What future for the Lebanon ceasefire?
Salah JABER
"Peace in Galilee" operation
The launched in June 1982 by Israeli premier
Begin and his defense minby the Phalangist Party - the reactionary Christian bourgeois party - to succeed his assassinated brother, Amin Gemayel was elected to the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. But he was able to take the helm of the
What is more, the consensus around
Amin Gemayel states of the region and the great powers of the world. Syria, which had vehemently denounced Beshir Gemayel's election,
Menahem ister, Ariel Sharon, had two objectives.
The initial, minimum objective attained in the first days of the invasion, that is, the occupation of a zone 45 kilo- of Beshir as a pretext for occupying Beimeters deep in southern Lebanon, that is, the area south of the Awali river.
The second objective, the maximum one cherished by Sharon, was to destroy the independent infrastructure of the PLO and set up a strong central government in Beirut allied to Israel.
The Zionist leaders made no bones about their desire to see Beshir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces - the fascist Christian militia allied with Israel - take the presidency of the Lebanese Republic.
FROM THE ISRAELI INTERVENTION
TO THE
AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT
The second objective was almost achieved. Begin and Sharon gained the withdrawal of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut, their last independent stronghold, and "sponsored" the election of their ally, Beshir Gemayel, to the post he sought. anese bourgeoisie could not survive a boycott by the Arab countries.
Since it gets the bulk of its profits from its relations with its Arab hinterland, the Lebanese bourgeoisie cannot afford the luxury of breaking with the other Arab countries of the area.
Thus, even Beshir Gemayel himself, after he was "elected," had to adjust his political ambitions to this fact. He had to go back on the peace treaty he promised to the Israeli leaders and in exchange offer them a feeble security treaty.
Gemayel tried to get out from under the shadow of Israel by stepping up his declarations of allegiance to the U.S. But, in fact, the fascist leader remained dependent on the Zionist state, since his "election" was disputed by Syria and the great majority of Lebanese Muslim currents. The assassination of Beshir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, put an end to all these calculations.
more favorable circum-
The Israeli army took the assassination rut and seizing the enormous stocks of weapons held by the Lebanese left, including those left behind by the Palestinest national consensus ever achieved around a Lebanese president.
Unity of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, including all communities, is a rare enough thing in itself and had been impossible to achieve for a long time. Nonetheless, it was achieved around Amin Gemayel.
The Lebanese left itself, in particular the Stalinists and Nasserites, declared their friendliness toward him.
As for the Lebanese people, in such conditions, it could not but place its hopes for peace and stability in the new president. It hoped these aspirations could be achieved in the context of a renewed accord among the communities.
War weary after seven years of fighting, the Lebanese people fervently hoped they had found their "savior."
sent its congratulations to his successor.
In the reactionary camp, only the Israeli leaders and the fascists of the Lebanese forces had reason not to join in the general rejoicing
The unity around the new president was, in fact, largely due to his reputation as a "moderate" - unlike that of his assassinated brother. Amin Gemayel was supposed to be anxious to maintain good relations between the government and the Lebanese Muslims, and between Lebanon and the Arab states in the region.
He was much more representative of the real interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie than his brother. Amin Gemayel, himself a businessman, could in no way take the Israeli option. His road was clearly marked out. He had to balance between the economic interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and world imperialism, that is, primarily between the U.S. and the oil-producing Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia.
Since he got unreserved support from both quarters, Amin Gemayel had only to maneuver adeptly to maintain the advantages he started out with and to achieve the Bonapartist project he expressed when he said on the day he was sworn in,
French troops in Lebanon (DR)
The would keep the presidency "above party and community conflicts.
### WHY GEMAYEL FAILED
There is no need today to spend a lot of time proving that the balance sheet of the past year of the Gemayel presidency amounts to a pathetic failure. necessary is to explain why the new president managed to wear out the great political capital he had when he started - consensus that had formed quickly emerged - contrary to his promises — as the representative of a party and a community.
Dependent on his party, the reactionary Maronist Phalangists led by his own father, Amin Gemayel was obliged to name Phalangists or people close to them to all the key posts in the state apparatus, in particular to the leadership of the most important bodies for any dictatorship -the army, the military intelligence services, and the police.
So, far from taking on a Bonapartist appearance, the military dictatorship with a civilian government that established itself in the Beirut area was very quickly was - a Phalangist
Moreover, as premier, the second most important post in the state and the most important one that could be held by a Muslim according to the balance that has been in effect since 1943 (1), Gemayel the nonentity Shafik The cabinet was made up of nobodies, who represented
These practices, which to say the least were ill-advised from the standpoint of the original project, were carried further by repeated appointment of Phalangists to functionaries' positions over a period sively alienate the Muslim masses, who had shown their sympathy for Gemayel at the start of his term by displaying his portrait all over West Beirut.
