Early retirem In the German workers' movement, shortening labour time has usually been argued on the basis of social concerns -health and working conditionsrather than on the basis of the need to fight unemployment, and impose a different economic logic in society. Angela Klein In the post-war years, Germany suffered high unemployment, exacerbated by the influx of German-speakers from Eastern Europe and the demobilisation of the armed forces. But this was absorbed by the economy, thanks to sustained, high economic growth.
Only in 1960 was it decided to gradually reduce the work week from the 48 hours stipulated in the 1938 Order on Labour Time. This Nazi-era legislation also allowed employers to impose a 60- hour week for up to two months every year.
By this time, there was a labour shortage. Official unemployment was 'only' 235,000, and 200,000 foreign workers had been recruited in the 1950s. During the 1950s and 1960s, GDP (the value of goods and services produced every year) increased by 6-7% annually. Until the early 1970s, output increased faster than productivity A position of strength
This meant trade unions were in a position of strength in their negotiations over the introduction of the 40-hour week. The DGB trade union confederation had been calling for a 40-hour week since 1955 (when unemployment was 761,000), but was unable to reach an agreement with the employers' confederation until 1960. No-one tried to link the demand for a 40hour week with the need to create new jobs. Only in 1978, looking back, was it pointed out that, if the 40-hour week had been introduced in 1970, 4.0 million workers would be employed in the metalworking industry, instead of 3.5 million.
Reducing the work week had only created 500,000 jobs. Annual working time fell from 2,084 hours in 1960 to 1,714 in 1979.
The 40-hour week, with eight-hour shifts and free Saturdays, was introduced in the metalworking industry in 1968. By 1974, almost all wage earners had won the right to a 40-hour week, and one month annual holiday, of which the employer paid 23 days.
The call for a 35-hour week arose in the mid-70s, as a response to the interna-
ent for Helmut Kohl!
tional crisis. It was first discussed in those companies where management's strategy (job cuts and 'rationalisation' was most transparent. In March 1977, an assembly at the Opel auto plant in Rüsselsheim voted unanimously to calling on delegates to the IG Metall trade union congress to struggle for the seven-hour, five day week: "35 hours without loss of pay!"
Opel workers had seen their ranks cut from 36,000 in 1973 to 28,000 in 1975. Their demand for a reduced work week was motivated by solidarity with their unemployed colleagues, and the need to protect the remaining jobs. This was a new argument in the trade union world. A radical movement
By autumn 1997, 25 sections of the IG Metall union, representing 662,000 members, had submitted the same motion. Seven larger sections (representing 308,000 members) had called for a 32 or even 30-hour week. At the end of August that year, the union leadership openly opposed all calls for a reduction in the working week to 35 hours or less. This did not prevent the IG Metall union congress from voting in favour of the demand (275 for, 261 against, four abstentions). The following year, the entire DGB federation called for the 35- hour week, against the advice of the Motions Committee, and in the face of opposition from leaders of a number of trade unions.
The left in the union had been able to win support for a strategy that had the potential to become a realistic strategy for the whole labour movement, in response management's own anti-crisis strategy.
Traditionally, trade union leaders had considered reducing unemployment and job creation to be the government's domain, particularly since the social democrats were in office. The DGB demanded that the government reform the 1938 legislation on the work week, and, above all, reduce the retirement age. The 35-hour week was, for trade union leaders, at most, an advance that could be negotiated for a few specific categories (like those who worked nights, or rotating shifts, or were paid on a piece-work basis.
Only the left in the unions had understood that the reduction in the work week could also be presented as a way of opposing "rationalisation' and job-cuts.
After the 1977 congress, the IG Metall union began debating how to implement the reduction in labour time. If the goal was to humanise working conditions, then the changes could be negotiated and introduced gradually. But if the aim was to save jobs and create new ones, then it would be necessary to implement significant reductions, more quickly.
Victory within sight...
In 1978, the union leadership incorporated the call for a shorter work week into its demands concerning the restructuring underway in the steel industry, which faced a massive reduction in capacity and employment. Shorter working hours were presented as legitimate compensation for the particularly hard working conditions of shift workers in that sector. The union didn't demand the immediate introduction of a 35-hour week, but a vague "first step towards the reduction in weekly working time, with the 35-hour week as a medium term goal."
Only later, when the struggle radicalised, did the trade union adopt the more dynamic slogan "Without the 35-hour week in the steel sector, the extermination of employment in the Ruhr area will become catastrophic."
It was a hard struggle: the employers were determined to block any reduction below the 40-hour week, and extension of holidays beyond six weeks, and any increase in the number of paid breaks during the day. According to management, "the allocation of hours or working days should not be subject to contractual restrictions."
Although these demands were popular, with tens of thousands of trade unionists across the country supporting the six-week strike (the first since 1950) of 40,000 steelworkers, the leadership of the IG