New chapter in CPP crisis
THE Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is in deep crisis. Last year, the party began to fracture. The repercussions from the crisis will be felt by the entire Filipino left. Some of the effects will be positive, insofar as it gives rise to the kind of pluralistic debate that had, until recently, been smothered; but also negative, because it has been accompanied by devastating revelations and an oppressive factional atmosphere which could lead to physical liquidations in the near future.
several CPP organisations had declared their "autonomy".
It is still too early to sketch an organisational balance sheet of the CPP crisis. The Sison faction probably remains the largest in terms of numbers. According to certain disputed estimates, it controls about 60% of the current forces of the party, while the opposition controls 40%. But the crisis has not yet come to an end, and there will likely be further repercussions.
What we are seeing is a crisis of legitimacy for a party that has lost a lot of the political influence and moral sway it had earned during the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship. This crisis can be seen at all levels.
Firstly, there is an internal crisis of legitimacy. The Party is now paying the price for its bureaucratic centralist functioning. In a way, the only source of internal legitimacy was success itself. Throughout its twenty-five years of history the Party has never held a congress - save for the founding congress in 1968, which only brought together a handful of cadre. Since then, no national leadership bodies have ever been elected, rather they renew themselves from CC plenum to CC plenum.
1. See Paul Petitjean, 'Crisis in Philippine Communist Party', International Viewpoint, no. 241, 21 December 1992.
2. The term "national democratic" (Nat Dem or ND) designates the current organised and inspired by the CPP. It brings together clandestine organisations - including the National Democratic Front - and other legal ones.
3. Founded in 1968 with a handful of members, the CPP grew massively, especially between 1975 and 1985. It was the backbone of resistance to the Marcos dictatorship and had a guerrilla force of 25,000 fighters, including 15,000 "regulars". It lead a grouping of popular organisations that organised several hundred thousand members. It experimented with different forms of struggle. For a long time it had a great amount of political legitimacy and incontestable moral prestige. At one time it could claim to be the last dynamic politico-military organisation in Southeast Asia. The leadership's errors of judgement, in 1985-86, lead to a "hard" boycott of the presidential elections, which isolated it and marginalised it within the huge anti-Marcos mobilisations and in the end left the ground open for Corazon Aquino.
4. On this question, see Paul Petitjean, 'New debates on Philippine left', International Viewpoint, no. 211, 22 July 1991.
5. Jose Maria "Joma" Sison was, under the name of Amado Guerrero, the first chair of the CC of the CPP from 1968 until his arrest in 1977. Freed in 1986, in 1987 he found himself exiled in Holland (although without asylum rights), and has been living there ever since. He is once again chair of the CPP, under the name of Armando Liwanag. Benito Tiamzon is the current vice-chair. Sison, Tiamzon and his wife, Wilma Austria, are members of the executive committee.
PAUL PETITJEAN - 17 February 1994 T HE fears which surfaced at the end of 1992 have become fact.' In the absence of a national congress the crisis of the CPP has deepened, resulting in a new wave of rank and file departures, continuing organisational break-up and a loss of political substance. The CPP of yesteryear is in its death throes and the configuration of the entire Filipino left is being dramatically shaken up. The so-called "national democratic" popular organisations and the united coalitions are splitting too.2 A new recomposition is emerging, which is bringing together elements of the non-Communist left and the democratic opposition of the CPP.
The origin of the crisis is well known. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be summarised by reference to two decisive dates.
would not organise the debate, and it went no where.
Secondly, 1991-92. A section of the leadership team around Ric Reyes attempted to open a discussion in order to prepare a congress.4 However, even if it was already quite late, for the SisonTiamzon wing it was still too early and they violently opposed the idea. For them, a congress was out of the question, since it could have legitimised the conceptions of leaders and organisations that had grown too independent of the "founding father" 5 The Sison-Tiamzon wing, who controlled the executive committee (which at the time only had three members), undertook a "rectification" campaign — a veritable ideological call to order including a purge of recalcitrant elements.