Still more surely, these alienated the Muslim political forces, not the traditional bourgeoisie represented in parliament as the "fighting" bourgeoise currents that consolidated a position after 1975, and which are not represented in any state institu-
This category includes three political currents based in the three Muslim communities and they had expected Gemayel to give them representation commensurate with their real influence.
the Sunni Nasserite current, whose best known organization is the Murabitun. It is the weakest of the three for sociological reasons but also - unlike the two others - because it was disarmed
Israeli invaders who entered Beirut in September 1982
Another of these currents is the Shi'ite one represented by Amal, which over the last years has recruited around the themes of anti-Communism, hostility to the Palestinians, and support for the specific demands of the Shi'ite community. recent months, in confrontation with the Gemayel regime, it is these demands of the Shi'ite community that have come to the forefront.
The third current is the Druze one represented by Walid Joumblatt, the feudalbourgeois leader of the so-called Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), a member of the Socialist International. anese Stalinists tail after this current. (2)
In order for the opposition of these three currents to the Gemayel government to spill over into clashes with the "legal" army, the regime had to lose another of its bases of support - Syria. To one degree or another, all three of these currents have attached themselves
LIMITS OF THE
UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL
However, before going into Gemayel's break with Syria, we have to go back to the Gemayel regime's relations with Israel, of which this break was in fact an
Indeed, in the course of one year Gemayel managed to alienate everyone, except his imperialist protectors. already on poor terms with Israel when he took over the presidency, since he immediately made it clear that he was putting his relations with the Arab coun-
Moreover, the Israeli leaders bitterly resented the fact that the Phalangist leaders had denied that their militia was involved in the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps and had put the sole responsibility on the Israeli army. (3)
this was a hypocritical and cowardly action on the part of the Lebanese leaders, who were trying to escape the heat of public opinion, both in the Arab world and in the world in general. The Begin-Sharon team have never
This resentment against the Phalangists on the part of the Israelis was compounded by just as deep was not just because Washington helped put the blame for the Sabra and Chatila massacres on the Israeli government. was also and more fundamentally because of the famous Reagan plan. This involved a statement by the U.S. administration at the beginning of September 1982 calling for a freeze on the building of Zionist settlements on the West Bank and for the restoration of the occupied territories to King Hussein's Jordan. (4)
In such circumstances, the presence of the Israeli army in Lebanon became the main card in their conwith their American big They proposed a deal, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in return for the U.S. dropping the Reagan plan.
However, this condition was unacceptable to Washington, whose relations with the Begin-Sharon government reached
The Israeli leaders then decided to stall the negotiations on the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon by advancing a series of conditions unacceptable to the much more onerous than those imposed on Egypt in return for the Israeli with-
However, the Israeli presence in Lebanon soon proved to be a two-edged sword, and the other edge began to turn and more sharply against the With the growth of all sorts of resistance to the Zionist occupiers, their grew continually, neutralizing the diplomatic advantages they drew from their presence in Leb-
The balance sheet of the Begin-Sharon government's operation in Lebanon also added up to a dismaying failure. Israeli regime had not succeeded in establishing an allied regime in Lebanon.
The Zionists had, moreover, alienated Washington and made Yasser Arafat's PLO more credible as an interlocutor for world imperialism. This corresponded, paradoxically, to the fact that the and less independent than ever, and thus could more easily be integrated into the American plan, without this requiring any major concessions.
The Zionist leaders reacted by a fit of spite. In the summer of 1982, they had allowed Beshir Gemayel's militia to move in forces into the Chouf and Aley regions, the preserve of Joumblatt's PSP 1976. Now they let Joumblatt take up arms against the Lebanese forces and even to bring in massive quantities of arms from areas controlled by the Syrian army.
Clearly, having been unable to get a Lebanese central government totally subservient to them, the Zionist leaders were putting their bets again on a breakup of Lebanon along communal lines. This old Zionist scheme had the merit in their eyes that it would create two ministates, one Maronist and the other Druze, both of which would be "clients"
And the rest of the country would be divided up between themselves would be a meager consolation prize in view of the 1. On the basis of the latest census figures available in 1943, when the French protector-
Lebanon was coming to an end, "national pact" was adopted that was supposed to establish a fair division of the central government among the various communities. posed to be a Maronite, the premier a Sunni affairs a Greek Orthodox, political dominance to the Maronite Christian bourgeoisie
Walid Joumblatt was in fact chairman of the Lebanese Communist Party participated, among the Sabra and Chatila massacres, see IV, No 14. October 4, 1982 analysis of the Reagan Plan in the resolution of the United Secretariat of the published in IV, No 16,
scope of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon, Begin's scapegoat, had to pay the price. The report of the inquiry into the Sabra and Chatila massacres offered the chance to sacrifice him.
