The crisis in the PLO
Yasser Arafat Livio MAITAN Within the framework of the PLO, there are a whole series of organizations that have often engaged in disputes among themselves and sometimes gone through splits.
To take just the most recent period, quite sharp disputes occurred between the summit of Arab states in Fez in September 1982 and the meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers in February 1983.
As I pointed out in a previous article May 16, 1983] two pro-Syrian organizations, the Saika and the Front of People's Struggle opposed Arafat's negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan. Moreover, five organizations that met in Tripoli in January expressed their opposition both to the Reagan plan and the resolution of
Within El Fateh itself, spokespersons for the left, including Abu Saleh, severely
Arafat's diplomatic activities. They accused him, for example, of "going outside the Palestinian consensus."
It should be noted, in addition, that opposition to Arafat's line was expressed, including in El Fateh, during the siege of Beirut itself, and it was only after the murderous bombings in early August that the idea of a withdrawal became general-
CRISIS IN EL FATEH
This background makes it easier to understand the crisis that erupted in May.
Since there is no way to make a firsthand check of the reports, it is obviously hard to reconstruct exactly what the chain of events was. It is still harder to make a definite assessment of the scope of the opposition to the Arafat leadership. Nonetheless, things seemed to have happened, in a general way, (1) as follows:
The conflict developed between May 9 and 12 in the Bekaa valley, near the city of Baalbek. It started when militants linked to Abu Musa, a member of the Revolutionary Council of Fateh, occupied a base. Arafat himself explicitly referred to the crisis on May 15, in a statement made in Damascus during a tour of the PLO mess halls that began on May 10 and continued until May 22.
Moreover, also on May 15, in an interview published in the Arab daily AshSharg Al-Awat which is published in London, the deputy commander of the Palestinian forces, Abu Jihad, mentioned the events in the Bekaa valley. He strove to minimize them ("the affair is settled" and "the leadership has gotten the situation under trol.")
On May 21 the Central Committee of El Fateh took a series of disciplinary
Eight top officers were relieved of their posts and "put at the disposal of Yasser Arafat." Sanctions were threatened against anyone who tried to get in contact with them.
At the same time, Palestinian military forces in Lebanon and Syria were reorganized. They were put under the sole command of Ahmed Affani (Abul Montasem), the deputy chief of the General Staff, whom the dissidents consider proEgyptian. In response to the demand for more democracy in the organization, Arafat also announced that there would be a special session of the Revolutionary Council of El Fateh.
The disciplinary measures did not solve the problems, and Abu Jihad's statements proved at least premature. At least five of the officers against whom sanctions were decreed refused to obey. Jihad Saleh minced that the decisions of El Fateh's Central Committee represented "a hypocritical action by Arafat and his cohorts designed split the movement." (Le Monde,
A few days later, on May 28, five officers in the El Fateh logistical services announced that they agreed "rebels," after occupying six military depots in Damascus. They claimed to have acted in response to the El Fateh leadership's decision to "cut off supplies" to the bases controlled by the oppositionists.
It was in these circumstances that threats of resorting to armed force began to be thrown back and forth between the two sides. A representative of the opposition, for example, told a proLibyan journal, Al Kifah Al 'Arabi, that his men "might not respond to the first or second bullet, but they certainly will back after the third." (Le Monde, May 31). Syria issued a formal warning that it would not tolerate armed clashes on its territory.
On June 4 armed clashes did take place in a place ten kilometers from Baalbek. Each of the two sides accused the other of starting it. There were casualties - according to some sources four dead and seven wounded, according to others seven dead and eighteen wounded.
The armed conflict reportedly ended after a few hundred Palestinian civilians went in to separate the two sides, at the risk of their own lives.
On the same day, the PLO represent-
Ryad, Rafik Al-Nacheh, announced that an agreement had been reached, following the withdrawal of the nomination of two officers who were particularly objectionable to the dissidents and whose nomination, therefore, provoked the protests that led to the challenge to the leadership. statement was as far as it went. As of this writing, the crisis remains open.
WHO ARE THE OPPOSITIONISTS?
