International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Sandinistas Fight for Economy Geared to Mass Needs

· International Viewpoint No. 39, 31 October 1983 · pp 11-16 · 5,204 words

Latin America Peasants and land reform

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Sandinistas fight for an economy geared to the needs of the majority

Nicaragua is up against a very difficult situation today. The revolution is under direct attack from the U.S. imperialists.

Washington has sent its fleet to threaten the Nicaraguan coasts. It is organizing large-scale maneuvers on Honduran territory. Morevoer, it is trying to strangle the country by imposing a full-fledged blockade. (1)

This imperialist offensive is also being waged through the intermediary of the counterrevolutionary forces operating from Honduras and Costa Rica. In addition to the harm these gangs do by their acts of destruction and crimes, they are forcing the

Sandinista revolution to give its main attention to defending itself.

To complete the picture, within the country itself, the most concentrated sector tral American countries. By way of comparison, a month's supply of 21 essential products for a family of six costs 36 dollars in Nicaragua. In neighboring Honduras - a prize specimen of Ronald Reagan's "free world" - the cost of this month's supply of staples is double.

All the other Central American countries have a cost of living far higher than Nicaragua. Despite all the difficulties Nicaragua has faced, it has suffered less of an economic decline than its neighbors.

The massive aid in dollars that has been showered on the most privileged layers in the other countries on the Central American isthmus did not prevent a drop of 9.5% in the GNP in El Salvador, 5.9% in Costa Rica, and 1.6% in Honduras. For most of the people in those countries, living conditions are much more difficult.

THE GRIP OF THE PAST

All the steps taken by the national leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) since July 19, 1979, have not, however, been able to immediately overcome the heritage of the past.

That is, Nicaragua is a small country that the former dictator Somoza assured would be dedicated mainly to growing coffee, cotton, and sugar cane, thereby increasing its dependence on the fluctuations on the imperialist-dominated world market.

In such a situation, it takes a long and complex process to eliminate the constraints imposed by ignorance, hunger, and poverty. You have to reorient the whole apparatus of production and exchange so as to give priority to meeting the needs of the greatest number.

This is what is involved in the objective and the work of building "people's power" undertaken by Managua. It involves organizing the power of the working class in alliance with the peasantry, that is, the overwhelming majority of the economically active population.

The direction of the process initiated on July 19, 1979, is clearly toward an overall reorganization of the economy. And this is going hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of a mass movement representing the interests of the working people in the cities and in the countryside.

At every step, this process has met with fierce resistance by the counterrevolution both from within and from without. This is why, far from advancing at a constant and regular rate, this process has been marked by crises and stops and starts. But the outcome of all these crises

See "The Nicaraguan revolution under fire." International Viewpoint, No 36, September 19, 1983. 2. With the cited exception, all these figures come from official data included in the report of the Government Council to the Council of State dated May 4, 1983; from the speech by Sandinista commander Daniel Ortega on the anniversary of the Sandinista revolution on July 19, 1983; and from the report for 1982 by the National Statistics Institute (INEC, Managua).

of private industry is refusing to invest disrupt the economy. Jean-Claude BERNARD

All the overall economic indicators for 1982, which are the latest known, show growing difficulties for the revolution. (2)

While in 1980 and 1981, the Gross National Product (GNP) grew by 10% and 6% respectively, in 1982, it declined by 1.4%.

Following the victory of the revolution in July 1979, the unemployment rate was reduced dramatically. In 1979, it stood at 36%. In 1980, it was cut to 13%. In 1981, it was still kept down to 16%. But in 1982, it had risen to 21%.

In 1982, moreover, consumption of products other than basic necessities dropped by 23%. As against this, consumption of necessities dropped by only 4.7%. While the rate of inflation was 25%, the drop in the buying power of the minimum-wage urban workers was only 14%. For rural working people, it is estimated that the decline in buying power was 19.6%.

Every revolution has experienced such difficulties in the beginning. The imperialists do not accept defeat but mount harassing operations. In the case of Nicaragua, these problems were further aggravated in 1982 by catastrophic floods that interfered with agricultural produc tion.

