Turkey's military accord with Israel
The recently-signed Turkish-
Israeli military accord is transforming the balance of forces in the Middle East. This new pro-imperialist axis, with a democratic facade, competes with the Irano-Syrian axis: out of favour with imperialism, but without the vaguest of democratic credentials. The main victims of the growing tension between these two axes are the
Palestinians and the Kurds: held in hostage by both sides.
Erdal Tan
TURKEY AND ISRAEL HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ON good relations. But "Moslem" Turkey used to be more discreet. The Ankara regime had no desire to confront the
Arab world by publicly renouncing solidarity with the Palestinian cause. But now that Israel has signed an agreement with the PLO,
Turkey has dropped its mask.
Turkish leaders are scrambling to visit Israel, signing a succession of economic, political and now military accords.
The United States is overjoyed to finally see the concrete realisation of the alliance.
Damascus and Tehran are rather less enthusiastic about these developments. They are the main targets of the new alliance.
Even Egypt (a state completely compromised by its collaboration with Israel) has expressed regrets.
At the same time as the Israeli air force began bombing Hizbullah and civilian targets in Lebanon, twelve Israeli fighter planes arrived at an air base in South-East Turkey.
Their mission, according to the Turko-Israeli military accord, is "a programme of training flights". In an unusual move, Turkey has
8 International Viewpoint #277 refused to condemn the Israeli raids, regretting only "civilian losses", and reaffirming the "right of each state to defend itself against terrorism by any and all means, including [activities] beyond its own frontiers." Over the last twelve years, the
Turkish military has made numerous incursions into in northern Iraq to attack bases of the Kurdish nationalist guerrilla movement PKK (Workers Party of
Kurdistan).
Turkey's rapprochement with Israel, to the detriment of Syria, is in part linked to the struggle against the PKK, whose leader Abdullah Öcalan ("Apo") and general staff are based in the Syrian capital Damascus. The PKK also has camps in Lebanon's Bekaa valley, which is controlled by Syria. This has infuriated
Turkish leaders, who have repeatedly asked
Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish guerrillas.
Damascus has consistently denied any PKK presence, and reminded
Turkey of Syria's (unsuccessfull) demands for an international agreement giving their country a greater share of the waters of the
Euphrates river, which is heavily dammed in
Turkey, before it runs into Syna.
The Turkish desire to
"teach the Syrians a lesson" crystallised when
Damascus mobilised the Arab
League against
Turkey's Project
GAP for building giant dams and hydroelectric power
Prime minister T. Ciller stations in South
East Anatolia, as well as a canal irrigation system supposed to quadruple agricultural production in the Urfa valley. What better than an agreement with
Israel, Syria's sworn enemy?
Turkish newspapers report that Ankara recently presented Syria with an ultimatum: cease all support for the PKK immediately, or Turkey will carry out military operations on Syrian territory. An adventurist wing in the Turkish state, particularly among the general staff, is ready to go a long way, even at the risk of provoking a war between the two countries.
The Kurdish question has been a central preoccupation of the Turkish regime for more than ten years: the war has claimed 20,000 victims over the last 12 years (according to official sources, the dead include 11,000 PKK militants, 3,000 Turkish soldiers, and 4,000 civilians). The conflict costs $7 bn. PKK leader "Apo"
every year, not counting the social and economic consequences: the collapse of the traditional economy in the Kurdish region, particularly animal husbandry; unemployment; the exodus of the Kurdish population which crowds into the poorest districts of the large towns in western Turkey; and so on. The war has also caused the political de-stabilisation and moral degeneration of society, with a serious rise in racism and nationalism. There has been a proliferation of death squads and Mafias. Systematic human rights violations (assassination, torture, press censorship, generalised repression in the Kurdish villages).
All this has "damaged the image of the country abroad," and delayed Turkey's integration into the European Union. The military itself has been touched by the perverse consequences of its war: maintaining a massive 250,000 man conscript army in the South East has hindered the Generals' projects for modernisation, by soaking up the funds which could have been used to by sophisticated weapons and create a professional army. What is more, the
Kurdish question is now being exploited by all of Turkey's neighbours, in their various disputes with Ankara. In other words, the non-solution of the Kurdish question is a direct menace to the stability of the regime, which is increasingly split between the advocates of a continued "strong hand" policy, and a faction which wants to calm the problem through cultural, administrative, democratic and economic reforms.
