Painful birth of a new era
The new Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, has won support from left and right for his moderate, modernist and pro-
European strategy. He wants to end the nationalist hysteria which has transformed the country's political life in recent years. But the situation is recomposition of the entire political and nationalist extremism, the left is By George Mitralias Hualac
This was no smooth transition. The dying Socialist leader Andreas Papandreou was a patriarch, who had always ruled alone. No-one in the leading circles of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) had ever dared challenge his absolute power.
And Papandreou was also prime minister. How to choose a new prime minister, with Greece in the situation it is in, without risking an explosion! No easy task for a catch-all party like PASOK, built around a charismatic, authoritarian leader, and more used to following orders than anything else.
The intrigues and dramas mirrored the last years of Peronism in Argentina. Including the attempt by Papandreou's young wife to play the Lopez Rega role. PASOK deputies breathed a sigh of relief when Kostas Simitis was finally approved as Papandreou's successor.
Eighty percent of the population, was also favourable. After a long period of degeneration in the general climate "national" frustration and personal and social uncertainty, Simitis' low profile, moderate, modernising image ensured a brief honeymoon with public opinion.
Very brief. Even before Simitis was sworn in, the confrontation with Turkey over the Imia ("Kardak") islands revealed the fragility of his position.
This crisis, which rocked all of society, and all the political parties, seemed to be a clear revival of the preceding nationalist explosions over the Macedonian an Albanian questions. In fact, the issue is much deeper. Conservative leader Miltiadis Evert did not just condemn the "treason" of a Prime Minister who had "let himself be humiliated by the Turks". . In effect, left and right nationalists (!) challenged the whole pro-European, modernist strategy of the new Prime Minister. Simitis' abandoning (relatively speaking) of his predecessor's traditional ultra-nationalist and aggressive discourse was perceived as irrefutable proof o fragile that the ruling party could explode at any time, detonating a spectrum. Unfortunately, after years of collaboration with austerity policies
"too divided, too discredited and too disarmed" to intervene in the crisis.
of his servility towards the European Union, the United States and Western imper-ialism.
Which, "of course" supports "Turkish expan-sionism" against our unloved, Orthodox Christian motherland.
Prime Minister Simitis was, how-ever, able to manoeuvre well and exploit his adversari es "
contradictions, minimising the damage and shortening the crisis. Bolstered by the support of former conservative
Minister
Prime :
Kostas Mitsotakis
(New Democracy
•Party), Simitis went on the offensive with pro-European his
Union, moderate agenda
Notwithstanding his concessions to the other candidates for the
Papandreou succession,
Defence Minister G. Arsenis and Interior Minister A
Tsohatzopoulos, Kostas
Simitis' domestic and foreign policy realism won him real points among the elite and the population.
Simitis proposes a clear orientation towards unconditional adhesion to the
Maastricht Treaty. He exploited the fact that his opponents support the same thing, but are reluctant to say so openly. Simitis also judged that the nationalist wave is running out of steam. He "dared" list the damage it has done to the "national economy." His opponents may agree in private, but you can still see them in public, evoking the spirit of
Alexander the Great.
Not surprisingly, the bourgeoisie and the decision-makers have been attracted to
Simitis. Which means that, while the nationalist ext-remists still mutter about his
"soft", docile and "un-Greek" nature, they support, or at least accept his authority.
This is not all.
Simitis' new policies provoking are significant realignment within the various left forces, apart from the neo-
Stalinist, isolationist
Communist
Party.
h e conservative New
Democrats are disorganised and divided, and the neo-liberal, modernist PASOK
Prime Minister is winning
Prime Minister is winning the support of an important fraction of the Greek right, which seems to be in favour of a recomposition of the political map.
At the same time, his moderate foreign policy
(normalisation of relations with the neighbouring states, recognition of the Republic of
Macedonia) has won him the support of sections of the non-communist left, in and outside PASOK.
We cannot yet call this a process of convergence towards the formation of a common party. But
Simitis nomination was clearly the catalyst for a historic re-working of the Greek party system. The social democratic left is leaving PASOK in disgust at the increasing severity of the austerity and privatisation programme, but
The author is a journalist, living in Athens
International Viewpoint n° 276
17
* Greece they are counterbalanced by the support offered to Simitis by a number of rightwing deputies, lead by prominent New Democracy figures like ex-PM Mitsotakis. And the extreme opposition of a fraction of PASOK to any proposal to normalise relations with the Republic of Macedonia, Albania and - to a certain extent — Turkey, is counter-balanced by the support Simitis now received from moderate pro-
Europeans of the right and the left.
