Growing resistance to "concessions"
in US unions in strikes.
The increased incidence of strikes was a reflection of the general mood of protest and rebellion within the country. There was a tendency towards more unauthorized strikes, particularly in the coalfields, which gave rise to a fear among the capitalist class that the union leaderships were losing control of their mem-
Absenteeism rose markedly the same period, and business
The following article originally appeared in the April-May 1983 issue of La Batalla, the theoretical magazine of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT Revolutionary Workers Party), the Mexican section of the Fourth International. The year 1968 is often pointed to as a turning point in world politics. rates the period of US world events from its noticeable decline. Yet it is often only with respect to other countries that the profound impact of that historic transition is noted. The student revolt and general strike in France, the events in Czechoslovakia, the hot autumn in 1969 in Italy, or the student revolt in Mexico are the typical examples of what was a worldwide youth radicalization and, at the same time, a new outbreak of radical workers the United States, however, that period set into motion important changes in the consciousness of the American working class. Despite the obvious importance of workers struggles within the imperialist heartland, relatively little has been written the impact of the transition to austerity upon the
This subject becomes particularly important today with the development of a movement in a number of major trade unions against the wave of contract con-
This movement has put down roots in the most important industrial
Furthermore, it objectively challenges the logic of capitalism: job security depends on company profitability and company profitability depends, during a recession, on workers making sacrifices. To discover how American workers have come to this point, despite the absence of a labor, socialist, or communist political tradition, will be the object of this article.
I will take up three separate waves of workers struggles in the United States since 1968. They are, in chronological order, the 1969-73 wave of official and unofficial strikes, the 1975-78 union reform movement, and the anti-concessions movement that began, in full force, in 1981. Any periodization of this sort will necesarily have important exceptions, since any given union will have its own peculiarities, or even a separate dynamic from the general trend. Nonetheless, it is useful to divide up the postin this manner, have been distinet types of struggles that, at a given juncture, were products of a specific moment in a broader transition in American politics.
After the ebbing of the strike wave that immediately followed the second world war, the government launched an attack against the most militant and politicized workers. The Taft-Hartley Act (1) and similar legislation was aimed at housbreaking the CIO unions, particularly those influenced by the Communist Party. Parallel to the McCarthyite purges of the 1950s, a layer of the most combative workers were removed from the
While this attack did not prevent from going periodically, or, on a trade union level, winning new gains in wages or benefits, it nevertheless helped to foster an anti-Communist conservatism in the
The entrance of a generation of workers that came of age after the period of these attacks, but during the prolonged conflict in Vietnam, into the factories put its stamp on the union contliets that developed during this period. The presence of a massive, organized opposition to the war in Vietnam, and a broad mood of
The Taft-Hartley Act was passed by Congress The following is the description given of it in Labor's Giant Step, a history of modern trade unionism in the United States by Art Preis, Who was the Labor correspondent of The Militant for many years:
"It outlawed the closed shop and prohibited union shop contracts except under very restricted conditions. It expanded the National Labor Relations Board from three to five members and added a General Counsel, appointed by the President, with power to determine which cases of alleged violations were to be prosecuted in the courts. It required a 60-day prior notice, the so-called cooling off period, before termination or modification of a contract. It empowered the President to set up a fact-finding board, without powers of recommendation, to inquire into any strike which he deemed to affect the national health and safety. Upon receiving this board's report, the President could then seek a federal court injunction to make a strike illegal for a 'cooling off' period of 80 days. It also authorized the NLRB to seek injunctions or restraining orders to halt a whole series of so-called unfair labor practices publications lamented the high turnover rates and lack of company loyalty. While there was no tendency towards longer strikes, the United Auto Workers (UAW against General Motors lasted 67 days in 1970. That could not be solely attributed to union or worker intransigence; rather it has been argued that the contract would not have been accepted without a long strike to wear down the militancy of the workers.
