Stop the imperialist military intervention
THE SITUATION in former Yugoslavia has changed in the last two months. The Croatian army's intervention in Krajina and the massive NATO attack [against the Bosnian Serbs] illuminate the fundamental dynamic of this conflict.
Let's start with the responsibilities and objectives of the current leaders of the various parties to the conflict. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has a primary responsibility for the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation. To keep his power within a bureaucratic regime in crisis, he launched a virulent nationalist campaign, which could only alarm the other peoples of Yugoslavia, and encourage secessionist tendencies. And those who insist on portraying Serbia as a bastion of "socialism" or anti-imperialism should note that Milosevic, just like the leaders of the other Yugoslav republics, had already begun flirting with the "market economy"
He has since watered down his strategy, for clear reasons. It is easier to shout out the ideology of Greater Serbia than to translate this ideology into a concrete political project, never mind carry out this project. Milosevic has discovered this, to his cost. He quickened the explosion of the federation, and provoked anti-Serb feelings and political decisions in the other republics. And yet the crisis in the Yugoslav army prevented him from solving the question by force. As Stojan Serovic comments in the independent weekly Vreme, all Milosevic can proclaim nowadays is the "Lesser-Greater Serbia"!
Milosevic is trapped. He has become the target of the outrageous currents with whom he was for a time in an alliance, and which now accuse him of weakness, even
Events in ex-Yugoslavia have provoked a wide-ranging debate within the European and international workers' movement. We publish here a contribution from our regular contributor Livio Maitan, member of the Italian Party of Communist Refoundation ("Rifondazione")
by Livio Maitan Paris, 24 September 1995 treason. And at the same time he must take into account the growing weariness of the poorer classes, less and less willing to carry the burden of a war which has caused a vertical drop in their standard of living.
Given this context, Milosevic has chosen the path of compromise (though without going back on a number of what he considers to be faits accomplis; the tight control over Kosovo, and a number of territorial demands). His goal is the lifting of the embargo, stemming the disintegration of the economy, and preventing any later aggravation of the conflict which could have unforeseen consequences for Serbia itself. The Bosnian Serbs could hardly be overjoyed by this change of direction: hence the conflict between Pale and Belgrade, and the murderous actions of the desperate soldiers of General Mladic against the unfortunate city of Sarajevo, and the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, with new "purification", and new convoys of desperate people fleeing their villages and towns.
CROATIA'S LEADERS were for a time not involved in major military operations, though they never gave up the idea of intervention in Bosnia, not just to settle the score with the Serbs, but also to counterpoise the Muslim influence. As they gradually realised that Milosevic was no longer able to re-launch the conflict at a higher level, that they could count on concrete international sympathy, and that the Bosnian government would support them, they went on the offensive against Krajina. They deployed a large part of their restructured armed forces, "modernised" with the direct assistance of the United States.
A large part of the international press has skated round the consequences of this intervention for the Serb population. Once more we saw people flee: tens, hundreds of thousands of them.
The third rascal, the Bosnian government, believed that no agreement, and therefore no durable cease-fire, was possible until they had imposed a more favourable balance of forces, by military means. This was what motivated the Bosnian army's various offensives during 1994 and 1995. The failure of these offensives could only reinforce the other strategy supported within the Bosnian leadership, that of ensuring a direct military intervention by the European powers, and above all the United States. Lifting the embargo on arms was only a supplementary goal. And embargo or no, the Bosnians have in fact received a significant quantity of armaments from abroad.
IN THE BEGINNING, the United States wanted to preserve the status quo, in the form of the Yugoslav federation. They worried about the situation becoming uncontrollable. And they saw that the economic choices already taken by the federal and republican leaderships represented an increase in the potential for penetration by imperialist capital.
But once the process of secession started, there new "independent" states were recognised quite quickly, with Germany the first major power to take this step.
As the conflict became more and more intense, the European powers and the USA hesitated. There were no important economic interests, and the strategic imperatives of the cold war were no longer valid. So the imperialist powers marked time, and became involved in a very limited way only, through the filter of the UN operation.
INTERNATIONAL OPINION became increasingly concerned, as the conflict continued to degenerate. The situation became more and more serious, and the implications for a whole region of Europe more and more difficult to predict with certainty. so despite ine mulapie ane- certainty. So despite the multiple diffe-
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rences between them, the imperialist powers decided to intervene, as energetically as possible.
The stakes were highest for the US. As the world power with hegemony pretensions, America had to show that in a serious situation like this, they were still able to impose their authority, and play the role of world supervisor, by virtue of their military superiority.
In this sense, and despite all the obvious distinctions, the intervention follows the same logic as the Gulf War. What is more, it creates an extremely serious precedent.
The intervention has clearly changed the situation on the ground. One of the reasons for hesitation was the conviction that an airborne intervention would not be sufficient, and that it would be necessary to deploy ground troops: such a decision would have been very difficult to take in Europe and in the US. This difficulty has now been overcome. The US and their allies bombard from the air and the sea, destroying the Serbian military system, without avoiding a number of civilian establishments. And at the same time, the Croat and Bosnian armies occupy the disputed territory.
Developments over the next few months are difficult to predict. Nothing is definitively "solved", , and all kinds of reversals of fortune are possible. This uncertainty is one more reason to try to be clear about the attitude Communists should adopt.
THERE IS NO QUALITATIVE social, political or ideological difference between the regimes in place in the republics of former Yugoslavia. These regimes have begun the restoration of capitalism (a remains a precarious and contradictory process). They have suppressed, or seriously eroded, the gains for workers, peasants and all democrats which were the result of the Yugoslav revolution and the Federal Republic which it created.
