International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Middle East: The Crisis of the PLO

· International Viewpoint No. 46, 13 February 1984 · pp 5-8 · 3,538 words

Salah Jaber was the pen name of Gilbert Achcar, a leading member of the Lebanese section, later professor at SOAS, University of London.

Middle East United States

The crisis of the PLO In an article like this, I cannot avoid going into a fairly detailed analysis of the course of the Palestinian resistance movement since its inception in the 1960s. This is all the more necessary because of the confusion that exists in the world revolutionary movement about the present crisis in the PLO.

In fact, the latest episodes in this crisis, both military and political, have managed to throw into disarray all those who have lost sight of the historical context in which this conflict has unfolded.

So, I will begin by recalling the main lines of the context, as well as the major developments in the most recent period.

Salah JABER

Following the defeat of the Arab regimes in The Six Day War with Israel in June 1967, the Palestinian resistance, as an autonomous armed movement of the Palestinian masses, experienced a powerful surge of growth. From the outset, it divided into two main currents. The predominant one was the right-wing nationalist current represented by the leadership of El Fateh. There was also a left nationalist current represented by the Popular Front and the various groups that split from it.

Unable to oppose this mass phenomenon head on, the Arab regimes chose to coopt it. To this end, they inundated the Palestinian resistance movement, which became the PLO in 1969, with a steady flood of millions of dollars. The main beneficiary, of course, was El Fateh, which Saudi Arabia in particular decided to finance to the exclusion of all the other organizations. Thus, by 19691970, bureaucratic squandering of money had already reached a level in El Fateh unheard of in any other national liberation movement.

In return for this massive financing by the Arab oil monarchies, the Arafat leadership of El Fateh obliged the entire Palestinian resistance, including by the use of force, to abide by its principle of "noninterference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries."

This policy found its clearest expres sion in Jordan, where the majority of the population is Palestinian, even without counting those who live on the West Bank, which was occupied by Israel in 1967.

In Jordan in 1968 the Palestinian resistance began to take on the aspect of a counter-state, in the context of dual power evolving rapidly in favor of the PLO. However, the Arafat leadership of El Fateh violently opposed the calls of the Palestinian left for overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy, a traditional ally of imperialism. In the conflicts that proliferated between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance it imposed a strictly defensive line.

Hussein was fighting to eliminate the Palestinian resistance in Jordan. Fateh was trying to maintain coexistence with Hussein's regime. The result was that the El Fateh leadership agreed to a number of partial retreats in 1970. It went so far as to accept evacuating its forces from the cities and concentrating them in an isolated area, where the Jordanian army was able to smash them easily in 1971.

The sacrifice of the Palestinian resistance's most devoted fighters in Jordan and the retreat of its leadership to Beirut, the capital of money making and corruption, considerably accelerated the process described by the Lebanese Fourth Internationalists as "the bureaucratic degeneration and bourgeoisification of the PLOEl Fateh." (1)

This social process obviously had to have a political reflection. The political turn was codified when in 1974, the Palestinian National Council, which is called the Palestinian parliament but in reality is an appointed body rigged to assure a comfortable majority for the Arafat leadership of El Fateh, adopted the goal of a ministate on a part of the Palestinian territory. Two years before, the PLO itself had characterized this proposal as liquidationist and contrary to the Palestinian national aim expressed in the formula calling for "the liberation of Palestine, '" which all of the organizations in the PLO identified with.

In fact, it was natural for the bourgeois state bureaucratic apparatus that the PLO had become to abandon the revoluționary objective of destroying the Zionist state for the more "realistic" solution of negotiating with the Zionists to get a supposedly independent Palestinian ministate in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank that would live alongside Israel and in peaceful coexistence with it. And this ministate was to be set up on 1. Inprecor (English edition) No 19, February 1975.

parts of the Palestinian territory that were not even occupied by the Zionists seven years before.

It should be noted that at the time some organizations in the Palestinian resistance grouped around Habash's PFLP, boycotted the PLO leadership and formed the Rejection Front. Further stage of capitulation

A lot could be said about the role played by the Arafat leadership of El Fateh during the 1975-76 civil war and subsequently. But there is not room for that in this article.

Particularly important in the civil war period were the Palestinian resistance movement's relations with the Syrian regime of Hafez El Assad. Up to 1976, the Assad regime supported the Arafat leadership against the Rejection Front (which was backed by Iraq and Libya).

