A
Survey of the Rise of the Central American RevolutionmA very powerful pressure for uniting the masses, and Mexico as well, are big customers of
By Sergio Rodriguez
MEXICO CITY--A key element in the growing confrontation between U.S. imperialism and the workers and poor masses of Central America is the Nicaraguan state, the only one on the isthmus in the hands of revolutionary and anti-imperial-
The future of Nicaragua is linked in an immediate way to the struggles that are now advancing rapidly in El Salvador and Guatemala and to the growth of a revolutionary movement in Honduras.
In particular, this is because Nicaraguan society itself still reflects the struggle between old capitalist economic forms inseparable from imperialism and the rising aspiration of the workers and poor masses to liberate themselves and reorganize the economy in accordance with their own in-
The pressures of the imperialist assault and the growing mass struggles in the area are pushing the Sandinista leadership to settle accounts with the local capitalists and take up the problems of building a collectivized economy faster than they intended. At the same time, this is complicated by the instinctive desire and need to unite the entire Nicaraguan people as firmly as possible against foreign military threats from the U.S. imperialists and their allies.
In the recent period, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie has maintained some margin for maneuver. Some 80% of the land is still in the hands of the bourgeoisie. The bosses control 55% of industry. The ranchers have been clandestinely moving their livestock to Honduras and Costa Rica. The economy has also been hit by the typical problems of a colonial economy, falling prices for its major cash crop--coffee.
Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan economy achieved a growth rate of 11% in 1980, and price increases were kept to 35.5%, considerably lower than the 60.1% in 1979, and not grossly out of line with the rate of inflation in supposedly stable Latin American countries, such as Mexico.
In 1981, as the pressures in the region increased, capitalist economic sabotage was
•There was a marked increase in capital flight and in the growth of a black market. The capitalists also sharply reduced the utilization of productive capacity.
The Sandinista government has carried out a series of very important measures that have helped it to maintain the mobilization of the masses on a very high level. It increased the real wages of the poorest strata of workers, and began to implement a policy of reducing wage differentials. It has also undertaken a massive program of building and renovating hospitals and schools and creating green zones. And this has had a major effect in cutting unemployment.
At the same time, the attempt by the
| Sandinista government to meet the needs of the workers and the poor masses without directly attacking the basic capitalist economic structures is creating more and more difficult contradictions. This is particularly true in the agricultural economy.
Most of the state farms are doing badly. They continue to be overshadowed by the private sector of agriculture. ganization the Sandinistas have created to mobilize the rural masses, the Asociacion de Trabajadores del Campo (ATC--Association of Rural Workers) has remained largely confined to the state farms.
The weakness of the ATC in the private sector is largely a reflection of the contradiction in the Sandinista policy. On the one hand, they call for increasing producfion and productivity, and on the other they are trying to organize agricultural
But it is obvious that a large part of these agricultural workers are dissatisfied with the conditions prevailing on the big ranches and plantations. And the Sandinistas call on them not to strike. So, many of these workers see no point in joining the ATC, since it is regarded as an appendage of the Sandinista government.
In industry, there are also problems. Four separate union confederations exist, one led by Christian Democrats, one by the Stalinists, and the third by the Sandinistas, as well as a company-union confederation.
Given the sudden development of the insurrection that brought the Sandinistas to power, they took control of the state without an already strong and well-organized base in the workers movement. In this respect, the history of the revolution in Nicaragua is quite different from that in
Since the seizure of power, the Sandinistas have been trying to make up for this weakness. The Sandinista Workers Federation is clearly the strongest of the four labor organizations. But the Sandinista leadership has not presented a policy for unifying the workers movement. This leaves an opening fr divisive maneuvers.
The declaration of an economic emergency on September 9, 1981, severely limited the right to strike. At the same time, an appeal was launched for increasing productivity. In these conditions, the non-Sandinista unions pushed immediate economic demands that have strong support among the workers. Therefore, while the Sandinista federation talks about increasing productivity, the others claim to be defending the right to strike. The dangers of this situation are obvious.
On the other hand, the imperialist threats, after the long experience of the U.S.-backed Somoza government, are a
Moreover, the Soviet Union has finally decided to extend financial aid to Nicaragua. A series of loans have been decided on, and the Soviet Union is studying projects for long-term economic agreements.
With the increasing attacks by former Somozaite bands from across the Honduran border and the training of counterrevolutionists both in Honduras and Florida, and the mounting imperialist threats and economic attacks, the Nicaraguan leadership will have to move more and more rapidly and decisively to establish the second workers state in the Americas.