None of the governments in place respects even the most elementary political rights. They all make use of authoritarian methods. They have changed, or tried to change, the map of the region through war. They are inspired by reactionary nationalist ideology, favouring the ethnic purification which they have all practised, though to different degrees. As Salim Beslagic, Mayor of Tuzla, said in Rome on 6 September, "this is not a confrontation between the peoples, but between the national oligarchies"2
All this applied to the Bosnian army and government too. They now follow the same dynamic as the Serbian and Croatian forces. The courageous partisans of a multi-ethnic solution (from a Communist and internationalist point of view, the only valid solution) do not represent more than a small minority. They deserve our solidarity and support, but they can hardly influence the orientation and the actions of the Bosnian government and its army.
THE WAR MUST STOP. All military operations should cease immediately. This is the condition sina qua non for reversing the perverse dynamic of nationalist and racist hysteria, destruction and massacre, to make possible the re-emergence of the most basic forms of civil society, and to sketch out political solutions which respect the interests and aspirations of the peoples concerned.
Those who doubt the sense of such a demand should consider this: About six months ago the precarious cease-fire was broken. The conflict flared up, with new killings, ethnic cleansing and exodus of population, mainly poor peasants, at a scale more massive than before. The International Red Cross talks of 350,000 refugees. No nation, no national group has benefited from this latest round of war. All have again paid the tragic price.
Are the Bosnians right to celebrate the change in the balance of forces, and the failures encountered by the Bosnian Serbs? From a nationalist, or a short-sighted perspective, perhaps. But the situation is still unstable, and peace is not at all assured. In the new context, the future of the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia in particular, will be determined much more by the interests and demands of the major imperialist powers than by the will of the peoples.
Communists and internationalists should under no pretext support such a perspective. In the face of a typical imperialist project, it is impossible to shuffle in silence. We must say "stop the bombing! Stop the NATO intervention!" Notes 1. Vreme, 2 September 1995. 2. This pertinent characterisation has not, unfortunately, prevented Beslagic from supporting a NATO military intervention.
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Workers
Dominique Duclois and Annick Coupé of the French communication workers' union SUD participated in the August 1995 convoy to Tuzla organised by Workers' Aid for Bosnia International Viewpoint: Why did SUD support the convoy?
SUD had not previously been involved in any real solidarity with Bosnia. Partly through lack of time, but also because the question is quite complicated. As a trade union, we don't have a deep analysis of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the course of the war, and who is responsible. We decided to participate after trade unionists from Tuzla visited Paris in January-February 1995. This visit clarified for us who was the aggressor and who the aggressed. The multi-ethnic and multi-cultural aspect of the Bosnians' struggle seemed to express the same values that we as a trade union defend. Our struggle against the far right and racism here in France is linked to the struggle in Bosnia on the same questions.
We also felt that, if the trade union movement doesn't involve itself in the solidarity campaign, we will be leaving the field open for extremists and fundamentalists of all kinds. And last but not least, SUD has always said that solidarity doesn't stop at the gate of your workplace, nor at the country's frontiers.
The Tuzla trade unionists who visited Paris made an appeal for French participation in a British convoy that was being planned. I should note that, while it proved easy for SUD to get involved, I don't think we really managed to mobilise across the PTT (Post Office/Telephone company). Of course, collecting material and delivering it over there is positive. The problem is being able to explain what is happening in Bosnia, and the need for solidarity, here in France, inside the PTT.
This difficulty partially explains the progressive loss of the idea of international solidarity across the French trade union movement, and not just concerning Bosnia. The strong tradition of solidarity in the [mainly Communist] CGT federation, and the Polish solidarity work of the [moderate| CFDT federation is fading, because of the difficulties facing the trade union movement. The disintegration of the East European countries, and the particularly complicated situation in Bosnia also have their effect. Most people start feeling that there is no difference between the different warring parties - because they don't understand what's going on. How was the August 1995 convoy organised?
The coal-mining region of Tuzla collected important aid for the British miners during their great 1984 strike. The war and the fascist siege of Tuzla led them to request aid for themselves. This is how Workers Aid was created — to support the workers of Tuzla. SOB (France) was formed in 1993 following contacts with the British campaign. Only a handful of people were involved at the beginning, but we have managed to organise two convoys to Tuzla.
Four SUD militants accompanied our 38 tonne lorry, which carried foodstuffs. As well as delivering the aid, we wanted to show out support for the workers there by our very presence in the besieged city.
As we drove down the Croatian coast, the effects of the war became more and more tangible. In the north we were held up by the large number of trucks transporting wind-surfing equipment for tourists. But in Masenica the bridge had been dynamited. The whole Zadar region was in ruins. We finally arrived in Split, where we met up with the other participants, 20 vehicles, mainly from Britain, but also from France, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
We were blocked for two days in Split by the formalities demanded by the Croats of "Herzeg Bosna" 2 While we were waiting we saw a convoy of a hundred trucks carrying petrol: presumably as part of the preparation for the offensive against Knin, the main town of Krajina [Croatian region until recently controlled by Croatian Serb secessionists].
The next stop was Mostar, at the frontier between "Herzeg-Bosna" and Bosnia. The Muslim part of town was completely destroyed by the Croats at the beginning of the war. The [historic] bridge was destroyed, and the mosques dynamited. The Croatian side of town is intact.
The people we spoke to told us that the Croats are blocking the UN initiatives to reconstruct the town, because they refuse all co-operation with the Bosnian Muslems. Most of our contacts thought that 80% of the Mostar Croats would prefer the partition of the town. We discharged part of the aid, and moved on.
We followed the river Neretva for 100 km, through a region where everything had been destroyed. In one village the Other aid initiatives
AJUDA OBRERA (CATELONIA) AND ARGUITECTOS SIN FRONTERAS
International work brigade to reconstruct university buildings (2 groups of 35 participants). Shares many of the priorities of IWA, but has some verv militant demands