A more important example of the type of labor action that began to occur during those years was the postal wildcat ident Nixon's refusal to authorize a wage increase unless Congress passed a PostOffice reorganization bill, dissident locals in the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) and the American Postal Workers Union (APWU) launched a wild-
It spread rapidly to thirty major cities across the United States, until Nixon ordered federal troops to be mobilized to distribute mail. 30, 1970, issue of Time magazine said the following about the strike:
"The wildcat movement erupted with suddenness that Congress, Administration, and the leadership of seven postal unions were unable to move promptly or effectively to get the men back on their jobs....Themselves surprised by their new-found militancy, and having already risked their jobs and pensions by defying federal antistrike laws, the postal by unions as well as employers. illegal secondary boycotts and jurisdiction strikes and barred the collection of 'excessive' initiation fees or dues. It directed the NIRB to take 'forthwith' legal restraining action against any union involved in secondary boycotts or "jurisdictional' strikes. It permitted employers to file damage suits against unions for breach of contract.
"It also required unions to file with the Secretary of Labor annual financial statements, copies of their constitutions and bylays, full details of how all officers were elected and their initiation fees and dues. It forbade unions and employers from contributing in cash or by indirect means, such as publicity, to campaign funds of any candidates for federal office. It prohibited strikes by federal government employees or workers in governmentowned corporations....It required officials of local, national, and international unions to file an affidavit swearing that they were not members of the Communist Party and did not support any organization advocating overthrow of the government by force or any 'unconstitutional means." - IV.
21
WORK STOPPAGES 1960 TO 1979
(Excludes work stoppages involving fewer than 6 workers or lasting less than 1 day)
workers were determined to justify the hazard by making the most of their action."
The strike was finally settled with a agreement calling for raises of 6% immediately and another
WORKERS INVOLVED 8% in six months. After all the workers had returned to work, Congress and the President stalled on approving the final Number (1) Percent of
However, militant locals passed strike calls, and in the end, the government backed down and authorized the final increase, The key to understanding the development of the wildcat strike movement, which ignored the pleas of the labor bureaucracy, and defied the government and its troops, is that it was not an isolated development, even if it tends to stand out from more routine conflicts. Feeling themselves left out from the general prosperity, making only 8,000 dollars per year, sometimes after years of service, and having observed that other struggles, whether by Blacks, workers, or students, were able to win concessions, the postal workers literally exploded into
YEAR WORK STOPPAGES
Number Average beginning in duration (1,000) VCAL (calendar year) 1960 3,333 23.4 1,320 1965 3.963 25.0 1,550 1967 4,595 22.8 2,870 1968 5,045 24.5 2,649 1969 5.700 22.5 2,481 1970 5,716 25.0 3,305 1971 5,138 27.0 3,280 1972 5.010 24.0 1.714 1973 5,353 24.0 2,251 1974 6,074 27.1 2.778 1975 5,031 26.8 1,746 1976 5,648 28.0 2,420 1977 5,506 29.3 2,040 1978 4,230 33.2 1,623 1979 4,827 32.1 1.727
DAYS LOST DURING YEAR Number Percent of Per worker total (1,000) estimated involved employed (2) working time (3) 2.4 19,100 14 14.5 2.5 23,300 15 15.1 4.3 42,100 25 14.7 3.8 49.018 28 -18.5 3.5 42,869 24 17.3 4.7 66,414 37 20.1 4.6 47,589 26 14.5 2.3 27,066 15 15.8 2.9 27,948 14 12.4 3.5 47.991 24 17.3 2.2 31,237 16 17.9 3.0 37.859 19 15.6 2.4 35,822 17 17.6 1.9 36.922 17 22.6 1.9 34,754 15 20.1 militant action.
Workers counted more than once if involved in more than 1 stoppage during year.
In 1967, total employed workers was redefined to coincide with U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures for nonagricultral employment plus agricultural wage and salaried workers.
MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
Idleness computed on this basis is lower than the former sense.
OF BLACK WORKERS
Estimated working time computed by multiplying average number of employed workers
(see footnote 2) by number of days worked by most employees.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Analysis of Work Stoppages annual
Another example of "new-found militancy" during that period was the development of the Revolutionary Union
Movement (RUM), and its companion organization, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers. Born in 1969, these
Black Marxist organizations exerted brief influence over thousands of Black workers and students in Detroit.
initial RUM organization, at the Dodge
Main plant, came out of a successful defense campaign for five Black workers fired in a wildcat strike.
were rehired after RUM, on its own called a wildcat strike of
Black workers which shut down the plant for two days.