By the end of 1992, the chance of an internal compromise seemed very limited. In July 1992, the Sison wing had convened a plenum of the Central Com-
10m PLENIN mittee (CC) - the
NOEKTRON tenth such gathering
- to organise their rectification campaign. The opposiure tion refused to
Conjunctur
Firstly, 1985-86. The central leadership of the CP made a two-fold error, which marginalised the party after a period of remarkable growth.3 It implemented a sectarian line on the question of alliances, and did not understand that the Marcos dictatorship could fall at the time of the presidential elections. The mistake was costly and provoked a debate on its origins. But the leadership accept the legitimacy of this micro-plenum — whose participants had been carefully chosen — on the grounds that it was actually inquorate.
From his Dutch exile, Joma Sison publicly accused his adversaries of being paid government agents. In turn, the opposition denounced the polemical excesses and replied that by refusing to return to the country to address the crisis Sison had lost all authority. By 1993,
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Therefore, in the event of a crisis of orientation, there is no structure, which has legitimacy, for settling differences in the leadership apparatus. The authority of the central leadership core rested upon its ability to perpetuate a consensus between the main regional and sectoral leaderships - an equilibrium, of sorts, between national unity and discipline on the one hand and the de facto autonomy of intermediary and regional organs on the other. When consensus is broken, the remedy of turning to the membership does not exis
Problems
The scope of the political problems the CPP had to confront, from the mid1980s, as a result of the evolution of the national and international situation, was such that this consensus could no longer be found within the leadership apparatus. The preparation of a congress was the only way to rebuild internal legitimacy — with a democratic debate and the election of delegates. This proposal, while commonplace in many organisations, was altogether revolutionary in the CPP even though the Party statutes anticipate holding congresses.
By refusing to accept the test of a democratic debate and a congress, the Sison-Tiamzon wing destroyed any remaining hope of maintaining the unity of the CPP. Clearly, given the seriousness of differences, a congress may well have been unable to safeguard and rebuild this unity. But it would have at least clarified the options, taken the debate to all the rank and file and given them the right to decide. In the end, a revolutionary organisation is not the sole preserve of the leadership's circles, but belongs to the entirety of the membership. In such an organisation, as in society itself, democracy must be the source of legitimacy.
In the absence of such a congress, it is impossible to know today which current (or bloc of currents) would have represented the majority of the CPP. Vertical control of leadership bodies, alliances between sections of the apparatus; these cannot be a replacement for the judgement of the membership arrived at through an open and free confrontation of analyses and options.
No wing can claim to represent a majority of members. It is probable that more than half of the membership has "voted with their feet" by leaving the party. The absence of debate has played a major role in the flight of the rank and file.
Secondly, there is a crisis of political legitimacy. Crises of internal authority and loss of external influence go together. An entire project — a highly simplified interpretation of the protracted people's war — is losing credibility. Although the social situation in the Philippines (and the international context) has changed significantly, accompanied by a tremendous enrichment in political experience, Sison's strategic and political conceptions have not changed at all.
The current orientation of the SisonTiamzon wing is a regression compared to the more dialectical approach the CPP began to develop in the 1980s with regard to the relationship between military and political activity.
### Backbone
After having formed the backbone of popular movements over a long period, the validity of the CPP's orientation began to be challenged in 1986. Now, it no longer occupies the central place it once did. The legal organisations of the "national democratic" current have split away — for example, the First of May trade union centre (KMU), the peasant organisation, KMP, and the Bayan coalition.®
It is still impossible to evaluate the state of the popular movement on a national scale. It is probable that the relationship of forces between mass organisations varies considerably from one region to the next. But there can be no doubt that a wide-ranging process of realignment and rebuilding is underway. New alliances are being forged between sections of the "anti-Stalinist" opposition within the CPP and the activist left outside the Party.
On the other hand, the Sison-Tiamzon faction seems to be having difficulty rebuilding wide-ranging alliances. The main national federations of the KMU (NFL, NAFLU, UWP) have left, alongside a large part of the Manila-area trade unions. In September 1993, these Manila trade unions established a new federation, the Union of Workers for Change (BMP), with Romy Castillo as the president.
In October, Bayan dissidents formed a new socialist organisation, Makabayan (Movement for the Liberation of the Sons and Daughters of the People). A new coalition appeared - the KAP (Union of Working People) - to organise a rally around social demands on 30 November 1993, bringing together the above-mentioned organisations, moderate trade unions and organisations of the independent left such as Bisig and Pandayan.