Assad thought that, from a position of strength, he could get an overall ArabIsraeli settlement in the framework of the Geneva Conference. In 1975, he allied himself with the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon to block Kissinger's policy aimed at getting a separate peace between Egypt and Israel.

This scheme was indeed disrupted in Lebanon. The Ford administration had to deal with the Syrians. The US promised an overall peace settlement in return for the Syrians reestablishing bourgeois order in Lebanon.

The US-Syrian honeymoon did not last very long. Begin's victory in the Israeli elections and then Sadat's visit to the Zionist state in 1977 set in motion a process that was to lead to the Camp David accords. This pushed the Syrians into opposition to American policy in the Middle East. The Syrian-Palestinian alliance was reestablished. The Palestinian resistance regained its unity, in particular since the organizations in the Rejection Front broke with Iraq (which after 1979 began flirting with Saudi Arabia and even Arafat in Tripoli, North Lebanon(DR)

with Sadat) and made a rapprochement with Syria.

The "peaceful solution" definitely seemed far away. This, moreover, was the argument always used by the nationalist left in Fateh after 1972 for staying in the framework of this organization dominated by Arafat. That is, that the Arafat leadership was chasing a right-wing utopia, that there was no chance that it could be included in an "American solution."

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was to upset these calculations. In this case also to describe the role played by the Arafat leadership would in itself require more than one article. Let me just point out that from the first days of the siege of Beirut, instead of rejecting in principle the evacuation of the Palestinian fighters demanded by Begin, Sharon, Reagan and Gemayel & Co., this leadership started negotiating with US representative Philip Habib on the conditions of such an evacuation. And it did not even pose concrete conditions, such as guarantees of the inviolability of Beirut and the camps. We saw how little the infamous Habib Plan had to offer in that respect. Aim of Arafat's negotiations

In fact, what was the subject of the negotiations were the political conditions. Arafat wanted to trade evacuating Beirut for a US-recognized role in the "settlement" of the Palestinian question. It was on this basis that he could say: "We are only leaving Lebanon for Palestine."

It was no mere coincidence that Reagan announced his plan on the very day that the last contingent of PLO fighters left Beirut, on September 1, 1982. A few days later, Hussein called for Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations on the institutional link between his kingdom and a future Palestinian entity on the West Bank and in Gaza, as was proposed by the American plan.

Arafat did not hesitate. He entered into negotiations with Hussein - the principal Arab hangman of the Palestinian people — over a scheme for a Jordanian-Palestinian "confederation" and for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to participate in negotiations with the United States and Israel, that is, in a Camp David II. He got the Palestinian National Council that met in Algiers in February 1983 to endorse the main lines of this policy, using only slightly ambiguous formulations.

In April, Arafat was about to announce an agreement with Hussein. The El Fateh cadres had been informed of the main lines of the deal. Confronted with warnings from the opposition, however, he had to pull back. But he intended this to be only a temporary retreat.

The nationalist left in Fateh, which resigned itself to evacuating Beirut only with the greatest reluctance and then was able to see in the light of the Sabra and Chatila massacres how much Arafat's promises were worth, could not go on forever accepting the unacceptable.

The pretext that Arafat's line of national betrayal was simply utopian and therefore did not have real effects could not be maintained any longer. For the first time, a framework appeared in which there seemed to be a genuine possibility for applying Arafat's line, that is, the Reagan Plan.

This was all the more unacceptable for the national left because its central nucleus was made up of Palestinian officers and soldiers who deserted from the Jordanian army in 1970 to fight alongside the Palestinian resistance. It is easy to image the anger of these fighters against a leadership that thirteen years after Black September had nothing better to offer them than going back under the tutelage of the Hashemite regime! So, the nationalist left led by Abu Musa, Abu Khaled and Abu Saleh warned Arafat against concluding any deal with Hussein.

Moreover, the Syrian regime, offered nothing by the Reagan Plan, which makes no mention of the Golan Heights, the only Arab territory occupied in 1967, except for East Jerusalem, that has been formally annexed by Israel, also warned Arafat against making any deal with Hussein. For obvious reasons, the Syrian regime is strongly opposed to a Camp David II, which would have the effect of leaving it totally isolated in the face of Israel.

This is why the Syrian opposition to the Arafat line of rapprochement with Hussein was expressed with growing force, both directly and through the Saika, once the negotiations between the two parties began. I should also note the opposition by Libya to Arafat, which was consistent with Libyan policy with respect to the United States and the Arab national question.