The RUM movement is the most famous of a number of Black caucuses that formed in the unions in the late
They were symptoms of the black rebellion that had already made itself noticed across the country through a series of riots in the major cities between 1964 and 1968. Studies of the Detroit riot of 1967 have pointed up that the participants were not simply unemployed Black youth, but rather they included an important concentration of
Blacks employed in Detroit's industries.
In the auto industry in particular, there was an especially high percentage of
One index of the discrimination they faced was that, while 250,000 of the
750,000 workers in the automobile industry were Black, only 3% of the skilled workers at General Motors were Black.
At Ford and Chrysler, only 1.3% of the skilled workforce was Black.
The importance of the auto industry to the American economy, then as now,
In 1970, the auto industry used approximately 20% of the steel, 11% of the aluminum, 50% of the lead, and
60% of the rubber consumed in the
(1) (2) United States. One in six jobs depended on the auto industry. was viewed with alarm by the companies the labor bureaucracy. to ensure the end of a wildcat strike at the Detroit Mack Avenue Stamping Plant, out one thousand unionists to stand at the gates. The same day, one of the main organizers of the wildcat was beaten leaving the plant.
The RUM movement turned out to be short lived, not being able to survive beyond the period of youth radicalization and Black rebellion. the union struggles that broke out were marked by the youthfulness of their instigators, their tendency to go beyond the bounds acceptable to the bureaucracy, and by their failure to develop into a national challenge to the union leadership. The rank-and-file groups that were created in that period either shifted their focus to gaining control of their union, or else their force dissipated quick-
This last period of relative capitalist prosperity in the late sixties and early seventies gave an impulse, as explained, for a revival of militant labor struggles. Although these struggles remained in a primitive form, they generated the first major challenges to entrenched union leadership. They gave whole sections of workers an important set of experiences
Even those workers who were not directly involved nonetheless lived through the years in which, as the Wall Street Journal complained on September 2, 1969, there was a developing tendency toward "more contract rejections by rank-and-filers," or in other words, a new challenge to the companies and the traditional union leaderships.
THE ONSET OF THE ECONOMIC
CRISIS - NEW SHOCKS TO U.S. STABILITY
The early seventies produced a number of shocks for the working class, and for that matter, the bourgeois economic experts as well. By 1974, "creeping inflation" of the previous decade had turned into double-digit inflation. For a brief period, unemployment was climbing at the same time as inflation was worsening, which all the economists had previously promised to be impossible. At the same time, on the political plane, the government seemed to be in perpetual crisis. The spectacle of the Watergate hearings, the oil crisis, and the worst recession in memory, at least for the younger workers, challenged the established ideas of a major portion of the American population. Whereas the office of the presidency of the United States had been sacrosanct in previous decades, Nixon had become an object of public scorn and rid-
Despite the attempt by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to convince the American people that the oil crisis was real, that higher prices had to be paid, and austerity policies implemented, there was widespread public disbelief. Polls demonstrated that Americans were more opposed to the big corporations than ever before. Though it should be noted that same polls always indicate that unions are extremely unpopular as well Finally, the debacle in Vietnam was coming to an end in these years as well. In 1973, the Paris Peace Accord was signed
and by 1975, National Liberation Front broad section of the American population concluded that such military adventures were either unnecessary or, at least, unrecession officially ended, the economic situation could still best be described as stagnant. Continued high levels of inflation and continued high unemployment afflicted a working class that, for the first time in decades, was unable to obtain their usual improvements
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Their first reac-
JOB Jobs tion was to believe that the elected union officials doing the negotiating simply lacked the desire or the backbone
N CL to get the job done.