This initiative was a big success in Manila, much more so than the competing KMU rally organised for the same day?
Finally, there is also a crisis of international legitimacy. The CPP's international network was always limited by sectarianism towards the non-Maoist revolutionary left and by its manipulative approach to solidarity work abroad. Nonetheless, because of its activist commitment, its influence in radical Christian milieu, and the weight of the KMU, it had prestige in the anti-imperialist solidarity movement. Today these gains have been very much thrown into doubt.
For example, the majority of solidarity groups in Europe have taken their distance from the Sison-Tiamzon faction. Confronted with the loss of international support, Sison seems to have turned his attention towards the international networks of Maoist organisations — entering into competition with Abimael Guzman of the Peru's Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) for the mantle of "theoretical leader" of international Maoism. ®
In a declaration, published on 26 December 1993, the Party's Democratic Opposition described their support and forces thus: the Manila-Rizal, Negros and Central Visayas regional committees, the "democratic blocks" in the Panay and Mindanao party organisations, and the Western Europe party committee. As for its central structures, there is the national peasant secretariat, the national united front committee, the Philippines-based international Home Bureau. There are also a significant number of individual members of the CC and various smaller units of the Party?
6. The break-up of organisations like the KU does not only reflect the internal struggles of the CPP. The functioning of the KMU has itself been criticised as undemocratic, and the positions of the leadership have come in for criticism - its support to the Chinese government, for example, after the Tienanmen repression. There are also cross accusations of corruption.
7. According to Max Lane, correspondent for the Australian paper Green Left Weekly (no. 126, 8 December 1993), the KAP brought out 110,000 people to its demonstration while the KMU only attracted between 3,000 and 5,000. The KAP also organised rallies in Cebu, Bacolod, Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Iligan and Zamboanga.
8. One of the main organisations that supports both Shining Path and the Sison-Tiamzon faction at the same time is the Belgian Workers Party (PTB). It recently ran an article that saluted the "rectification movement" within the CPP, called 'Against the renegades, police agents and the Trotskyists, restore the honour of the protacted people's war', Solidaire, 10 March 1993. Here we have a fine example of the Stalinist tradition of slander and amalgams - in 1993!
9. See 'Out of Crisis, Renewal, Philippine Left Update, 1 January 1994.
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The Sison-Tiamzon wing has thus held onto its control of the majority of regional committees (the important territorial structures of north and south Luzon and a part of the Visayas and Mindanao committees). But it should be noted that the Manila-Rizal (M-R, the capital region) section is the most powerful, with about 5 thousand members, while the CPP as a whole has around 15 thousand members (although these figures are only estimates).
Beyond squabbles about numbers, what is important is that the CPP is losing in terms of quality.
To be sure, the CPP was molded in a monolithic ideological tradition, a prisoner of a bureaucratic centralist method of functioning and far too respectful of the authority of the "founding father" There is no tradition of free debate, and the party has gone through some terrible chapters — such as the paranoid antiinfiltrator purges that led to the deaths of hundreds of members between 1985 and 1988.10
But contrary to the media myth perpetuated by Sison himself the CPP was not a politically monolithic party. There were always significant internal differences. And the party was largely built independently of Sison, who was imprisoned for ten years and then exiled -and this is true whatever his initial role was and whatever his ideological influence continues to be. The party also brought together original leadership teams from the various regions.
When Sison was released from prison in 1986, he could have played a unifying role since he still had a tremendous amount of prestige. He had not been directly involved in conflicts inside the leadership (which, for example, set Ric Reyes against Rodolfo Salas), and he had formulated a conciliatory critique of the 1986 election boycott. He opposed an ultra-sectarian faction in the violent confrontation which set different CPP networks in Japan against one another.
But to have definitively played such a unifying role, he should have been self-effacing, admitting that he was a national leader like any other - and that the CPP was indebted to initiatives and ideas that were not only his own. It is an option he does not seem to have ever considered. " Sison's personal sense of history has played an unfortunate part in the current crisis. It could soon lead to further splits, including within his own faction.
