After the accords
OUR correspondent in Israel, Michel Warshawsky, is currently on a speaking tour through Europe to discuss the situation following the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement in Washington. We caught up with him to discuss the political situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
government was advancing both the necessary strategic perspectives and, on a daily level, the demands around which people should mobilise.
I think this is a very dangerous attitude which has given Rabin and his govern-
INTERVIEW — Paris, 21 October 1993
HAT has W happened in
Israeli society since the signing of the accords?
In Israel it is as if the new situation has always existed. And this is perhaps the most interesting phenomenon. This event of historic proportions has been widely accepted and the immense majority of the population is behaving as if it were entirely normal. The far-right demonstrations that took place immediately after the signing of the accords have since calmed down. The settlers and far-right parties are in the process of re-evaluating their response, with the objective of preventing the implementation of the agreement; and there are differences within their ranks. Given the unpopularity of their demands, they do not want to be seen taking a position of outright opposition to the process.
Is there a danger that in this milieu a kind of extra-legal armed force will emerge?
No, it is more likely that there will be direct actions by small isolated groups, which could do great damage. Israeli security forces are on the lookout for these kind of groups. It is not excluded, for example, that small groups - some of whom have connections in high places — will organise a bloody provocation in an Arab village. And this could in turn unleash a dynamic of destabilisation that would jeopardise the entire process. The great majority of settlers, and even the far-right Gush Emunim, have annouced that they will not go beyond a certain limit and that they would not commit seditious acts -and I believe that this is their real position. There will be more demonstrations; but since the dismantling of settlements is not on the agenda, they have a problem mobilising people.
They are trying to mobilise people on the basis of the accords, saying, for example, that they will not obey the proposed Palestinian police force. Bilateral commissions have been set up to discuss the kind of links that there will be between the Israeli armed forces (who will be in charge of the settlers and the settlements) and the Palestinian police force (who will be responsible for the territory. They are discussing how to coordinate their actions.
Can it be said that a section of
Israeli society is beginning to question the ideology of
Zionism?
For Israel and Israeli society, these accords signify recognition for the first time of Palestinian rights over the land of Palestine. The entire history of Zionism has represented a negation of this right and the will to erase Palestine from the land of Eretz Israel. One of Ilan Alevi's books is entitled "Under Israel, Palestine"; the agreement lifts Palestine out from underneath Israel and gives it a certain place — a place that is far from providing justice to Palestinians; a place that is even far removed from what is minimally acceptable to Palestinians; but which legitimises this place for Palestine beside Israel. This has tremendous significance.
And the peace and anti-war movements? From the outside it almost seems as if there has been a kind of demobilisation after the signing of the accords.
How mobilised are they and what is the political content of their demands following the accords?
Indeed, there has been a significant demobilisation which has not only affected the central current of the Israeli peace movement, Peace Now, but also the most radical wing which felt that the government was doing its job. They felt that the which has given Kabın and his government credit that they do not deserve. There is no doubt now that the government is going to take measures that go beyond the narrow limits set by the Oslo agreement; this can be seen with the freeing of political prisoners which appears to be imminent, and which will give tangible results.
It can also be seen with the rhythm of negotiations. For once it is the Israelis who want things to go faster, and the Palestinians are having certain "logistic" problems with the setting up structures to take over the administration of the Occupied Territories, beginning in Gaza and Jericho. But there is a waning gap between recognising these facts and giving confidence to Rabin; this is a trap to be avoided at all costs.
This is why we, along with others, are trying to put together a series of demands around which a substantial section of the peace movement can be mobilised. Rabin reacts to external pressures, and we are in a position to put the pressure on. For the moment, rightist pressures are much less substantial than what many feared, but 1 believe they will return and they will have a real influence on the government's decisions and its ability to go forward with the implementation of the very accords that it signed.
What is the climate in the
Occupied Territories? Is there mobilisation or demobilisation, illusions or disillusionment? How are the different groups reacting? Concretely, how is the arrival of the PLO leadership being prepared?
In a general sense, a majority of the population is preparing itself for a new situation, and organising its life in accordance with the new framework. There is a bit more freedom and independence, with a certain sense of autonomous power — but no euphoria. People are very much aware of the accord's limitations - independence is a long way away - and the problems that will arise. They know that the occupation will continue. They have
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reservations concerning the future Palestinian administration. There is a fight for power, which is more a fight between clans and individuals than between different strategies.