Therefore, they turned to leaders who called for a more militant posture towards the corporations and for greater union democracy. Union democracy, to the ranks, meant making the union structures more responsive to
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STRUGGLES FOR UNION DEMOCRACY US workers demonstrate for jobs, against economic policy (DR)
The Miners for Democracy America was a forerunner of the union reform movement. In 1969, they ran a campaign against the corrupt Boyle leadership which culminated in a fraudulent election victory of nearly two-to-one for the incumbents. murder of the main leader of the MFD, Jock Yablonski, and an investigation by the government of the fraudulent voting, a new election was ordered. In 1972, in the new election, the MFD slate headed by Arnold Miller swept to victory. New democratic reforms, including rank and file ratification of national contracts, were implemented
Inspired by this victory, union reform activists in the steelworkers union decided in 1976 to form a Steelworkers Fightback slate to oppose I.W. Abel's handpicked successor, Lloyd MeBride. argued that the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA), an agreement signed in 1973 prohibiting national strikes when the old contract expires, made the union less able to negotiate gains for the membership, and was accepted without a vote by the rank and file. Since the period of the greatest gains for the United Steel of America (USWA) had been in the 1950s, when they had gone on strike nearly every year, this argument struck a chord with many steelworkers. In fact, by the time of the election in February, 1977, the Steelworkers Fightback slate had garnered majority support among the workers covered by the national steel agreement. However, they lost the election owing to the lack of support in nonsteel districts of the USWA.
Reform forces in the NALC likewise lost a close election in December 1976. Unlike the defeat of the reform forces in the USWA, this was to be just a temporary setback. In 1978, under the impact of wildcat strikes in Jersey City, Brooklyn, and San Francisco, and owing to the opposition to the government's contract offer, Joseph Sambrotto was elected president of the NALC. His election, and the companion victory of Morris Biller in the 1980 APWU elections, represented the culmination of a process initiated in the 1970 national wildeat strike.
During this same period some growth was registered by similar forces in the Teamsters Union, exemplifed by the formation of Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU). On a local level, similar rank-and-file caucuses were formed in hundreds of unions. This develop. ment, while it shared some of the basic motivations of the earlier wildcat strikes and militant caucuses, differed in a few militants who made up these groups were far more rooted in the existing union structures. sciously set out to take control of the apparatuses of the national unions, and therefore chose the tack of running national election campaigns in their respec-
Where the caucuses were weak, such as in the Teamsters Union or
UAW, nomination of alternative candidates was as far as they were able to strong, such as in the USWA, they managed to get the support of dozens of local and district officials. Regardless of their relative strength, all of the rank-and-file caucuses attempted to get their militants elected to local positions ranging from shop steward to local president.
Secondly, the reform movement grew during the economic stagnation of the
Resistance to union demands had increased, and this was reflected in an increase in the average duration of strikes. In 1978, for example, the average strike lasted 33.2 days, compared to 25.0 in
Because of the spreading perception that the difficulties faced by the American labor movement were the result of the cautiousness and conservatism of the top bureaucracy, the reform movement was able to have much more of an overall effect on American labor politics. In contrast, the militant Black caucuses remained quite isolated, and the wildcats failed to budge the union movement from its collaborationist perspective.
If the union reform movement declined in the late seventies, it was due to causes similar to those that gave it birth. After having elected Ed Sadlowski and later Jim Balanoff, to the position of director of District No. 31 (2) in the USWA, workers experienced deep-cutting some 20,000 of the 65,000 workers in this district were laid off. Faced with a certain disappointment that electing reform candidates could not halt the layoffs, a partial demoralization took place among the workers who had supported them. In 1981, Jack Parton, backed by the USWA top leadership, defeated Balanoff
Most of the budget cutbacks and inthe Carter administration. the election of Reagan signaled a decision on the part of the bourgeoisie that the pace of the attack on the standard of living and rights of the working class was too slow. Similarly, in the field of concession bargaining, important precedents exist during the Carter administration. But the number and size of the concessions demanded have qualitatively creased since 1980.
THE 1977 COAL STRIKE - THE
FIRST BIG BATTLE AGAINST THE GIVE BACKS
The first important battle over concessions occurred during the 111-day coal
District 31 includes some of the most important steel centers, Chicago, for example. - IV.
