Wind in the Islamic sail
THE Turkish municipal elections of 27 March received a great deal of attention in the international press. This was essentially as a result of the Muslim fundamentalist's relative success. Even though this victory, which our correspondent analyses, will have major consequences, the stakes of the elections were not limited to this aspect alone. Indeed, the most important aspect was the clarification of the process of political recomposition currently underway. ERDAL TAN Istanbul, 20 April 1994
HIRTEEN formations T contested the elections, with nine of them garnering some 25 percent of votes cast. This confirms the extreme fragmentation of political life in the country.
The 1980 coup d'etat led to a breakup of the traditional political system, based on two big parties — one of the centre-right, the other of the centre-left. Since the coup, the centre-right (which had majority support in the country in the 1950s) has been divided into two rival formations which are each other's throats. The Motherland Party (ex-President Özal's ANAP) and the Just Path Party(President Demerel's DYP).
### Division
The bourgeoisie deplores this division and for three years has been calling in vain for a rapprochement and a coalition between these two nearly-identical parties.
The centre-left split into four parts after 1980, giving birth in the early 1980s to the social democratic Populist Party (SHP, currently in a government coalition with the DYP) and the Democratic Left (DSP, of former Prime Minister Ecevit). Then followed the creation of the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Kurdish nationalist
Democracy Party (DEP), which both left the SHP in 1991.
This extreme fragmentation of political life — which threatens the stability of the bourgeoisie's system of rule - is accompanied by the difficulties in bringing forward a new generation into the ruling elites. This has been highlighted by Ozal's death last year, the current President Demirel (who is virtually a retiree) and the retirement of Erdal Inönü from the presidency of the SHP.
One of the central issues of the elections was the settling of the conflict over the leadership of the right-wing, between Prime Minister Ciller (president of the DYP) and Yilmaz (president of the ANAP). The ANAP, which is present above all in the big cities, was favoured by a big bourgeoisie nostalgic for the time of Ozal which it sees as its golden age. The DYP, which has a more rural character, representing the small and medium-sized provincial bourgeosie, is not trusted in this milieu due to its populist tendencies.
It is for this reason that the arrival of Tansu Ciller — a young bourgeois careerist from Istanbul educated on the American model, who has the stated ambition of becoming "Turkey's Iron Lady" — at the head of the DYP was encouraged and greeted with joy in Istanbul business circles. They hoped she would incarnate Özal's liberal reformism, as opposed to Demirel's prudent and populist conservatism.
But Ciller's record in office, where she has been for less than a year, was soon to disappoint her supporters in the media and the big bourgeoisie. Helped along by their male chauvinist attitude, they quickly called her incompetent and re-directed their support to the ANAP and Mazut Yimaz, Ozal's young successor.
But the election battle produced a confused result with no winners. During the campaign, neither of the two forces stood out in relation to the other, nor did either manage to push ahead of the other in the election results themselves. Only 200 thousand votes seperated the two (the DYP polling 21.5 percent, and the ANAP about 21 percent).
Nevertheless, these results are a victory, even if only psychological, for DYP leader Ciller over the ANAP's Yilmaz. maz. Indeed, in spite of polls which pointed to an electoral defeat, Ciller managed to put up unexpected resistance, even though support for the DYP fell by about 5 percent compared to the 1991 legislative elections.
While this 5 percent fall in the governing DY's support may seem normal — given the crisis of democracy and a near 50 percent devaluation in the value of the Turkish pound — the 3 percent drop in votes for the ANAP (in relation to the 1991 elections) is much more difficult to explain, except as a result of its inability to present itself as a credible governmental alternative.
Political manoeuvres will therefore have to take the place of a clear verdict from the results of the election. But the problem remains for the bourgeoisie, which has still not found a charismatic and powerful leader of the Mendares, Demirel and Ozal variety.
The situation is even more confusing for the left, which has suffered a major defeat. The combined vote of the three parties (SHP, DSP and CHP) hit a historic low at 27 percent. It was at 31.5 percent in 1991 and 37.7 percent in 1989. The SHP remains the strongest left-wing party with 13.6 percent, but it has lost one third of its voters in the space of two years (and one half in relation to the last local elections in 1989), along with most of the local governments it had captured in 1989, including the country's three major cities: Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.
