* Brazil Democrati popular go The vicious electoral campaign in 1998 polarised Rio Grande's population into two opposinc locks. But the right winc parties are divided and confused after losing control of "their" state. This gives a certain breathing space to the new institutions. Mark Johnson After the most polarised electoral campaign in Brazilian history, 51% of votors in Brazil's southernmost state elected Olivio Dutra as governor at the end of last year. 18 International Viewpoint #312 June 1999
7.ORÇAMENTO PARTICIPATIVO VOCÊ É QUEM FAZ UMA CIDADE DE VERDADE : and vernment
When he entered the presidential palace, he found the administration in ruins. Despite a huge privatisation programme, public debt had tripled under the previous conservative state government And a string of dubious contracts had transferred resources and power to a clique of construction, manufacturing and agricultural companies.
The new Popular Front administration faced terrible obstacles, even before the financial crisis which halved the value of the Brazilian real and pushed many of Brazil's states to the edge of bankruptcy.
The opposition parties seized this opportunity to accuse the Workers Party (PT) of making rash promises, which it was now unable to fulfil. "It's time to start governing!" screams the graffiti.
According to Luis Felipe Nelsis of the vice-governor's office, this criticism is unreasonable. "The right want us to do in three months what they didn't do in 45 months in power!"
"Our main electoral promises were to prioritise health, education, and to house landless peasants. We have started our programme, and are more or less on target in all areas.
Like all of Brazil's state governments, Rio Grande do Sul is short of money. According to Nelsis, the solution partially lies in better tax collection. "Tax evasion is chronic, and there are a mass of tax exceptions introduced by the previous administration. None of the major companies in RS pay any tax at all!" These exceptions are now being reviewed.
In his election campaign. Olivio it s tie
Dutra promised that he would only respect contracts which were "juridically th perfect and socially just." The new admi-
Lil nistration has identified a number of po loopholes in the tax exemptions that de
Nelsis expects will lead to the abolition
COI of "a considerable number" of excepdea tions.
The Dutra administration is also sta examining each inherited tax break and pro investment incentive in terms of its socia
Th impact. The PT municipal government in pro the state capital, Porto Allegre, recently approved an application to build Latin
America's largest hypermarket in the mil town, but only after investors rehoused au!
job homeless squatters who had occupied and built a shantytown on the site.
der
In March, Dutra suspended the get investment incentives which his predefis
25 cessor had promised General Motors and
Ford, who planned to build large car the assembly plants in the state.
pro
In
The resources will be used for health and education, the government's main priorities. The reallocated R$466m.
Ac
(US$300m.) represents 31,000 new ex
GI houses, 36,000 classrooms, or 5,200 basic health centres. It would also pay for go the rehousing of 11,650 peasant families pu on small plots of land, (the government thi plans to rehouse 10,000 this year, and
100,000 by the end of Dutra's four-year tir mandate.
M
Mainstream politicians have a strong base of support in business circles and the media. But the PT in Rio Grande do es
Sul only has its electoral base and the trade unions. This support could ste evaporate if the Dutra administration ta fails to overcome the obstacles ahead, or
.E fails to maintain a high level of popular to mobilisation in support of its programme.
га
So far, however, the government
VE team is full of confidence. According to tri
PT Organisational Secretary Ignacio ha
Fritzen, the government's suspension of pc investment incentives for GM and Ford was "extremely positive. It was a specific promise in our electoral programme, and
t cot bend dt ht t pod it shows, beyond a doubt, what the priorities of this government are, compared to those of the previous administration. Like the election campaign, it has again polarised the state. Two models of development, of modernisation, are again confronted."
The problem with the GM and Ford deals was not just the enormous cost of state subsidies (R$4.7bn. in infrastructure projects, and R$5bn. in tax exemptions). The reality is that investment in auto production generates fewer jobs than in most other areas of the local economy.
According to the state finance ministry, each R$1m. of new demand for auto products generates 139 full time jobs. By using the same sum to stimulate demand in other sectors, the state could generate 298 jobs in the agriculture and fishing sectors, 273 in the clothing sector, 253 jobs in the livestock sector, 247 in the coffee industry or 241 in the milk production sector. (BNDES/FEE, cited in Informe Direto March 1999)
The main issue is one of priorities. According to a government statement exposing the secret deal with Ford and GM, "over four years, the previous government invested only R$20m. in the public health system. The amount that the state would have to pay to Ford and General Motors this year alone is 20 times higher!" Mobilisation
"Many foreign commentators underestimate the level of popular support for this government." says Nelson. "At every step of the election campaign, and since taking power, the population has been informed and consulted. The Participatory Budget [a system of direct democracy at the municipal level] gives us a very solid base. So, while it is obviously true that our support could decline, we have some time to build new elements of popular mobilisation."
According to Ignacio Fritzen, "The PT's fundamental role is to ensure that the government's project advances. This means mobilising considerable social forces in support of out electoral demands. It will take considerable effort and time to implement our reforms. We need to explain, educate and mobilise.
"Every government measure that opposes 'them up there' will cause conflict, media attacks, and confusion. So we need a constant dialogue with the population. The PT needs to be on every street corner, putting the argument for our alternative.
"The party must organise so as to ensure that the government governs for the people. That hasn't been the case in other states where the PT has won power. It was a major mistake there. We will do differently."
According to the Party's Communications Secretary Lúcio Costa, this means "doing the opposite of what the Chilean left did under Allende in the early 70s. Back then, the Communist Party in particular tried to limit popular mobilisation, 'to let the government get on with its job."
"The challenge facing us is the exact opposite. We need to mobilise the population around the participative budget, and build the participative budget process across the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This means organising, in each town, a coalition of the left parties, the trade unions, the churches and the resident's associations. In the rural interior of the state, where the party is weakest, this represents a major financial, organisational and political challenge.
"It is this popular participation which gives us the capacity to intensify the conflict with the central government. Otherwise, we will be defeated." Division of labour
Brazil's political system gives the state president considerable powers, but the right's majority in the State Assembly places considerable limits on the Popular Front's power. There are some possibilities of negotiation with dissident factions within the bourgeois block, but the main strategy for ensuring governability will be articulating the social movements to put pressure on the state parliament.
Local PT leaders inside and outside the government stress that it is the PT and the other left parties which must mobilise the social movements to maintain support for the government. The government itself will concentrating on the implementation of its programme, and building links to other forces that oppose the federal government.
This division of labour reflects the PT's conception of the role of the party, the trade unions, and government. According to Nelson, "Just as a left party should not control the trade unions, but should encourage the self-organisation and autonomy of the social movements, a left party in power must distinguish between the role of the party and the role of the government.
"The government must divide resources between different social groups, and intermediate between them. How can a party control that process? The PT here is at the head of the government, the trade unions and the social movements. We have to maintain clarity and separation between the roles of all three." Clean government
In a country where corruption and clientelism are central to the political process, the PT in Rio Grande do Sul is determined to run a 'clean hands' government. "The previous administration created huge numbers of jobs for its supporters, used government contracts to reward its supporters, and used the state machinery to mobilise its supporters in their unsuccessful bid to retain power. We have to govern differently," explains Nelson.
That doesn't just mean cutting the Government's refreshments bill from R$30,000 to R$3,000 reals/month by making civil servants buy their own coffee. Nor is it confined to gestures like
International Viewpoint #312 June 1999 19