Moral defeat for right
Alexander Buzgalin and Andrei Kolganov report from Moscow on Russia's election results
RUSSIA'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER 1995 brought few surprises. Analysts had anticipated the success of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), headed by Gennady Zyuganov. They also correctly predicted that the left (more precisely, social-chauvinist) centre would receive about 40% of the total vote when the results in singlemember territorial electorates were taken into account, and that an unstable equilibrium would come to exist in the
Duma. What was surprising was the scale of the defeat suffered by the parties of the right and centre in the party-list elections. The bloc Our Home is Russia, headed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, received fewer than 10% of the votes, while Russia's Democratic Choice, led by the favourite of the Western media Yegor Gaidar, attracted fewer than 5%. This represented a powerful moral defeat for the rightists, with their policies of "shock without therapy" (Gaidar), and then of war in Chechnya and "depressive stabilisation" (Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin). The majority of Russian citizens came out in clear opposition to such "reforms". For the present, however, this is only a moral deteat. The forces of the political right are still powerful even in the present Duma, where if so-called "independent deputies" from single-member electorates are taken into account, the rightists will have about a third of the seats (this was written on 20 December, when the authors still did not have final figures available). Among the forces of the right we include the Yabloko bloc headed by Grigory Yavlinsky. We stress that the differences between the real policies of this bloc and the policies of the present authorities amount only to nuances within a shared pro-bourgeois strategy. Yavlinsky's current radicalism is mainly the result of his wish to present himself as an oppositionist. In the Duma as in Russia as a whole, a situation close to chaos and collapse has emerged as the presidential election approaches. The rightists have already ceased to exercise straightforward control over the situation, even though at the same time they retain administrative and political power and control over property. The left is far from real victory. Circling above this "scene after a battle" is the right-wing socialpopulist Zhirinovsky, who has the ability to shift the relationship of forces in the Duma decisively in one direction or the other... 12 January 1995
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE ELECTIONS The political equilibrium (naturally, very unstable) which has come to exist in the present Duma reflects in many ways the wider social and economic relations within Russia. It is important to note that since the winter of 1993-1994 the model of nomenklatura-corporatist capitalism that arose in our country during the process of "reform" has begun gradually to change. From the speculative pursuit of a pro-Western course, the Russian authorities have begun a gradual turn to a chauvinist-paternalist orientation. This turn has proceeded slowly and in contradictory fashion, but its causes are profound. Now it has yielded its first results. So what is happening? By 1995 noticeable changes had begun appearing. They were called forth by the fundamental rejection by the Russian economy and the people of the attempts to implement the program of "shock therapy"; by the concentration and monopolisation of private capital, processes hastened by violence and corruption; and by the regrouping and partial adaptation to the bureaucratised and corrupt market of a significant sector of the "old" monopolies (primarily in the fuel and raw materials sector). Partly through the rapid grouping together at the local level of numerous small speculative firms, large corporate clans have arisen, not only in the sphere of material production but also of trade and finance. Within these clans property rights and real power are distributed among various groups of the clan elite. These groups include corrupt elements of the federal and municipal authorities that support a particular clan; the banks that serve and control a given clan; managers of enterprises that are part of the clan, and various private individuals. In most cases these clans bind "their" workers and the residents of "their" cities tightly to the clan structures using ties of patronage and fear. It is significant that in the elections virtually all the present provincial governors were re-elected irrespective of their political orientation. As the clans consolidate themselves (and the process of their formation is not yet complete they enter into fierce struggles over the division of property rights and economic power. Naturally, in this struggle (and it is proceeding, we should remember, in a country with a state-bureaucratic capitalism in which a great deal depends on official structures) it is extremely important for the clans to make the breakthrough to political power. As a result, each of the clans has placed, is placing or will place its stake on one or several political forces, which are called upon to lobby for the clan's interests. The abundance of clans (and if we take into account the republican and regional elites, they number many dozens) and their wish to diversify their representation provides one (Translated by Renfrey Clark)
of the reasons for the multiplicity of electoral blocs with extremely similar political programs.
Meanwhile, in the course of 1995 two poles of attraction for these corporate structures began gradually to emerge.