23
miners strike in 1977-1978. At issue was the coal companies' attempts to dismantle the unique "cradle-to-grave" health-
The rank and file rejected two tentative contracts endorsed by their leadership. Finally, they accepted a contract which included lesser concessions, health benefits. Rich Trumka, in his recent successful campaign for the presidency of the UMWA (United Mine Workers of America) noted that:
"The present trend of major corporations attempting to extract concessions from their workers might well have had its beginning with negotiations of 1977-78. The negotiations, after a 111-day strike, resulted in contract losses to our membership. Perhaps the single most important loss was that of the HS-85 Health Service Card. For our union and our membership that can only be described as
The 1979 auto contract, like the 1978 miners agreement, contained a number of contract concessions, although relatively
The Ford agreement, which was the pilot agreement that year, included increases in the pension plan and the usual 3% annual increases plus cost of living. However, the cost of the increase in the pension plans was compensated for by a reduction in paid personal holidays and lower wages for all newly hired people. This contract was ratified by a margin of two-to-one. It was followed by a similar agreement at General Motors.
With Chrysler Corporation, the UAW succumbed to the argument that the company faced a dire financial situation, and approved 203 million dollars in concessions for the next two years. months later, in connection with obtaining government approval on a plan to 'save' Chrysler, the UAW recommended to its membership that they accept another 243 million dollars in concessions Frightened by the possible loss of their
Chrysler workers agreed to an immediate 1.15 dollar per hour pay cut, combined with the loss of (cost of living allowance) payments. By 1982, Chrysler workers 3 dollars per hour less than their counterparts at General Motors and Ford.
GM and Ford wanted to narrow that gap, but by lowering the wages and benefits of the workers at their plants. began to demand an early reopening of
Of course, it was impossible to deny that the auto companies were experiencing hard times. December 1981, auto plants were operating at less than 50% of their capacity. In January 1982, they posted a record 107-day inventory of unsold cars. inite layoff. Meanwhile, plant closings were being announced with greater frequency. On January 15, GM announced that production cutbacks in the next four months would idle 60,400 workers, 5,400 of them indefinitely.
Despite the economic situation and the threats of plant closings, the UAW leadership was having trouble generating enthusiasm for concessions. The GM bargaining council, meeting in Chicago, composed of delegates from every local, narrowly approved a proposal to continue negotiations with GM.
the concessions demanded by GM would doubtlessly have been defeated handily. On January 28, negotiations between GM and the UAW lapsed. On January 30, GM reduced the prices on a variety of models of cars and light trucks by 500 to 2,000 dollars, even though they had previously claimed they needed concessions from the workers in order to be able to do that.
At Ford, a similar development was at work. On January 24, the UAW agreed New York Times reported that the UAW leadership was trying hard to "sell Ford's financial situation to the workers." February 14, a tentative contract had been reached, which included important
To sell the contract, Douglas Fraser, president of the UAW, explained to the skilled trades conference that the union faced the choice of accepting the concessions or striking from weakness. an even more unusual move, AFL-CIO leaders, meeting in Bal Harbour, Florida, lauded the UAW-Ford contract as a model of innovative bargaining. March 1, it was reported that the Ford cession contract by a margin of 3 to 1.
The new contract at Ford included the foregoing of annual pay raises, giving up nine paid personal holidays, and deferring COLA (4) increases for nine months. In addition, newly hired workers would be paid 80% of full pay for the first year. In return, Ford agreed to lower prices on its cars, establish a profit-sharing agreement, and agreed that no plants would be closed due to company decisions to buy components from other
According to the 1982, issue of Industry Week:
"The contract itself can only be interpreted as a corporate relief plan. Despite some argument to the contrary, the contract contains precious little for the work. ers. The 'gains' achieved by the UAW -items such as profit sharing, job guarantees, and plant-closing language — are so rife with qualifiers that they are virtually meaningless to the vast majority of Ford UAW members."