### Defeat
With a 7 percent drop in the SHP's score (in relation to 1991), these elections are a political defeat for its new leader, Murat Karayalcin, who succeeded Inänü last September and dreamed of becoming the "Felipe González of the Turkish left"
The DSP of Ecevit (an old charismatic leader from the 1970s, the "Turkish Papandreou" ", ran a highly chauvinistic and rightist campaign, especially on the Kurdish question. The party's vote dropped to 9 percent.
The CHP received 4.5 percent.
That said, the actual defeat of the social democratic left is much more limited than the psychological impact,
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given the loss of the three major cities and cities in the southeast (including Diyerbakir) to the Islamic fundamentalists. The SHP and the CHP received 18 percent of votes, which is only a 3 percent drop from 1991, when they ran together. In many cities - including the three major ones — the SHP candidate only lost by a frew thousand votes, and would have won with the support of the CHP or the DSP
This factor can be explained in part as a result of the disaffection of a sizeable minority of the Kurdish electorate following the split of the DEP. This was their way to censure the coalition parties — in particular the SHP — for the repressive policy of the government in the Kurdish region.
The coalition government has been burned on the Kurdish question. Its effective complicity with the policy of repression has discredited it in the eyes of the Kurdish electorate, while its verbal opposition to the most extreme measures of repression has angered the nationalist wing of the Turkish electorate.
In this way, the SHP is paying for two years of complicity with the DYP in the right-wing government that has kept hardly any of its promises of democratisation, and which has chosen to manage the capitalist crisis on a day-to-day basis. Corruption scandals in SHP-run municipal governments also lost it some votes.
### Promises
The Kurdish question in part determined the outcome of these elections. Ciller came to power promising democratic reforms, especially on the Kurdish question. But very soon, the weakness of her political base forced her to ally herself with the army, lining up behind the policy of full-scale repression advocated by the "hawks" of the State.
In response to the dramatic increase in repression, the DEP withdrew a few weeks before the election date and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) called for a boycott.
This clearly skewed results in the Kurdish region and in the big cities in the west (where the majority of Kurds actually live). The real participation figures in the Kurdish region are a subject for debate. Kurdish nationalists place them at 50 percent in certain cities, whereas the national figure was 92 percent. A high number of blank votes and spoiled ballots was also reported, particularly in Diyarbakir where the figure is said to have reached 50 percent of ballots cast.
But the Kurdish movement, which received a number of blows - for example, the arrest of the 96 DEP deputies and the suspension of the nationalist daily Kurde Özgür Gündem — is losing speed. The PKK is having difficulty in the military arena. The systematic destruction of Kurdish villages suspected of supporting its guerrilla forces has reduced its support significantly.
The Turkish army, which has been responsible for the deaths of some 300,000 people in the southeast of the country, is proceeding on a sector by sector basis and has organised operations right into northern Iraq to destroy PKK bases. It hopes to be able to declare a "military victory" sometime between now and the end of the summer, leaving the "settling of the Kurdish question" to civilian politicians who would make some superficial reforms. But reality could be very different.
The rise of Turkish nationalism in reaction to the Kurdish national movement and the actions of the PKK has certainly let Ciller make up the electoral ground lost as a result of the economic crisis. She took the lead thanks to her aggressive propaganda on the theme of the struggle against separatist terrorism (a DYP poster even declared, "each vote for the DYP is a bullet against the PKK").
This also explains the success of the semi-fascist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which doubled its votes from the last elections, thus achieving its best score ever with 8 percent of votes cast.
At the same time, the absence of nationalist candidates worked to the advantage of the Muslim fundamentalists in the Prosperity Party (RP), which won the majority of municipal governments in the Kurdish region. It won 19 percent of votes nationally, increasing its score by 4 to 5 percent compared with the legislative elections of 1991.
If one adds the number of Islamic fundamentalist-type and semi-fascist candidates elected from the "centrist" parties, it is clear that the country is sliding towards the far-right, which took 30 percent of votes cast (between the RP, MHP and small far-right parties).