Certainly, the Party never developed a serious attitude towards unitary initiatives with other currents, and, indeed, never really understood the significance of innovations which developed within its own ranks. But, in spite of appearances, and not without its contradictions, the Party was able to integrate a wide range of experiences, personalities and orientations.
It is this internal wealth that the CPP is now in the process of losing. The Sison-Tiamzon wing is cutting itself off from the living forces of the party, and paving the way for an outright break in the continuity of the party's evolution — thus unleashing a politically regressive process that places a question mark over its future.
### "Historic" figures
Through the years, the CPP has alienated itself from many activists in the popular organisations and NGOs. Since 1986 a number of "historic" figures have left the national democratic movement. Radically, in the case of Bernabe Buscayno, also known as commander Dante. Progressively in the case of those who went on to found the "popular democrat" current, such as Isagani "Gani" Serrano (a former member of the Party's Political Bureau), Edicio "Ed" de la Torre (founder of Christians for National Liberation), Horacio "Boy" Morales (the first president of the National Democratic Front).
The departure of these figures is significant. In his own way, Dante incarnated the "pluralist" history of the CPP; proof that even in the initial years the leadership was not reducible to Sison alone. The new Popular Democrats had long fought for the adoption of a unitary line and to give the National Democratic Front its own dynamic, a functional and decision-making autonomy in relation to the CPP. Even if they did not break from the Party; by distancing themselves, they only proved that they had failed
One sign of the times is that in 1993 this current decided, after a long period of hesitation, to create a formally independent organisation. Its second congress, held on 22 March 1993, decided to transform the organisation into a "social movement distinct from other formations and perspectives", in the words of its president, Boy Morales. 12
Among the former central leaders of the CPP, clearly some have remained with the Sison-Tiamzon faction - such as Rafael Baylosis, never known for his ideological openmindedness. Others have remained prudently reserved, such as Satur Ocampo, a respected figure who led the CPP in its negotiations with the Aquino government in 1986-1987. Others, such as Rodolfo Salas, have simply kept their distance from both camps (the Sison-Tiamzon wing and the Democratic Opposition).
But among those that have declared their "autonomy" can be found very strong personalities that embody original experiences. This is the case with Ric Reyes, who embodies the multi-sectoral experience of Mindanao; Romulo Kintanar, also from Mindanao, who brings along his experience as a central guerrilla leader in the 1980s; Felimon Lagman, who has urban experience in Manila-Rizal that dates back to the 1970s; and Victor del Mar, for his experience in Visayas.
### Difficulty
In spite of the existence of permanent networks in North America and Western Europe, the CPP has always had tremendous difficulty grasping international realities. These networks, finally, are now addressing the questions all revolutionary organisations have been asking themselves.
But the leadership core existing in Holland (Luis Jalandoni, Antonio Zumel, Coni Ledesma, Jose Maria Sison and Juliet Sison) has cut itself off from this process, leading to increasing isolation. It no longer represents the National Democratic activists living in Europe, unlike other official leaders of the movement that have broken with Sison, such as Byron Bocar (a spokesperson for the NDF) and Sixto Carlos (a "historic" leader who, after his arrival in Europe, was a sectarian's sectarian but now declares himself to be a committed anti-Stalinist).
The debate within the CPP clearly expresses the nature of the currents taking part. The texts put forward by Sison are presented as a return to the
10. On this point see Paul Petitjean, 'Counter-insurgency, terror and democracy, International Viewpoint, no. 176, 25 December 1989 and Walden Bello, 'The Philippine Communist Party at the crossroads', International Viewpoint, no. 240, 7 December 1992
11. For a reductionist identification between his own history and that of the CPP, see Jose Maria Sison, 'The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View, Crane Russak, New York, 1989. The CPP was a victim of a pernicious ill. ness, the presidential syndrome. Other revolutionary organisations have neither a chair nor a general secretary, only members of a national leadership whose tasks are shared on a functional basis. And they are much the better for it.
12. 'Movement for Popular Democracy moves forward", Conjuncture, February-March 1993. The MDP does not describe itself as a party but has set for itself the task of "strengthening popular organisations and NGOs". At their congress, there were about 250 participants from, among other places, Metro-Manila, north Luson, Bicol, and central Luzon. A national leadership council of 25 members was elected.