Begin's former right-hand man was replaced as defense minister by the form-
Israeli ambassador to Washington, Moshe Arens. The objective of the new chief of the Zionist armed forces was to get Israel out of the Lebanese quicksand and to reestablish good relations with the American administration. An ordinary day of streetfighting in Beirut (DR)
The Israeli government's new star, Moshe Arens, advanced a very simple point of view. It can be summed up as follows: Israel had nothing to lose by making an accord with the "legal" Lebanese government, even if this meant "sacrificing" Israel's faithful puppet, Saad Haddad, and his militia in southern Lebanon.
This was for the good reason that such an accord, even if it included only the minimum conditions accepted by Amin Gemayel on Washington's advice, had no chance of being approved by Syria. It would therefore be a dead letter even before it was signed, because its application would depend on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.
So, such a movement would be a cheap way of placating the Americans by putting the ball in the court of the Syrians. The latter, in turn, were demanding guarantees on the matter of the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory seized by Israel in the 1967 war, as a condition for cooperating with Washington.
Thus, the idea was, Israel would continue to hold the aces and at the same time get out of the Lebanese quicksand. It would then only have to pull the Israeli army back to the line of the Awali river, which the Zionist treats more and more like the Jordan, that is, as the natural boundary of the Israeli state. (5)
The Israelis expected that this move would, of course, be followed by a sharpening of the conflict between the Druzes and the Maronites. But the Begin team did not see anything in that to be unhappy about.
### BREAK BETWEEN
GEMAYEL AND SYRIA
"Advised" by Washington, Amin Gemayel fell into the trap that Moshe Arens laid. In May 1983, he signed an "accord" with Israel. It had no validity, but it did alienate the Syrians, who were opposed
In fact, the Syrians took the LebaneseIsraeli accord a pretext for launching an offensive against the Gemayel regime, which was the big loser in this whole
Indeed, no one should be fooled. It is not the Phalangist government that excites the ire of the Damascus govern-
It got along with Gemayel quite well before the conclusion of this stillborn accord. In fact, Hafez El-Assad allied himself with the Phalangists, intervening on their behalf in 1976 against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese
Over and above their present opposition to the Phalangists, what the Syrian leaders are seeking is recognition of a central role for Syria in any settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict by the Zionists' American protectors.
Already in 1975-76, before intervening on the side of the Phalangists, the Syrian Baathists leaders backed the Palestinian and Progressive forces in Leb- pia earl e anon. This was their countermove to the Egyptian-Israeli accord on the Sinai, which was concluded in September 1975, under the sponsorship of Henry Kissinger.
However, this attitude on the part of the Syrians lasted only until Washington, faced with the threat of an anti-Phalangist victory, was ready to make a deal with
The Americans promised to include Syria in any further diplomatic moves to achieve a settlement in the region in return for Syrian intervention in Lebanon to stop the Palestinians and the Lebanese left. (7)
Subsequently, the Syrian-American honeymoon was soured by the victory of the Likud party in the 1977 Israeli elections.
In the present crisis, the Syrian leaders want to make the American administration understand that if Israel holds one key to implementing the Reagan plan, they hold the other.
Today the dictatorship of Hafez-ElAssad's Baathist party finds itself in a much stronger position with respect to Washington than it did in 1975-76. And as paradoxical as it might seem, that is because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982
Because of the Zionist aggression, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese forces opposed to the Phalangists are more dependent on Syria than ever. At the same time, since it ended in a checkmate, the Israeli intervention is no long er a Sword of Damocles hanging over the Syrian regime.
Quite the contrary. The "Lebanese syndrome" is at least as strong a factor in Israeli public opinion as the "Vietnam syndrome" has been in the U.S. since 1973. The Zionist state is less capable than ever of waging any war other than a defensive one. The best proof of this is the low profile it adopted during the clashes in Lebanon.
THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION
Thus, after the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese accord in May 1983, Damascus gave the green light to the revived Lebanese opposition to take on the Phalangists. A Front of National Salvation was constituted, under Syrian auspices, bringing together the three main figures attached to Syria - Soleiman Frangieh, who was president before the 1975-76 civil war, and who later became hostile to the Phalangists after long being their ally (up to 1978!); Rachid Karemeh, premier during the same period, who, like his north Lebanon home city Tripoli, is under Syrian control; and, of course, Walid Joumblatt.