It is clear that this confliet has developed essentially within Fateh, which is by far the most important of the organizations that make up the PLO. One of the main opposition spokespersons is Abu Saleh, who, as I noted, criticized Arafat sharply in December and subsequently in January. He was removed from his position as a member of the Central Committee of El Fateh. Up to 1976, it was Abu Saleh who commanded the Palestinian forces in Lebanon.
A still more prominent role apparently has been played by Colonel Abu Musa, 1. This article is based essentially on the daily press such as Le Monde, Liberation, the International Herald Tribune, and Corriere della Sera, and on the excerpts from the Arabic press that these dailies have cited.
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who has issued several statements throughout the conflict. Another opposition leader is Lieutenant Colonel Abu Raad, who, like Abu Musa, is a member of the Revolutionary Council of El Fateh (this council is an intermediate body between the Central Committee and the congress).
Working with these two personalities have been other lieutenant colonels Abu Majdi, Mahmud Issa, and Ziyad El Zpughayar. It was they who took the initiative of occupying a base at the start of the conflict. In all, six out of the seventy members of El Fateh's Revolutionary Council, have reportedly lined up with the opposition.
The logistics officers I referred to earlier on were Commander Ali Shukri, officer in charge of supply; Captain Abu Haidar, officer in charge of resupply: Captain Abu Khaled, officer in charge of transport; Captain Abu Imad, officer in charge of fuel; and Lieutenant Abu Hassan, officer in charge of maintenance.
Among the civilians involved is Musa
(whose pseudonym is Abu Akrama). According to him, twenty-four leaders representing about 10,000 members of El Fateh, attended an oppostion which sent a memorandum to the El Fateh leadership supporting the dissidents' demands. (Liberation, June 3). figures should be taken with a grain of salt. For his part, Abu Musa has claimed the dissidents have four battalions of 150 to 200 personnel each. (See his interview in Liberation, May 30). On the other hand, Arafat grants his adversaries no more than 100 to 150 soldiers in total. (International Herald Tribune, June 1).
WHAT ARE THE DISSIDENTS SAYING?
Taken together, the statements and interviews by the representatives of the dissidents make it clear enough what sort of criticisms they are making of the majority of the El Fateh leadership.
First of all, they denounce Yasser Arafat for his decision to withdraw from guarantees and relying on the Arab regimes, and thus in the last analysis on the U.S., to achieve a solution to the Palestinian problem. It was this orientation that was the basis for the negotiations with King Hussein, held under Reagan's auspices, as well as for the overtures to Egypt. Both these operations are severely criticized by the oppositionists.
They also accused Arafat of underestimating the importance of the alliance with Syria and the USSR. This underestimation, they claim, weighed heavily in the decision to abandon Beirut.
In a communique issued at Chtaura and republished by the international press on May 25, the oppositionists demanded the recall of all the exiled Palestinian forces "so that they can resume their place on the battle field." They demanded the drawing up of a military plan for reorganizing all these forces, beginning with the military arm of El Fateh, El
And they also called for a committee to run the financial affairs of El Fateh, as well as the summoning of a
Musa Awad declared in a statement on June 1 that most of the leaders of El Fateh were opposed to the withdrawal from Beirut and some of them had even threatened to open fire
The dissident leader said that the Palestinian fighters should return to southern Lebanon, their departure point for the liberation of
"Let those who continue to have illusions in the American plans leave for Tunisia. They can lie on the beaches
In an interview in Liberation of May 29, Abu Musa made, in general, the same criticisms. In particular, nounced the approval of the Fez resolution and the idea of confederation with
(*We are against the plan for confederation with Jordan. We want an independent Palestinian state, not just to create a twenty-third Arab country but to be able to carry on the fight against the Zionist enemy.")
In a further statement to the Lebanese weekly Ash-Shiraa of June 11, Abu Musa opposed any idea of a split, calling for "a radical reform of El Fateh." He said that the oppositionists could win a majority and thus call a congress "to put on trial the American plans adopted by the El Fateh leadership."