THE GAINS OF THE REVOLUTION

Nonetheless, the growing obstacles have not diverted the Sandinista leadership from its orientation of meeting the needs of the workers in the countryside and in the cities.

What should be pointed up first of all is the major efforts made to improve publie health and education. In 1982, for the first time in the history of the country, there was not a single case of polio, which represents no small accomplishment.

Between 1978 and 1982, the infant 12 and consciously doing its bit to further mortality rate fell by a quarter, dropping from 120 per 1,000 to 90 per 1,000. Medical care is free in the health centers, and these centers account for 60% of the visits to the doctor registered in 1982.

In the area of education, the reduction of the rate of illiteracy from 50% before the revolution to 12% today represents a real historic victory.

The number in school has tripled, rising from 500,000 in 1978 to 1,500,000 today. Some 73% of children between the ages of seven and twelve are now in school.

The gainers from these advances have been the immense majority of the population, the working people in the countryside and the cities, who were previously denied access to these social services.

This progress means little for the bourgeoisie and the well-to-do middle strata, who already had access to medical care and to education for their children.

This orientation of meeting the needs of the largest possible number is reflected also in the results obtained in the area of consumption. The year 1982 was certainly a difficult one. But the drop of 4.7% in the consumption of necessities was small by comparison with the drop of 23% in the consumption of other products. This is the effect of subsidies to stabilize the prices of staples such as maize, rice, and beans.

The increase in the prices of necessities was only half that of other products - 12% as opposed to 25%. In fact, the general decline in consumption noted in 1982 hides the significant fact that there has been a very large increase in consumption of the highest-protein foods.

This is a particularly impressive success since in 1979 the diet of the majority of the population suffered from protein deficiency. For example, per capita consumption of chicken increased by 15% between 1980 and 1982 and per capita consumption of eggs by nearly 25%.

There have been calculations of the relative cost of living in the various Cen-

is a further shift of the relationship of forces in favor of the workers and peasants.

Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie still controls an important part of the productive apparatus and which can exert ideological influence through its press and the Catholic hierarchy. And it has not yet given up hope that it can reverse the process.

IMPERIALIST ECONOMIC PRESSURE

This process is all the more complex because Nicaragua can only develop on the basis of international exchanges. There has been a steady reorientation of such exchanges since July 19, 1979.

In 1979, 78% of the credits came from international organizations, as against 22% from bilateral contracts negotiated with individual governments. In 1982, this situation was totally reversed. Bilateral contracts accounted for 92% of the credits, as against 8% from international organizations. This is due in part to the full-fledged boycott imposed by U.S. imperialism, which managed to block financial assistance from the international bodies that it largely controls. But it is also a result of the policy adopted by the FSLN and the Government Council for National Reconstruction.

The Nicaraguan government is now better equipped to make bilateral agreements, even with the governments of the capitalist European countries, that meet the priorities it has set for development. For the entire period running from July 1979 to May 1983, cooperative aid from capitalist countries represented 78% of the total, whereas that coming from the "Eastern countries" and Cuba amounted to only 22%. (3)

This pronounced dependence on the capitalist countries can be seen also when you examine the results of foreign trade for 1982. Exports to the "Eastern countries" and Cuba represent 6.3% of the total, while imports from these countries add up to 11% of the total imports. These facts far from support the stereotype promoted by the international press of Nicaragua becoming a "Soviet-Cuban" colony.

Latin America (including the Central American Common Market) accounts for 45% of imports and 16% of exports. The Central American Common Market alone accounts for 18% of imports and 13% of exports.

The U.S. itself still accounted for 19% of Nicaragua's imports and 22% of its exports in 1982. The steps taken by the Reagan administration in the spring of 1982 to block Nicaraguan sugar exports to the U.S. will reduce this.

The still relatively important scope of trade with the U.S. indicates how much any stepup of the American blockade could disrupt the Nicaraguan economy.

Trade with West Europe has been growing over the most recent period. Exports to the Common Market countries, which account for 24.5% of the total of Nicaraguan exports, are four times great-

Revolutionary banner in Nicaraguan shanty town (DR)

er than those to Eastern Europe. Imports from the EEC - 14% of the total - are double those from East Europe.

