International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

What Future for the Lebanon Ceasefire?

· International Viewpoint No. 38, 17 October 1983 · pp 5-8 · 4,578 words

Salah Jaber was the pen name of Gilbert Achcar, a leading member of the Lebanese section, later professor at SOAS, University of London.

Middle East United States World economy France

In German: Warum der Krieg weitergeht, 29.9.1983 (Inprekorr Nr. 158, 10. November 1983)

What future for the Lebanon ceasefire?

Salah JABER

The "Peace in Galilee" operation launched in June 1982 by Israeli premier Menahem Begin and his defense minister, Ariel Sharon, had two objectives.

The initial, minimum objective was attained in the first days of the invasion, that is, the occupation of a zone 45 kilometers deep in southern Lebanon, that is, the area south of the Awali river.

The second objective, the maximum one cherished by Sharon, was to destroy the independent infrastructure of the PLO and set up a strong central government in Beirut allied to Israel.

The Zionist leaders made no bones about their desire to see Beshir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces - the fascist Christian militia allied with Israel - take the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. FROM THE ISRAELI INTERVENTION

TO THE

AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT

The second objective was almost achieved. Begin and Sharon gained the withdrawal of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut, their last independent stronghold, and "sponsored" the election of their ally, Beshir Gemayel, to the post he sought.

Carried away by his reactionary simple-mindedness, Ariel Sharon forgot that unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the Lebanese bourgeoisie could not survive a boycott by the Arab countries.

Since it gets the bulk of its profits from its relations with its Arab hinterland, the Lebanese bourgeoisie cannot afford the luxury of breaking with the other Arab countries of the area.

Thus, even Beshir Gemayel himself, after he was "elected," had to adjust his political ambitions to this fact. He had to go back on the peace treaty he promised to the Israeli leaders and in exchange offer them a feeble security treaty.

Gemayel tried to get out from under the shadow of Israel by stepping up his declarations of allegiance to the U.S. But, in fact, the fascist leader remained dependent on the Zionist state, since his "election" was disputed by Syria and the great majority of Lebanese Muslim currents. The assassination of Beshir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, put an end to all these calculations.

Designated by the Phalangist Party - the reactionary Christian bourgeois party - to succeed his assassinated brother, Amin Gemayel was elected to the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. But he was able to take the helm of the state in much more favorable circumstances then Beshir.

The Israeli army took the assassination of Beshir as a pretext for occupying Beirut and seizing the enormous stocks of weapons held by the Lebanese left, including those left behind by the Palestinian resistance.

In this situation, at the outset of his term, Amin Gemayel enjoyed the broadest national consensus ever achieved around a Lebanese president.

Unity of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, including all communities, is a rare enough thing in itself and had been impossible to achieve for a long time. Nonetheless, it was achieved around Amin Gemayel.

The Lebanese left itself, in particular the Stalinists and Nasserites, declared their friendliness toward him.

As for the Lebanese people, in such conditions, it could not but place its hopes for peace and stability in the new president. It hoped these aspirations could be achieved in the context of a renewed accord among the communities.

War weary after seven years of fighting, the Lebanese people fervently hoped they had found their "savior."

What is more, the consensus around Amin Gemayel extended to the Arab states of the region and the great powers of the world. Syria, which had vehemently denounced Beshir Gemayel's election, sent its congratulations to his successor.

In the reactionary camp, only the Israeli leaders and the fascists of the Lebanese forces had reason not to join in the general rejoicing.

The unity around the new president was, in fact, largely due to his reputation as a "moderate" - unlike that of his assassinated brother. Amin Gemayel was supposed to be anxious to maintain good relations between the government and the Lebanese Muslims, and between Lebanon and the Arab states in the region.

He was much more representative of the real interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie than his brother. Amin Gemayel, himself a businessman, could in no way take the Israeli option. His road was clearly marked out. He had to balance between the economic interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and world imperialism, that is, primarily between the U.S. and the oil-producing Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia.

Since he got unreserved support from both quarters, Amin Gemayel had only to maneuver adeptly to maintain the advantages he started out with and to achieve the Bonapartist project he expressed when he said on the day he was sworn in,

French troops in Lebanon (DR) 5

above party and mutity presidency he would keep the presidency

WHY GEMAYEL FAILED

There is no need today to spend a lot of time proving that the balance sheet of the past year of the Gemayel presidency amounts to a pathetic failure. All that is necessary is to explain why the new president managed to wear out the great political capital he had when he started -the Arab consensus that had formed around him.