Politically, the DYP/SHP coalition government has come to an end. DYP, ANAP and MHP deputies collaborate systematically in parliament, creating a de facto right-wing coalition.
But the question of making a government out of this de facto coalition runs up against the problem of the leadership of the right-wing. For the moment, this stumbling block has allowed the Ciller government to survive.
As a result, the bourgeoisie finds itself in a very uncomfortable situation. There is a government and a prime minister that no longer enjoys the confidence of the house and the country, but it has no choice in the short-term but to support it, insofar as the government has adopted the programme of austerity and radical restructuring that it has been demanding for three years.
However, the implementation of such a plan — which calls for privatisations, the closing of so-called unprofitable public firms (such as the coal mines), radical tax reform, price rises up to 100 percent, and a semi-freeze on salaries — requires a strong government that can confront social discontent.
For the bourgeoisie, the fear of social revolt is very real. The main trade union federation, Türk-is, reacted very strongly to the social elements of the package, threatening the government with a general strike. There is furious agitation among workers in firms slated to be closed down - such as the Petlas factory in Kirsehir, the shipyards of Haliç and the Tekel factory in Cibali.
Anger is rising in the Zonguldaket and Karabük mining regions. More than 35 thousand miners and their families demonstrated in response to the call of the miners trade union of Zongulalak — against closure and privatisation. The president of Türk-is, M. Moralmi, participated as did ANAP and CHP deputies.
### Reply
That said, the trade union movement does not appear up to organising a real and massive reply in all sectors. 1993 was one of the calm years in the area of trade union struggles. Upcoming struggles will likely be largely defensive in nature. The effects of demoralisation caused by the economic crisis and the lack of a political alternative - the absence of a real "class struggle" party and the divisions and discredit of the social democratic parties (which all have a right-wing line on the question of the economy) - weaken the working class movement.
Rumour has it that trade union leaders are even in the process of negotiating a kind of social contract with the employers. One of the questions raised on the eve of the elections was whether in coming years Turkey would go through a period resembling "the Spanish model" — with sustained economic
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growth (6 to 7 percent on average for the last few years, with an inflation rate of 70 percent and a foreign debt of US$65 billion), the stabilisation of a bourgeois democracy, with a social contract and democratic reforms, a peaceful and reformist outcome to the Kurdish question, and continued integration into the European Union.
### Financial crisis
The fundamentalist victory in the municipal elections comes at a time of deep financial crisis, the implementation of austerity measures, the degradation of the traditional political system, the current impasse on the Kurdish question and growing instability outside the country (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Iraq and Cyprus).
For nearly 25 years the independent Islamic fundamentalist current — represented by the Prosperity Party (RP) of M. Erbarkan — has had a constant presence in Turkey's political life. For a long time it was a marginal force restricted to certain cities in central Anatolia and in the Kurdish region, based primarily on traditionalist rural currents. This party underwent serious internal changes in the 1980s and began to set down roots in the cities.
Taking advantage of the integration of the conservative Islamic current of the traditional right into the State apparatus — particularly at the time of Özal's prime ministership, ideologically rehabilitated by Özal's "neo-Ottoman" ideological line, and profiting from a favourable conjuncture (Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria), the Muslim fundamentalists grew in force.
The new municipal governments won by the RP - thanks to the split in the liberal and secular vote - could well become "liberated zones" and a basis for future gains.
While the national score of the RP (19 percent) remains rather limited, its gains are no less real, especially if one considers the moral and material victories represented by the winning of a high number of municipal governments, including nearly all the cities in central Anatolia and the Kurdish region.
To this should be added the victories in Ankara, the political and administrative capital and in Istanbul, the economic, cultural and social capital of the country. The RP won by less than 10 thousand votes in Ankara (3 million inhabitants) in front of the SHP, and by less than 100 thousand votes in Istanbul (10 million inhabitants) ahead of the ANAP. In
Izmir (2 million inhabitants and the country's third largest city), it was an "undercover fundamentalist" (a candidate on the DY slate) that won, only 20 thousand more votes ahead of the outgoing SHP mayor.
The RP is not just an ordinary party and its victory in a number of large urban centres could have a dramatic effect on the country's future. It is clear that the victory in the municipal elections is only a first step for the fundamentalists in their strategy for the conquest of State power - which would mean a total change in the government and in the way of life.
