* Palestine
THE PEOPLE The Intifadah is declining, but the diversity and level of popular initiatives and activities to defend their land and resist colonisation is increasing. The general feeling among the masses is one of disappointment with the political parties, which refuse or are incapable of acting. People are beginning to act without relying on "the politicians". Recent examples include the three sit-ins at Um Tuba and Bet Safafa to oppose land expropriations, and the 1 April 1995 demonstration against new dams organised by Jerusalem-based NGOs "for the right to housing". Opposition to the Israeli national celebrations of the supposed 3,000 anniversary of the foundation of Jerusalem by King David has taken various forms: a demonstration at Al Issawiya, a press conference on confiscated land in Bethanina, and a demonstration in the Beb Al Jadid district of Jerusalem over the increasing Jewish domination of the town. Experienced political activists, some of whom have in the past been arrested for presumed membership of the PFLP, have played an important role in the organisation of these activities, be it through the movement for the right to housing, at Um Tuba or at Sowr Behir. But this was a matter of individual initiative, not evidence of "remote control" by the organisation. The growing involvement of the masses in this type of activity is certainly positive. But it also testifies to the general weakness of all the political formations. Today's demonstrations are peaceful, and do not degenerate into violence. One result could be not just the definitive abandoning of the underground struggle and the acceptance of legality in all forms of protest, but also a risk of confining ourselves to the struggle against the expropriation of this or that scrap of land, or the right to an apartment, without challenging the occupation as such, and abandoning the field of political struggle for the rights of the Palestinian people to a state, the right of return, and the right to self-determination. These current struggles are very important. The root of the housing problem is the suppression of the Palestinians' right to housing by Israel, through colonisation and appropriation. But it is essential that the struggles against expropriation and for the right to housing incorporate a political struggle on the "big issues" . And this is not at all the case at the moment. JERUSALEM A council has been established, including representatives of Fatah, PFLP, FDLP, the People's Party, Hamas and the Fida movement 6, and five independents (two close to Fatah, one close to the PFLP, one Muslim religious leader and one Christian). Faysal Al Husseni presides, without occupying one of these 11 designated seats. Commissions are being established to deal with health, education, culture, tourism, commerce, land, and a range of other questions. The prerogatives of the council, and its relationship to the State of Israel remain to be defined. The Jerusalem Council has no official relations to the Palestinian Authority, and has the power to allocate all the funds it receives. The Council has refused to take a position on the question of land appropriation in Jerusalem. It seems, however, that Al Hussayni has at least the moral authority of the Council to lobby and make media statements on this question. The members of this Council are designated from above. The "representatives" of the DFLP, PFLP and PPP have not yet received the authorisation of their respective parties to participate in the Council's activities. There is a real risk that the Council of Jerusalem is a first step towards one of three "solutions" of the Jerusalem question:
* Separate Israeli and Palestinian municipal authorities to run West and East Jerusalem respectively.
* A single umbrella council, de-centralised in practice to separate bodies for East and West
"from the Jordan to the sea" Israel's parliament approved Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's peace deal with the PLO on 6 October 1995 by 61 votes to 59. Rabin donned his general's hat for the debate to try to outflank right-wingers who accuse him of wanting to return Israel to its pre-1967 borders. "The borders of the state of Israel under the permanent agreement will exceed the borders that existed prior to the Six Day ЛУШУУ War. We will not return to the lines of June 4th 1967," said Rabin, Israeli army chief of staff during the 1967 Middle East war. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said Israel had conceded nothing. "From the sea to the Jordan River and from the Jordan to the sea, there will be no other army but the Israeli Defense Forces." More than 20,000 Israelis lined the streets of central Jerusalem on the eve of the vote to protest against the deal, later surrounding the parliament building. The 1993 agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation passed by a vote of 61-50. Since then, Rabin's coalition has shrunk and maverick legislators have crossed lines on the peace issue. Two members of the ruling Labour party voted against this latest plan. 6 International Viewpoint n° 271 - November 1995 6
Palestine's
Jerusalem (adopting a formal model similar to the local government structure of London).
* An integrated municipal council.
politicians
The PFLP, DFLP and Hamas would, of course, refuse to participate in any of these three bodies. But the current council might just be a way of testing the water before
* Palestinian Pact Party carrying the other Palestinian forces further in the "process
Gaza-based. Supports the Palestinian of negotiation".
Authority
Leaders Abdalah Issa and Kannan Al Saraj
A number of political forces have called for the abandoning of the Jerusalem Council, and the establishment of a
* Palestinian Peace Movement
"Workplaces Commission". In Naplus and Ramallah, such
Gaza-based. Created as Arafat's response to commissions have become the main common structure of the Israeli peace movement, who criticised the lack of a Palestinian peace movement.
the various political forces. Village and local representatives
Leader: Assad Abu Sharkh, doctor at the Al participate in these bodies to discuss local social questions.
Azhar University
* Palestinian Patriotic Regroupment
INSIDE THE 1948 CEASE FIRE LINE
Naplus-based. Supports the Palestinian
Authority and the Oslo
Palestinians within the 1948 cease fire line are citizens of the
Accords, wants to
State of Israel, and can therefore participate to a limited
"reinforce democracy"
extent in parliamentary politics there. The main formation
Leader: Ahmed Tuqan supported by the members of the "two fronts" (DFLP,
* Patriotic Unionist
PFLP) is the Patriotic Democratic Regroupment. A
Regroupment founding congress will be held later this month, though
Jerusalem-based. Same torces already committed include the Abna Al Balad orientation as the movement, Pact and Equality Movement, the Progressive
Palestinian Patriotic
CALAME
4D
Regroupment
Movement of Mohamed Miarri, the Roots in the Negev
Leader: Daud Abu movement, and a number of independent personalities.