The demand for democratizing the Palestinian movement seems to have gotten a particularly broad response, includDFLP, Naef Hawatmeh, has said, for example, that "some bureaucratic institutions in the PLO have become an obstacle to the development of the revolution and they should be cleaned out." (Le Monde,
For his part, the PFLP leader, George Habash, has said that he is favorable to democratic reform in the structures and institutions of the PLO and in the ranks of the Palestinian forces." (Liberation, June 3).
Moreover, the DFLP and the PFLP as organizations have issued a joint communique in Damascus calling for democratic reform "on the basis of national unity" and saying that "speeding up the process of reform in the structures, institutions, and bodies of the PLO and in the ranks of the Palestinian forces involves ending the role played by bureaucratic and bourgeoisified military, administradiplomatic categories." (Le
In an interview published by the Arab Emirates daily, Al Khalid, Arafat's righthand man, Abu Iyad, himself went so far as to blame Arafat for "showing negligence and not sufficiently consulting the collective leadership of the movement." But at the same time, he said that anyone else would have done the same thing, given the complexity of the situation in the Arab World." It recognized at the same time that the oppositionists were raising legitimate demands, even if their methods were unacceptable. (2)
As soon as the crisis erupted, some organizations immediately took positions favorable to the oppositionists in El Fateh. I have already mentioned certain stands taken by the PFLP and the DFLP.
The PFLP-General Command, led by Jibril and which has linked itself in varying degrees to the Syrians and to the Libyans has gone the furthest. It has sent 150 soldiers to the spot where the clashes have taken place.
A similar move was made by the Fateh Revolutionary Council, that is, the Abu Nidal group, which is responsible for a series of irresponsible terrorist actions, the most recent of which was the assassination of Issam Sartawi. group has enjoyed the good will of the Iraqi regime and is suspected of being infiltrated by agents of the Israeli Mossad. According to Arafat, Abu Nidal sent 65 soldiers to aid the "rebels." (Liberation, June 13). (4)
Regardless of whether the Abu Nidal group has actually tried to intervene, it does not seem that the dissidents themselves are favorable to any such moves. Abu Musa has explicitly condemned Abu Nidal, saying that his position toward him remains the same as that of the majority of El Fateh.
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The Fateh leadership has not hesitated to accuse Libya and Syria — the first explicitly, the second indirectly - of having manipulated and backed the oppositionists. What is the basis for this accusation?
It is no secret to anyone that Qadhafi has tried several times to take advantage of the PLO's internal difficulties. In January, on the occasion of the meeting of the five organizations in Tripoli, he claim ed that a "program of political and military action" had been drawn up in consultation with him.
As soon as the conflict broke out in the Bekaa valley on May 15, Qadhafi made a speech calling on the other movements in the PLO to line up behind the El Fateh dissidents to reorganize the resistance under a single command and get it out of the impasse into which it has been led by its reactionary and defeatist leaders." Arafat responded in an abusive way, threatening to eut Qadhafi's tongue 2. During the session of the Palestinian Council in February, a member of El Fateh told a correspondent from Liberation: "A parliament for life, a president for life - we are looking more and more like the Arab regimes we condemn." (Liberation, May 30). 3. It should be noted that while Hawatmeh declared for maintaining the unity of El Fateh, he approved of some of the demands raised by the dissidents, including the removal of of ficers who were promoted despite actions that amounted to desertion at the start of the Lebanon war. 4. On May 9, the bodies of five members of the Abu Nidal group were found in the Beka valley. A month later, Arafat claimed that they had tried to assassinate Abu Jihad and had been executed.
out. But besides his verbal accusations, there is no indication that Qadhafi has played any real role in the crisis in Fateh or that those opposing Arafat are linked to him.
It has been well known that the relations between Arafat and the Syrian leaders have been decidedly bad for some time. This was confirmed by the polemies that preceded the Palestinian National Council in Algiers.
Mohammed Heydar, a member of the
(Pan-Arab High Command of the Baathist party accused Arafat of
"more interested in setting up a state than he would be president of than of carrying forward the revolution."
politician also accused Arafat of "putting all the Arab states on the same level, making no distinction begressive ones." (Le Monde, May 5).