EL SALVADOR
The revolution in El Salvador has quickly become a clearer class confrontation than the insurrection against Somozismo was in Nicaragua. It is already far bloodier, and has involved a longer-term and more elaborately organized mobilization of
Since 1980, there have been more than 28,000 deaths in El Salvador. But the Salvadoran people and their vanguard have not been deterred even by that level of slaughter. By the end of last year, the masses began to resume their advance, which was only temporarily halted by the partial defeat of the January 198l guerrilla offensive and general strike.
Between 1960 and 1978, El Salvador, the smallest country geographically in Central America, had an annual growth rate of 5.55%. After that, the economy went into a nose dive. Toward the end of 1981, the big businessmen presented an ultimatum to President Napoleon Duarte. Either he restored "order, " or "private enterprise" was packing its bags.
In the period preceding the rise of the revolution and the economic crisis, economic dependence on the U.S. increased markedly. From 1970 to 1978, the medium- and long-term loans rose tenfold (for Guatemala and Nicaragua, the increase was threefold).
Private U.S. investment reached the level of 145 million dollars. Between 1953 and 1979, U.S. government aid increased by 218 million dollars. In 1961, U.S. military aid amounted to only 100,000 dollars. In 1979, it was already 16.8 million dollars. In addition to this, aid increased enormously from international financial bodies basically controlled by U.S. imperialism. Between 1953 and 1968, such institutions lent 24.7 million dollars to El Salvador. From 1970 to 1979, they lent 397.1 million dollars.
The Salvadoran government channelled a large part of this aid to military purchases. Most of the Central American countries,
the Israeli arms merchants. In the case of El Salvador, form 1974 to 1978, the government purchased 25 Arave Stol "transport" planes, which were in fact used primarily for "anti-insurgent" operations, It also bought two hundred Uzi submachine guns, two hundred 88mm missile launchers, 18 reconstructed Dassault fighter-bombers, six IAL Fouga fighter training planes, and
After the victory of the Sandinista revolution and the beginning of the Salvadoran revolution, the U.S. government stepped up military loans to the Salvadoran government. In January 1980, it sent 205,45l dollars in crowd-control equipment and made a grant of 300,000 dollars for military training in El Salvador.
In April 1980, 5.7 million dollars in military aid was given, and then a subsequent 5,5 million. In March 1981, the U.S. announced a loan of unprecedented size for El Salvador, 25 million dollars for military uses. By the end of the year, military aid amounted to 35.4 million dollars.
At the start of 1982, military aid of 66 million dollars was projected, and now the actual amounts have begun to mushroom.
But this huge escalation of spending for a tiny country has been unable to stem the revolutionary upsurge. That testifies to its power and the profound contradictions that gave rise to it. On the other hand, the progress of the revolution has not been a straight-line development. Its setbacks as well as its resumed advance offer important
Unlike in Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas remained a small nucleus until the very eve of the seizure of power, the Salvadoran revolutionary groups gained a major organizational base in the mass movement early on.
In 1980, it is estimated that the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR--People's Revolutionary Bloc) had more than a hundred thousand members. At the same time, the Frente de Accion Popular Unificado (FAPU-Unified People's Action Front) is supposed to have had seventy thousand members, and the Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (February 28 People's Leagues), 50,000. The MLP and the Communist Party had ten thousand each.
What these figures reflected was the undeniable reality that the revolutionary organizations had the support of the overwhelming majority of the working class, the majority of the peasants, the majority of the unemployed and underemployed, and almost all the students--that is, most of the population. It was this strength that enabled the general secretaries of the mass organizations to walk the streets of San Salvador in the midst of a revolutionary
Following the assassination of Archbishop Romero, it became clear that an all-out confrontation between the masses and the government was developing. The revolutionists prepared for their first insurrection in August 1980. This period represented the peak of the revolutionary organizations' capacity for mass mobilization. For that reason, they sought to initiate the insurrection based on a general
Days before this action was to begin, the FAPU announced that it would not par-
This broke the unity of the workers movement and greatly limited the possibilities for success, since at that time FAPU dominated FENASTRAS, the country's largest union confederation.
Despite FAPU's decision, the other revolutionary organizations decided to go ahead with the strike. It proved to be about 70% effective, and it led to an advance in the formation of united-front committees in the poor neighborhoods and rural zones. despite the failure of the FAPU to participate, the strike was a limited success.
However, several days after the end of the general strike, the FAPU called a general strike of its own, using its weight inside FENASTRAS and drawing in the most powerful single union in the country, the electrical workers organization (STECEL).