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roots, that is to the line that he defended before his arrest in 1977. They denounce subsequent advances as "deviations" They assert a frozen and linear strategic outlook. They see international developments as a confirmation of Maoist Cultural Revolution-era notions. They entrench further still bureaucratic centralism.
The texts of the various opposition forces highlight the advances of the 1980s. They examine a large spectrum of strategic approaches. They discuss the democratisation of the party, popular democracy, the notion of the vanguard and its relationship to the masses. They seek alternatives to the command economy for the transition to socialism. They draw a critical balance sheet of the history of the international working class movement and frontally address the question of Stalinism - characterising the Sison-Tiamzon current as a Stalinist faction.
"Anti-Stalinist"
Today the opposition remains politically heterogeneous, coming from different regions and sectors of work. For sure, they make up a principled "anti-Stalinist" block, and some define themselves as a "Leninist opposition". But they are still far from being united in any significant way.
The definition of a common organisational and political framework and the clarification of complex tactical options will not be easy. The various components of the Democratic Opposition must also convince other currents and activists that they themselves have changed, and that they are capable of making a critical balance sheet of their own history.
This includes the disaster of the antiinfiltrator purges in Mindanao, and the costly error made in Manila in 1987 when the urban units of the party were wrongly "activated" ', providing a good pretext for the death squads to hit legal activists such as Lean Alejandro, a Bayan leader.
For the moment, the CPP has lost the political initiative to the Ramos regime, in particular in the area of the peace negotiations. But its crisis takes place at the same time as a lively recomposition and realignment of the popular movement. There is still a real potential for social resistance in the Philippines today.
The government knows this, and has, for example, abandoned the proposal to impose a price increase for oil
To avoid the worst
During a press conference held on 14 December 1993 in the south of Luzon island,
Gregorio Rosal (alias Ka Roger), an official spokesperson for the CPP (Sison-Tiamzon wing) declared that leaders of the Democratic Opposition were going to be brought before a "people's tribunal" on charges of "gangsterism", "corruption"
"sabotage" of the underground movement. When asked, Rosal refused to exclude the possibility that a death sentence would be passed
He named four central leaders (three members of the Central Committee and the secretary of the capital region), all faced with the same threat: Romulo Kintanar (former guerrilla leader), Ricardo Reyes (former leader in Mindanao and of the Political
Bureau, Felimon Lagman (a leader of the Manila-Rizal region), Arturo Tabara (a leader from Visayas).
This initiative is very serious, and highly irresponsible. It follows a series of declarations by Sison who, without evidence, accused leaders of the opposition of being government-paid agents. It could lead to a destructive dynamic of liquidations and counter-liquidations, and unleash uncontrolled developments. It provides a unique opportunity for the Ramos goverment and repressive forces to deepen contradictions within the popular movement and increase the number of provocations.
It is essential that debate remain in the political arena and that all the factions involved explicitly reject settling scores by physical means. After the 14 December press conference, it is particularly important that the official spokespeople unambiguously reject the use of "people's tribunals" and death sentences in the current political struggles.
In January, Father Frank Fernandez, general secretary of the National Democratic
Front, said that no death sentence would be pronounced upon leaders of the opposition (Bulletin Today, 10 January 1994). A welcome statement, but it does not clear up all worries. It was released in the name of the NDF and not of the Party, like the statement in December. It only excludes the death sentence for circumstantial and not for principled reasons. If the press report is to be believed, Fernandez did not challenge the inflammatory accusations levelled against leaders of the opposition. As such, he continues to criminalise the political debate and differences around questions of orientation. This denies any notion of free choice to the party rank and file. O which would have dramatic consequences on the population's standard of living.
If the different opposition currents avoid fragmentation, and above all if the worst is averted (physical confronta- The incredible tions, see box) the crisis might prove to shrinking Jose be beneficial in the long run. The current Maria "Joma" situation reveals, now more than ever, Sison, the dynamic pluralism aka Armado of the revolutionary movement Guerrero, and the popular aka Armando left. Liwang,
The debate, aka... as never before, is everyone's affair. *
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