Kashmir conflict is fa mar crat renc whe
The 'nuclear deterrent' has not prevented the escalation of Indo-Pakistan conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Praful Bidwai Three months after their "historic" summit for peace and reconciliation at Lahore, India and Pakistan resumed shelling and insulting each other across the Kashmir border. For the first time in 21 years, Indıa has deployed its air torce ın border hostılities. Over 60 Indian soldiers have died in ground operations.
Although India says the conflict is confined to its side of the line of control (LoC), as the disputed boundary is called, Pakistan claims that some bombs have fallen on its territory and it regards the matter as "very, very serious"
Both states accuse each other of breaking the letter and spirit of both the Lahore Declaration of February 21 and the Simla Agreement signed after the Bangladesh war of 1971.
eBoth countries claim sovereignty over the divided Jammu and Kashmir regions. Both are insecure about each other's military capacities and intentions, and foreign policy-making.
This confrontation began when the Indian army detected the presence of armed "infiltrators" on the Indian side of the LoC. Pakistan says the men are Kashmiri mujaheedin (guerrillas), fighting for independence of India's only Muslim-majority state.
Such cross-border forays have been routine for years, especially after the winter snows melt. More than 350 exchanges of heavy artillery fire were reported in the six months both countries exploded nuclear tests in May 1998.
What is new about the present case is the relatively large number of guerrillas crossing the border (unofficially estimated in India at 1,000 to 1,500) and their success in penetrating 7km into Indiancontrolled Kashmir. The guerrillas have established relatively well-equipped camps over an area reportedly as large as 15km'. Apparently, the Indian army's routine operations failed to dislodge the militants.
Army sources say this is the first time in 50 years that Kashmiri guerrillas have established permanent control over Indian-controlled territory near the border.
Indian home minister L.K. Advani claims that the infiltrators included Pakistani "army regulars and mercenaries."
India says it had no option but to use air info power to soften up the intruders and cut clai off their supply lines. Any delay would have encouraged Pakistan to extend its abo operations;
non-eviction of the
The
"infiltrators" would have changed the to i alignment of the LoC to India's limi disadvantage; the security of the vital
Srinagar-Leh road would have been bila threatened; and continued occupation of of r the heights would have led to further
"na infiltration.
tal
In the absence of full and verifiable wea information, it seems that after the Indian
The army failed to dislodge the militants, thei perhaps after sustaining high casualties con
(according to the local Kashmiri press), sior the government decided to launch air extr strikes.
sup
These strikes are being carried out by helicopter gunships and a range of combat aircraft including MiG-21s and
MiG-27s, with MiG-29s providing cover.
These strikes add a new element of speed to the military confrontation and involve the risk of aircraft straying across the border, and bombs and rockets missing targets and hitting militarily significant assets in Pakistan.
The border is undemarcated on the ground. This increases the chances of retaliation and strategic misperception.
W
Strategic miscalculation has been a
M constant factor in India-Pakistan rivalry.
In 1965, Pakistani General Ayub Khan thought that merely parachuting troops
CE into Kashmir would trigger a popular rebellion against India. This started a
St bitter war which Pakistan did not win.
In 1986-87 and again in 1990, Indian d military exercises convinced Pakistani generals that attack was imminent. In
1990 the Pakistan government lined up
P:
trucks at the Kahuta uranium enrichment a plant. demonstrating its willingness to escalate the confrontation to the nuclear level.
g
The present stand-off raises three serious questions: Was the Pakistan army a or its Inter Services Intelligence agency b really involved in the "infiltration"? If so, did it act independently or with the civilian administration's concurrence?
n
Why did all the mutual-consultation and confidence-building measures agreed by the two states fail to avoid conflict? And what determined the timing of the Indian air strikes?
If the Pakistani army was involved, a that would cast doubts both over the
P viability of limited "good faith" agree-
2 ments such as those reached at Lahore and the ability of the Nawaz Sharif government to prevail over the army
E which is considered all-powerful and the
final arbiter of political decisions in Pakistan.
If, on the other hand, the Indian claim is false, then that would put a questionmark over the transparency that "democratic India" professes. Such transparency has always been low in Kashmir where the public has limited access to information and cannot verify official claims.
The Lahore accords are not really about serious arms restraint and control. They are a declaration of good intentions to improve relations and introduce a limited form of transparency.