So, the overall reorientation of international exchanges is marked by two features. On the one hand, there is a growth in trade with the East European countries. On the other, there is a realignment of trading relationships among the capitalist countries - with the West European countries (Germany, France, and Italy) and the Latin American countries (mainly Mexico) assuming a larger role.

The importance of trade with Mexico is still more crucial because today it is Nicaragua's major oil supplier. Up to the end of 1982, the 15,000 barrels a day Nicaragua needs were supplied equally by Venezuela and Mexico.

At the beginning of 1983, Venezuela stopped deliveries because of Nicaragua's inability to meet its debts on time. This has to be seen as a direct result of U.S. pressure on a country like Venezuela, which is also deeply in debt.

Since early this year, the 13,000 barrels arriving daily in Nicaragua have come from Mexico alone. And the U.S. has been increasing the squeeze on Mexico, as the New York Times has indicated. (4)

So, reorienting Nicaragua's international exchanges is closely related to the diplomatic and economic pressures that can be brought to bear on the country and which represent obstacles in the Sandinista revolutionary process.

This relationship makes the question of the foreign debt and the negotiations on repayment particularly acute. In 1982, repayment of the foreign debt absorbed 45% of the total income from ex•ports. This points up one of the means the imperialists might use to try to strangle the revolution.

The pressure of this debt forced the FSLN national leadership and the govern3. Figures provided by the International Fund for Reconstruction (FIR), Managua. 4. Information provided by the weekly bulletin of the Nueva Nicaragua news agency, Managua, August 1983.

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ment council to reduce imports in 1982 by 25.5% by comparison with the preceding year. The fact they were able to limit the drop in GNP to 1.4% is actually a testimony to the resources of a system that is beginning to reorient the economy toward putting the needs of the majority of the population first.

Like the escalation of the military threats, the increased economic problems, owing essentially to the imperialist blockade and the counterrevolution, are sharpening the social polarization in the country.

Up to now, it is the bourgeoisie and the middle classes in Managua who have been most directly affected by the economic restrictions, which have mainly been put on the importing of luxuries. So, the result of the economic difficul ties has been the deepening of the revolutionary process that can be seen today in Nicaragua. It is reflected in the continuation and acceleration of the agrarian reform, as well as in the transformations that are shifting the balance of the mixed economy.

THE AGRARIAN REFORM

In a country where more than 60% of the economically active population is made up of peasants and agricultural workers, where 75% of exports are agricultural products, and where agriculture represents half of total production, the question of agrarian reform is clearly a decisive one.

Before July 19, 1979, a couple of thousand landowners held 50% of the land, while 120,000 peasants held only 3%. This richest layer of landowners have been hardest hit by the transformations in progress. Under the impact of the expropriation of the holdings of Somoza and his direct associates immediately after July 19, 1979, the percentage of the land held by this top layer of landowners fell from 50% to 13%.

At present the land is divided up as follows: 23% is held directly by the state, 20% belongs to small peasants organized in cooperatives, 13% remains in the hands of the big landowners, and the rest - 44% - belongs to the middle peasants.

The agrarian reform decreed in August 1981 set the maximum individual holding at 350 hectares on the Pacific coast (the most densely populated area and 700 hectares on the Atlantic coast. A lot of agrarian reforms in other Latin American countries might look more radical on paper. But unlike most of them, the Sandinista agrarian reform has actually been put into practice.

What is more, cultivating land effec-tively has been made a condition for keeping it. In accordance with the dynamic of the revolution, it has been the mass peasant organizations — the National Union of Farmers and Stock Raisers (UNAG) and the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) - that have made sure that this condition is observed.

Unlike in the big industrial plants, 14 elaborate forms of monitoring are not necessary in agricultural operations. The peasants organized in their mass organizations can easily find out whether land has been left to lie fallow, or is being underused with respect to the average productivity in the region.

Thus, the agrarian reform puts all privately held land under peasant control. It provides for turning the expropriated land over to individual peasants or cooperatives. These titles can be inherited, but they cannot be sold. This prohibition is to keep big landed estates from reforming.

