* Kosovo Finland More of the same There were few surprises in The Socialist League presented the March parliamentary four candidates as independents on the CP list. They gained about. 500 election. Juhani Lohikoski votes, which the SL considers reports. "satisfactory" for its first electoral campaign. The Social democrats are still the One reason for the poor results of largest party, though down 5% to the left was the low turnout-68%, 23% of the vote. The conservative the lowest since the 1930s. Since Coalition party got one of the best the Left League maintained its results of its history by gaining 21% score, it seems that protest voters of the vote, and winning several either stayed home or voted for new seats in the capital, Helsinki. those Left League candidates who The opposition Centre party inc- have criticised the government. reased its share of the vote by 2.6% Muutos 99 and the CP were not to 22,4%, failing to capitalise on its seen as a serious alternative opposition role and overtake the The CP's campaign tactics were Social Democrats. not the best. Instead of presenting
Voters failed to punish the Left the profile of a socialist alternative, league and the Greens for their un- the party represented itself as a principled participation in the Social normal smaller oppositional party. Democratic government. The Left The neoliberal Young Finns lost League received 11% of the vote, both their seats in parliament, down only 0.3%. Half their new despite spending at least 1m Finnish MPs are former "left" communists Marks on their campaign. Money and other opponents of the can't buy everything League's moderate line (like MEP There were 20 candidates from an Seppanen). Voters failed to reelect immigrant background, represenLL minister Terttu Huttu-Juntunen. ting all the parties. Despite a good Expect growing tension as the LL reception among young people, comes to terms with its results. none were elected.
The Green share of the vote was As we go to press, all the parties 7.3%, up 0.8%. Cabinet member want to form a government. The Pekka Haavisto was not returned to Social Democrats and the Conservaparliament. tives are close to agreement, but
The alternative left block Muutos some Conservative leaders want a 99 (Change) got less than 1% of the coalition with the Centre Party. The vote, and no seats. Most of these leadership of the Left League wants votes went to the Communist Party, to continue their participation in (0.8%, or 20,519 votes). Party government. But the left of the leaders had expected several times organisation is not happy about more support, and up to six seats in this. * parliament. * The author is the chairman of the Socialist League 10 International Viewpoint #311 May 1999
W
US policy, and were particularly annoyed by Secretary of State Albright's "sabre-
C( rattling" (Kevin Cullen, Boston Globe,
W
Feb.22).
SU
Today, the more closely one approa-
SU ches the conflicted region, the greater the opposition to Washington's insistence on force, even within NATO (Greece and th
Italy). France had called for a UN ti
Security Council resolution to authorise deployment of NATO peacekeepers. The
US flatly refused, insisting on "its stand ге that NATO should be able to act di independently of the United Nations,"
fo
State Department officials explained. The
US refused to permit the "neuralgic word
"authorise"" to appear in the final NATO statement, unwilling to concede any ur authority to the UN Charter and of international law; only the word re
"endorse" was permitted (Jane Perlez, vi
NYT, Feb. 11).
ac
Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a ag brazen expression of contempt for the
UN, even the specific timing, and was so lin understood. And of course the same is true of the destruction of half the ar pharmaceutical production of Sudan, a ob small African country.
on
It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of the rules of po world order is irrelevant, just as it had be lost its meaning by the late 1930s. The
(F contempt of the world's leading power th for the framework of world order has ex become so extreme that there is nothing no left to discuss.
A review of the internal documentary do record demonstrates that the stance traces back to the earliest days, even to the first tru memorandum of the newly-formed
Hi
National Security Council in 1947.
ha
During the Kennedy years, the stance adl began to gain overt expression.
do
The main innovation of the Reaganca years is that defiance of
Clinton ne international law and the Charter has become entirely open. It has also been tio backed with interesting explanations, which would be on the front pages, and jus prominent in the school and university
Wa curriculum, if truth and honesty were
SUC considered significant values. The att highest authorities explained with brutal
CO clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become irrelevant thi because they no longer follow US orders,
Un as they did in the early postwar years.
гер
One might then adopt the official position. That would be an honest stand, int at least if it were accompanied by refusal it to play the cynical game of self-righteous vOi posturing and wielding of the despised
Bu principles of international law as a highly sta selective weapon against shifting the enemies.
of
While the Reaganites broke new of ground, under Clinton the defiance of me world order has become so extreme as to eff be of concern even to hawkish policy a S analysts. In the current issue of the tha leading establishment journal, Foreign pro
Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that de
Washington is treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the world-probably most of the world, he suggests—the US is "becoming the rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest external threat to their societies.
Realist "international relations theory," he argues, predicts that coalitions may arise to counterbalance the rogue superpower. On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be reconsidered. Americans who prefer a different image of their society might call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds.
Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It leaves it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as it explicitly recognises, escalates atrocities and violence-"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet another blow against the regime of international order, which does offer the weak at least some limited protection from predatory states.
As for the longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible observation is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every ethnic killing in Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace" (Financial Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes are extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice.
A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end
The right of humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more frequently invoked in coming years-maybe with justification, maybe not-now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly respected commentators-not to speak of the World Court, which explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the United States, its essentials not even reported.
In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and international law it would be hard to find more respected voices than Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that "Particular states or groups of states that set themselves up as the authoritative judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others, are in fact a menace to international order, and thus to effective action in this field." Henkin, in a standard work on world order, writes that the "pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force are deplorable, and the arguments to legitimise the use of force in those circumstances are unpersuasive and dangerous...