Bosnia's by Catherine Samary Those who support a massive military intervention by the Western powers generally argue that it has been NATO's "hard line" against the Bosnian Serbs which has brought the war to an end. Reality is different. The Dayton/Paris agreements are branded with the realpolitik and double-discourse of the Western powers. The new "peace" is fragile and contradictory. The peace plan was negotiated at Dayton (Ohio) on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December under intense pressure from the US government. Clinton needed a quick diplomatic success for domestic reasons. As a result, the hurried peace accord effectively establishes Bosnia as "one nation, divisible". With no clear winner in the ground war, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian leaders each hope to implement the accord in a different way. Clinton combined promises with threats to extract the signatures of the three warring parties. Without directly implicating the US in the war, in one camp, he exploited the military-political balance of forces on the ground in a very cynical way. NATO bombing certainly weakened the position of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. But in favour of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, not in favour of the opponents of Serbian nationalism. The Paris accord even recognises Karadzic's Serbian Republic, allowing it control over 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina (more or less the territory it controlled after the autumn 1995 Croat-Bosnian offensive). These accords could only be implemented once Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was able to speak in the name of all Serbs. When Bosnian Serb leaders delegated their power to Milosevic, they did not know that the accords would include a clause preventing "War Criminals" (as defined by the Hague Tribunal)
from holding office anywhere in the new Bosnia. Hence today's resistance by Radovan Karadzic and General Radko Mladic to a plan which, in all other respects, confirms the success of the war they have waged these last four years. But NATO bombings played only a secondary role in the modification of the political and military balance of forces. One transformation was the slow construction and reinforcing of the Bosnian government's army (Armija BiH). Superior in numbers (but weak in heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft), the Bosnian Army was also handicapped by geography - the territory controlled by the Bosnian government was only the heart of Bosnia, surrounded by Serbian and Croatian forces. But the main transformation in the military balance of forces was essentially in favour of the Croatian army, which benefited from US and German aid. For President Franjo Tudjman, this was all part of the affirmation of his "Greater Croatia" . His strategy combined the creation of an anti-Serb Croat-Muslim bloc, with a tacit agreement with Serbian President Milosevic to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbian and Croatian spheres of influence. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic was the most reluctant to sign. He had been mandated to refuse any ethnic partition of Bosnia. But nothing which the Paris agreement promises for the multi-ethnic Bosnia has yet been implemented. And the situation on the ground, recognised by the agreement, confirms the logic of separation. The Sarajevo government had neither the political capacity nor the military means to resist both Serbo-Croat and US pressures (accompanied by a significant financial "carrot"). Clinton has certainly also agreed to aid the Bosnian Army, so as to achieve a more stable balance of forces on the ground, which, he hopes, will allow
Pax Americana the withdrawl of NATO troops in a few months. His problem is that the
(Republican dominated)
Congress demands that the
US develop an unilateral aid programme for the
Armija BiH, despite the opposition of the Russian and European Union representatives in the
"Contact Group"
HIGH RISK PEACE
The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) is only supposed to stay for 12 months. But what will the situation look like, one year from now? Clinton's apparent diplomatic success caries very high risks. He might have been the main author of the peace plan, but he had to accept the deployment of large numbers of US ground troops in Bosnia. And he had to assume the role of leadership in the
NATO intervention. His goal now will be to get the "boys" out of the Balkans without too much loss of life, and before he stands for re-election, if at all possible. US public opinion will not be able to support another bloody or drawn-out intervention, and is likely to turn against Clinton if US troops are still in Bosnia when he stands for reelection.
This is why Clinton is insisting on the massive deployment of heavy artillery
(rather than infantry), against the council of those generals who know that such weaponry is of limited use on Bosnia's snow-covered mountain roads. It is also the reason behind
IFOR's "tough" image — unlike
UNPROFOR, IFOR say they will shoot first if they face hostility from
"locals".