York Times echoed that "The benefits to Ford are clear....The benefits to the union are less clear and immediate."
the margin of approval Ford workers, ship once again proposed reopening the
On March 4, the UAW bargaining unit voted to do so. This time, GM asked only for what Ford had already gotten, and within three weeks a tentative contract was announced which ran along the lines of the Ford contract. It won the approval of the local presidents by 299 to 25. The margin of approval in the ranks was much closer: 114,468 to
FIGHTBACK STARTS IN AUTO
Even that narrow 52% to 48% margin was challenged by militant local leaders. At the local in Linden, New Yersey, Martin Cid, a member of the GM bargaining council challenged the outcome of the vote: "We would like to have an investigation of how the vote was conducted." The shop chairperson of the same local hinted that they would take it upon themselves to do a recount, if necessary: "Around the country 10,000 workers in the assembly plants are going to be out of work (as a result of the contract), and we want to be sure the vote was accurate."
Opposition to the Ford and GM contracts came from a group known as Locals Opposed to Concessions (LOC), which was formed during the first set of negotiations with GM in January. LOO was responsible for organizing the near rejection of the continuation of bargaining by the GM bargaining council in January and the near rejection of the GM contract in April. During the Ford negotiations, it brought out 300 workers to an 8 a.m. picket line against the tentative contract. LOC is spearheaded nationally by the Independent Skilled Trades Council (ISTC), a militant rank-and-file caucus in the skilled trades.
Against this background of growing opposition among autoworkers to the concessions, Chrysler's renegotiated contract was approaching its expiration date. In August 1982, in a vote that traditionally carries with an overwhelming majority, 92% of Chrysler's workers voted to authorize a strike if an agreement were not reached. On October 18, being presented with a contract that did not give them parity with Ford and GM workers, the workers rejected it, thereby authoriz-
The UAW leadership, facing a situation that normally would have led to a strike, hastily called a second vote. poll would offer the workers the alternative of going out on strike immediately, or postponing the decision until January 1983. This time the workers voted to accept a postponement.
### CANADIAN AUTO WORKERS
In Canada, however, the UAW leadership called a strike. The Canadian autoworkers, who have a contract similar to that of their American counterparts, were angered by Chrysler's 1.1 billion dollar cash reserve, and its refusal to grant any wage increase. Therefore, they held out for restitution of the 1.15 dollar per hour that they had lost in the previous contract.
3. The Bituminous Coal Owners' Associa tion. - IV.
Cost-of-Living Allowance: before the givebacks, the UAW was the pacesetter on the question of sliding scale of wages.
When Chrysler gave in, they had to package, although due to the difference in currency, they received 40 cents per
One important difference in the contracts, however, was that Chrysler's Canadian did not have to accept a strong anti-absenteeism clause in their contract. Nonetheless, all of Chryswon a victory, and it was clearly the result of the steadfastness of the workers in the initial rejection of the contract and then the strike by the
In the steel industry, in which plant production has been steadily nosediving in the past two years, workers were also faced with company demands for wage
In July 1982, talks collapsed as the companies demanded a three-year wage freeze, no COLA for the first year, a cap of 50 cents on COLA payments for the next two years, and a 3 dollar per hour wage cut for all newly hired employ-
This proposal was rejected unantowards the automation of work performed by humans. In the steel industry, resentment against the companies rose when it was reported that U.S. Steel was investing in Florida real estate. In other words, the savings that the companies realized from concessions were not necessarily being directed toward investment in the steel industry itself.
The existence of a movement against concessions is not just a response to a given conjunctural situation. It also reflects the maturation of an important layer of the American working class. The industries in which the anticoncessions movement exists have experienced massive layoffs, eliminating the bulk of the younger workers, who are traditionally the most militant. The workers who are left in these industries and who are the militants of this movement, are the ones who lived through the experiences of the two previous waves of working-class struggles in the late sixties and the seventies.
The anticoncessions movement also imously by the local presidents, who are of this article, the UAW agreed to an represents a beginning polarization in empowered to ratify or reject contract proposals. It should be mentioned that this proposal would have cost the steelworkers 8.2 billion dollars.