The possibility of such an outcome has plunged secular milieux into disbelief and consternation - especially women, worried by threats on their freedoms and way of life. In the euphoria of the RP victory, there were random incidents of "beards" threatening and committing acts of aggression against women in the streets. The craziest rumours have begun to circulate and an atmosphere of "fear in the city" has emerged, particularly in Istanbul. The possibility of army intervention has been raised, as has a development along Iranian and Algerian lines.
Beyond the pyschological impact, however, the reality is much more complex and the fundamentalists' task is not so simple. Had there been two rounds of voting and an alliance of the centre, the RP would have won no more than 3 or 4 municipalities in central Anatolia. Moreover, it seems that the RP committed mass fraud in neighbourhoods under its control. But the State did not dare cancel elections, fearing a radicalisation of the RP and a dangerous test of strength.
The RP vote did not have the same meaning, and will not have the same consequences, everywhere. While it seems probable that it will strengthen the fundamentalists' hegemony in central Anatolia, the management of Kurdish cities - where nationalists and the PKK retain a real presence - will be more difficult and conflict-ridden. In Diyarbarkir, for example, where the RP candidate won with 35 percent of votes cast, its real score taking into account abstentions and spoiled ballots — was only 14 percent.
In Ankara, the new RP mayor is more of a fascist-type dissident than a fundamentalist activist. He is a former member of the MHP and the nationalist wing of the ANAP, and his victory is due in part to his personal popularity in nationalist circles. As a mayor of the capital city, protocol demands that there be co-operation with State leaders and the army — and this will be a check on fundamentalist excesses. He could very well leave the RP and join a new party of the reunited centre-right.
In Istanbul, the situation is somewhat different. The new mayor, M. Erdogan, is a pure product of the RP, a committed and intelligent fundamentalist, and a leader of the "renovator" current of the party.
The RP won in nearly all the popular suburbs that surround the city, as well as in three municipalities of prestigious neighbourhoods (now rather impoverished), including Beyoglu, the city's cultural and commercial centre. The RP finds itself in command of a considerable amount of power (and money), and will have greater access to the media. This will enable it to expand its audience.
### Difficult
Nevertheless, Istanbul is a difficult piece to swallow. Running a cosmopolitan and industrial city of 10 million inhabitants is a much more complex affair than an Anatolian village or a distant suburb. In spite of the knowledge of its activists, the RP may very well stumble in the process.
The RP is based primarily among new layers of migrants who come in their large majority from the Black Sea region and the east of the country. The RP vote reflects the socio-economic disarray of these uprooted and disinherited layers, a cultural shock and rejection of city life based on the western cultural model and of a capitalist mode of consumption to which they only partially have access.
For the moment, the RP victory is more a defeat for the traditional bourgeois parties than a fundamentalist victory. The main parties have virtually identical profiles and programs that the voter no longer sees the difference. If the RP is the only party making gains, it is because it is the only one that claims to represent a global and radical alternative to the system and "clean and uncorrupt" management.
In other words, it is above all the absence of a coherent left-wing force in government that has let the RP emerge and fill the void. Taking this reasoning a bit further, and given the discredit of the main bourgeois parties, it can be argued that the growth of the RP remains "modest" due to the rejection of its overly fundamentalist and backward image
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by the overwhelming majority of the population. This explains the attempts at "renovation" within the RP, which tried to change its image before the elections. It even recruited a number of modern women — a dentist that does not wear a scart over her head, a former model from Istanbul's "high society", and so on.
In Istanbul, the RP is up against a number of dilemmas that could prove fatal. If its municipal government takes on a fundamentalist hue (to appease the extremist fringe), the RP will come up against considerable opposition from the majority of the population, which is hostile to fundamentalism and has a secular way of life that it would be impossible to change without the use of force.
But as long as the RP does not have power on a national level, it will not have the means for such a confrontation. On the contrary, the State apparatus could well try to champion hostility to fundamentalist excesses itself, in order to avoid popular self-organisation and mobilisation.