A particularly significant element in the present dynamic of the revolution is that the agrarian reform decree has not only served to institutionalize the situation created by the mass land occupations that came in the wake of July 19, 1979, when Somoza and his cronies left a lot of land abandoned. It also started a movement that, far from running out of steam, is continuing to accelerate. Twice the amount of land was distributed between June 1982 and March 1983 as between October 1981 and June 1982. (5)

Thus, between September 1981 and July 1983, titles have been distributed for 210,000 hectares, with 166,000 going to cooperatives and 44,000 to individual small peasants. This process is speeding up. In fact in July, at the time of the fourth anniversary of the revolution, 70,000 hectares were distributed, which represents more than half the amount distributed since the start of the year.

So far, 20,000 peasant families have gotten land through the agrarian reform. In fact, a larger number of peasants have been affected by the ongoing transformations, since it is estimated that about 60,000 are involved in the cooperative movement.

The two mainstays around which the agrarian reform is organized are the lands nationalized "in the domain of people's property" and the lands cultivated by the burgeoning cooperatives. The target is an allotment of 50% to the poor peasants, 25% to the state sector, and 25% to a private sector of market farmers. The share still held by big landowners and middle peasants, more than half the total, indicates how far the Sandinistas still are from their goal.

### AGRICULTURE HARNESSED

TO SOCIAL NEED

The change in tempo in recent months does not mean that the goal is already near. What it signifies is that to meet the demands of the revolution's social base in the countryside and to orient agricultural production in accordance with the national priorities it was necessary to step up the pace.

To appreciate the sort of alliance that has been formed between the peasants and the revolution, it is important to note that the targets of agricultural production are not being determined by the interests of the peasants alone. The first task the FSLN national leadership set for agriculture was to assure an adequate supply of the staples of the national diet.

This goal is in the interests of the peasants, to be sure, but also of the urban workers. It was not set to suit economic interests of one or another layer of the peasantry. It was adopted to meet the demands of a policy designed to achieve a planned development of the country in the interests of the majority of the working people.

This political choice has already led to tangible results. While the overall level of agricultural production in 1982 was 10% lower than in 1977, the trend was the opposite for the food-staple crops. tween 1977 and 1982, rice production doubled, the bean crop increased by 15%, and the supply of pasturized milk rose by 70%. At the same time, production of maize, the basis for the main national staple - the tortilla - remained constant.

On the other hand, there was a marked drop in cotton production in 1982, while the coffee and sugar cane harvests stayed at the old level.

THE ROLE OF THE BIG LANDOWNERS AND STATE FARM MANAGERS

The reason for the fall off in cotton is 2 ти ат that this crop is cultivated mainly on the big private plantations or state farms. And in the case of the state farms, the administrative teams appointed under Somoza are often still there, since there is a shortage of technically qualified personnel to replace them. These two factors combined to produce poor results, in contrast with the cooperative sector in which the poor peasants have combined, and in the most advanced cases cultivate the land collectively.

In the cooperative sector the social mobilization is much more active than on the private plantations and big state farms. It should also be noted that the cotton and sugar cane crops have been the targets of criminal arson by the "contra" gangs.

So, the agrarian reform underway can only be analyzed as a process that is still far from being completed. Active participation by the agricultural workers and the poor peasants is the key in this area, as it is for the revolutionary process as a whole. The advance of the agrarian reform cannot, in fact, be analyzed separately from the measures taken with respect to other sectors of the economy, in particular foreign trade and distribution within the country.

HOLES IN THE STATE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK

The state holds a monopoly of foreign trade and wholesale trade in agricultural products has been nationalized. Thus, the peasants in principle do not have direct access to the market. The trend is rather toward nationalized con5. The magazine Envio, Managua, August 1983.

trol of distribution of produce, whether it comes from the private, cooperative, or public sector. Thus, the revolutionary government is tending to acquire the means for allotting agricultural surpluses to those sectors to which it gives priority.

In this area also, even though a clear target has been set, the present situation remains very uneven. Two distribution networks continue to exist side by side, from wholesalers to retailers.

Products subsidized from the state budget are sold only through the public network. In fact, because of these subsidies peasants can buy beans and maize at lower prices in the stores than the price they got for selling the same products.