This debate re-emerged during on 9 April, when the army killed more than 160 "terrorists" at a cost of 40 soldiers in the Diyarbakir/Bingöl region. This was the bloodiest clash in the last 12 months. Public opinion was shaken. Particularly since the PKK had announced an unilateral ceasefire in December 1995, and the new Turkish government had promised a series of "reforms." Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz had promised to abolish "within three months" the "Emergency Powers Law" in force in the Kurdish region, and to "liberalise" several repressive laws on freedom of expression. Yilmaz recently embraced in public the writer Yasar Kemal, who had been imprisoned for "unacceptable" opinions. The Minister of the Interior even promised to authorise Kurdish language teaching (though only in private schools). He also suggested that the public television station TRT-GAP could broadcast partly in Kurdish (though his suggestion was for "public information" propaganda, rather than general programming). PKK leader Apo even wrote to Prime Minister Yilmaz proposing a peaceful arrangement in the framework of respect for the "unity and integrity of the Turkish state"
In such a context, the army operation surprised everyone, and provoked wide criticism in the bourgeois press. After the obligatory crocodile tears for the "martyred soldiers, fallen for the motherland", the press unleashed an attack on the military General Staff of unprecedented virulence. The leading dailies Hürriyet and Milliyet questioned the "timing" of the operation, and, noting the high number of soldiers lost, speculated that there had been an error in the command structure. A number of editorialists went further: "For years now, every spring, the General Staff affirms that the PKK is on the point of total liquidation. And each time, we realise that this is false. Doesn't this prove that military means alone cannot solve the Kurdish question?" The country's largest circulation daily, Sabah, went even further:
"the military option solves nothing... The General Staff should be accountable for its actions... Is it worth sacrificing so many soldiers to kill a hundred PKK militants? Certainly not!... The terrorism of those who want to appropriate a monopoly on patriotism is revealed to be just as dangerous as the terrorism of the PKK!" This is the first time that the media has made such an open challenge to the army's claims of efficiency and the state's political line in the Kurdish question. This reflects public opinion's frustration with the endless bloody war, and in particular the bourgeoisie's desire to cut their losses and withdraw from the "Kurdish mess," whatever the cost.
The army will therefore be obliged to accept a number of reforms, or find itself dangerously isolated. The paradox is that this situation comes at a moment when the army has never had a greater political weight (given the extreme fragility of the civilian regime). Of course, this will not mean the end of repression. For
Refah (Prosperity) party leader the army, "the Kurdish question is one thing, the PKK is another". So necessary reforms could easily be combined with a lightening attack to re-establish the army's image. Scenarios include bombing raids on the PKK camps in the Bekaa valley, and an attempt to assassinate Apo in Damascus.
Flirting with Israel may be the Generals' way of preparing the justification for such actions. It certainly explains Turkey's sudden support for Israel's intervention in Lebanon. But there is another motivation. Iran.
Tehran has been increasing its influence on the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq. Iran also tolerates a number of PKK bases on its
Turkey * own territory. The root cause of Ankara's discomfort, of course, is the whole logic of the United States' policy in Iraq since the end of the Gulf war. The very existence of an autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, free of all control from Baghdad, creates a de facto base for an independent Kurdish state: something Turkey wants to avoid at all cost.
Turkey supported the US against Iraq, but has not been able to convince their ally to lift the embargo against Saddam Hussein's regime. Ankara also accepts the deployment in the south east of the multinational Operation Provide Comfort force, which continues, at least symbolically, to threaten Baghdad and "protect" the Kurds.
Turkey's relations with the Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, Talabani and Barzari, have proved complex and contradictory. The approach has been to alternate the carrot and the stick. This has not stopped PKK presence and influence from growing. The Iraqi Kurds have neither the means, nor really the desire, to stop the PKK. Turkey's repeated incursions into northern Iraq have essentially aimed at destroying PKK bases near the frontier.
Turkey's relationship with Iran continues to decline. Two months ago, while most of the region's rulers assembled for the great "anti-terrorist" summit in Egypt, the Turkish police arrested a number of Islamic fundamentalists, accused of having assassinated anti-clerical journalists in 1990. Those arrested claimed that they had been trained in Iran, and that they had acted under the orders and with the support of Iranian diplomats accredited in Ankara. Four Iranian diplomats were asked to leave the country.
No-one questions the existence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups likened to Iran, but the timing of the "discovery" of this particular circle is extremely suspect. For its part, Iran responded by "uncovering" a "Turkish espionage network", and requesting the departure of four Turkish diplomats accredited in Tehran.
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayarti is due to visit Turkey soon. Discussions will include the question of PKK camps in Iran and northern Iraq, and the Turko-Israeli accord. This diplomatic escalation could stop there if the two capitals can agree on a new set of ground rules. Otherwise, the degeneration of the relationship cannot be excluded. This would mean, initially, a few major assassinations or bombings, in Istanbul or in
International Viewpoint #277 9
* Turkey the tourist resorts on the west coast. These attacks would be attributed to the PKK or to Hezbollah (the group backed by Iran). Turkey would then retaliate at the border with Iran, or in northern Iraq. Military cooperation with Israel would be stepped up.