### Important
Istanbul is far too important a city on the international level and for tourism. The "cultural innovations" of the RP would not go unnoticed, and would create scandals and provoke a reaction from the ministers of tourism and culture.
If the RP government aims first and foremost to meet the social aspirations of its voters in the poor suburbs, and takes on radical populist hues, it could well run up against tremendous resistance from established economic forces (large industry, the banking sector, foreign enterprises, organised crime) — which would lead to economic bankruptcy, in turn leading to intervention by the State apparatus.
If on the other hand the RP takes a low profile and tries to make a temporary compromise with the powers that be in the city - within the framework of a stagist strategy — it could be corrupted by the old city.
This would appear to be the evolution preferred by the major employers. One of its main representatives declared, "Turkey is not adapting to the RP, but the RP will adapt to Turkey."
This is the real question: will the RP maintain its identity as a radical Islamic party that hopes to change the system, or will it become a conservative "Islamicdemocratic" party integrated into the system?
The united socialist
In other words, will the new RP governments be satisfied with a strong alternative dose of Muslim conservatism added to
The revolutionary left was divided on the current system (which the big bourthe question of whether it should partigeoisie could easily accommodate), or cipate in the municipal elections or call will they orient themselves to a radical for a boycott in solidarity with the Kurshake-up with the goal of setting up an dish national movement. A number of
Islamic Republic, thus directly confrongroups (a majority of which had neiting the powers that be?
ther the means nor the intention to
To be sure, as the Iranian example participate in the elections) called for a shows, the fundamentalists' "change of boycott, going so far as calling those the system" is limited to the political and who participated "lackeys of the Turkisocial superstructure and does not touch sh State" and "collaborators in the capitalism as such, in spite of all the dirty war against against the Kurdish people". Others ran independent canpopulist and anti-imperialist posturing.
didates in certain regions. Two parties
Among the RP's financial backers ran slates on a national level: the can be found Saudi Arabia and many
(Maoist) Workers Party (IP) and the
"fundamentalist" Turkish capitalists,
Socialist Unity Party (SBP), with each such as the head of the giant agro-busiwinning about 80,000 votes, or 0.3% ness firm Biscuits Olker. But the RP of votes cast.
cannot be considered a simple bourgeois party that is more conservative
The SBP ran a unitary slate, the United Socialist Alternative (BSA), in than others.
which other currents participated -
Due to the many internal contrathe SBP (ex-CP), Kurtulus, Emek dictions and divergent social inter-
(which withdrew from the elections but ests, the future evolution of the RP remained in the BA), and Yeniyol may even lead to a split. But for the
(Fourth Internationalists).
moment, it has the wind in its sails,
One of the main themes of the BSA and it is the radical sectors that campaign was solidarity with the Kurhold sway.
dish people and the struggle against
The fundamentalists hope to the dirty war and the repression set up an Islamic Republic, a new meted out to Kurdish deputies. Candi-
"Ottoman Empire" that would dates of the BSA defended this line in take out its revenge on the West all their public meetings and in their and on the secular republican television spots.
government, to once again
This unitary effort - a very recent
"leader of the become the undertaking - met with real success
Muslim world".
(on its modest scale) and holds out
Turkish fundamentalism, promise for the post-election period.
unlike the Arab variant, has
The goal is the building of a unitary an imperial, nationalist hue.
party, not on the basis of an ideologi-
A fundamentalist governcal debate and total programmatic ment would inevitably fusion (which could end in the usual unleash a military adventusterile impasse), but based on united re.
action around a platform of common
Its project also implies demands and on democratic internal radical changes in social functioning that respects the identity of life and in the functioeach component.
ning of the State appara-
The important common work carried tus. A shift from "bourout during the elections bodes well for geois democracy"
the future, and other currents have
(however militarialready decided to join. ® sed) to a theocratic
Islamic dictatorship would not be without given consequence for Turkish the RP a capitalism. It is oriented entirely key role. Its course in the towards the European Union
(more than half of foreign trade), and coming period will the big bourgeoisie has gambled everydetermine much of what the thing on integration into the EU.
future holds for the country. *
The radical Islamic fundamentalists are pushing the leadership of the RP into a confrontation with the State. The depth of the current crisis in the country has
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