While it is true that Saika is the instrument of the Syrian regime and Jibril's PFLP-General Command is in the pay of Libya and closely linked to Damascus,

International Viewpoint 13 February 1984

it has to be made clear that making an amalgam between the nationalist left in Fateh and the Syrian regime is a false and tendentious procedure. In fact, Abu Musa and his comrades were the most resolute fighters against the Syrian regime in 1976 when it tried, in concert with Washington, to strangle the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. Up until 1983 this group had no relations with the Syrian regime, leaving this to the Fateh leadership.

However, after the summer of 1982, the Palestinian resistance no longer controlled any territory in Lebanon. All its forces were operating from areas under Syrian control. Thus, when the dissidents in Fateh constituted themselves as an autonomous force they cannot be reproached for having alliance-type relations with Syria. It is possible, and necessary, however, to criticize the forms given to these relations. I will come back to this. Nonetheless, representing the split in El Fateh as the result of Syrian manipulation is simply a propaganda ploy by Arafat. Provocation

In fact, this split was not produced by manipulation from Damaseus but provoked by Arafat himself, who wanted to cut his connections to the Palestinian left and the Syrian-Libyan axis in order to clear the way for going over to the camp of the Arab reactionary regimes allied with American imperialism.

All the evidence supports this conclusion. A few days after the interruption in his negotiations with Hussein, Arafat proceeded to name people personally loyal to him and known for having deserted the fight in June 1982, to command of Fateh's forces in Lebanon. What is more, he ordered the most prominent leaders of the nationalist left to go into exile in Tunisia.

Both decisions were unacceptable. Abu Musa and his comrades were left with no alternative but rebellion. So, they rejected Arafat's measures and proposed a program of demands, the central planks of which were the following: A democratic congress of El Fateh to define the line of the organization. The demand for an accounting of the finances of El Fateh available to all members of the leadership. Breaking off negotiations with Hussein and rejection of the "Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation." Stepping up the anti-Zionist armed struggle.

It is out of the question that Arafat would risk confronting the left opposition in the sort of democratic congress it called for. He would be at a strong disadvantage on such ground. This is why he chose to push things toward an armed clash by envoking military discipline against the dissidents. In this way, he could cover up the political and organizational issues in the conflict. What is more, Arafat publicly accused the Syrians of having organized the rebellion against him at a time when they were not only not doing that but were showing a conInternational Viewpoint 13 February 1984 ciliatory attitude toward him, following the interruption in his negotiations with Hussein, and had offered to mediate to solve the crisis in El Fateh.

By provoking a fight with the dissidents, Arafat killed two birds with one stone. He cut his ties to a regime opposed to his Jordanian option and at the same time disguised the nature of his conflict with the dissidents in the way best suited to confusing the Palestinian masses, especially on the West Bank. Arafat and his powerful propaganda apparatus presented the conflict with the dissidents, supported by the Syrians, as a struggle against an attempt by the Syrians to impose their dominance, a struggle to defend "the autonomy of Palestinian decision making." Walid Joumblatt at the Geneva conference (DR)

All offers of mediation and proposals for stopping the fighting between the two factions in El Fateh and settling their conflict in a democratic way were rejected by Arafat. For example, the mediating commission formed by the Executive Committee of the PLO meeting in Tunis last summer had to suspend its work and issue a communique in October saying that its proposals had been accepted by the dissidents but rejected by Arafat. From his point of view, Arafat had a good enough reason for turning them down, they provided for organizing a democratic debate.

Arafat was determined to go all the way, all the way in breaking with the dissidents and the Syrian-Libyan axis and all the way in lining up with the Arab regimes dependent on American imperialism - Saudi Arabia, Jordan and even Egypt itself!

In September, Arafat went on an Egyptian freighter via Cyprus to Tripoli in northern Lebanon, where the troops still loyal to him had regrouped. In the meantime the great majority of the fighters in the Bekaa valley facing the Zionist army had rallied to the dissidents. Arafat organized a campaign to wipe out all opposition to this policy in the camps in the Tripoli region and then in the city itself.

The Islamic Unity Movement launched an operation with the support of Arafat's forces to establish total domination over the city. This is a fundamentalist Sunni movement linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and particularly to its Syrian branch, which is armed, trained and financed by El Fateh.

