Another round in the crisis of the Communist Party After being by far the strongest force in the clandestine opposition to the Franco dictatorship (at least on the all-Spain level), the Spanish Communist Party has been more and more marginalized since "The Transition," that is, the return to parliamentary democracy in 1975-77.
The fading of the CP first became evident in the parliamentary elections of June 1977, when it was outdistanced by the Social Democratic PSOE. One of the reasons for this was that the CP leaned over backwards to accomodate the Francoist government in the period when it was preparing The Transition.
Since 1977, the CP has been in steady decline. In the elections last year that brought a PSOE government to power, it was reduced to an almost insignificant position on the all-Spain level.
The discontent among the militant working-class base of the CP has also been fed by the party's support for the various social pacts that it has entered into, along with the PSOE. These amounted to a surrender to the bosses by the workers parties and trade-union organizations at the very time the economic crisis hit, reducing the living standards and level of employment of the workers disastrously.
Since in this period, the leadership of the CP, headed by Santiago Carrillo was identified with a liberal, or Eurocommunist line, the left opposition tended to be captured by Stalinist fundamentalists harking back to the "good old days.
The conflict came to be centered in the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), the CP's affiliate in Catalonia, which is where the CP has its greatest strength. In this area in particular, a lot of oppositionists left the party and oriented toward the formation of a new party. The Congress of Communist Unity formed a new philo-Soviet "Communist Party" on January 15, unanimously electing Ignacio Gallego general secretary.
After last year's elections, Carrillo was obliged to give up the leadership of the party, but he quickly organized a fight against the new general secretary, Gerardo Iglesias. The following article analyzes the outcome of this fight at the CP's eleventh congress in mid-December, where Iglesias' main resolution was passed by 386 to 376 with 25 abstentions, the smallest majority in the party's history.
gress. The party has also to rebuild its strength among layers of professionals in order to be able to present a more attractive broad electoral image.
Within the framework of these common concerns, the main debates be- the between the two tendencies in the congress developed around the balance sheet of the Transition and the PCE's policy after 1979, the characterization of the PSOE government and what sort of opposition to conduct toward it, and the kind of party they want to build. ! This last point involves ideological definitions, relations with the various social movements, dealing with internal differences, as well as relations with the USSR and the other Communist parties.
Nonetheless, on all the questions I have just cited, the political and organizational differences were not clarified, at least not sufficiently to justify the violence of the conflict between the two tendencies. The differences are more comprehensible in terms of a power strug•gle in the party and maneuvers by the two tendencies to gain support for that purpose.
For the sake of this game, Carrillo tried to present himself as a left opposition to Iglesias. He stressed the danger of a coup, criticism of the PSOE government and the need for strong opposition to it. This left talk, which sounded funny coming from him, fitted in with his attempt to gain support among the rank-and-file worker members.
Many of these rank-and-file worker communists want a more left policy, and sections of them could be attracted by Ignacio Gallego's alternative and the Communist Unity Congress. To avert that, Carrillo did not hesitate to give a pro-Soviet turn to his international positions.
On the other hand, Carrillo made no criticism of all of the social pacts that have been accepted one after the other. This was precisely because that is one of the fundamental themes the PCE's working-class ranks could radicalize around, and this would have immediate practical consequences.
Carrillo's inability to offer a consistent criticism from the left enabled Iglesias to play the same game of talking out of the left side of his mouth, to keep Carrillo from stealing the thunder of the "left turn." He stepped up his criticisms of the PSOE and has made trips to Portugal and Cuba. At the same time, he raked up Carrillo's rightist past and his clashes with the USSR.
glesias obviously thought that the question of the party was his strongest point. Thus, he talked about intervening in the social movements, about collective methods of work and normalizing differences in the party. He put a lot of stress on the appeal to those who wanted change to return to the party. But he did not neglect the critical element on the left who might feel attracted to the Communist Unity Congress. He promised that the PCE would be a democratic party that would respect the right to have difference.
International Viewpoint 30 January 1984
F. CRUELLS
Gerardo Iglesias' victory in the Eleventh Congress of the Spanish CP has by no means marked the end of the party's long crisis.
Even the PSUC magazine Treball could not summon up much optimism:
"We do not want to be so naive as to think that the tensions will disappear immediately, when in fact in the period preceding the congress we saw a tendency toward geographical consolidation of the differences."
In this article, I will analyze the reasons for the continuing crisis of the PSUC.
To explain the conflict between the Iglesias and Carrillo tendencies in the PSUC, it is useful to look at the body of problems both face. The common ob12 jective of the two tendencies was to give impetus to a revival of the PCE as a force in electoral politics and in the mass movement.
Both tendencies knew that in order to accomplish that, the party has to capitalize on the discontent with the PSOE government among elements that want more radical policies. However, both Iglesias and Carrillo are firmly committed to a generally reformist line, little different from that followed by the PCE in the period of transition to parliamentary rule.
The PCE needs to demonstrate some renewed vitality in order to stop the bleeding split of militant workers from which the party has been suffering for some time. Moreover, in particular, it has to keep a large left element from 1 being attracted to the Communist Unity Con-
Words, however, are cheap. The question of the party's attitude to religion can be fuzzed over by saying simply that it is Marxist in inspiration. And Felipe Alvaraz did not take any big risks by inviting Ignacio Gallego to rejoin the party. But acts are something else.
Integration of the left wing was limited to putting a single representative on the Central Committee, Antonio Romero, who was surrounded by 109 representatives of the two other factions. And the differences are being "normalized" only to the extent that this enables the leadership to get through congresses.
This is what CP leader Francisco Palero had to say about it: "Would the publication of the various amendments make this congress more democratic? I don't think so, because far from promoting debate and synthesis, it would lead inevitably to polarization and division."
This original conception of democracy promoted factional methods of debate and lead to the strange situation where Carrillo could represent himself to the Eleventh Congress as a persecuted dissident.
Undoubtedly Iglesias drew support from the fact that no oppositionist has anything to hope for from Carrillo's return to the effective leadership of the party. The friends of the "reformers" have heard him say continually that he would throw them out of the party if he got the chance.
Party members who sympathize with the positions of Ignacio Gallego are not likely to forget that it was Carrillo who led the offensive at the Fifth Congress of the PSUC, which ended in splitting the party down the middle.
The confused debate went hand in hand with deep internal division in the hand with deen internal division in the PCE and an extraordinary violent discussion filled with mutual attacks. The PCE has come out of this congress without a new split but with a climate of crisis and internal warfare that it will be very difficult to dissipate.
Trying to build a left alternative to the PSOE based on a reformist policy is a difficult juggling operation. In fact, one of the sources of the crisis of the PCE is the lack of political space for two reformist parties. On the other hand, there is no sign of any letup in the internal tensions in the party. Carrillo is too strong and was to close to victory to let himself be pushed to the sidelines. Moreover, he cannot make an open compromise with Gerardo Iglesias without a large part of his base becoming demoralized or turning toward the Communist Unity Congress.
On the other hand, Iglesias cannot be content with his majority on the Central Committee and the Executive Committee as long as ten regional organizations (including the one in Madrid and in the Valencian country) are controlled by Carrillistas who are only waiting for him to make the first misstep before launching a campaign against him.
The conclusion is obvious. The crisis continues. International Viewpoint 30 January 1984
DENMARK