Libya: caricatures and reality
This article was published in Rouge, newspaper of the Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International, No 1076, dated August 26-September 1, 1983. Claude GABRIEL
During the conflict in Chad we have found ourselves once more plunged into the midst of a brainwashing campaign. At the same time as the government is justifying its military intervention to the French workers by banging away at the theme of the it is covertly making contact with Tripoli. The question of the nature of the rela tionship between the Libyan regime and imperialism has been raised once again.
Since the start, Qadhafi has been motivated by a nationalist and anti-imperialist line. political regime, based on what was the motor force of the 1969 uprising - getting rid of the corrupt social layers linked to the monarchy and the Senussi Islamic Brotherhood. The radical populists of the new regime claimed to be founding a state based on the people's committees. But the thought of the 'guide' collected in the 'Green Books' has evolved progressively from Islamic fundamentalism to a more rational outlook.
Undoubtedly the Libyan political system does not go beyond the confines of formal democracy. It is a strong, authoritarian and repressive state. But there is no way that it can be claimed to. day that it is the bloody dictatorship that
The Libyan Jamahirya (which means more or less 'the state of the masses') has thus bit by bit come to represent a danger for certain imperialist interests, for certain links in ipulation of the neo-colonial regimes in Africa. Tripoli has aided those military coups d'etat that make superficial reference to the ideal of 'restoring' the Jamahirya. The Libyan regime has supported different parties or political adventurers whose programmes mix nationalism and Islamie ideas.
This regime has put itself at the side of the Palestinian resistance without, for all that, breaking with the tradition of manipulation and blackmail of the Arab regimes against their leaderships. Libya threats against Libya should be immediately denounced.
The Kremlin has established direct links with the Libyan government. In a good number of cases, Tripoli's diplomatic line has followed the interests of the USSR, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between Tripoli's own policies and how it is used by the bureaucracy.
Thus the 'radical' policies of Qadhafi remain inconsistent. The proof of this is the reactionary content of its aid to one of the cliques in Chad, or the halt on aid to the Eritrean people from the time when Moscow gave its support to the military regime in Ethiopia. It did the sented itself at the side of Algeria as the great rearguard of the Polisario Front, Qadhafi then stated on June 18, 1983, *Libya has fulfilled its duty in the Western Sahara. There will be no further dispute between ourselves and Morocco on this question. The immediate problem for Arabs is to confront the Zionist danger'
A PARTICULAR CASE
Such is the ambiguity of this sort of regime. Their state policies seem to have many aspects similar to those of the Stalinist regimes, although the social interests they defend are those of the petty bourgeois layers coming out of the nationalist movement.
Libyan populism has been able to keep itself in power through the years mainly because of the oil revenues. These are considerable, assuring an income of 5,280 US dollars per head This has allowed the stabilisation of a relative social peace, by favouring the petty bourgeoisie within the apparatus of a 'good payer' state and by ensuring a reasonable income to the workers.
Libya is an exceptional case in the continent, having been able to develop simultaneously intensive agriculture and modern industry, free of the previous very extravagant ruling classes.
However, Libya remains profoundly dependent on its oil exports in a market controlled by imperialism. The situation is deteriorating. Since 1980 the government has had to apply a policy of draconian restriction on investments. This has only served to exacerbate the competition of Western suppliers. In addition the effects of the world crisis also weigh heavily on all the countries of the Maghreb.
### CONTRADICTORY INTEREST
Thus, it is not surprising that Qadhafi, at the height of his polemic against the Fez plan for Palestine, accepted the в Мото на policy of an economic Greater Maghreb some like to depict.
Libyan forces leaving N'Djamena in November 1981 (DR)
14 same in regard to the Sahara. Having prewith Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. His problem is to respond to the needs of a dependent economy, oriented towards importing of Western technology, at a time when he is obliged to seek the best relationship of forces to face up to the international crisis.
Qadhafi, fearing economic and political isolation, is trying to maximize all Libya's advantages in the framework of a Greater Maghreb group. To achieve this aim he is ready to recognise — as he just stated during his visit to Tunisia that he was mistaken in thinking that only the revolutionary regimes could bring about Arab unity. "Radicalism is now giving place to pragmatism.
Thus, it is not surprising that we have seen the French government blowing hot and cold. In these times of increased competition in the field of producers goods the existence of an open market cannot fail to make capitalists' mouths water.