No road but the struggle
T HIS sharpened turn towards neoliberalism and authoritarianism reflected one of the gravest economic crises in the country's history. Between January 1999 and January 2000 the sucre was devalued by nearly 300%, and since the beginning of Mahuad's presidential term in August 1998 the exchange rate of the dollar has gone up five times. The last increase was considered as purely speculative by the majority of analysts.
Inflation has leapt by more than 60% in the course of the last year. The workers are suffering the full ravages of unemployment - in 1999, more than 150,000 people lost their jobs. The purchasing power of wages has also deteriorated rapidly - in the 17 months of the Mahuad government the average monthly salary fell from S160 to $37. During this time, in December, the Wages Council sanctioned a pay increase of only 10%.
### Harsh blows
Meanwhile, the cost of public services has spiraled; the price of water has increased by 400% and telephone and electricity bills have gone up by almost as much. The price of petrol has been held stable following protests but an increase is planned for July 2000. The economy suffered some harsh blows in 1999 - GDP fell by 7%, although the fall leveled off during the last quarter. Company debts have reached $4.8 billion, and many have already announced their inability to pay up. Small and medium companies have begun to go into liquidation.
The economic crisis was precipitated by a financial crisis. In 1998 and the first quarter of 1999 several of the most important banks went bankrupt and came under state administration. Currently, 60% of the banks are under state control, although government officials have said that once healthy they will be reintegrated into the private sector. Last March the financial crisis led to a freezing of deposits worth approximately S4 billion. Meanwhile, the state allocated around $1.8 billion to the 'rescue' of the banks. But before the freezing of assets, nearly $6 billion had already left the country.
The government's problems were not confined to the economic front. Mahuad
ON THE evening of Sunday ON TUE avanina of Condou.
January 7th Ecuador's President, Jamil Mahuad, announced the 'dollarization' of the country's economy - the linkage of the national curren-
Icy, the sucre, to the dollar.
Moreover, a number of deregulatory measures were to be taken: increased flexibility of labour contracts as well as acceleration of the privatization of the energy industry and the social security system. At the same time, Mahuad threatened repression and a 'firm hand' against those who would oppose the implementation of the reforms.
### JUAN ADOLFO
MONTENEGRO had begun his term in the framework of an apparently solid alliance with the Social Christian Party (PSC), together with the small Conservative Party and the Alfarist Radical Front. On this basis, the government intended to accelerate the hitherto rather restrained application of the neoliberal model, notably in the area of privatization.
### Agreement breaks down
But the economic earthquake of the March 1999 banking crisis led to the breaking of the agreement, with the PSC and the bourgeoisie of Guayaquil (Guayaquil, on the Pacific coast, Ecuador's most important port and Quito's main rival for the economic and political leadership of the country accusing the government of favouring the banks of the capital, Quito. Through this conflict, the PSC and the dominant groups of Guayaquil waged a struggle for the private appropriation of public funds. By gambling on a 'regionalist' mobilization they rendered disunity inevitable.
Consequently the government tried to reach an agreement with the centre-left, notably the Democratic Left, which benefited from having a sympathizer as a director of the central bank. But by insisting on neoliberal reforms the government again brought about the breakdown of this agreement. Mahuad's alliance policy then took another sharp wrench - he sought an understanding with the Roldosiste Party of former president Abdala Bucaram, dismissed from office following a massive popular mobilization in February 1997.
Agreement was reached on the condition that the government accepted changes in the penal code seeking to annul the legal process against Bucaram. These changes were finally officially published just after the announcement of dollarization. But these new agreements would also bring their share of difficulties, with a group of deputies from the president's party defecting.
### Demands for resignation
From this time onwards demands for the resignation of the president began to gain some ground - among those withdrawing their support from Mahuad were former President Rodrigo Borja, leader of the Democratic Left, former President Leon Febres Cordero, leader of the Social Christian Party, the principal officials of the chambers of commerce in the Guayaquil region, employers' leaders in Altiplano, as well as some deputies from his own party, close to former President Oswaldo Hurtado.
During this time, in late December, the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS) demanded the resignation of the government as a whole, together with the Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice, calling for the setting up of 'parliaments of the people' to replace Congress.
Of course, the demands for resignation came from opposed points of view, as had not been the case during the fall of Bucaram in 1997. The popular movements demanded a change of social and economic model, whereas the employers' groups were pressing for a strengthening of the neoliberal policy, dollarization and the acceleration of 'reforms' and privatization. At this time the popularity of the president International Viewpoint #320 April 2000 17
* Ecuador plummeted, reaching the level of 9% in the first week of January 2000, against 53% demanding his resignation. It was now that Mahuad responded by totally accepting the employers' demands.