But many sections of the peasantry continue to sell their crops through private circuits, thereby deliberately causing shortages of the products sold at subsidized prices in the 2,600 public stores.

For example, the "Eastern Market" in Managua, the city's oldest market left standing after the 1972 earthquake, is a den of speculators. In August 1983, they were selling rice and beans at double the prices in the public stores. The price for chicken was 80% higher. (6)

The daily press that supports the revolutionary process, Barricada, the organ of the FSLN, and Nuevo Diario have been waging an intense campaign against these speculators, who can profit from the systematically created in the public distribution network. the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS, the neighborhood organizations) in combating speculation should be noted in particular.

The weight of the past and the complexity of the problems to be solved becomes clear when you see that on many levels private distribution networks have been able to tap the public ones.

Nationalized farms growing maize, for example, contribute to speculation by selling their crops to private wholesalers at prices higher than the official ones. Often it is managers left over from Somoza's time who are responsible for this.

Moreover, at all levels of the public distribution network, private traders are in a position to buy for resale at substantial profits.

In fact, the question of supplying the needs of the majority of the population, especially in the cities, has been the focus of a lot of recrimination. This is a real source of discontent.

However, the FSLN is by no means trying to put a bureaucratic damper on this discontent. To the contrary, it is trying to use it to get a mass struggle going against the speculators and the enemies of the revolution and to deepen the revolutionary process. The revolution is not something that stands still, or that has already set for all time the level of socialization in the economy.

WHAT FUTURE FOR THE "MIXED ECONOMY"?

The same observation holds for the industrial sector, which is also under a mixed economy system. In Nicaragua, industry accounts for only about 30% of the Gross Domestic Product. It is very dispersed. On February 31, 1982, there were no more than 96 plants with more than 100 workers, and no more than 97 with between 50 and 100 workers. But these less than 200 plants by themselves accounted for 85% of the country's industrial production in terms of value.

In 1982, it was estimated that the private sector accounted for 60% of industrial production and the public sector for 40%. But this figure is not very significant in itself because it combines small craft production and capitalist production in the full sense of the term.

To assess the dynamic of the present situation, it is more fruitful to look at investment. The main fact that comes out here is that private investment represents no more than 23% of the total, including all sectors of the economy.

The role played in reality by private investment was analyzed as follows in an economic survey by Barricada focused on investment in 1979-82.

"Private fixed investment declined, playing much less of a role in the investment process. Moreover, the capital flight figures reflected in the balance of payments indicate that the private sector is 'decapitalizing' (7) instead of investing.

"Likewise, the demand for long-term credits by the private sector to the national financial system dropped in 1982. If we add to this that the private sector does not get foreign loans, since its economic activities are 100 percent financed by the national financial system, we see a negative orientation on the part of big private capital. It is showing a lack of interest in the effort to achieve national capital accumulation.

"In recent years, the surpluses generated by big private capital have been directed toward non-productive uses. This includes not only consumption but speculation and capital flight." (8)

To deal with this "negative" attitude on the part of big private capital, the revolutionary government is not just making denunciations. It is expropriating or intervening in plants where the bosses are not respecting the terms of the contract made - that is, to produce in accordance with the national priorities and to try to meet the most urgent needs of the population. This means putting a watch on the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie from above. But its behavior is also being monitored from below on the initiative of the workers.

THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT,

A "SANDINISTA" BOSS, AND THE WORKERS

The example of the "labor conflict" that occurred in Managua in early August in the biggest bakery in the city illustrates the sort of initiatives the workers are taking.

This bakery employs 85 workers and the state holds the majority of stock (51%). The manager, who holds the rest of the stock, was a Costa Rican citizen, Chavez Ovarez. During the war of liberation, he supported the FSLN and was rumored to be linked to the "Group of the Twelve" (a group of prominent exiles who lined up with the FSLN).

So, this manager had ties to current leading circles and was guaranteed a supply of flour, even in the event of shortages. This did not keep him, however, from being an aggressive boss. In particular, he refused to accept the setting up of a local of the Sandinista Workers Confederation (CST) in "his" business. He went so far as to fire a militia member who was mobilized to defend the revolution.