Within Lebanon, Amin Gemayel quickly emerged — contrary to his promises — as the representative of a party and a community.

Dependent on his party, the reactionary Maronist Phalangists led by his own father, Amin Gemayel was obliged to name Phalangists or people close to them to all the key posts in the state apparatus, in particular to the leadership of the most important bodies for any dietatorship -the army, the military intelligence services, and the police.

So, far from taking on a Bonapartist appearance, the military dictatorship with a civilian government that established itself in the Beirut area was very quickly seen for what it was - a Phalangist dictatorship.

Moreover, as premier, the second most important post in the state and the most important one that could be held by a Muslim according to the balance that has been in effect since 1943 (1), Gemayel appointed the nonentity Shafik ElWazzan. The cabinet was made up of illustrious nobodies, who represented nothing.

These practices, which to say the least were ill-advised from the standpoint of the original project, were carried further by repeated appointment of Phalangists to functionaries' positions over a period of weeks.

The inevitable result was to progressively alienate the Muslim masses, who had shown their sympathy for Gemayel at the start of his term by displaying his portrait all over West Beirut.

Still more surely, these methods alienated the Muslim political forces, not so much the traditional bourgeoisie represented in parliament as the "fighting" bourgeoise currents that consolidated a position after 1975, and which are not represented in any state institution.

This category includes three political currents based in the three Muslim communities and they had expected Gemayel to give them representation commensurate with their real influence.

One is the Sunni Nasserite current, whose best known organization is the Murabitun. It is the weakest of the three for sociological reasons but also - unlike the two others - because it was disarmed by the Israeli invaders who entered Beirut in September 1982.

Another of these currents is the Shi'ite one represented by Amal, which over the last years has recruited around the themes g of anti-Communism, hostility to the Palestinians, and support for the specific demands of the Shiite community. In recent months, in confrontation with the Gemayel regime, it is these demands of the Shi'ite community that have come to the forefront.

The third current is the Druze one represented by Walid Joumblatt, the feudalbourgeois leader of the so-called Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), a member of the Socialist International. The Lebanese Stalinists tail after this current. (2)

In order for the opposition of these three currents to the Gemayel government to spill over into clashes with the "legal" army, the regime had to lose another of its bases of support - Syria. To one degree or another, all three of these currents have attached themselves to the Syrians.

LIMITS OF THE

UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL

However, before going into Gemayel's break with Syria, we have to go back to the Gemayel regime's relations with Israel, of which this break was in fact an effect.

Indeed, in the course of one year Gemayel managed to alienate everyone, except his imperialist protectors. He was already on poor terms with Israel when he took over the presidency, since he immediately made it clear that he was putting his relations with the Arab countries first.

Moreover, the Israeli leaders bitterly resented the fact that the Phalangist leaders had denied that their militia was involved in the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps and had put the sole responsibility on the Israeli army. (3)

In fact, this was a hypocritical and cowardly action on the part of the Lebanese leaders, who were trying to escape the heat of public opinion, both in the Arab world and in the world in general. The Begin-Sharon team have never gotten over it.

This resentment against the Phalangists on the part of the Israelis was compounded by just as deep unhappiness with their American protectors. This was not just because Washington helped put the blame for the Sabra and Chatila massacres on the Israeli government. It was also and more fundamentally because of the famous Reagan plan. This involved a statement by the U.S. administration at the beginning of September 1982 calling for a freeze on the building of Zionist settlements on the West Bank and for the restoration of the occupied territories to King Hussein's Jordan. (4)

In such circumstances, the presence of the Israeli army in Lebanon became the Zionist leaders' main card in their confrontation with their American big brother. They proposed a deal, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in return for the U.S. dropping the Reagan plan.

However, this condition was unacceptable to Washington, whose relations with the Begin-Sharon government reached their most critical point.

The Israeli leaders then decided to stall the negotiations on the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon by advancing a series of conditions unacceptable to the Gemayel regime. These were in fact much more onerous than those imposed on Egypt in return for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

However, the Israeli presence in Lebanon soon proved to be a two-edged sword, and the other edge began to turn more and more sharply against the Israelis. With the growth of all sorts of resistance to the Zionist occupiers, their burden grew continually, increasingly neutralizing the diplomatic advantages they drew from their presence in Lebanon.

The balance sheet of the Begin-Sharon government's operation in Lebanon also added up to a dismaying failure. The Israeli regime had not succeeded in establishing an allied regime in Lebanon.