The political crisis experienced by the Mahuad government has its roots ultimately in the crisis of the regime which opened in February 1997, something the dominant sectors have not succeeded in resolving to this day.
Each serious crisis accompanied by social protests throws more light on the fragility of the presidency. The mobilizations undermine the stability of the government, preventing it from establishing itself within a renewed constitutional continuity every four years. Social demands can radicalize rapidly and large sectors of the masses have been pushed to a state of quasi-permanent protest by the intensification of the 'reforms'. Thus social mobilization has twice succeeded in preventing the implementation of more radical neoliberal measures, in March and July 1999.
On the other hand, faced with the economic debacle, the bourgeoisie has ceased to take into consideration its general class interests and prioritizes its own sectoral interests, although it has also encountered some difficulties in representing itself as a social class. However, the present situation is characterized by paralysis, for the popular movement has not succeeded in developing a credible alternative for the majority of the population, nor in taking the leadership of a movement of organization and more sustained mobilization.
### Army is arbiter
In this context appeals to 'arbitration' by notables, the Church and above all the military, become more pressing. The armed forces, who assumed this task in February 1997, have not abandoned this role of arbiter and exercise a tutelage on democracy with every upheaval. But the armed forces themselves are traversed by the conflicts which determine social life. Their unity seems to be maintained by strong institutional sentiment rather than the firmness of the hierarchy; it is this which has led them to go back to the mechanism of internal consultations.
The social and economic conditions consequently tend to undermine the legitimacy of governments, including the state institutions, and social consciousness detaches itself easily from the idea of their 18 International Viewpoint #320 April 2000 immutability.
This persistent political crisis ultimately expresses the difficulties of the bourgeoisie and its successive governments in carrying through the neoliberal programme, implemented progressively from 1982 then with more force and coherence from 1994 onwards. Since this date, the social forces have positioned themselves very clearly in this central conflict, throwing into question both the economic model and the political model of limited democтасу.
In the period leading up to Friday January 7th demands for Mahuad's resignation became more urgent, coming from everywhere, with the press itself no longer ruling out such a possibility. At the same time, truck drivers announced strikes for Monday January 10th. The CONAIE and the CMS prepared for mid-January mobilizations to strengthen the setting up of "parliaments of the people'. All in defiance of the state of emergency declared by Mahuad on January 5th - rumours of resignation were flying around. Until the announcement of the measures of the evening of Sunday January 9th.
With dollarization, Mahuad attempted to convince the big employers' groups of his capacity to administer the state by assuming fully the programme demanded by the employers' Chambers. Moreover, he left open the possibility of reaffirming the governmental agreement with the PRE and bringing in the PSC.
Little by little, on Monday and Tuesday, the opposing parties came to accept the measures taken. The clearest sign was the decision taken by the big banks to support the quotation of the dollar at 25,000 sucres. The final result was that the government, at least temporarily, succeeded in reversing the relationship of forces. This reversal was reinforced by the incomprehension among the popular classes of the meaning of dollarization and its effects on living conditions. Thus the first polls showed an improvement in the government's image, reflecting a passive support at least.
New elements
The week of January 17th introduced new elements to this class confrontation. On the one hand, it was apparent that the government had succeeded in rallying the bourgeoisie and its parties behind it, after having adopted the economic policy demanded. At the same time, measures of repression against the popular movement began to be forcefully carried out - arrest of leaders, occupation of universities, escalation of violence against demonstrators, intrusion of the armed forces in the indigenous communities. All this showed that the bourgeoisie as a whole had made the choice to close ranks around the government and thus smash any attempt at a popular alternative.
During this week, mobilizations began in an unequal fashion - partial closure of roads, urban mobilizations although weak and sporadic, appeals to mobilization and occupations of roads. In the streets the division of the mass movement was already apparent, between a sector linked to the CONAIE and another to the Patriotic Front. Their incapacity to coordinate their activity was reflected in competing initiatives.
### Movement seizes power
The popular and indigenous movement, together with a group of soldiers with some young officers at its head, took power in Ecuador for several hours on Friday January 21st, in a climate of growing social mobilization.
Antonio Vargas, leader of the CONAIE, and colonel Lucio Gutierrez surrounded the Congress with a group of indigenous peoples, repudiated the powers of the state and formed a governmental junta. In the hours which followed, the top military hierarchy, the employers, the different political parties (Social Christian, Popular Democrat, Roldosist and so on) and members of the government found a response to this coup carried out by the popular movement and a sector of the army, by making vice president Gustavo Noboa president of the republic in place of Mahuad.