This action led to the jailing of the whole class-struggle leadership of STECEL and a military takeover of the unions. The whole workers vanguard in the unions disappeared. Many were imprisoned or killed. Others joined the guerrillas. The focus of the confrontation shifted from the cities to
The division in the movement was subsequently overcome, when the FAPU came back into the Coordinadoras Revolucionarias de Masas (CRMs--Mass Revolutionary Coordinating Committees), which had been the original united-front structures. But a heavy price was paid for the split.
What led the FAPU to break working class unity was the belief that it could achieve an agreement with an important section of the Salvadoran military, the lieved that it had sufficient strength to dominate the process and make the other revolutionary organizations follow along
It was the very strength of the revolutionary organizations that kept them from understanding the importance of unity. In the Nicaraguan revolution, the rise of the Comites de Defensa Civil (Civil Defense Committees) opened the way for a process of self-organization of the mass movement. That is what led to unity in action. In the case of El Salvador, each organization promoted its own current within the mass movement. The different revolutionary groups fought for control of the union executive
This experience in El Salvador showed once again that it is not enough simply to mobilize the workers; it is necessary to build united-front organizations to give consistency and form to the mobilizations. In the first phase in El Salvador, the process of mass self-organization did not move forward; therefore, the masses were not prepared for a decisive confrontation with the reactionaries.
The relative failure of the January 1981 strike is explained by the events of August
1980. Because after the latter date, the revolutionary mass organizations are out of the picture. After that time, people stop talking about the FAPU and start talking about the National Resistance. The BPR is replaced by the Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion (FPL--People's Liberation Forces), the Ligas Populares give way to the Ejercito Revolutionary Army), and (ERP--People's Revolutionary Army), and the MLP to the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Centroamerica (PRT-C--Revolutionary Workers Party of Central America).
The revolutionary organizations lost their connections with the workers, who had been the vanguard of the process. almost abandoned their activity in San
Then, when the FAPU returned to the CRMS, a correct balance sheet was drawn up about the past experience. The conclusion was that it was necessary to make a new step toward uniting the movement. The result of this was the formation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which came to take the place of
Nonetheless, it was not possible in certain sectors to rapidly regain the influence that had been lost, especially in San Salvador. This was clearly demonstrated in the general strike and attempted insurrection.
In San Salvador, the general strike had almost negligible effect. In the interior cities and above all in the countryside, far greater success was achieved.
A new stage in the revolutionary process opened with the January 1981 confrontations. It was clear that in the revolutionary organizations there would be a deepgoing reassessment of the policies and methods employed up until now.
A process of political recovery began. On the one hand, the Salvadoran army proved incapable of liquidating the revolutionary army. On the other, the revolutionists began to renew their contact with the workers and people of San Salvador. They began to improve their methods of work in the mass movement and to understand the importance of united-front or-
Finally, the revolutionists have won the battle for world public opinion launched by the imperialists with their preparation of phony elections. In this respect, the Salvadoran revolutionists' proposal for dialogue was absolutely correct.
The conditions the FMLN put forward for dialogue cannot possibly be accepted by the government and the imperialists. They were for release of the political prisoners, lifting the state of siege, and ending military control of the trade unions. But all this seems reasonable enough to a considerable part of world public opinion. That is what made it possible to get a U.N. vote against recognizing the elections, when these conditions were not met.
The revolutionary mass movement has begun advancing rapidly in Salvador, but the ultimate outcome still depends very much on the development in the region as
a whole. In this respect, the advances in Guatemala are quite important.
### GUATEMALA
The tradition of guerrilla struggle is already very long in Guatemala. It goes back for decades.
Of all the Central American countries, Guatemala has experienced the most rapid process of industrialization, although this has not led to the integration of the large Indian population into the growing economy. This country is also one of those that most benefited from the rise of the Central American Common Market, because it entered it with a much higher level of productivity than the average.
From 1960 to 1978, Guatemala maintained an annual growth rate of 5.8%. This was largely due to the level of U.S. investment. Of all the Central American countries, Guatemala has the highest total of U.S. investment--260 million dollars.
The Guatemalan revolution faced initial obstacles greater even than those in El Salvador. Since the Cuban revolution, the Guatemalan army has been well prepared for internal repression. It is also the strongest army in the region. The growth of state terror has reached incre-
In the last two years, more than 30,000 Guatemalans have been murdered by the police, the army, or right-wing bands. The vast majority of those slaughtered have been Kekchi Mayan Indians.