The campaign culminated in October in a full-scale offensive against the Tripoli section of the Lebanese Communist party, which resulted in the deaths of more than fifty Communist Party members. In its communique on these events, the Lebanese Communist Party said that Arafat's troops played the predominant role in what it described as a massacre perpetrated against its members.

At the same time, in the port Arafat was getting shipments of arms and ammunition sent by Mubarak. He was preparing for a battle that was becoming inevitable as a result of his actions, a battle that he deliberately provoked. so doing he had not the slightest illusion about being able to defeat the majority of the Palestinian forces supported by Syria. His objective was not that but rather to dramatize that he was exerting every effort to present it as a Syrian-Palestinian conflict, covering up its inter-Palestinian character. In that way, he could evacuate his remaining troops to Tunisia, Algeria and North Yemen. There they would be put under the control of the local regimes until he could transfer them to Jordan. Arafat had long since accepted evacuation in principle, and had even discussed the forms with the Gemayel regime (in May 1983, the rebels exposed these dealings).

From this standpoint, it can be said that Arafat got what he was after, that is, victory for his policy and not a military victory.

Negotiating a prisoner exchange with Israel in the midst of the conflict and announcing in besieged Tripoli that his relations with Hussein were reaching the point of total agreement, Arafat got his forces evacuated under the cover of the UN flag and with a French naval escort. From Tripoli to his meeting with Mubarak, it was a direct line, both in terms of navigation and politics!

If Arafat has managed up until today to fool broad masses of people, it is due in part to the political failings of his adversaries, the dissident faction of El Fateh, who alone can rally the Palestinian masses to their cause. The dissident bloc began to take form in May 1983. It was a heterogeneous combination of more or • less radical oppositions to the Arafat line. The gamut went from a far left that claimed to be Marxist, represented by Abu Khaled, to opportunists with little concern for principles. Somewhere in the middle were the petty-bourgeois nationalists represented by Abu Musa and a pro-Soviet current represented by Abu Saleh. The political line that predomin-

7

ated was in a direct line of continuity from the origins of El Fateh, opposition to Arafat's "deviation."

Revolutionary Marxists must, of course, support the program of the dissidents against Arafat. But in so doing they also have to criticize the dissidents' political limitations and their errors, and in the first instance the forms taken by their relations with the Syrian regime.

Instead of making a "strategic alliance" with the Syrians on the basis of a wrong and politically short-sighted alliance, the nationalist faction in El Fateh should have kept its distance from Assad, refusing to let him interfere in any way in the conflict with Arafat. It could only have gained from this politically in the eyes of the Palestinian masses far away from the scene of the fighting, in particular on the West Bank. This is by no means an "ultraleftist" criticism. I am not saying that the dissidents should fight the Syrians today, but I am convinced that without too great difficulty they could have kept the Syrians out of their conflict with Arafat.

The dissidents at least could have refused to engage in any battle against Arafat in which troops manipulated by the Syrian regime were involved. They should have stayed out of the fighting in northern Lebanon, as did Habash's PFLP and Hawatmeh's DPLP. (2) In so doing, the dissidents could have avoided the political kick in the teeth they got when the Syrians made a deal with Arafat through the intermediary of the Saudis, without even bothering to consult them. On the basis of this deal, Arafat evacuated his troops from Lebanon, while the dissidents had said from the beginning that they were categorically against any such evacuation and were fighting only to force Arafat to accept their demands. (3)

The failings of the nationalist faction in El Fateh are an additional illustration of the urgent need for building a revolutionary proletarian tendency in the Palestinian resistance. Only such a tendency, equipped with a correct strategic view of the indispensable interaction between the Palestinian struggle and the Arab revolution could conduct the fight of the Palestinians in concert with the struggle for the Arab revolution and keep the tactical alliances the Palestinian resistance has to make within strictly tactical limits, without compromises. The Lebanese Fourth Internationalists in the Revolutionary Communist Group are trying to win the most advanced militants in the fighting Palestinian left to this point of view. 2. There are certain shades of political differences between the PFLP. long the radical nationalist wing of the Palestinian resistance, and the pro-Soviet DFLP. 3. Unlike Arafat, the dissidents had approved the proposals by the PFLP and DFLP for ending the fighting in Tripoli. When the SyrianSaudi agreement was announced, the dissidents' radio station criticized it, as did the PFLP and DFLP. Subsequently, the dissident radio stations directed appeals to Arafat's troops, calling on them to stay in Lebanon and promising to respect their democratic rights. 8

DOCUMENT

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