there is a relative absence of open debate.
The future perspectives for the left must, of course, be tailored to the likely forms and content of class struggle and social movements in India in the coming
The urban working class has, roughly, a three-tiered structure. There is the unorganised workforce in the small-
There is the middlelevel organised workforce in 'traditional' docks, railways, textile, etc., which is dissatisfied with existing unions and has seen its real wages steadily eroded
There is a modern well-paid workforce capable of running its own independent, rather than party-controlled or affiliated unions, or those led by 'outside' trade union leaders such as Datta Samant, R. J. Mehta, etc.
The problems that Indian leftists will have to address are necessarily different in each case. Unionisation itself is the most important issue for the unorganised. This holds true also for the rural landless who are increasingly resorting to this form of organisation. For the middle-tier, basic economic demands are increasingly having to be accompanied by some perspective with regard to the redundancy effects of modernisation (mechanisation of textile production, railway computerisation, etc.). The level of technology being introduced may not be very high by international standards but it will still be causing serious dislocation in these industrial sectors. In the most modern sector, the nature of workplace problems will have much more to do with issues of control over the production process and the workplace environment. This trend will in all likelihood lead to newer forms of shop-floor organisation which may be integrated within existing union structures, but are more likely to co-exist and operate alongside the unions. Obstacles to class unity
The enormous unevenness of Indian industrialisation thus poses grave problems for the generalisation of demands the urban working class across its structural divisions. If there is one lesson of the national movement, it is that the weight of social issues (caste, communalism, ethnic and linguistie discrimination, sexual inequality) is extremely strong in India. One of the strengths of the Congress and the national movement under Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was its ability to link campaigns around widely-felt social needs to an expressly political demand - the erosion and then elimination of British colonial rule. Just how such experiences can be relevant for the purposes of generating the broadest possible working class movement is not clear. But without such generalised action it is difficult to see how even a state weakened by endemic and growing political instability can be decisively threatened by the imminence of
That has been the lesson of the failure of the public sector strike by 125,000 workers in Bangalore, of the 1974 railway strike, which was brutally crushed, and of the historic textile strike which in terms of the financial and moral support and sympathy strikes by other sections of the
Jayaprakash Narayan (DR) 21
urban working class, and similar financial and material support from the rural environs of Maharashtra, was the most generalised working class struggle in India's post-independence history. It was not enough. The textile strike failed to win any of its basic demands. Even these defeats leave their deposit of demoralisation. This does not mean that long plant-level strikes or even prolonged industry-wide struggles will not again break out. They will. But the capacity of the Centre to wait them out cannot now be underestimated, nor indeed its willingness to physically repress such struggles in the last resort.
Communalist clashes
There is little doubt that caste conflicts and communal clashes will continue to take place with sufficiently disturbing frequency. The social and economic changes that underlie these struggles are not about to disappear. No section of the left has been able to intervene effectively in these movements because they have not been able to effectively address themselves to the problems of cultural alienation or to provide cultural solace rather than simply explanations of the socioeconomic rationale of caste and communal outbreaks. Nor has the left been able to organise defense networks for the threatened minorities. Even effective solidarity work with the capacity to immediately intervene whenever trouble brews could pay enormous political dividends for the left. But it means that the left must take such issues much more seriously and prepare an adequate infrastructure for such practical intervention.
If the preservation of a bourgeois democratic structure is so important for the ruling classes because it is the best possible form for the resolution of noneconomic conflicts, such conflicts are also the principal threat to the existence of bourgeois democracy. Perhaps the single greatest threat today comes from communalism - Assam; Punjab; HinduMuslim, Hindu-Christian clashes in the south; the rise of the RSS and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) as the organised reflection of Hindu reaction; the 'Ekmata Yagna' or north-south, east-west nationwide pilgrimage organised by the VHP to promote 'Hindu integration'; the explosive beet tallow issue in which manufacturers of vanaspati, a vegetable oil cooking medium, have been accused of (with some evidential basis) importing animal beef and mutton tallow and adulterating their product with it (since one of the major importers is close to the Congress (I) which bears responsibility for overseeing general import policy, the opposition parties have been trying to get as much mileage out of the issue by deliberately stoking the fires of religious anger); the deliberate wooing by Mrs Gandhi of the Hindu caste vote in a manner calculated to arouse communal sentiments (she is the most reliable protector of their interests and of Hinduism). For the vast mass of the petty 22
Indira Gandhi's repressive forces in action (DR) bourgeoisie in the small towns and big cities, this is often the most deeply felt issue.
It was Leon Trotsky in The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany who observed that it is the self consciousness of the petty bourgeoisie which is one of the most important determinants of the form of bourgeois rule. By that same logic it is the communal passions of this strata that might create the strongest pressure for a transition to an authoritarian form of the state and, even before such a point is reached, for an extended though still selective erosion of democratic rights that exist.
There is, finally, one last point. As things stand and for some time to come, the weakest point of control of the Indian state does not lie within the geographical boundaries of India. The state structures of its surrounding neighbours, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, are much weaker than their Indian counterpart. The Indian state will increasingly have to take responsiblity for securing the stability of bourgeois rule in these countries. The likelihood of external Indian intervention in these countries in the future is strong. Currently, the weakest link in the South Asian chain is Pakistan. The managers of the Indian state will have to think in terms of a collective strategy for assuring South Asian stability including the necessity for, at least, tacit cross-country alliances.
The Indian left will have to begin to think in a similar manner. If the intervention of the Indian state in neighbouring countries means that the power of op pressed nationalism can be harnessed to the revolutionary struggle to overthrow this state, it also means that the Indian left must be able to effectively combat the power of great Indian chauvinism (so visible during the three Indo-Pakistan wars of 1948, 1965 and 1971). If the Indian state is thus the principal enemy, the arena of revolutionary struggle and strategy is South Asia, not India alone.
International Viewpoint 27 February 1984
The FPL on the split
1. Marcial developed an exaggerated estimation of himself. He began to consider himself the most consistent, pure and flawless revolutionary of our country and of the entire region, as the sole genuine spokesman for the Salvadoran proletariat and people.