Systematic assassination as a form of counterinsurgency was introduced by the government of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro that took office in 1966. Nineteen murder organizations were set up throughout the country. Then in March 1968, after the West German ambassador Karl Von Preti died in a FAR guerrilla action, the nineteen groups were replaced by a single one, called An Eye for An Eye (Ojo por Ojo), which escalated the murder campaign to new levels.
In 1970, the Arana Osorio government declared a state of siege, and there was a new escalation of the terror. It was primarily directed against the urban guerrillas but also against student and trade-union leaders. Thousands of people were killed, and there were more than 4,000 arrests.
Then under the Laugerud government which took office in 1974, the anti-Communist terrorist organization, Mano, reappeared. In a public communique it boasted of more than 30,000 secret graves of Indians.
Under the government of General Lucas Garcia which came into office in 1978, the Ejercito Secreto Anticommunista began to operate again, publishing a list of people it intended to kill. It then proceeded to assassinate student, trade-union, and peasant leaders, as well as members of political parties. The General Secretary of the Guatemalan CP was murdered.
Of those murdered by rightists between 1966 and 1976, 65% were rural workers and peasants, 7% were students; 43% owned no property, and 34% had only a single-family 4 dwelling; 67% had a monthly income of 50 quetzals or less and 17% from 50 to 100 quetzals (the quetzal is at parity with the U.S. dollar). Thus, the class character of the terror is obvious.
Few peoples have had to live with such a massive terror. But the Guatemalans have shown the capacity to beat it. This is demonstrated by the increasing weight of the guerrillas. Having maintained their activity for several years, the guerrilla groups have been able to win an important social base both in the countryside and in the cities.
The Indians are a key force in Guatemala, and the revolutionary movement has gained great strength precisely in this section of the population. For example, the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP-Guerrilla Army of the Poor), the strongest of the guerrilla organizations, and the one with the longest tradition, has its base of operations in Indian areas--Quiche, Huehuetenango, and San Marcos.
The Organization del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA-- Organization of the People in Arms) has its base in Solola, Chilaltenango, and Quetzaltenango. And the FAR has the bulk of its forces in the Peten region.
The mass movement experienced a new rise beginning with the strike against Coca Cola, which led to the development of the Coordinadora Nacional de Solidaridad (the National Solidarity Coordinating Committee). This is a united-front organization bringing together more than 150 organizations, trade unions, peasant and student organizations, political parties, women's
However, the development of mass movements and coordination among them is just
The Guatemalan revolution puts much more immediate pressure on the Mexican government than the others in the region. It is clear that both the Mexican government and army are getting very nervous. Toward the end of 1981, the Mexican government extradited 5,000 Guatemalan peasants, turning them over to the Guatemalan army. It follows a very tough policy of persecuting Guatemalan revolutionists who live in exile in Mexico. And it is obvious that there is very strong cross-border cooperation, of the type that cost the revolutionary leader Yon Sosa his life
The biggest problem area for the revolution in the region is Honduras. The revolutionary process here is in no way comparable to what is happening in the surrounding countries. And the U.S. imperialists have special plans to convert Honduras into a counterrevolutionary fortress for the entire region.
For example, the imperialists completely rearmed the Honduran army after the Sandinista victory. That was because the weapons left behind by Somoza's National Guard made the Sandinista army better armed than the Honduran.
Honduras has had the lowest growth rate in Central America. Between 1960 and 1978, its gross domestic product grew by an average of 4.2%, then showed an overall decline of 1% in 1979.
Moreover, Honduras is the only Central American country where agriculture represents more than 30% of the gross national product. What is more, the growth of agricultural productivity between 1970 and 1978 was only 0.8%.
Of all the Central American countries, Honduras has the greatest percentage of the labor force in the countryside, 64%. It has the fewest tractors, 1,3l6. It exports 90% of the raw materials it produces.
Only 14% of the labor force are industrial workers; and they, moreover, suffered a 30% drop in real wages between 1974 and 1978.
However, American investment in Honduras is almost as great as in Guatemala, 250 million dollars. U.S. military aid before the current rise of the struggle in Salvador was 28.4 million dollars, which at the time was exceeded only by the military aid given to Guatemala--
Honduras received the most aid from financial institutions--some 688 million dollars from 1953 to 1978.
Thus, the control of the Honduran economy by U.S. imperialism is almost total.
Now, after nine years of military rule, the authorities are proposing a return to civilian government and in fact to a twoparty system. However, it is clear that the present Liberal government of Siles is
The imperialists' plans involve making Honduras an example of political stability, and to accomplish that they have to create a facade of parliamentary rule. To this end, the imperialists are following a two-sided tactic. On the one hand, they are making a series of loans, in an attempt to reverse the decline in the Honduran GNP. On the other, they are building up a stronger army for repression at home and intervention elsewhere in the region.
