Trade Union leader Kwon Young-ghil won 1.2% of the vote in presidential elections on 18 December. Most progressive voters supported the successful candidate, Kim Dae-jung, who's election Kwon Young-ghil recognised a "very significant" step forward for South Korea's labour and human rights movement.
This is only the third time progressive forces have presented an independent candidate. In 1992, Baik Ghi Wan won 1% of the vote.
Kwon, who led the general strike at the beginning of 1997, was supported by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) of which he is president, and NADUK, a grouping of progressive, intellectual and non-governmental groups.
His campaign centred on the dismantling of the Chaebol, the industrial conglomerates which dominate the South Korean economy. He opposed the IMFled calls for mass dismissals as a result of the country's financial crisis, and proposed a range of concrete alternative policies for workers' and the people's living standard.
Kwon Young-ghil won 6.1% of the vote in WoolSan province, with local high scores of up to 17.0%. But the campaign failed to spread across the country, and in all other provinces he polled 0.2-1.7%. His national score of 1.2% represents just over 306,000 votes.
Eighty-one percent of eligible voters participated in the election, with voters polarised between the establishment candidate, and veteran oppositionist Kim Dae-jung, who won by a narrow margin.
A statement from the Kwon Young-ghil campaign praised Kim Dae-jung as "not only a leader of anti-dictatorship and democratisation movement, but also a comrade of distinguished men out of 28 International Viewpoint #296 office, so his election is a significant event."
Pointing to the disastrous economic situation, widespread corruption of politicians, and the "indiscriminate management of the Chaebols... which makes the people suffer from huge unemployment, high prices and other difficulties, the Kwon Young-ghil campaign urged the new president to respect "the desire for a change in regime among those who voted for him. The change of regime should be real and complete... We have already experienced a so-called 'civil regime' which turned out to be worse than a military dictatorship!
"Therefore, we demand that the new president open his mind to the desperate voices of the people and critical arguments of [his] ex-comrades from progressive groups and civil society movement forces: those who struggled with him in the past, for democratisation.
"The election has considerable progressive aspects compared with past ones which were very based on government authority and money power. However regional antagonism, biased report of the press, unfair TV discussion and regulations which prevent new political forces from emerging are problems which must still be solved.
"We are confident that we did our best in such a difficult condition. We accept the outcome of the presidential election. We will make an endless effort to keep the promise we made with the people during the presidential election. For us, this presidential election has the meaning of a new start. We continue preparing for alternative progressive politics into the 21th century." [JD] * Source: Statement by People's Victory 21 for Democracy and Progress campaign, 19 December 1997 For more information: www.solinet.org/LEE/korea11.html
ispossessed icnnecaccod those deprived of their civic rights following a court conviction, and students and civil servants, forbidden under Turkish law from joining a political party. It also allowed a completely free debate, without the legal straight-jacket that affects public discussion in Turkey.
The resolutions approved at this conference were submitted for debate to the official congress, held in the presence of a government commissioner, the press, and some 10,000 party supporters. The resolutions, and the candidates for the new Central Committee, were formally approved.
This first regular congress confirmed the pluralist character of the ÖDP. All nine currents presented candidates, and all are represented, proportionally, in the 100member Central Committee. Dev-Yol won 43 of the seats. Furthermore, the smaller currents are over-represented in the 24member Political Bureau.
None of the founding currents can now turn back from the ÖDP project. The common identity has impregnated each current, and is reflected in the discourse, style and above all, the practice of the new party. The ODP systematically avoids left jargon, and seeks new, innovative ways to address the masses, rather than just speaking to its own narrow circle of supporters. This is particularly important in the current context, where politicisation touches only a thin layer of working people and youth.
For example, the financial report to the congress carried the slogan "We are the party of love, revolution, and the dispossessed!" In ODP demonstrations, protesters carry brooms, to symbolise the struggle against the Mafia. And the party's alliance policy is characterised by the slogan "the ivy of the people." The rain fills the bucket
In the last municipal elections, the ÖDP won 1.6% of the vote in the five major municipalities where it presented a ticket. Recent opinion polls suggest that the party, which has more than 20,000 members, would win at least 3% if elections were held soon. For the first time since the 1980s coup d'état, the socialist movement is represented by a nonmarginal political force: a reality that must be taken into account in the trade unions, in the mass organisations, and even in the mass media.
The social composition of the ÖDP is fairly representative. Almost all its members are wage-earners, and almost one quarter are factory workers. Many of the others are public sector employees (the layer that leads most social struggles in Turkey). The party also brings together representatives of a range of social movements that do not necessarily consider themselves socialist: feminist groups, ecologists, conscientious objectors, human rights activists, and (very unusually for this part of the world) militants for lesbian and gay rights. The ODP has a certain weight in the trade unions, particularly the public sector confederation KESK. Party leaders hope to double the number of members from 20 to 40,000 in the coming period, and to increase the proportion of young people, women, and manual workers within the membership.