One, close to the present authorities, is linked to the paternalist-minded bureaucracy, is oriented toward a compromise with the workers (hence the social populism of the programs)
and toward the maintaining of national production through state support, limitations on foreign competition, cheap credits and so forth. On the basis of personal ties and of sectoral and regional affiliations the clancorporations of this type put their stakes on one of the social-chauvinist blocs, for the most part, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) or the
Confederation of Russian Communities
(KRO). There are also clans of a second type - capitalist corporations which have already adapted to the market through monopolising exports of raw materials and energy sources, through intermingling with the current authorities, and through strengthening their position in the financial and banking sphere as a result of the concentration and monopolisation of capital. These clans supported Our Home Russia, Russia's Democratic Choice and other right-wing blocs, competing not only with the paternalist (social-chauvinist) structures, but also with one another. Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand either the results of the elections or the prospects for Russia's future if we "forget" the position of the working people who make up the bulk of the population.
It should be recalled that 1995, despite the official optimism of the authorities, was a period of continuing economic decline.
Over the first eleven months of the year the fall in GDP amounted "only" to 4%, while the real wages of workers, following a temporary stabilisation in 1994, began dropping sharply (by 15%). The government's successes in the fight against inflation were truly memorable - prices in 1995 rose by "only" 220%! Already, the majority of workers were simply exhausted by the unceasing crisis. Apart from that, more than a quarter of the population were below the poverty line, which the Russian authorities defined in very simple fashion: people were considered poor if they lacked the minimum of low-quality foodstuffs needed for survival
"over a certain period of time".
There is no doubt that the Russian population today remains atomised and indeed enslaved by clan paternalism. Yes, the workers of Russia as before show little capacity for self- organisation, while economic crisis and the need to work at two or three jobs for twelve to fourteen hours per day strengthen tendencies to conformity and passivity. Yes, our country has already seen the formation of a "worker aristocracy", consisting of employees of a number of raw materials branches and of the banking and finance sector who receive from five to ten times the pay of workers in machinebuilding, education or science. All this is true.
However, the workers of Russia are already beginning, even if only passively, to protest against such policies, to protest
Russia l * against such an economy and against such ruling authorities. One sign of this is the fact that in the parliamentary elections as many as 70% of electors came out to vote in the so-called "less favoured" regions. Another sign is the massive support that was given to the KPRF as almost the only party possessing mass grass-roots structures and working (above all in the case of the regional organisations) with ordinary people (for the present, mainly with pensioners, but all the same...). Parties of the same political stripe which lacked such structures failed in the elections, as was shown by the example of KRO. Even if passively, the working people who make up the majority of the Russian population are thus becoming the decisive factor in the political struggle. The workers are not yet capable of joining forces independently in order to defend their own interests (the KPRF is a party of mass passive support for the "good" - that is, paternalist - nomenklatura). But the support, rejection or indifference shown by workers is becoming a decisive factor in the struggles of the corporative elites. THE DISPOSITION OF POLITICAL FORCES IN THE DUMA AND SOCIETY In order to understand the results of the 1995 parliamentary elections one needs to keep in mind the bases of the political system that came into being as a result of the coup d'état of September- October 1993. This political system is based on the combining in the hands of the executive power (the president and government) of the prerogatives enjoyed by the ruling authorities in both parliamentary and presidential republics. The rights of the parliament (the Duma) have been curtailed not only compared to parliamentary systems of rule, but even compared to presidential ones. The Duma is restricted even in its legislative functions. In order to overcome a veto by the upper house, the Council of the Federation, a two-thirds majority is required; a presidential
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* Russia veto can be overcome only by a two-thirds vote in both houses.
The Duma can scarcely be regarded as a force equal in standing to the executive power. The only substantial functions it possesses are the rights to adopt the budget and to contirm in ottice three key officials nominated by the president -- the Prime Minister, the Chairperson of the
Central Bank and the Prosecutor-General. Meanwhile, a refusal by the Duma to pass the budget or an expression of no confidence in the Prime Minister may provide grounds for early dissolution of the Duma.
Even though the number of Duma seats held by various political forces is of great importance to the ruling elite, in these the circumstances disposition of forces in the
Duma clearly lacks decisive significance. It is no accident that during the election campaign the observation was often heard that the Duma elections were merely a full dress rehearsal for the presidential election of June
1996.
The Duma elections were held on the basis of relatively democratic legislation. A mixed electoral system was used.
Half the positions (225) were to be filled by proportional representation according to party lists, while the remaining
225 would be filled by candidates who had run for election in a particular electoral district and had received a simple majority of votes. The party lists were divided into a general federal list (consisting of only 12 candidates) and regional lists. This was done in order to prevent an undue concentration of Moscow politicians in the Duma.