The revolutionary organizations in Honduras are weaker than those elsewhere in the region. There are three important left parties. There is the Partido Socialista Hondureno (Honduran Socialist Party, the Honduran branch of the Salvadoran PRT-C). It has been growing very rapidly, and is particularly strong among teachers and public workers.
There is the Communist Party-Marxist Leninist, of Maoist origin, and more or less linked to the Salvadoran PRS. It has strength among students and agricultural workers, especially in the Atlantic region.
The third group is the Honduran Communist Party. It is strong among the agricultural workers but weak among industrial workers.
All three of these parties, along with another smaller group joined in the National Patriotic Front, which gained legal status. But it disappeared when it proved unable to confront the major national tasks.
However, political experience and examples are spreading more and more rapidly I through the region and are richer and richer and increasingly powerful.
The Growth of the Liberated Zones in El Salvador
By Jean-Pierre Beauvais
SAN SALVADOR--Night fell a few minutes ago. The darkness is almost complete, barely touched by dim moonlight and the fluttering flames of two modest candles.
In the "encampment, " the center of organization for life in the zones controlled by the revolutionists, it is the time for "political discussion."
Arturo, the discussion leader, comments on the reports given by the FMLN radio-actions that took place the previous day throughout the country, failure of that offensive that involved more than two thousand government soldiers in the key area around the Guazapa volcano, reactions to Reagan's speech to the Organization of American States in Washington, international solidarity, and so on.
The radio station is decisive. In such a remote place, which can only be reached by following a torturous road and then continuing on foot for several hours, the radio keeps everybody aware every day that they are part of something bigger than an isolated nucleus, that their fight is part of a growing nationwide struggle, that they have the support of a vast movement of international solidarity. The radio station is the symbol of, and an extraordinary means for, consolidating the growing political authority of the FMLN and of its leadership.
Tonight there is to be a discussion of the directives broadcast to the population for March 28, the day scheduled for national elections:
"Evacuate houses close to military bases; these bases will be attacked. Keep away from military patrols; on March 28 they will all be targets. Travel as little as possible; many roads will be mined at strategic points. Assist the actions of the guerrillas by building barricades in the surrounding areas to obstruct the movement of the genocidal armed forces. "
In practice, this concerns very few of the poor peasants who live in this tiny valley. What are elections? None of those at the meeting tonight have ever voted. Maybe their votes were cast for them at the military base in the nearest town, four hours away by foot. But they don't know anything about all that. Besides, for months no army patrol has ventured in here. So, March 28 will be almost just another day.
But it is important that they know what will happen outside, in the cities that some of them have never seen.
PETER GRAHAM,
-MORIA
This is very important. Because, to a large extent, it is how they can begin to understand concretely that there are other forms of mobilizations, other forms of struggle, besides those that they are engaged in, other ways of fighting for the same objective.
This was the meaning of the astonishing discussion that followed in the more-thanhalf darkness. There were questions, inter- re the pain, on rea by long silences.
Tirelessly, Arturo answered and explained. He told stories full of vivid images. They seemed to reflect the experience of someone born here but who had also worked in the city and been active for some time in a trade union. The picture he outlined for these peasants was simply the concrete reality of some of the most classical forms of working-class struggle.
Further on, the discussion became really animated. It had turned to the problems that had come up during the day and some special tasks that had to be carried out tomorrow, day-to-day organizational problems. There were also some petty personal conflicts. This was part of the whole vast--and extremely fruitful--effort to teach people to discuss all such things collectively, after a centuries-long tradition of individualism. That is, the individualism of small peasants, stooped over their own little plots of land, crushed down by the arbitrary authority of the local strongman.
Such night meetings have already become routine in the innumerable guerrilla camps like this one. And these circles of men and women sitting on the ground, as these prople are this evening around Arturo, between a few hammocks and two tiny peasant huts with walls of dried mud, are the best illustration of the reality and the meaning of this struggle of an entire people.
You would need all the ill will, prejudice, and ignorance, and blind self-interest of a Reagan, Haig, and other such criminals to see in this "the hand of a foreign power.
It is not Cubans, Nicaraguans, or Russians that inspire the hopes that flash in otherwise timid eyes--eyes that contrast with the marks left forever on these people's faces by years of hunger, sickness, and resignation. The simple language spoken here reflects a conviction born out of a daily expereince of superexploitation-a conviction that the old society cannot be endured any longer, a conviction that there
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