Sabre-rattling in the East is combined with a more pacifist tone towards the West. Turkey has proposed dialogue with the Greek government on a number of issues government on a number of issues concerning integration with western Europe. The aim is to reduce the number of borders on which there is tension.
For the first time, Turkey no longer seems interested in the reactions its policies provoke in the Arab world. Indeed, the new policy is one of "cutting" ourselves off from the Arab-Islamic world. And of erecting a strong barrier between the "higher interests of the nation" and the internationalist political sympathies of Turkey's Islamic fundamentalists. There are increasing exhibitions of anti-Arab "state racism." Including the Minister of Culture's ridiculous ban on "belly-dancing to Arab-sounding rhythms," now considered to be "opposed to the Turkish national identity."
The authors of this new foreign policy are the soldiers. Turkey's diplomats and politicians are usually more prudent. The Generals have been able to impose their line by exploiting the extreme weakness of the civilian regime. After the Çiller government fell in September 1995, the country went through months of governmental crisis, solved only by the formation of the Yilmaz/Çiller government in March this year. Three months separated the December 1995 general elections from the formation of a government able to win a parliamentary majority.
The army had been alarmed by the impressive score realised by the Islamic fundamentalist Refah Party in December 1995. The Generals repeatedly stressed their determination "to protect the non-clerical, Kemalist, modernist Republic against the middle-age, obscurantist agitation of a handful of fundamentalists." The army seems determined to break the political power of the Islamists, whatever the cost.
In such a context, an open conflict between Turkey and the islamo-Arab world would put the Refah Party in a difficult position: Either adopt a low profile and lose ground politically, or enter into frontal opposition to the "national" policy, and risk being perceived as "traitors to the motherland 10 International Viewpoint #277 and its national interests". If so, the Generals would not hesitate to outlaw Refah, as they did with the Kurdish nationalists two years ago. Though, since Refah is much bigger than the banned Kurds, things might no go so smoothly...
It was the army which sabotaged, behind the scenes, the initial attempts by the conservative ANAP (Motherland Party) of
Mesut Yilmaz to form a new government in coalition with Refah. Military opposition forced Yilmaz to ally with the outgoing government of Tancu Çiller's DYP (True Path Party). The resulting coalition is a minority government, which only had a majority thanks to the support of the nationalist-populist DSP (Democratic Left Party) of Ecevit. *
• Electoral fragmentation The general elections on 24 December 1995 have revealed deep political instability. The fundamentalist Refah (Prosperity) Party won most seats, though much less than the combined vote of the country's two conservative parties (separated by leadership conflicts rather than programmatic differences). The two social democratic parties won slightly more votes than Refah. The fascist MHP won 8% of votes, which was not enough to take seats in parliament (seats are divided proportionally between parties which score at least 10% of the national vote). The far left presented a number of candidates on the Kurdish nationalist Peoples' Democracy Party (HADEP). This party won 16% in the Kurdish region (scoring 4050% in a number of towns) but only 4.2% of the total vote. The fragmentation of the vote weakens all the political forces. Refah is the largest party, but its score disappointed the Islamic leaders, who counted on a sweeping victory, ruling alone or together with Islamic "submarines" in the other parties. The real struggle in this election was for leadership of the conservative block. Neither Yilmaz nor Çiller can be happy with the result: they scored the same as each other, and less than in the previous elections. The military has forced them into an unhappy coalition government, but this has not stopped them fighting each other. The coalition could easily explode as a result of its internal problems. Unless the generals were seriously angry with such a situation, they would have to hold new general elections: maybe before the end of the year. The traditional right has lost one million electors to the far right since the municipal elections of March 1974. Compared to the legislative elections in 1991, the situation is even more alarming. Back then ANAP and the DYP scored 51%, and the fascists and fundamentalists totalled 17%. In December 1995 the traditional right vote fell to 38%, while the fascist/fundamentalist vote rose to 30%. In comparison, the total social democratic vote fell from over 30% to less than 25%. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the state apparatus, particularly the police and the army, has won relative autonomy, and established itself above the control of civil power. The coming months will tell whether the adventurist sections of the military will be willing to take the country into a real military confrontation, and whether civil society and the political parties will accept this without resistance. The workers' movement and the Kurdish nationalists are weak. For the moment, predictions are for a turbulence and polarisation of society between the army and the fundamentalists. [E.T.]
Party vote seats MHP (fascist) 8 -Refah (fundamentalist) 21 158 ANAP (Led by Yilmaz) 20 125 DYP (Led by Çiller) 19 135 DSP (Soc-Dem, led by Ecevit) 15 76 CHP (Soc-Dem) 11 49 HADEP (Kurd nationalist/left) 4
Ireland *