Meanwhile tens of thousands of demonstrators came onto the streets across the country to support the overthrow of Mahuad and the formation of a government rejecting dollarization and the various neoliberal measures taken some days beforehand. The pressure brought by the US government (threats of sanctions and a blockade like Cuba') the unity of the bourgeoisie, the tardiness of the urban popular sectors in joining the mobilizations, the army's ability to cover up its divisions are some of the elements which determined the defeat of the popular rebellion.
But the profound causes of the crisis are obviously still not resolved.
In the hours which followed his inauguration, the new president announced the pursuit of dollarization and privatization, while the leader of CONAIE, Antonio Vargas, went into semi-clandestinity, several officers were arrested, the last indigenous groups present in Quito were dispersed by special forces and the deputies demanded exemplary sanctions against the 'insurgents'
While no one could for the moment predict fully the consequences of this defeat, some lessons can already be drawn from these events.
Ecuadorian society is increasingly polarised, and the conflicts clearly take on the character of a class confrontation. The bourgeoisie has closed ranks around an institutional solution. All its divisions have been put aside for the time to face down the popular mobilizations. The strengthening of neoliberalism has also reinforced social polarization.
It appears obvious that there exists inside the armed forces a 'nationalist' current close to the demands of the popular movement which seeks to develop a distinct political project. In his speech, colonel Gutierrez referred to the 'Juliana revolution', a movement of young soldiers who overthrew the regime of the bankers in 1925. But the divergences are still not pronounced enough inside the military institutions. Given that fact, a strategy based almost exclusively on a military pronunciamiento had little chance of succeeding.
### Popular divisions
The popular mobilizations remained marked by strong divisions and by discontinuities. Whereas the countryside was in the vanguard and the struggle rested essentially on the indigenous population, their efforts were only to a limited extent accompanied by significant urban mobilizations.
In most of the big towns, the majority of the popular sectors began to enter into struggle only when the rebels took over Congress and the march on the government palace was organized. The strategy adopted has apparently not taken into account the disparities of the movement. The principal and urgent task to come will be to renew the links.
However, the movement can take com-
Ecuador / Chile * fort in some victories; Mahuad has finally been removed from power. This reinforces in the social consciousness the conviction that the government cannot act with impunity, and that it is the people which is sovereign in a democracy - governments are only legitimate when they satisfy popular needs.
It is important to note that social struggles have acquired, almost naturally, a clear class character, without for all that ceasing to attract to them increasingly diverse sectors. The social articulations have then a tendency to stand out with more clarity. The majority of the population has been able to perceive clearly that the political class, the state institutions, the military and Church hierarchy all protect the interests of the dominant classes. The *parliaments of the people' remain a conquest for future struggles, and it is proba-
Fourth International condemns ble that some similar forms of organizations will reappear as and when the situation demands it.
But immediately it is not possible to measure the breadth of the defeat in terms of demoralization. Nor is it possible to predict the harshness of the repression, against the officers and against the popular organizations. Beyond this, the pursuit of the neoliberal model and the impoverishment which will result from it could, in addition to demoralization, condemn the social movement to torpor for a longtime. There is no indication that the crisis of the regime has been checked. If the uprising of January 21st has been defeated, the popular movement still has some reserves. Its principal task continues to be confronting the model of pauperization and authoritarianism, even in difficult conditions. And there is no other road than the struggle. * liberation of Pinochet
PINOCHET: GLOBALIZED IMPUNITY The Fourth International expresses its most categorical repudiation and shares the indignation of the democratic, progressive and revolutionary forces of the world at the liberation of the mass murderer Pinochet. The decision of the British Home Secretary Jack Straw and Tony Blair's Labour government confirms that the much trumpeted global "justice" is a farce in the new world order dominated by the imperialist powers and the multinationals. Thanks to the complicity of the governments of France, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain, who for political, economic and democratic reasons have not opposed the British decision, the murderer of thousands of people has returned unpunished to his country. The Fourth International support all protests, democratic mobilizations and demonstrations of solidarity with the Chilean people and honours the memory of those who fell in the combat against the military dictatorship headed by General Pinochet. At the same time, it demands the judgement and punishment of the former dictator, and all the torturers and murderers who, on behalf of the state and its security apparatuses, have been responsible for terror, crime and disappearances in Latin America. Therefore, we support unconditionally all the initiatives of the human rights organizations as well as the comrades, families and friends of the victims who suffered the atrocities of regimes like that of Pinochet. And involve ourselves in the struggle against impunity and for the creation of a genuine international system that guarantees the defence of and the fullest respect for human rights. * March 3rd, 2000 Unified Secretariat of the Fourth International
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