The Zionists had, moreover, alienated Washington and made Yasser Arafat's PLO more credible as an interlocutor for world imperialism. This corresponded, paradoxically, to the fact that the PLO was weaker and less independent than ever, and thus could more easily be integrated into the American plan, without this requiring any major concessions.

The Zionist leaders reacted by a fit of spite. In the summer of 1982, they had allowed Beshir Gemayel's militia to move in forces into the Chouf and Aley regions, the preserve of Joumblatt's PSP since 1976. Now they let Joumblatt take up arms against the Lebanese forces and even to bring in massive quantities of arms from areas controlled by the Syrian army.

Clearly, having been unable to get a Lebanese central government totally subservient to them, the Zionist leaders were putting their bets again on a breakup of Lebanon along communal lines. This old Zionist scheme had the merit in their eyes that it would create two ministates, one Maronist and the other Druze, both of which would be "clients" of Israel. And the rest of the country would be divided up between themselves and Syria.

This result, however, would be a meager consolation prize in view of the 1. On the basis of the latest census figures available in 1943, when the French protectorate over Lebanon was coming to an end, a "national pact" was adopted that was supposed to establish a fair division of the central government among the various communities. On the basis of these decisions, the president is supposed to be a Maronite, the premier a Sunni Muslim, the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite, the minister of foreign affairs a Greek Orthodox, etc. This "national pact" in fact gave political dominance to the Maronite Christian bourgeoisie. 2. Walid Joumblatt was in fact chairman of the Lebanese National Movement, in which the Lebanese Communist Party participated, among others. 3. On the Sabra and Chatila massacres, see IV, No 14, October 4, 1982. 4. There is an analysis of the Reagan Plan in the resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International entitled "The War in Lebanon: A Turn in the Middle East Situation," published in IV, No 16, November 1 1982.

scope of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon, Begin's scapegoat, had to pay the price. The report of the inquiry into the Sabra and Chatila massacres offered the chance to sacrifice him.

Begin's former right-hand man was replaced as defense minister by the former Israeli ambassador to Washington, Moshe Arens. The objective of the new chief of the Zionist armed forces was to get Israel out of the Lebanese quicksand and to reestablish good relations with the American administration. An ordinary day of streetfighting in Beirut (DR)

The Israeli government's new star, Moshe Arens, advanced a very simple point of view. It can be summed up as follows: Israel had nothing to lose by making an accord with the "legal" Lebanese government, even it this meant "sacrificing" Israel's faithful puppet, Saad Haddad, and his militia in southern Lebanon.

This was for the good reason that such an accord, even if it included only the minimum conditions accepted by Amin Gemayel on Washington's advice, had no chance of being approved by Syria. would therefore be a dead letter even before it was signed, because its application would depend on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

So, such a movement would be a cheap way of placating the Americans by putting the ball in the court of the Syrians. The latter, in turn, were demanding guarantees on the matter of the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory seized by Israel in the 1967 war, as a condition for cooperating with Washington.

Thus, the idea was, Israel would continue to hold the aces and at the same time get out of the Lebanese quicksand. It would then only have to pull the Israeli army back to the line of the Awali river, which the Zionist government treats more and more like the Jordan, that is, as the natural boundary of the Israeli state. (5)

The Israelis expected that this move would, of course, be followed by a sharpening of the conflict between the Druzes and the Maronites. But the Begin team did not see anything in that to be unhappy about.

### BREAK BETWEEN

GEMAYEL AND SYRIA

"Advised" by Washington, Amin Gemayel fell into the trap that Moshe Arens laid. In May 1983, he signed an "accord" with Israel. It had no validity, but it did alienate the Syrians, who were opposed to it. (6)

In fact, the Syrians took the LebaneseIsraeli accord as a pretext for launching an offensive against the Gemayel regime, which was the big loser in this whole operation.

Indeed, no one should be fooled. It is not the Phalangist government that excites the ire of the Damascus government. It got along with Gemayel quite well before the conclusion of this stillborn accord. In fact, Hafez El-Assad allied himself with the Phalangists, intervening on their behalf in 1976 against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left.

Over and above their present opposition to the Phalangists, what the Syrian leaders are seeking is recognition of a central role for Syria in any settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict by the Zionists' American protectors.

Already in 1975-76, before intervening on the side of the Phalangists, the Syrian Baathists leaders backed the Palestinian and Progressive forces in Lebanon. This was their countermove to the Egyptian-Israeli accord on the Sinai, which was concluded in September 1975, under the sponsorship of Henry Kissinger.