By the time the auto contract talks were reopened, unemployment had worsened dramatically. Out of a workforce of 360,00 unemployment had risen from 100,000 in July to 140,000 in November. The companies came back with an even worse proposal, from the standpoint of the workers, than the rejected July proposal. This time they proposed an immediate across-the-board pay cut of 2.25 dollars per hour and the elimination of the local right to strike for 44 months. The COLA formula was to be tied to individual company profitability. In return, the steelworkers were to receive a ninety-day notice of all plant closings and an unemployment fund for workers with more than five years seniority. This plan and annual 50 cents raises were to be financed by the wage cut.
The vote was much closer this time: 231 to 141 against the contract. The International president, who endorsed the agreement, held the vote by secret ballot, thereby allowing local presidents to vote for the contract without having to admit it to the ranks. Nevertheless, the still comfortable margin against the contract gives a clear indication of the sentiment against these cutbacks.
The contract does not expire until August of 1983. In preparation for the next round of negotiations, the usual threats of plant closings are mounting. General Motors, which uses 7% of all steel domestically produced is threatening to switch to foreign companies if an agreement is not reached by March 1, 1983. Unemployed steelworkers now number more than 160,000. Given the support for major concessions expressed by the International leadership (5) and the opposition to concessions by the local presidents and the rank and file, the conditions obviously exist for a major conflict. [In fact, subsequent to the writing early contract signing in March. IV]
SPREADING BATTLES AGAINST GIVE BACKS
There have been many other manifestations of anticoncessions sentiment in the working class in the past two years. They range from the ousting of incumbent union leaderships, such as the defeat of Sam Church in the United Mine Workers' election in November 1982, to successful defenses of jobs and previous gains through bitter strikes, such as the United Electrical workers (UE) strike against the Morse Cutting Tool company in New Bedford, Massachusetts.
While there are several factors that help explain the growth of this sentiment, the essential reason is that over the last few years a number of workers have given important concessions, only to lose their jobs anyway. The Experimental Negotiating Agreement signed in the steel industry was supposed to have given steelworkers some real job security. Instead, there is over 40% unemployment among union members covered by the basicsteel agreement. The Chrysler workers, having been the first in the auto industry to grant concessions to the companies, were promised a return to parity with other autoworkers as soon as the company became profitable. However, even as Lee lacocca was bragging of his 1.1 billion dollar cash reserve, he was asking for further concessions from the Chrysler workers.
In many cases, the actual terms of the concessions directly eliminate jobs. For example, when autoworkers at Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford gave up nine paid personal holidays, it meant the immediate layoff of whatever workers were previously needed to fill in for those taking a day off. Less directly, the use that is made of the additional profits from these concessions may also eliminate jobs. Particularly in the auto industry, new capital investment is aimed
American politics. It corresponds to the deep frustration with the Reagan presidency and to the perception that that presidency is openly antilabor. The smashing of PATCO, the air controllers whose transparently the rapid alteration of the relationship of forces the This was to be accomplished on a number of levels, including weakening health and safety standards, social services cutbacks, eliminating industry regulations, and reactionary tax
This policy, needless to say, has not succeeded in breaking the back of Amer-
If union membership continues to decline, it is primarily due to the recession, both in terms of losses of current membership, and in a declining rate of representation elections won by unions. There is no evidence that unions have become less popular. On the contrary, on the September 19, 1981, Solidarity Day, the AFL-CIO brought out a demonstration of a half million workers, proving that workers are still willing to fight when their leadership demonstrates its own seriousness about a struggle.
If anti-Reagan sentiment in the work. ing class can be channeled into the Democratic Party, the same cannot be done with the anticoncessions movement. On the contrary, the pressure continues to build in the unions. It will be through such battles, or more exactly, through successful defensive struggles that the working class will be able to prepare the ground for a counteroffensive. It is in this light that the development of a broad movement in the most powerful unions against the need of American capitalism to rationalize its industries should be seen.
5. Union federations in the US are often called International. The reality to this is that many of them include English Canadian workers. - IV.
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LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS LEGAL STRIKE ON OCOMOTIVE ENGINTENS ROTHERHOOD OF