The fact that when autonomy and the new administration are mentioned, there is talk of police sends shivers up the spines of many Palestinians, and not only those of opposition activists.
There is little sign of opposition to the agreements...
Yes, there is quite a bit of disarray. There is opposition to the accords, which are seen as a step backwards. But in my opinion this opposition has yet to develop an alternative strategy that could translate this opposition into mobilisation. It has abandoned the terrain of struggle, which has been partially occupied by Fatah itself. Fatah was at the head of demonstrations for the liberation of political prisoners, in close and successful cooperation with the radical wing of Israeli pacifist forces.
I think that the opposition should at least have been, if not at the origin of these demonstrations, then involved in them and participated as equals with Fatah and ourselves. The secular opposition is still organising meetings to denounce the accords, with very little attendance.
As for the Islamic opposition, Hamas in particular, it is profoundly divided Sheikh Yassine is the uncontested leader of Hamas and a spiritual and political leader in the Occupied Territories. He is currently in prison and Yasser Arafat has demanded his immediate release. He sent a letter to Arafat, which was quoted in the press a few days back; it is considered to be very moderate by those close to the Fatah leader.
Rumour has it that Hamas is divided. On the one hand, there is a pragmatic current which is ready to negotiate its place in the new framework, to participate in elections and to not oppose the setting up of the autonomous Palestinian administration. On the other, there are the hardliners, represented by the spokesperson for those deported to south Lebanon, Doctor Rantissi, who want the accords to fail and to "punish the traitors"
In administrative terms, it is clear that the setting up of the PLO administration will create enormous problems. Given the bureaucratic and corrupt character of the mini-State apparatus that the PLO is, how is recruitment taking place?
I spent a few days in the police recruiting centres in Jerusalem and Fatah's area of Bethlehem, but not in the PLO centres or in the Palestinian national centres. Let's just say that it wasn't exactly the political and intellectual elite. While those in charge of recruitment were former political prisoners that have earned their stripes in the struggle against the occupation, the same cannot be said of their assistants, especially of those who have just recently mobilised. Many go there in the hopes of finding work; others are looking to secure some power. I believe that the scramble for power is at least as present as the thirst for independence and freedom.
This can be seen everywhere. As such, in the women's movement, there was a call from PLO headquarters in Tunis for the establishment of the foundation of a ministry or office for women's issues. There has been no discussion on a working paper or legislation concerning women's status under Palestinian autonomy. Instead, according to certain members of this movement, there has been a violent battle to see who will represent the movement in the Palestinian State or semi-State structures.
What tasks can progressive anti- imperialist forces in the region set for themselves? Are there concrete demands that can be made?
I firmly believe that the new situation, and the situation that will be created by the implementation of the accords, will create new openings for political activity, for mass mobilisation within the framework of autonomy in Gaza and the process of setting up a Palestinian autonomous territory in the West Bank.
The Israeli army is withdrawing from Palestinian daily life. There are laws and military decrees banning all forms of organisation, all forms of political, cultural and social expression, all types of demonstrations, any kind of political debate. These will all disappear. There are those who will say, "yes, but there will be a Palestinian police force that will restore the same order." I'm not convinced - this too will depend on the struggle, and if this terrain is abandoned, democratic hopes will be even more limited
Nothing is certain. I don't see how Arafat will be able to easily do what the Israeli army itself could no longer do — or, at least, only with great difficulty. The unions, women's movements and political parties have some space opened up before them, space which they can use to mobilise the population. Firstly, they can demand more than what is in the text of the accords and go beyond the accords in the area of the rights acquired therein. Secondly, they can address the ultimate objective of independence and make their mark on the kind of State and society that the accords will produce.
We don't have the right to say that the jig is up. This is politically false; but it also a bad reading of the reality before us. I repeat, nothing is certain. There is a relationship of forces, one of whose elements is the creation of these spaces of "freedom" which can, if they are properly used, improve the relationship of forces. I'm not saying that the relationship of forces can be radically altered, but it can be improved.
To be concrete, there is nothing preventing union confederations from organising congresses and meetings. They don't have to wait for autonomy to do that. And if the Fatah union confederation doesn't want to do this, I'm sure that the others can do so, and create a charter for the defense of workers, for example.
They can demand, for example, the
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return of the more than two billion shekl that the Israeli government took from Palestinian salaries to finance a social security system to which Palestinians never had access. The money can be reinvested in the only thing that the Palestinians would do well to copy from the Israelis: a social security system.