However, this attitude on the part of the Syrians lasted only until Washington, faced with the threat of an anti-Phalangist victory, was ready to make a deal with Damascus. The Americans promised to include Syria in any further diplomatic moves to achieve a settlement in the region in return for Syrian intervention in Lebanon to stop the Palestinians and the Lebanese left. (7)

Subsequently, the Syrian-American honeymoon was soured by the victory of the Likud party in the 1977 Israeli elections.

In the present crisis, the Syrian leaders want to make the American administration understand that if Israel holds one key to implementing the Reagan plan, they hold the other.

Today the dictatorship of Hafez-ElAssad's Baathist party finds itself in a much stronger position with respect to Washington than it did in 1975-76. And as paradoxical as it might seem, that is because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982.

Because of the Zionist aggression, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese forces opposed to the Phalangists are more dependent on Syria than ever. At the same time, since it ended in a checkmate, the Israeli intervention is no longer a Sword of Damocles hanging over the Syrian regime.

Quite the contrary. The "Lebanese syndrome" is at least as strong a factor in Israeli public opinion as the "Vietnam syndrome" has been in the U.S. since 1973. The Zionist state is less capable than ever of waging any war other than a defensive one. The best proof of this is the low profile it adopted during the clashes in Lebanon.

THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION

Thus, after the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese accord in May 1983, Damascus gave the green light to the revived Lebanese opposition to take on the Phalangists. A Front of National Salvation was constituted, under Syrian auspices, bringing together the three main figures attached to Syria - Soleiman Frangieh, who was president before the 1975-76 civil war, and who later became hostile to the Phalangists after long being their ally (up to 1978!); Rachid Karemeh, premier during the same period, who, like his north Lebanon home city Tripoli, is under Syrian control; and, of course, Walid Joumblatt.

In due course, the Stalinists lined up behind this front, which has nothing popular about it, with its three bourgeois components.

The Shi'ite organization Amal did not join this front, which reflects its relative autonomy from the Syrians. But it saw the offensive of the anti-Phalangist oppo5. Many reports of Israeli preparations for long-term occupation of southern Lebanon make it possible to compare its position there with the occupation of the Left Bank of Jordan. 6. Extracts from the Lebanese-Israeli accord were published and commented on in Inprecor, our sister publication in French, No 155, July 28, 1983. 7. For a more detailed analysis of the 197576 civil war, of the attitude of Syria, and the orientation of the Lebanese left forces, see my articles published in Inprecor, No 47-48 (old series), April 1976.

7

sition as a chance to make a show of strength and renegotiate the question of its involvement in the "legal" government, as well as the "Shi'ite" demands, for which it had assumed the role of spokesperson.

Since the Israeli army had announced its intention to withdraw immediately to the Awali river - despite the heavy pressure Washington was putting on the Begin cabinet to delay the pullback until the "legal" Lebanese army was ready to move in to fill the vacuum - the starting signal was given for a battle for control of the region between the Awali and the Beirut-Damascus Highway.

Prior to this, Amal had taken up arms in Beirut, and in particular, in the predominantly Shi'ite suburbs in order to demonstrate its strength.

As soon as the Israeli withdrawal was carried out at the beginning of the summer, the Chouf went up in flames. The Lebanese Forces were rapidly defeated, in particular since they were not fighting on "their own" territory.

The "legal" Lebanese army then took over from the Phalangists, and the fighting concentrated around the Souk-ElGharb area. This was a strategically important point since it commands access to the capital from the south and east.

Joumblatt's Druze forces were reinforced by Palestinian fighters, with the blessing of the Syrians, and were backed up by Syrian artillery. They probably could have scored a military victory and rung the death knell for the Amin Gemayel regime, if the imperialist multinational force stationed in Lebanon, and in particular the American forces, had not intervened directly against them.

IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION

The multinational force, which originally included troops from three imperialist powers - the U.S., France, and Italy - and was later joined by forces from Britain, intervened in Beirut on August 1982 with a two-faced line. Its purpose was presented by some as protecting civilians while the Palestinian fighters withdrew and by others as assuring that this withdrawal was actually carried out.

In fact, the multinational force opened up the way for the subsequent Israeli invasion of the capital by dismantling the fortifications and clearing away the mine fields from the defensive perimeter built up by the forces besieged in Beirut. Once this task was accomplished, the multinational force withdrew, leaving the field open for the Tsahal (the Israeli army) and its Lebanese allies, who were to perpetrate the revolting massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps.