On Sunday, July 31, 1983, the bakery workers hung a banner across the front of their workplace with a hastily written slogan, "Stop the violations of the workers' rights!"

In response to growing discontent among the workers, the manager decided

Nuevo Diario, Managua, August 3, 1983. 7. "Decapitalization" is a jargon term coined to cover the two-sided policy of the bourgeoisie of refusing to make investments and taking their capital out of the country (capital flight). 8. Barricada, Managua, August 15, 1983.

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"The people of Sandino are a victorious army' (DR)

EL PUEBLO DE SANDIO

ES UN EJERCITO VICTORIOSO D

to close "his" business, claiming that he was having problems with flour shipments. He put up a sign saying "Closed until August 4," without giving any notice to the workers concerned or to the responsible administrative authorities.

The workers responded quickly and decisively. They appealed to the Ministry of Labor to remove the manager. Within four days they got satisfaction. The manager was ousted, although he kept his stock. He was replaced by a new administrator whose nomination was approved by the CST.

A local of the CST was finally set up in the bakery, and working hours were readjusted. This conflict is particularly significant because it was not between an avowed supporter of the Somocistas and the workers but between the workers and a boss formerly linked to leading circles in the FSLN. The Ministry of Labor rapidly settled. the dispute in favor of the workers. This case is a clear in-

Thus, the "mixed economy" system that prevails today in Nicaragua has not established a fixed line of demarcation between the private and public sectors. It represents a transitional economy. The rate at which it evolves depends on the class conflicts that are continuing to develop between a working class that is building up its strength and capacity for organization and a bourgeoisie that is disputing every inch of ground to defend the economic positions it still holds after having been ousted from political power.

The private sector is obliged to respect the targets set by the national plan, under threat of expropriation. And expropriations are in fact carried out. This constraint gives rise to real differentiations within the bourgeoisie, since certain sec. tors have an immediate interest in working within a system that guarantees their prices and markets. This is true, for example, for a section of commercial farmers.

Nonetheless, the general tendency is toward a direct takeover of production by the government that came out of the revolution. Most of the big investment projects are being carried through by mobilizing public resources alone. This goes for the schemes to achieve self-sufficiency in energy, as well as to develop transport and food processing.

THE WORKING PEOPLE TAKE CENTER STAGE

What is most important is that, even if they have not yet been able to institute developed forms of workers control, the working people of the cities and in the countryside are strong enough through their mass organizations to keep a watch on all the private producers. In this way, social polarization sharpens as the revolution advances.

The transitional form represented today by the mixed economy is possible only because there is a revolutionary government in Nicaragua that has not reformed but destroyed the Somoza regime's instruments of coercion.

In a book published in July 1983, Jaime Wheelock, one of the nine members of the national leadership of the FSLN, wrote: "The bourgeoisie is used to being the dominant force ideologically, culturally, and socially. And now it is not dominating things. Now it is the workers and peasants, the student leaders, the ATC, the CST, the Sandinista Front that are doing the talking and pointing out the path to follow. And none of these represents the bourgeoisie."

All the potential contradictions that lie in the mixed economy system being followed today were in fact pointed up by Jaime Wheelock when he wrote: "It has to be tested whether the bourgeoisie can produce without power, whether as a canal class it can limit itself, to playias a productive role, that is, limit itself to exploiting the means of production that it holds and using them to live and not as an instrument of power and oppression."

The whole question is, in fact, whether a social class that is being offered the material possibility to maintain itself as a class can long resign itself not to using its material means as an instrument of political power.

The events that have unfolded since July 19, 1979, show that the ranks of the counterrevolution have been swelled by one bourgeois faction after another which has preferred to break national unity rather than accept its own defeat. unity is the than acat the revolution has not stopped its advance despite the growing threats from U.S. imperialism nor yielded to the pressures of the bourgeoisie.

The example of steadfastness that the Nicaraguan revolution gives every day cannot help but inspire the international movement in defense of the Sandinista revolution to show a similar determination.

Celebrating the sixth anniversary of the women's organisations (DR)

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