This is a clear programme, around which people can be easily mobilised. It is very concrete; every worker has paid a sum of money and this money still exists — it has been calculated by an Israeli organisation, Kav Laoved, that defends Palestinian workers and which has managed to demonstrate exactly how much money has been stolen from Palestinians, money which is theirs by right.
The Palestinian delegation — instead of begging in New York one day, in Paris the next, and in Brussels the next -should demand this money. This is a demand that the unions can put forward, clearly spelling out what the money is meant for: to build a Palestinian social security infrastructure.
Why not plan - there is nothing utopian about this, it is concrete, it can be done tomorrow - a Palestinian women's congress. And if the Fatah women's organisation doesn't want to do it, do it without them. This would be very popular with hundreds and thousands of women which are calling on Fatah to begin a national debate on the status of women under Palestinian autonomy. Is this a struggle whose defeat is foretold? Certainly not.
Many people fear the inevitable cooperation between Israel and the PLO to control the money that comes in, and to determine the relations between the
Palestinian police force and the
Israeli army. In this field, are there specific demands that the left can put forward?
The control of economic factors will be the most difficult. On the other hand, it will be easier to affect the type of democracy that is put in place. After 25 years of occupation, the idea of a human rights charter in the Occupied Territories is something that speaks to every woman and man in the Territories. Not so long ago, Faisal Husseini was saying that the first act, the first decree would deal with human rights and not police. This should be forcefully taken up by the popular organisations and the human rights organisations which carried out courageous work during the occupation. There is no reason for them to let their guard down now.
It is much easier to set up structures for local administration than it is on the national level. There should be a demand that they have a say, and that they should form the base of Palestinian autonomy, or at least be able to negotiate their place in the Palestinian administration. This is something concrete, which can easily be achieved starting immediately.
There are already popular committees and networks; there are still activists, there is a memory and accumulated experience. Why not reactivate them right away and integrate them into a process of developing Palestinian autonomy? Why not point to what were the beginnings of Palestinian autonomy — at the beginning of the intifada we always spoke of autonomous territories, liberated territories, in which there was Palestinian self-administration - and rebuild the popular and relatively democratic structures that were repressed by the Israeli army, structures that were inclusive and the fruit of a united front between different political and social forces.
On the economic level, at least as far as social services are concerned, there will have to be a series of struggles to demand that the PLO and the future sources of financing, including the EEC, finance the existing network of clinics that was set up within the framework of resistance to the occupation through popular mobilisation, by voluntary groups, and by NGOs. This is the infrastructure for a quality popular healthcare system which, in a way, has already proved itself.
In the PLO, in the Palestinian medical corps, people want to privatise right away, or replace the popular health networks with State medecine based on the hospitals of the military administration - hospitals which are in a state of decay and in no position to meet people's needs. A mobilisation of a part of the medical corps and healthcare users can be mobilised to defend the clinics and get funding — for a more just and rational sharing of funds, instead of the creation of new private clinics. This is another possible area of struggle.
There is no shortage of issues, just a lot of work that needs to be done and can be done. But this a conscious decision that has to be made by the mass organisations, the NGOs and political formations that have a political programme that goes beyond obtaining places in the police force. A strategy centred around this type of mobilisation has to be drawn up.
How are Palestinians with Israeli citizenship reacting? Are they even more cut off from
Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories or, on the contrary, closer to them?
They responded to the accords with demonstrations that were relatively large, even enthusiastic, in comparison to the downturn that preceded the signing of the accords. For them, too, it was the first time that they could freely fly the Palestinian flag. It is clear that Gaza and Jericho, or even Palestinian autonomy, will have only a very limited impact on their situation. For the moment, it is something rather external to their own situation.
If we were dealing with Palestinian sovereignty, in one way or another that would give them a point of reference for their national identity. But the fact that the Palestinians of Gaza, even those of the West Bank, have self-administration does not concern them, except very indirectly.
Because they have a superior status?
No, because they have a very different status.
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What danger is there that of a split in the Palestinian community between those who are outside and those who are inside Gaza and Jericho? How can abandonment, division and separation be prevented?
For the last 15 years, the Israeli dream, above all the Labourite dream, has been to the separate the Palestinian question in the Occupied Territories from the Palestinian national problem in general — in order to atomise the Palestinian national question. This was the main reason for refusing to recognise the PLO, because recognition would mean recognition for the whole Palestinian question as a national question. There would be specific problems all over, but they would be treated as part of a