The remodeled multinational force that returned to Lebanon shortly afterward maintained its two-faced pretenses. According to Claude Cheysson, the French minister of foreign affairs, its role was to be to protect the civilians. According to Ronald Reagan, it was to help 8

Amin Gemayel build up his state.

In fact, once again, there was nothing humanitarian about the way the multinational force intervened. Its troops, in particular the French paras, distinguished themselves by going over Beirut with a fine tooth comb, working alongside Gemayel's army. At the same time, the American contingent specialized in training the recruits to the Lebanese army.

There could be no doubt that the purpose of the multinational force was not to keep the "peace" but to maintain "order," and specifically the Phalangist new order.

With the new flareup of the Lebanon war in the summer of 1983, the imperialist governments involved in this multinational force found themselves facing a dilemma. They were caught between the prospect of getting immersed in the quicksand where many had sunk before them or becoming decisively discredited in the eyes of their neocolonial clients if they failed again to bail out an allied Lebanese regime.

This is why Washington above all had to intervene in support of the Lebanese army and the Phalangist forces, for fear seeing President Gemayel's name added to a long list of proteges abandoned by the U.S. To take up just the most recent period, this list includes the shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua. Washington had, therefore, to intervene directly in the Lebanon war to show the dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere that they will not be left to their fate when the chips are down.

However, the Reagan administration is still hampered by the "syndrome" created by the U.S. military defeat in Vietnam. And so it could not throw its troops into the fight just like that. It chose to advance slowly but surely, threatening direct intervention by its troops (2,000 Marines are being kept in readiness off Beirut to be landed in support of the forces already on the ground). Along with this, for the first time since the Vietnam war, the U.S. openly used its means of mass destruction to rescue an allied regime. Washington even went so far as to divert the New Jersey, the "world's most powerful" battleship from the Caribbean to the waters off Lebanon.

However, besides the stakes in world politics, the imperialists had chips in the local game to protect. The Reagan administration wanted to make the Syrian leaders understand that there was a limit that the offensive of the military forces they were backing could not overstep.

### PERSPECTIVES AND TASKS

The American intervention created an impasse in the Lebanon war, making a diplomatic agreement the only way out. Damascus, for its part, considered that the Americans have been given a clear enough lesson. And so, it proved possible to declare a ceasefire on September 25.

The question that is posed is what the outcome will be. Will the "reconciliation" under Syrian and Saudi auspices proceed as expected? In other words, will this battle end in a new partition of the central government, or a partition of the country?

These questions remain open, but one thing is certain today, as it was in 1976: The outcome of the war will be determined by the course of U.S.-Syrian relations, and this continues to be tied to the evolution of Israeli domestic politics.

If the post-Begin period, prefigured by the resignation of the Israeli premier, leads to a government of Zionist national unity and if the Israeli regime demonstrates a greater willingness to accept a negotiated settlement in the region, the way will be smoothed for a Syrian-American understanding.

In any case, the Syrian regime is trying to show Washington that it can control not only the Lebanese opposition but also the Palestinian resistance. This is the meaning of the ultimatum recently put to Yasser Arafat's troops stationed in the Bekaa valley (where Syrian and Israeli troops directly face each other), demanding that they withdraw to northern Lebanon, which they did.

When it considers it necessary, the Syrian regime will not hesitate to dictate to all the Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, ordering them to regroup wherever it suits them. A Syrian-American accord could not fail to lead to a refloating of the "constitutional document" that the Syrians negotiated at the beginning of 1976 with Frangieh, who was president at the time, and which has remained a dead letter since.

This revival of this document would mean a redivision of the "legal" government among the various communalist and political factions in the ruling class, a redistribution of power in which the working people would get nothing.

If, on the other hand, the Syrians and Americans do not manage to come to an understanding, the fighting will resume sooner or later. The task of the revolutionary communists will be to try to keep these struggles from being diverted away from the only objective that today is in the interests of the working masses - that is forcing the withdrawal of the imperialist forces and then bringing down the Phalangist regime of Gemayel and dismantling his state.

It is with this perspective that the Revolutionary Communist Group, the section of the Fourth International in Lebanon, took part in the recent fighting. Two comrades were killed in the Souk-El-Gharb region, defending their village against Gemayel's army. They did not die for Joumblatt or for Assad but in defense of their own people and their own banner, in defense of their own program.

It is an urgent task for the entire Fourth International to join in the fight of the Lebanese comrades to force an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the imperialist and Zionist troops from Lebanon.

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