Paramilitarisation
After a decade of human rights abuses, the situation in Colombia is worsening. Human rights organisations say 1996 "will go into history as Colombia's worst year in terms of human rights" The country now has more than 920,000 internally displaced inhabitants: more than the combined refugee population of Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. Pablo Restrepo points the finger at the state's use of paramilitary groups as a central component of its repressive strategy. Between 1970 and 1979, 59,378 homicides were reported in Colombia, of which 1.4% were political assassinations. Between 1980 and 1989 the number of murders rose by 134% to 141,232. Of these 11,043 (7.8%) were political. In other words, there were more than ten times as many political assassinations in the 1980s, compared to the previous decade. In the first half of the 1990s, 11,471 political assassinations took place, slightly more than the total for the preceding 10 years.
In February 1995, the European Conference on Human Rights in Colombia calculated that "since 1988, on average, seven people are assassinated on a daily basis for political reasons and an additional three are killed in combat as part of the internal armed conflict. Every other day a person is 'disappeared and another is killed through social cleansing'. Arbitrary detentions are frequent and torture is endemic. Since 1986, about 20,000 people have been killed for political reasons or presumed political reasons., and 600,000 have been forced to flee their homes to protect their lives.
These statistics vastly supersede the 17 years of military dictatorship in Chile" 2 Seventy percent of the violations can be attributed to the armed forces, state security divisions and paramilitary groups, and 30% correspond to the insurgents and the militia. Deteriorating situation
An openly militarist mentality prevails in the Colombian state and society, to such a degree that we can speak of the resurrection of a constitutional dictatorship. The spaces won for democratic ideas, such as controlling the government's ability to declare states of emergency and repress social conflicts or our ability to subordinate the military to civilian control or institutionalise measures to protect our rights that have been threatened, are increasingly reduced
This is certainly the conclusion to be drawn from the government's proposals for reforming the 1991 Constitution with respect to human rights. On the one hand, a series of proposals have centred on the character and use of states of emergency, which taken together contravene the Commission of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. In general, the reforms aim to give the state of emergency a more permanent character, remove constitutional controls on how it is declared and give the military unlimited rights to legally investigate civilians.
In the period covered by the last state of emergency, November 1995 to November 1996, Special Zones of Public Order were created. Among other stipulations, this permits the military and police to restrict the right of free movement and residency as well as allows them to make arrests and search homes without a warrant. The crushing effect of these measures in eastern regions of the country can be clearly seen:
"The demonstrators were treated as wartime enemies, which manifested itself in acts of vandalism by the army, such as dynamiting a road, the mass arbitrary detention of more than 400 people, restriction of food supplies, subordination of mayors and governors to the authority of the military commanders and intimidation and destitution of a judge who dared to defend the rights of those subjected to a military siege." 4
Also, proposals have been made by the military that have been blessed by certain sectors in parliament, in an attempt to strengthen the armed forces. Among them are the abolition of the power of public prosecutors and the Attorney General to investigate members of the armed forces, as well as an attempt to institutionalise the power of the state security forces to detain anyone sus-
Colombia pected of disturbing public order for seven days without an arrest warrant. Meanwhile, there is the creation of "National Militias" (civilian support groups for the army). The paramilitary strategy
We are not just dealing with a simple attempt to promote death squads as just another mode of repressive operations. In Colombia paramilitarism is a series of factors that taken together form a strategy promoted by the military to conduct counterinsurgency warfare against any form of opposition with the aim of protecting and encouraging the expansion of the latifundas (plantations)
Paramilitarism takes shape from the moment the military assumes a determining role, expressed by a certain politicisation in favour of particular social sectors; and in which the participation of civilians is encouraged in repressive tasks supposedly reserved for the police and army.
In other words, paramilitarism deforms the rule of law. It is a hidden, underground strategy. Starting from a "legal" position (state power), the powers-that-be resort to illegal actions, in such a manner that there is no proof or public record on the basis of which their activities can be monitored, evaluated or challenged. Their cover-up techniques can be so efficient that the puppet appears to be a totally autonomous being. But this charade is only possible thanks to the perverse skills of the "ventriloquist".
A November 1996 report by the US group Human Rights Watch sums up the Colombian experience of paramilitarism, and places it in a clearer perspective:
"The military-paramilitary association forms part of current Colombian reality. Human Rights Watch has been able to prove that the collaboration between military intelligence, military commanders at division,
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* Colombia brigade, battalion level and paramilitary units continues as envisaged by Order 200-05/91. Based on our interviews with witnesses and ex-members of the network, investigations by the government and the abundant material compiled by human rights groups and journalists, we believe that the top brass of the Colombian armed forces continues to organise, encourage and mobilise paramilitary units in a hidden war against those suspected of supporting the guerrillas." S
In 1978, the American Anti-Communist Action group emerged. "Triple A" was directly associated with the military's Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Battalion At the beginning of the 1980's, MAS another paramiltary group was integrated into the process of repression and counterinsurgency in the Magdalena Medio region.
According to the High Commissioner for Peace, paramilitary groups are present in 450 municipalities. In north-western Colombia, the paramilitary units are the dominant armed force. And they no longer act in a dispersed manner. They are headed by the ACCU (Self-Defence Groups of Cordoba and Uraba) led by Carlos Castano.
In mid-1996, the paramilitary "Self-Defence Movement of Colombia" held its third National Summit. Apart from refining its citera for capturing suspected guerrillas and kidnapping their relatives, delegates reaffirmed their identity.
"The guerrillas know that the paramilitary phenomenon is irreversible. They know all so well how hard we have hit them. But our movement continues to be outside the law and political life, even though many of our collaborators, administrators, supporters, financiers and advisors take part in political activity. The discrediting of the Samper administration presents us with a magnificent opportunity to increase our work as combatants of the anti-subversive struggle. One could say that the operational incapacity of the armed forces due to the pressure of human rights organisations and other institutions such as the Attorney General's Office and the Public Prosecutors places us in the vanguard of the struggle"
There is an "almost perfect" correlation between the reduction of abuses directly attributable to government forces and the increase in abuses directly imputable to paramilitary bands. The paramilitaries stated aim is to establish themselves as the third force in the Colombian conflict, alongside the regime and the leftist guerrillas. There are also signs of a sustained offensive to pressure the population in many areas to elect mayors sympathetic to the paramilitaries in the October 1997) municipal elections. * *The author is a Colombian human rights activist Notes 1. Gallon, Gustavo. Autoritarsio en Ascenso, Comision Colombian de Juristas, 1996, p.i 2. Coordinacion Belga por Colombia, European Conference on Human Rights in Colombia. 3. Decrees 717 and 900 4. Gallon, Gustavo. Op. Cit., p.3 5. Human Rights Watch. Colombia. The Networks of Assassins in Colombia. The military-paramilitary association and the USA, Washington, Nov. 1996, p.7 6. Mimeographed Document. Ill Cumbre Nacional Movimiento Autodefensas de Colombia, p.6-7 12 International Viewpoint