On 1 January the armed insurrection of the EZLN moved national politics towards the left, encouraging radicalism and the hope that the Priista regime would come to an end. The assassination of Colosio moved the political scene back to the right, by injecting uncertainty, fear and conservatism.
However, the assassination was only the most dramatic manifestation of the decomposition of PRI power. The public perceived this, and it lost a great deal of prestige.
The crisis pervaded the atmosphere; the regime found itself held at bay. Although the democratic opposition did not cease its activity, with hindsight it is clear that it squandered its chance. Nothing should have been accepted which would not make a radical change to the rules of the game, including election organisation. It was mistaken in its calculation that it would achieve such a huge vote that fraud could be overcome.
What is painful is that, while the Zapatistas made sacrifices and played their part in creating that chance, the democratic citizens' movement did not do the same.
The regime has recovered a certain degree of control over the situation, both on the economic and political plane. It has now defused the most explosive elements and, although there is the internal divisions amongst the ruling class on the one hand, and on the other the founding of the CND, they have as yet not had a decisive influence on the mind of the State nor on the conscience of the broadest sections of the population.
The results are there to see; but it would be a serious error of judgement to suppose that the situation is intractable and that the regime is about to enjoy a new period of stability. The State party continues to be rocked by conflict and the democratic tasks which have characterised this period still remain.
Tasks and perspectives
What was made clear on 21 August is that the transition to democracy, and the end and dismantling of the Priista dictatorship, will be both a longer and more complex process than anticipated. But the process is on-going. A Cárdenas victory would have avoided many problems and reduced the time period: This was the view of those on the revolutionary left who decided to support his candidacy. This is what the Zapatistas understood, who in contrast to sectarians and ultra-leftists, knew that he could not nor should not avoid the electoral scene, and that the consequences of their actions would touch all of us, even though we preferred to close our eyes.
While others have a gradualist vision of transition, we believe that for there to be real change there must first be a rupture. In the short term the possibility of this was posed in the possibility of a Cárdenas victory. What has happened now is that the rupture has been postponed, and it will be a great challenge to discover the routes by which we may once again reach this possibility.
The advances made in proving the illegitimacy of the election, the persistence of the democratic movement against the State party, the possibility that major financial scandals will come to light and that new evidence will be
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"Triumph" rooted in fraud uncovered of the crimes in which the "mafias of power" are involved, and further infighting and fresh splits amongst the decadent Priista "family" will continue to threaten the regime. All this is happening within a framework in which, despite the announcement of growth and stability following the victory of the PRI, Salinismo has left undermined key areas of the economy and generated huge unrest, including amongst sectors of the business world - not to mention the majority of the population, for whom any growth which has taken place in the last six years has been nothing more than a growth in poverty and unemployment.
The most difficult problem for the PRI continues to be Chiapas, where there is a strong possibility that the electoral fraud will be overturned and which is still on the brink of civil war. While clearly the EZLN did not benefit from the outcome of the election, its local and national presence cannot be effaced by the government. Even away from the Chiapaneco problem, the existence of armed organisations is a permanent problem for the State.
### Gradualism fails
There continues to be head-on struggle with the State party dictatorship. Gradualism has proved to be a failure, yet in return for some minor concessions it has continued to give it oxygen.
On all fronts, not just political, we must put forward initiatives aimed at the dismantling of the State party. To do so we must politicise the social struggle in the unions, the urban areas, the country, and so forth.
Changes also have to be made in the importance ascribed to the various social and political protagonists which have been struggling against the State party. As a result of the election result we are possibly witnessing the wane of the Cardenista leadership in this struggle. This is not because Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas did not demonstrate great integrity or was not important, but because the role of the political forces is changing in the new scenario. If the pre-electoral scenario - with the social and citizens movement, the Zapatistas, the "mediating" forces and the Cardenista campaign- was inevitably compartmentalised, the post-electoral scenario is even more so. It is vital that we learn to combine, co-ordinate, and synchronise the different social and political protagonists.
The National Democratic Convention founded in Aguascalientes, Chiapas, should play a fundamental role in this. Seen in defensive terms, the CND represents the ultimate army-in-waiting to deal with the oppressive intentions of the regime and its preservation is vital for all. However, seen in the medium term, the CND should be the space in which the different social and political protagonists in the struggle against the State party dictatorship are united and which forms a focus for change at this moment of crisis in traditional politics.
The CND cannot give respite to the regime. The objectives upon which it was founded (a transitional government and a Constituent Assembly) are more valid than ever and should guide its activity at all times. The ways, means and time period in which to meet these objectives may be various. But it is clear today that the only way in which the extensive and long-suffered State party system will be vanquished is through a broad social alliance; the CND may serve as the seed. *
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EZLN demands respect
Communiqué from the Underground General Committee of the Zapatista
Army of National Liberation, Mexico.
15 September 1994
To the people of Mexico:
To the peoples and governments of the world:
To the national and international press:
The Underground General Committee of the EZLN denounces and declares the following:
Brothers and sisters:
1. Salinas de Gortari has deceived both national and international public opinion with his so-called desire for dialogue. The supreme government is preparing for a military solution by increasing the number of troops and military experts in the field of operations, intimidating the civil population and the suppression and murder of fighters by its paramilitary forces.
2. The armed forces of this wicked government have now sent ten divisions to the southeast with which to crush the honourable voice of the Zapatistas. With these even greater in number than the 50 thousand federal troops already here, the supreme government is attempting to strike fear into the rebellion of the EZLN against the fraud and illegitimacy which it is aiming to establish with the support of the communications monopolies in Mexico.
3. The federal troops which occupy the municipal centres of Ocosingo, Altamirano and Las Margaritas have begun patrols outside their actual territory and gone into Zapatista territory with the intention of provoking our troops, intimidating the civil population and forcing an end to the ceasefire.
4. The federal air force has resumed night flying, carrying out low-altitude flight manoeuvres above civilian areas.
During the night of 12 September, the same date that the usurping power threatened the Chiapanecos with suppres sion, federal army warplanes carried out intimidatory manoeuvres above dwellers in the towns of Las Margaritas and
5. In high governmental circles a military solution has already been decided upon. They are only awaiting an opportune moment in which to attack the Zapatista positions.
6. The EZLN is addressing itself to the federal army, to its high command, officers and soldiers to ask that, although it nas been decided that armed force should be the response to our demands for democracy, liberty and justice, i conducts itselt in accordance with military honour and with respect for the civilian population. Our troops are ready t fight back and have received orders to defend our land until the last. We will fight with honour and dignity.
7. An end to the ceasefire upon the part of the federal troops, and the consequent outbreak of war, fits in with the scheme of the usurper Salinas de Gortari for the creation of a situation favourable to his desire to hold on to power.
8. In response to the warlike attitude of the usurper of federal executive power, the EZLN has placed all its troops on
"Red Alert".
9. The EZLN reaffirms its decision to hold to its demands of:
Democracy!
Liberty!
Justice!
With respect.
From the mountains of south-east Mexico.
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