293116VD EL MUNDO FEE Colombia 1913 More peace, more war Both of Colombia's main rebel groups have opened negotiations with the government. But 60% of the population expects the armed conflict to continue. Ernesto Herrera introduces this report on Latin America's strongest guerillas, and their peace plans.
exercise a real counter-power to the state.
Each group is negotiating separately with the government. The ELN started in July 1998, the FARC began its discussions with President Pastrama in January of this year. Both groups refused to negotiate in secret, and invited a range of social and church groups to participate in their talks with the government.
The talks are extraordinarily complicated. Among other things, the FARC met with US representatives and agreed that, when the appropriate moment comes, it will participate in efforts to eradicate "illegal" coca production and drug smuggling.
Another central question is the disbanding of the paramilitary groups which terrorise much of the country. The guerrillas refuse the paramilitaries' demand of recognition as a political participant in negotiations about the country's future.
Unlike "peace talks" in some other countries, Colombia's guerrillas, particularly the FARC, are dominating the talks, rather than being swept along by stronger forces.
The government is committed to the talks. It has withdrawn its troops from more than 100 municipalities, now entirely controlled by the FARC. If President Pastrama backs down, the public will blame hime for yet another failure to end the 36-year old civil war.
More than 20,000 people died, and over one million were "displaced" between 1985 and 1997, in this country's 36 year-old civil war. Human rights groups generally blame the guerrillas for 3,000 of the deaths. The rest were the work of the army and the country's numerous paramilitary groups.
The Pastrama government, and significant sectors of the capitalist class have decided to accelerate the negotiations with the guerrillas, recognising the high cost of the war. The government estimates that the war cost US$3.7bn. in 1997, and at least $8bn in 1998 (Colombia's gross domestic product was about $94bn. in 1997, but fell at least 3% in 1998 because of the conflict.) The nationalised oil company Ecopetrol lost at least $100m. last year, as the result of attacks by the ELN, the smaller of the two rebel groups. 6 International Viewpoint #309 March 1999
For years we have been told that the guerrillas were linked to the drugs trade, and degenerating into a red mafia.
In fact, well organised rebel groups have continued to expand their activities. The FARC and ELN were active in 173 municipalities in 1985, 473 in 1991, 622 in 1995, and 622 when negotiations began in 1998. The guerrillas are now present over 60-70% of the country.
Quite simply, there are two Colombias. One controlled by the government troops, the multinationals, the druglords and the paramil itaries, and the other in the hands of the guerrillas.
The FARC control 42,000 km', with 12,000 fighters organised on 62 fronts. The ELN operates in 19 of Colombia's 32 departments, with 5,000 fighters organised on 35 fronts. In their zones, the guerrillas
Paramilitaries
Progress in the peace talks has alarmed the thugs, profiteers and Tundamentalists who control the fundamentalists who control the country's myriad paramilitary groups. They are demanding a place at the negotiating table, and intensifying their violence at the same time.
Their main leader, Carlos Castaño, openly says that the war will be won in the field, and that his offensive is aimed at the social base of the FARC among the peasants. Attacks like the recent massacre of 150 civilians in Antioquia are designed to convince the USA to convince Pastrama to admit the paramilitaries to the talks.
The paramilitaries are active over about four million hectares, including some 400 municipalities. These are the zones dominated by the country's major landholders, and the heavily armed drug-smuggling gangs.
The paramilitaries receive financial support, recruitment help and intelligence from the armed forces. Soldiers and policemen are seconded to work with them on a regular basis.
Paramilitary groups also control much of the private security industry, which has developed thanks to the increasingly violent conflicts between the main cattleranchers, landholders and druglords.
The paramilitaries carry out the "dirty work" which the army cannot do directly, because of pressure from human rights groups or their minimal respect for legality. The goal of the paramilitaries is clear: eliminate the guerrillas by destroying their social base among the peasants. Nothing is resolved
While the talks intensify, so does the war. President Pastrama faces trouble on three sides. Civil society demands the pacification of the continent's most violent country. Part of the army thinks that, with a little more time and money, they can exhaust and destroy the guerrillas. And the FARC and ELN are strong enough to deny Pastrama the power to make decisions that will hold.
The negotiations between FARC and Pastrama open a window towards the end of this cruel, long war. But no-one can guarantee that.
The writer Arturo Alape says Colombia is a country "which counts, among its many qualities and characteristics, a particular talent to cause deaths in all imaginable ways." * Source: Rouge, 21 January 1999