During the conflict, the Syrian government took steps that it claimed were designed to prevent clashes but which the Fateh leadership claimed in fact aided the
The dissidents, as we have seen, have well as to the USSR. This was perfectly logical on their part. In his interview in Liberation, Abu Musa explained his attitude as follows: "Syria rejects the Reagan plan and is pointing its tanks in the direction of Israel. That's my position too." He added: "If Syria retreats, I will take the same position as I did in Sidon." (5) He concluded by saying that it was perfectly possible for his movement to remain independent from Damas-
As for the USSR, it can hardly be said that the Kremlin bureaucracy has encouraged the dissidents. In an all-out diplomatic counteroffensive, including trips by Arafat to Bucharest and Saudi Arabia, the PLO leadership sent Abu Jihad to Moscow. It seems to have gotten what it
In a message, Andropov has spoken of "Palestinian unity under the legitimate of Chairman Arafat." in a press conference held in Moscow on June 7, Abu Jihad could say: profoundly convinced that the USSR will accord us support in the political field as which we have appealed for such support." Saudi Arabia has come out explicitly behind Arafat. He was greeted at Jeddah by King Fahd, who said: "We have the good fortune to have with us today, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, in whom we place great hopes." (6)
THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC DISCUSSION
The dissidents are in danger of finding themselves in a very difficult situation. On the international scene, they cannot expect to find very many friends. On the other hand, they are in danger of coming under very heavy pressure, in particular from Syria, which would seriously obstruct their activity.
Moreover, there remains a strong reflex for unity in El Fateh and the PLO, which in the final analysis, works against them. This reflex reflects two realities.
One of the realities is the material strength that the PLO and its major organization, El Fateh, draw from the existing economic, political, and military structures. If there were a break, a lot of things would be put in question, and the apparatus would be profoundly today are a lot more critical toward their
They feel a need to think, discuss, and redefine their strategic op
But they fear that any splits would weaken them further in a situation that has become more difficult since the withcalls for unity by the organizations that have taken positions on the May events statements of the dissidents themselves in support of the unity of El Fateh and the PLO. However, this concern for unity should not lead to accepting a pseudo-unity, that is no more than a diplomatic facade, the sort of unity that was proclaimed in Algiers in ruary and which has proven to be completely ephemeral.
The position in which the Palestinian resistance finds itself now, it should be repeated, is undoubtedly the most ditficult it has experienced in a long time. The present crisis should confirm for everyone what in fact was clear enough
The resistance needs to make a balance sheet of its struggle, of the political orientations it has pursued, and of its organizational methods. This is a need that is undoubtedly felt by the great majority of the fighters.
Arafat himself, caught in a dilemma by the fact that his policy has produced no concrete results, has had to make more radical-sounding statements in recent
Israeli Arabs demonstrate in support of PLO (DR)
He has said, notably, that "the best means would be for the Arab leaders to adopt a fighting course and prepare for war to change the balance of forces." (Le Monde, May 17).
Moreover, Arafat said that he "always the Arabs to launch a war against Israel because that is the only way to right the political balance in the region. The Arabs missed the chance to launch such a war during the siege of Beirut."
Such statements explode the claims that Arafat himself put forward, that is that after Beirut the PLO was politically
Likewise, they unintentionally prove that the arguments that some of the oppositionists advanced during siege of Beirut were not without founda-
But what is more important is that occasional demagogic statements - that have no relation to real practice — are not going to overcome the crisis the resistance
Now is the time for critical thinking and debate, which are the prerequisites for developing a new orientation and for relaunching the struggle.
For such critical thinking and discussion, a democratic framework is necessary. Thus, it is necessary to transform the structures and the methods of functioning that have prevailed up till now. On this point, as we have seen, the dissidents' demands seem to be very widely shared. It is in the interests of the Palestinian movement as a whole that these demands 5. In 1976, Abu Musa led the Palestinian forces that destroyed a Syrian column trying to repress the PLO fighters
According to some reports a compromise was also reached between Arafat and Qadhafi, thanks to the mediation of North Yemen. These reports have subsequently died. Nonetheless, questions are posed by Qadhafi's trips to countries that he previously attacked in violent terms (North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Syria).
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