Despite these obvious risks, the peace accords and the troop deployment do represent a new legitimacy for NATO,
"the peacemakers", who are taking the place of the discredited United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). ONE AND DIVISIBLE Some on the left expect miracles from this latest intervention of the great powers. They should instead recognise the exorbitant power which the USA and the other powers have appropriated, on the backs of the local populations. Because the Dayton accords don't just concern the ceasefire and transitional period leading to a constitutional refoundation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the return of full sovereignty to its peoples. Instead, they impose an American (quick) timetable for the establishment of a whole new constitutional system. Elections are scheduled for June-October 1996 to governing organs defined at Dayton. There is no role for any kind of constituent assembly, where the representatives of all Bosnians could take the decisions which could ensure a real peace. It has already been decided that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be composed of two distinct entities — a Croat-Muslim Federation (51% of the territory, and the Serbian Republic in Bosnia. Each of the three armed forces (Bosnian Serb, Croat HVO, and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina) will come under the control of one of the members of the collective presidency (to be made up of one Serb, one Croat and one Muslim). Bosnia will have some central institutions (though these have yet to be created, unlike the structures already build up in the three separate zones). New common organisations will theoretically be responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade, and monetary policy. But the Serbian and Croatian zones will have the right to develop direct relations with the neighbouring states of Serbia and Croatia. And the only currency circulating in all three zones so far is the German Mark! The first governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia-Herzegovina will soon be appointed - by the IMF! Citizens in the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Serbian Republic in Bosnia. will vote separately in
January 1996 23
* Bosnia elections to the Chamber of Representatives (one third of the 42 seats will be filled from the Serbian Republic). Legislation can be overturned by a 2/3 majority of deputies from either of the constituent parts. Such guarantees for national groups, inherited from the Tito era in former Yugoslavia, can offer important guarantees to minorities in multi-ethnic states. But there are three problems with the specific structure proposed for Bosnia. • the territorial separation of Bosnia is based on supposedly ethnic criteria (hence ethnic cleansing). • the main political parties appeal for votes on an ethnic, rather than a political platform. This encourages each community to vote for its own" party. • each citizen is assigned to one or other of the ethnic groups on the basis of family origin or father's surname. Those who object to their classification will have to "prove" that they are who they say they are. Such a system squashes all political choices and "imperfect" identities. Those who are non Serbs will find it hard to get representation in the Serbian Republic. So will those who don't fit the norms in the Croat Muslim Federation. This doesn't just mean all the local minorities. It includes all those who identify with a mixed identity [.] A DURABLE PEACE The reactionary aspects of the Paris accords may provoke a new outbreak of hostilities, or render the rights accorded under the accord null and void. What is the sense of the "right" to free circulation, or the "right of return" of the three million refugees and displaced persons, in a state where the great powers are negotiating (ethnic) "corridors" to link the various parts of the (ethnically defined) Serbian and Croat-Muslim components of Bosnia. Having said this, the cease-fire, and the exercise of the rights provided for under the accords do also widen the 24 International Viewpoint nº273 forum for political struggle. We should be sensitive to the development of two types of activity by those in Bosnia who refuse the construction of ethnically exclusive states: developing control "from below" in the new Bosnia, and rebuilding an egalitarian and democratic society. • Monitoring and criticism of the role and the effects of the deployment of IFOR may develop into denunciation of that role, and demands for the withdrawl of NATO troops. We can certainly expect conflicts generated by the contradiction between the population's desire (and right) to move freely across the entire territory, and IFOR's logic of building miniature Berlin walls between the "ethnic entities" . Nor should we neglect the tensions caused by the presence of 20,000 relatively wealthy US soldiers in a society sick and deformed by a long war. •Anti-nationalist forces may decide to agitate for a delay in the elections, to allow them to campaign better and in all parts of Bosnia. We should be ready to help relay this demand. Free circulation of ideas, as well as people, is a precondition for the elections. • Western governments are exploiting the Paris accords as a justification for expelling their Bosnian and other ex-Yugoslav refugees. Elections (of any kind) will only encourage this cynical policy. There are no guarantees on the conditions refugees will face after repatriation. • Aid distribution should be transparent. We should support those who's projects are for bringing communities together, rather than those private interests who, in situations like these, invariably come to an arrangement with those nationalist forces which are intent on dividing the country. ACT NOW! If peace is to last, radical forces should help in the reconstruction of an egalitarian, democratic society. • the independent media should be allowed to circulate in all parts of Bosnia - these are the publications which will make it possible for antinationalist forces to be heard. Antinationalists include those who, in the Croat-Muslim Federation, came together in September to publish the "Declaration of Principles for Establishing a Durable Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina". This document sets out the conditions for the creation of a "non-confessional, multi-cultural and multiethnic" state, with "decentralised federal units" rather than "mono-national" units. It would be logical to demand a referendum on these questions. And for democrats in Bosnia to link up with anti-nationalists in Croatia and Serbia, and make sure these values are presented to the population in the zones controlled by Serbian and Croatian nationalists. The "right to return" is only credible if it is solved at the level of former Yugoslavia. The process of return should be supervised by nongovernmental organisations, which should make sure that all collective guarantees are respected. The right of return is crucial, because the resettlement or repatriation of refugees is so closely linked to the rights of minorities. So far, each refugee population has served to "clean" the minority from the region where it finds refuge. The Hague Tribunal should take real action against all the war criminals. Free elections and the return of the refugees can only take place if the terrorist chiefs in Herceg-Bosna (Croat-controlled) and the Serbian Republic in Bosnia are removed from positions of power. A series of international conferences of those non-governmental organisations which share these objectives should assure control over the process, and develop initiatives for further mobilisation. Tuzla has already hosted such a conference (see IV 272). Now we should try to impose such events in Mostar (Herceg-Bosna) and Banja Luka (Serbian Republic in Bosnia). *
Sri Lanka