Now that it is present in almost all the country's Prefectures and Sub-Prefectures, the ODP meets the legal requirements to present candidates in parliamentary elections. With 300 local offices, the party is certainly not confined to the main urban centres, even though the effort so far has been to organise the existing milieu, the existing potential, rather than winning over new layers and new forces.
The party faces many of the same difficulties as similar mass left parties in other countries. Unlike the Turkish Workers Party (TIP), which had about 3% electoral support during the 1960s, during a period of mass struggles, the ÖDP must organise against the current, with limited forces, without a mass workers movement. The centre-lett parties have confined themselves to parliamentary manoeuvres. Actions speak louder
In this context of general demobilisation, the success of the ÖDP in transporting 5-10,000 people hundreds of kilometres, to the various protest demonstrations we have organised in far-away provincial towns is particularly impressive.
At the beginning of November, to mark the first anniversary of the "Susurluk" affair (which revealed the links between the Mafia, the far right, the police, and politicians from Tansu Ciller's party), tens of thousands participated in ODP demonstrations in three provincial towns. This reflected ODP militants having been at the head of popular reaction to that scandal since the beginning.
Other mass actions initiated by the ÖDP include the April demonstration of 25,000 in downtown Ankara, and the party's May Day contingents: more than 25,000 in Istanbul, 15,000 in Ankara, and several thousands in a series of provincial demonstrations.
The party also contributed to the collection of a million signatures for the "signature for peace" [in the Kurdish region] campaign. In June, the party gathered 35,000 protesters in Istanbul for a demonstration against the twin dangers of Islamic fundamentalism and military rule. A similar number attended the party's recent rally at Istanbul's Fenerbahçe stadium.
What has been surprising is that these spectacular mobilisations only represent
ÖZGÜRL-ÜK VE
DAYANIŞMA
PARTİSİ
ÖZGÜRLÜKvER the party's ability to mobiliss I Si
SM the party's ability to mobilise closest supporters. While the party' slowly increasing its contacts with the general public, it is far from generating or OVE leading a large, social movement. Stilthe ISMA the political scene, with its own persona lity, and its own way of doing politics.
OZGÜRLÜK VE
New period: new problems
Will SMA
In the coming period, the party have to develop tactics to politicise theSI left, and to reach wider layers, beyond the
Ö GÜRLÜK VE classic centre-left electorate.
Turkey may tace pre-term parnamen ISMA prepare itself for this possibility. Ufider theS current electoral law, only parties that win
10% of the national vote will be admitted
-ÜK VE to parliament. So we will be under pressure from the social democrats alies M sure from the social democrats be urging leftist voters to make vote for the centre-left,
, "so as to block the
Islamists and the right." To be credible in
ÜK VE the eyes of the masses, we may have to consider some kind of electoral alliance
MISMA
Particularly important in this respecT iSl our relationship with the Kurdish nationalist left, through the People's Democratic
ÜK VE
Labour Party (HADEP). Despite its respectable score in the Kurdish region (southeast IŞMA
Turkey), HADEP has little echoiR theSI western areas. Until now, the ODP has refrained from organising in the region
UKVE under martial law. But some currents inside
IISMA the party are arguing for a change of policy.
Despite a number of commodinitia-Si tives with HADEP, and a very prudent attitude on the part of the ÖDP, there have
UK VE been some tensions. Even today, the
Kurdish nationalist movement tends to IŞMA have a sectarian and arrogan? attitudeSI towards the groups that comprise the ÖDP.
As an indirect result and counter-bal-
ÜK VE ance of this, some sectors within the party are urging us to distance ourselves some-SMA what from HADEP. So far, howedeR theSI leadership of the party has maintained our privileged relations with HADEP, who we consider our legitimate interlocutor in the KVE
Kurdish region, in the struggle for peace. NIŞMA
Another important problempthe partyS I must solve is the tension between the organisational form of party work required by its legal status (such as the division of KvE activities to correspond with the terriforial I SMA division of the state) and the need tosI organise at workplaces, in working class and poorer districts, and in struggles.
Something must also be done about-ÜK VE the party's weak apparatus, and our orga-ISMA nisational amateurism: apart from acpuples i of secretariat staff, the party has no full timers, and all party work is carried out by
ÜKVE volunteers.
What is clear is that, in the coming ISMA months and years, the heritage of thespasts i will be less important for the ODP than our own struggles and activities. We are a
KVE force to be reckoned with! *
OLGUR
PARTISTMA
DAYANIŞMA
PARTISI
* history