Ghazala
Some 59% of delegates to the recent Abna Al Balad
* Patriotic Movement for movement congress resolved not to present a list in the
Change forthcoming Knesset (Israeli Parliament) elections, not to
Led by former members oppose the presentation of any PDR list, and not to publicly of George Habash's
Popular Front for the endorse any electoral list.
Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP), following their
This position represents a compromise. A small minority of meetings with Arafat, this delegates wanted Abna Al Balad to dissolve itself into a formation declares it
PDR bloc. Others wanted to impose the demand for the goals as working for the abolition of the Zionist character of the State of Israel on any re-enforcement of the
Abna Al Balad or PDR list. In fact, of course, the Israeli
Palestinian authorities authorities would probably refuse to register any electoral and of democracy, and the "consolidation" of the perspectives of the list with such a demand.
Oslo accords.
Leaders: Khadar Al Maghribi and Youssef Al
After a long and difficult debate, Abna Al Balad has
Ajrami, emerged stronger from this conference, and is united around the new strategy.
* Patriotic Democratic Regroupmen so created by former FPLP members i
The Islamic fundamentalist movement inside the 1948 cease
Gaza, and since February 1995 incorporating fire line will abstain completely from the Israeli elections. It also the National Movement for Change
Leaders: Yussef Atwan and Fariss Yagh vill neither present nor endorse candidates. This is formally a very similar position to that of Abna Al Balad. Except that
* Arab Socialist Baath Party the fundamentalists cannot be expected to vote the same
Naplus-based, this scission of the Arab wav. Whereas most Abna Al Balad militants can be
Liberation Front was created after a meeting expected to vote for a PDR list.
between the fraction's leader, Jamal Al
Bastami, and Yasser Arafat.
*
* Movement for Democratic Construction
Reformist opposition formation, working for a constituent assembly, and stressing the importance of democratic reforms. Supported by the Palestinian people's Party (ex-
Leader: Haidar Abd Al Chafi.
Communist
* Islamic Process Movement and Islamic
Front
Both these scissions of Hamas (Movement of the Islamic Resistance) have been legally recognised by the Palestinian Authority.
7
International Viewpoint n° 271 — November 1995
Political Plaw and the
(absent) left by Adel Samara
THERE ARE TWO MEASURES AGAINST WHICH TO JUDGE THIS accord: the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and the effect on the imperialist-Zionist domination of the Arab homeland. As a solution to the rights of the Palestinians, notably the right to return, Oslo B has nothing to do with the essence of the conflict. It benefits the dependent Palestinian capitalists at the expense of the majority of the population. It guarantees the right of return for the leadership of the PLO and its police, at the expense of the right of return of two thirds of the Palestinians in the diaspora. As concerns the second yardstick, the best interpretation one can give to Oslo B is to see it as a functional division between the Israeli central government and the Palestinian self-rule authorities. A functional division of control over the West Bank and Gaza, that is. Not a functional division of control over all of Palestine. The direct subjection of the West Bank and Gaza to the occupation is being replaced with a "legitimisation" of the occupation, as has already happened in Gaza-Jericho. This reflects the balance of power between the dependent and comprador Palestinian capitalists and the Israeli lumpenimperialist regime. But why has the PLO leadership decided to negotiate? Why
Political Islam
Fundamentalism or
National Struggle?
by Adel Samara oublished in October 1995 by the Al Mashria Centre to
Development and Cultural Studies, Jerusalem. Price 16/$12 8 International Viewpoint n° 271 — November 1995 surrender? Why limit itself to the interests of the dependent, comprador social factions of the Palestinian people? The ambitions of these social factions never transcended the aim of having a small share in the joint exploitation (with the Israeli capitalists) of Palestinian labour. Far lower than the ambitions of a productive, nationalist pitalist class, which would seek to control its own, nation market. For a long time, in point of fact, the PLO leadership has been re-shaping the PLO's position to fit in with the ideology and interests of capital, and ruling capitalists in the region and on the global scale. This clarifies its iglimi (regional, provincial) ideology, as the negation of the panArab nationalism of the Arab popular classes.... What facilitates the signature of this agreement is the total absence of any action by the Palestinian radical leftist and democratic opposition. The last tew months have seen the 'rejectionists' moving, albeit indirectly, towards acceptance of Oslo. The situation is that of the internalisation of defeat by much of the radical left. Especially the leadership. The political Islamic movement is the only part of the rejectionist front which is still, in practice, resisting the agreement. This guarantees that movement a substantial part of popular support. The police machine of the self-rule authorities, and the occupation forces, are responding against this development. The radical left is unable to face the right-wing camp's surrender to the occupation, or to match the practical resistance of the political Islamic current. The radical left is formally against Oslo B. Today, I doubt the seriousness of this opposition. The left will doubtless stay in this position for a certain period. The real development will come from the popular Arab rejection of the agreement. Such a rejection is already visible among the activities of the trade unions, writers, journalists' associations and so on. When the agreement is applied, the Palestinian people will realise that it fails to regain their legitimate rights. And as long as the comprador Arab regimes continue to facilitate the Israeli intregration-through-domination of the Arab homeland, then popular resistance will be renewed. * Notes 1. 1 July 1994* 2. Visiting Gaza at the beginning of 1995 3. Figure given by George Al Abd at a recent press conference organised by the Abd Al Hamid Shuman in Amman, Jordan. 4.. $228 m., according to Nabil Shaat. 5. Al Umma (the Nation) has been banned, and the editor of the pro-Hamas newspaper Al Watan (the Motherland), Said Abu Sameh, sentenced to two years imprisonment for propaganda against the regime. His newspaper was closed for three months. 6. scission of the DFLP