The electoral procedures were also relatively democratic, and appear generally to have been adhered to, at least in regions where conditions were more or less "normal".
Journalists, however, reported numerous and glaring violations
Chechen in the
Republic, where the elections took place under wartime conditions.
Press reports also suggested major shortcomings in major shortcomings In the election practices me erecon Practices bloc received under 10% of votes.
used on military bases elsewhere in Russia). The main source of disquiet was the question of the fairness or otherwise of the vote- counting, since there was almost no possibility of independent control over this aspect of the electoral procedure.
According to figures released on 20 December, the KPRF gained first place in most regions, attracting 21.9% of the party-list votes. It is expected that together with 59 deputies elected in local constituencies, the KPRF will have about 157-
158 Duma seats - more than one third of the total, and almost twice as many as in the previous Duma. Second place in the elections was taken by Zhirinovsky's LDPR with 10.5% of the votes, half as many as before. Because the LDPR had only an insignificant number of candidates elected in local
14
January 1995 constituencies (despite having run more candidates than any other party), its parliamentary fraction will make up fewer than 10 per cent of the total number of deputies. The progovernment NDR came in third with almost 10% of the vote, but won only ten territorial seats. Yavlinsky's Yabloko bloc received 7.3% of the vote and had 14 deputies elected from local constituencies. The other electoral blocs failed to make it over the 5% barrier. Most experts were surprised not only by the KPRF's level of success, but also by NDR's degree of failure. The vote for the LDPR was expected to be considerably smaller. Also mistaken were the near-unanimous predictions that the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), the Agrarian Party (Al), Gaidar's DVR and the Women of Russia group would surmount the 5% barrier. On the whole, however, the trend of the voting was predicted correctly. All the forecasters put the KPRF in first place, predicted a substantial gap between the KPRF and NDR, and pointed to a significant drift of voters away from the LDPR, DVR and AP. The only major, fundamental error made by the experts was their exaggeration of the political strength of the KRO. It was predicted that this organisation would rank among the leading factions in the future Duma. But as in the previous elections, a political organisation resting on industrialists and declaring its moderate, centrist character (at that time this role was played by the Civic Union) saw its hopes dashed. It is interesting to note that in 1993 the majority of experts also failed to predict the failure of the Civic Union. What conclusions do the election results allow one to draw about the mood of the voters? In the first place, there was an unmistakeable rejection of the government's course. This was despite an extremely powerful propaganda campaign waged by NDR, openly supported by state television, and despite real signs that the economic decline was slowing Second, the right-wing parties which overcame the 5% barrier received only 27.8% of the party-list vote compared with 52.7% in the 1993 elections. An unstable right-wing majority (unstable because of discord within the fractions)
was replaced by the absence of a clear majority for any political current. We include in the category of right-wing parties not only Yavlinsky's bloc, but also the nationalist
LDPR, since the LDPR gives its firm support to Russia's capitalist path, and despite spouting anti-government rhetoric and voting with the KPRF on some questions, has also supported the government on all of the most important issues (the budget, confidence in the prime minister etc.). Unlike the situation in 1993, the organisations Women of Russia and PRES, which have basically supported the government, did not pass the 5% barrier. The defeat suffered by Gaidar's DVR was particularly crushing. After having gained 15.4% of the party-list votes in 1993, it attracted only 4.1% in the 1995 elections. Confidence in the miracle-working powers of the free market has dissipated like smoke. Even Yabloko, which made a show of opposition to the government, managed only to keep its losses to a minimum, recording 7.3% compared with 7.8% in 1993. Third, not a single centrist party (whether left-centrist in the style of the social democrats, the Ivan Rybkin bloc and
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomydin's Our Home is Russia