This is a paradox. Simitis can brandish his audience outside his own party in order to outmanoeuvre his enemies inside the PASOK government, and even inside the party leadership! This cannot last indefinitely. The ruling party could explode at any moment. This terminal crisis of PASOK would provoke the general recomposition of the general recomposition of the party-political framework. Kostas Simitis may not be the head of a PASOK government for much longer. But nothing prevents him returning to office at the head of a new formation, or a coalition government.
The left and the trade unions are largely impotent in the face of these grand manoeuvres, in which Simitis enjoys the support of big capital and the overwhelming majority of Greek entrepreneurs. After having collaborated, or, worse, inspired and managed the submission of the workers' movement to a succession of austerity policies, the left is now too divided, too discredited and too disarmed to even think about spoiling the festival.
The left is paying the price for its betrayal of the workers' interests. Betrayals to which we can attribute concrete figures: Between 1986 and 1994, real wages fell by 12% (compared to an 11.6% rise for the European Union as a whole) while real profits rose by 22% (compared to 13.5% for the EU).
This is not all. This same, respectful left did not just tolerate these shameful policies which have brought misery for many and happiness for a few. Whole sections of the left surrendered, body and soul, to the bourgeoisie's racist, xenophobic, nationalist offensive. They made pact after pact, in the name of the national, even the 'antiimperialist' unity of the Greek nation. No wonder the workers "agreed" to these "sacrifices" which have brought them to the edge of pauperisation. They had been convinced that their super-exploitation was in the interests of the "besieged motherland."
Things are not completely black. The last two months have seen impetuous popular mobilisations. Peasants, farmers, 18 International Viewpoint April 1996 pensioners, naval dockyard workers, civil servants and students have begun to struggle again. The explosions are more and more violent (particularly the peasant and farmer demonstrations) but the struggles remain fragmented, uncoordinated and without real political perspectives.
So there is no reason to conclude that all is going well for the Greek bourgeoisie. On the one hand there is a total crisis in its political representation, and at the same time the exasperation of the workers and peasants is such that a growth of social conflict among new sectors of the working class cannot be excluded. The political situation is very precarious, and the credibility of the major parties is disintegrating before our eyes. The
The Contribi Mandel to N Seminar organized by the Amsterdam, traditional control mechanisms of Greek society are less and less effective. Which makes an upsurge in social struggles easier to imagine.
So this is Greece, at the end of the long epoch which began with the fall of the
Colonels' Dictatorship, 22 years ago. Like the people of Spain and Portugal, Greeks are taking stock of their hopes and their illusions, buried under the ruins of actuallyexisting social democracy. It is a rude awakening. Maybe it will be a refreshing one. It is never too late to present the bill to those who have crumpled so many of our hopes and ideals. * tion of Ernest Marxist Theory Ernest Mandel Study Centre July 4-6, 1996
Speakers: • Jesús Albarracin and Pedro Montes (Economists, Bank of Spain): The theoryof late capitalism as a Marxist interpretation of postWW2 capitalism • Robin Blackburn (Editor, New Left Review, London): The place of Ernest Mandel in the history of Marxist political thought • Alan Freeman (Economist, University of Greenwich): Economic dynamics: Mandel's legacy • Michael Löwy (Sociologist, CNRS, Paris): Ernest Mandel as a revolutionary humanist • Francisco Louça (Economist, IESGUniversity of Lisbon): Ernest Mandel's contribution to the theory of long waves of capitalist development • Charles Post (Historian, City University of New York): The theory of bureaucracy • Catherine Samary (Economist, University of Paris XI): The conception of the transition to socialism • Enzo Traverso (Political Scientist, University of Amiens): Ernest Mandel's vision of the relation between capitalism and barbarism. All introductions and discussions in English. For information about inexpensive accomodation and entrance fees and for registration forms (reservations necessary: due to space limitations only a limited number of people can attend): contact EMSC c/o IIRE, Postbus 53290, 1007 RG Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] Fax: (31 20) 6732106. © 6717263 For financial support to the Ernest Mandel Study Centre send your cheques to the IIRE, or make a bank transfer to account630-0113884-65 at Caisse Privée Banque, Brussels, Belgium.
Mexico *