In due course, the Stalinists lined up behind this front, which has nothing popular about it, with its three bourgeois
The Shi'ite organization Amal did not join this front, which reflects its relative autonomy from the Syrians. But it saw the offensive of the anti-Phalangist oppo5. Many reports of Israeli preparations for Longe it possible to coote it on on no southern Lebanon with the occupation of the Left Bank of Jordan 6. Extracts from the Lebanese-Israeli accord were published and commented on in Inprecor, our sister publication in French, No 155, July 28, 1983. 7. For a more detailed analysis of the 1975. 76 civil war, of the attitude of Syria, and the orientation of the Lebanese left forces, see my articles published in Inprecor No 47-48 (old series), April 1976.
7
as a chance to make a show of Amin Gemayel build up his state. strength and renegotiate the question of In fact, once again, there was nothing its involvement in the "legal" humanitarian about the way the multiment, as well as the "Shi'ite" demands, national force intervened. Its troops, in for which it had assumed the role of particular the French paras, distinguishspokesperson. ed themselves by going over Beirut with
Since the Israeli army had announced a fine tooth comb, working alongside its intention to withdraw immediately to Gemayel's army.
Awali river - despite the heavy the American contingent specialized in pressure Washington was putting on the training the recruits to the Lebanese Begin cabinet to delay the pullback until army. the "legal" Lebanese army was ready to There could be no doubt that the purmove in to fill the vacuum - the starting pose of the multinational force was not signal was given for a battle for control of "peace" but to maintain the region between the Awali and the and specifically the Phalangist Beirut-Damascus Highway.
Prior to this, Amal had taken up arms With the new flareup of the Lebanon in Beirut, and in particular, in the pre- war in the summer of 1983, the imperialdominantly Shi'ite suburbs in order to ist governments involved in this multidemonstrate its strength. national force found themselves facing
As soon as the Israeli withdrawal was They were caught between carried out at the beginning of the sum- the prospect of getting immersed in the mer, the Chouf went up in flames. The where many had sunk before Lebanese Forces were rapidly defeated, them or becoming decisively discredited in particular since they were not fighting in the eyes of their neocolonial clients if on "their own" territory. they failed again to bail out an allied
The "legal" Lebanese army then took Lebanese regime. over from the Phalangists, and the fight- This is why Washington above all had ing concentrated around the Souk-El- to intervene in support of the Lebanese
This was a strategically army and the Phalangist forces, for fear access to the capital from the south and added to a long list of proteges abandon-
Led by the U.S. To take up just the most
Joumblatt's Druze forces were rein- period, this list forced by Palestinian fighters, with the shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua. blessing of the Syrians, and were backed Washington had, therefore, to intervene up by Syrian artillery. They probably directly in the Lebanon war to show the could have scored a military victory and dictatorships in Latin America and elserung the death knell for the Amin Ge- where that they will not be left to their mayel regime, if the imperialist multi- fate when the chips are down. national force stationed in Lebanon, and However, the Reagan administration is in particular the American forces, had not still hampered by the "syndrome" creatintervened directly against them. U.S. military defeat in Viet-
IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION troops into the fight just like that. to advance slowly but surely,
The multinational force, which orig- direct intervention by inally included troops from three imper- troops (2,000 Marines are being kept in ialist powers - the U.S., France, and Italy readiness off Beirut to be landed in sup- and was later joined by forces from port of the forces already on the ground). Britain, intervened in Beirut on August Along with this, for the first time since 1982 with a two-faced line. Its purpose the Vietnam war, the U.S. openly used was presented by some as protecting its means of mass destruction to rescue civilians while the Palestinian fighters an allied regime. Washington even went withdrew and by others as assuring that so far as to divert the New Jersey, the this withdrawal was actually carried out. "world's most powerful" battleship from
In fact, the multinational force opened the Caribbean to the waters off Lebanon. up the way for the subsequent Israeli However, besides the stakes in world invasion of the capital by dismantling the politics, the imperialists had chips in the fortifications and clearing away the mine local game to protect. The Reagan adfields from the defensive ministration wanted to make the Syrian built up by the forces besieged in Beirut. leaders understand that there was a limit this task was accomplished, the that the offensive of the military forces multinational force withdrew, leaving the they were backing could not overstep. field open for the Tsahal (the Israeli army) and its Lebanese allies, who were PERSPECTIVES AND TASKS to perpetrate the revolting massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Cha- The American intervention created an impasse in the Lebanon war, making
The remodeled multinational force a diplomatic agreement the only way out. that returned to Lebanon shortly after- Damascus, for its part, considered that ward maintained its two-faced pretenses. the Americans have been given a clear to Claude Cheysson, enough lesson. And so, it proved possible French minister of foreign affairs, its role to declare a ceasefire on September 25. was to be to protect the civilians. The question that is posed is what the cording to Ronald Reagan, it was to help outcome will be. Will the "reconciliathe country?
litics.
suits them.
dead letter since.
ing.
defense gram.
It is an of the Lebanese
Lebanon.
the Israeli premier,
This is who was president
"legal"
gov-
The task of the defending their and their