"Power to the People", or right-centrist like the KRO) has managed to overcome the 5% barrier. This means that for the Russian voter the question is not one of choosing between economic tactics for market reform. The question is one of socio-economic strategy. Once again, the question on the agenda is that of where Russia should be heading. A very significant part of the population is certain that the government is taking Russia in the wrong direction, and that mere adjustments to the reform process are no longer sufficient. In order to be successful, the Russian social democrats need to study the example of Salvador Allende, not of Mitterand. Fourth, the failure of Vladimir Jirinovsky's LDPR, KRO and a series of smaller blocs using nationalist slogans has shown that the concept of great- power chauvinism, at least in itself, does not attract significant sympathy from voters. Nor was there significant support for those blocs (the same ones plus a number of small formations of a straightforward right-wing character) whose leaders called for the use of authoritarian political methods. This is a very encouraging sign. The effect of the elections on the disposition of forces within the left is a particularly complex question. All of the relatively small - or minuscule — left and left-centrist groups failed to surmount the 5% barrier, though two of them, Svyatoslav Fyodorov's Party of Workers Self-Management, and the bloc "Communists —Toiling Russia for the Soviet Union", received more than four per cent of the votes. It is clear that a united left bloc could have received from 45 to 50% of the vote. The elections confirmed the undoubted fact that the KPRF overshadows all the other left parties and groups taken together. Orthodox communists and supporters of various versions of democratic socialism have only a very weak influence on the masses. At the same time, supporters of "small" orthodox communist and left parties and groups outside the KPRF - people who in many cases did not vote because "their" (democratic socialist) party was not running -could have contributed some 5 to 7%. Together with the social democrats, this might well have provided the vital 10 to 12% of additional votes which the KPRF needed for victory. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN Russia? It is not known whether Yeltsin, after the failure of the bloc The
1993 total deputies % of deputies 1996 total deputies vote (%) vote (%) Duma DVR 15.38 56 21.3 (4.1) 8 1.78 LDPR (Jirinovsky) 22.79 11 15.6 10.5 11 Communists (KPRF) 12.35 33 14.2 21.9 59 34 NDR - 9.98 10 11 AP 7.9 26 10.4 (3.9) 20 4.4 Yabloko 7.83 13 7.3 7.27 14 9 PRES 6.76 9 6.0 (?) ? ? Women of Russia 8.1 4 5.6 (4.65) 3 <1 Power to the People - - (?) 8 1.78 KRO - - - (4.1) 5 t1 Independents - 30 6.7 - 77 17.1 *On the basis of figures released on 20 December. The first column shows the percentage of votes received on party lists. The second column shows the number of deputies elected in territorial constituencies. And the third column predicts the probably number of deputies from the fraction as a percentage of the total number of deputies.
Russia * led by the "Yeltsinite" Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, will decide to hold these elections. If not, will the opposition and the elites that are dissatisfied with Yeltsin have enough strength to force the elections to be held despite the resistance of the "party of power"? For the moment, it seems very likely that the presidential elections will go ahead. There are too many clans anxious to force the present minority away from the presidential feed-trough, and most importantly, the majority of working people reject the current course. In addition, the presidential team is beset by contradictions, and Yeltsin himself is not in good shape. In the event that a more or less democratic model is employed for the presidential elections (at least while the election process is under way), the opportunity will arise for leftists, social democrats and the more moderate socialchauvinist forces (from Toiling Russia through the democratic left to the KPRF as the main force of the coalition, and beyond to the Agrarians, various social democrats and "pink" chauvinists of the type of Nikolai Ryzhkov's bloc, etc.) to establish a powerful coalition. This will be possible if there is good organisation, if various disagreements are overcome, and if compromises are reached between the clans supporting the political groups. On the path to this objective there will be numerous obstacles, both the "old" ones that prevented such a coalition from being formed and achieving victory in the parliamentary elections, and also new ones linked to pressure exerted on the KPRF by the authorities and the centrists. Both these forces will try to "buy" the leaders of the KPRF with official positions and with the promise of compromises. It can only be hoped that this effort fails. For the present, it is unclear around whom the rightists will rally, or whether they will unite their forces at all. In any case, this process will probably exclude Zhirinovsky, who at least in the first round will probably make his own effort to finish ahead of the pack. The ferment and vacillation in the rightwing camp, and the lack of an obvious favourite, are among the symptoms of the overall crisis of right-wing politics in the past few years. Nevertheless, the "party of power" as in the past concentrates in its hands the support of the bulk of corporative and speculative capital, of officialdom, of the "middle class" (in Russia this consists of employees of commercial firms, of the majority of the "elite" intelligentsia, and of workers in some privileged sectors) and of a minority (though a substantial one) of workers. As a result the possibility is not excluded that in the presidential elections a more or less even balance will arise between right and left, and that Zhirinovsky with his 10 per cent will play the role of arbiter. If this is to be prevented, a democratically organised left-centrist coalition is necessary. This the main task of leftists today. *
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% of deputies
* pays
Poland