book notes
Revolution from Above: The demise of the Soviet system
David M. Kotz and Fred Weir,
Routledge, London and New York, 1997. Reviewed by Boris Kagarlitsky The Western press has attributed the fall of the Soviet Union to the unsoundness of its economy, and/or the bankruptcy of socialist principles as such. Added to this are stories of mass outbursts of popular protest destroying the system from within.
These mass protests, however, played a relatively unimportant role. There were strikes and demonstrations in the years from 1989 to 1991, but there have been far more in the years since. Work stoppages and hunger strikes have become a daily phenomenon in modern Russia, but almost no-one in official circles pays attention to them. Coal miners live from strike to strike, but rarely receive their wages in full. Yeltsin's "democratic" regime has been able for five years to ignore countless manifestations of popular discontent, while the communist system supposedly collapsed like a house of cards as a result of two miners' strikes and a few demonstrations in Moscow and St Petersburg.
Within Russia itself thinks the change was the result of a mass anti-communist movement. Among Russian writers there is, however, a theory that centres on conspiracy and treachery by the elite. Communist and nationalist newspapers claim that various figures within the Soviet hierarchy were bribed by Western intelligence services, or that Western agents carried out subversive operations. But even if a conspiracy existed, it explains nothing. Throughout the history of the USSR there were innumerable anti-Soviet conspiracies. All of them failed. Why, on this occasion, was the subversive activity of the West so stunningly successful?
The theory that the USSR suffered an economic collapse does not stand up either. Russia since 1991 has undergone an economic crisis many times more severe than the one it experienced in 1990 and 1991. Moreover, the economic woes of 1990 and 1991 had their origins not so much in the To order the books and magazines mentioned in International Viewpoint, try your nearest progressive bookstore, or write to La Brèche, 9 rue de Tunis, 75011 Paris, France © (+33 1) 43676357 fax 43792961 (English, French and Spanish spoken). Where no price is given, we suggest you enclose US$ 10 in any convertible currency to cover the postage costs of the publisher. To announce your publication in this free listing, send a sample copy to "Book reviews" c/o International Viewpoint, PECI, BP 85, 75522 Paris cedex 11, France.
decay of the system as in the first ill-conceived efforts to reform it. The Western economists who now write about the collapse of the Soviet system were previously much more inclined to make a high evaluation of its achievements in the 1960s and 1970s.
Analysing the development of the Soviet economy throughout its history, Kotz and
Weir conclude that the crisis of the system was the result not of its fundamental bankruptcy but on the contrary, of its achievements. The hyper-centralised mobilisation economy, in which control over all resources was concentrated in the hands of the state, made possible the winning of the war and the transforming of a backward agrarian state into a super-power possessing not only military, but also industrial and scientific might. However, the same hyper-centralised system began showing signs of stress once the task ceased to be that of creating a modern economy, but of managing it.
It is one thing to build a factory on a bare field, but something quite different to come up with a long-term program for its technological development, for the retraining of workers and so forth. The fall in growth rates was accompanied by a decline in the ability of the Soviet leadership to control the functioning of the system, and this crisis of management in turn aided the spread of corruption and the growth of criminal structures.
"Despite these failings, we have seen that the Soviet economy managed to bring very rapid growth for many decades," Kotz and Weir note. "However... in its last fifteen years the system suffered a serious deterioration in its economic performance" (p. 229). In these circumstances the bureaucratic elite was forced to search for new methods of sustaining its rule... The Soviet system met its end not because the economy stopped working, but because a political coalition arose and gained power which was dedicated to replacing it with capitalism" (ibid.).
Unlike the supporters of the "conspiracy theory" , Kotz and Weir show that in the USSR the "treachery" of the elites had profound social causes and was predetermined by the very character of the development which had preceded it. This prospect was outlined by Leon Trotsky in The Revolution Betrayed. Trotsky hoped that the rebirth of the Russian proletariat and a political revolution would stop events from following this course. But the system proved far more stable than the great revolutionary had supposed. It was precisely this which ultimately made the restoration of capitalism inevitable.
The turn to capitalism did not occur immediately, and the bureaucracy itselt was tar from united. The authors distinguish three tendencies within the Russian elite. These were supporters of capitalism; conservatives who tried to preserve the system with only minimal changes; and finally, supporters of reviews democratic socialism. The last of these the authors identify with Mikhail Gorbachev.
Unfortunately, here the authors succumb to their own myth. The bureaucracy did not resolve immediately to proclaim capitalism as its ultimate goal. A process of transition was needed; public opinion had to be prepared. Moreover, the ruling elite itself was by no means capable of immediately formulating its new priorities. Gorbachev prepared the path which most members of the elite were soon to follow.
Despite the socialist rhetoric, Gorbache's project differed little from that of
Yeltsin. In both cases the main stake was placed on privatising the economy, on turning the country into a junior partner of the West, and on integrating it into the world capitalist system as a supplier of raw materials and cheap labour power. It was
Gorbachev who concluded the unequal agreements with the West that the Yeltsin regime later fulfilled.
Gorbachev would have preferred a gradual transition to capitalism while maintaining many of the familiar features of the
Soviet system. This was the essence of his "socialism". In the period from 1988 to 1990 these moods were shared by the overwhelming majority of the Soviet elite, who were quite sincere in condemning Yeltsin as an extremist and populist. But the policy of gradual reform failed. The bureaucracy began losing patience. Former supporters of
Gorbachev began crossing over to Yeltsin in large numbers. Yeltsin, who had criticised privileges and luxuries, unexpectedly became a prophet of liberalism. Then Gorbachev, who from 1987 to 1989 had practically forgotten the word "socialism" , finally remembered it again as he tried to present himself as the guardian of Soviet traditions.
Gorbachev made a real effort to preserve the USSR, but only so long as this promised to allow him to retain his post. When he was faced in December 1991 with the choice of capitulating to Yeltsin or of convening the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, which would have provided a chance of preserving the union but which for him would have probably meant impeachment, he unhesitatingly chose capitulation. The country has not forgiven its former president. Proof of this is provided by Gorbachev's ignominious failure in the 1996 elections, when he failed to attract even 1% of the vote.
This idealisation of Gorbachev is the only serious flaw in Kotz and Weir's book. Readers will find a great deal of information on the real state of affairs in the Russian economy and the results of "shock therapy"; on the way society has been transformed; and on the government and the opposition.
It is not only the Soviet system that has suffered a crash during the past ten years. The policies of neo-liberal reform have failed as well. In this context the question of socialism remains pressing.
But socialism can only be discussed in a serious manner if the "Russian lesson" is well assimilated. In this regard, Revolution from above can serve as a highly useful text for Western radicals. *
May 1997 #288 35