9. Southscan, Vol 8 No 34, 17 September 1993.
10. Regional structure of the National Women's Coalition in which the ANC and other progressive women's organisations are in the leadership.
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
EAST TIMOR
Eighteen years of resistance
THE November 1992 arrest of
Xanana Gusmao, the central leader of the East Timorese struggle for self-determination, has put this Southeast Asian people back into the world spotlight-after 18 years of resistance to an Indonesian occupation that has claimed
200,000 lives.
WILL McMAHON
- 17 October 1993
HE Indonesians invaded East
Timor on 8 December 1975, one day after US President
Gerald Ford's visit to Jakarta.
Due to a confluence of political factors, President Suharto and the military came to view the absorption of
East Timor as almost a foregone conclusion.
The United States saw the struggle for East Timorese independence as the emergence of another pro-Soviet affair after the defeats they suffered in southeast Asia and Africa and as a threat to their access to the Ombai-Wetar Straits, a strategic deep-sea submarine passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
East Timor groups
ABRI Indonesian armed forces
Apodeti Associacão Popular Democratica
ASDT Associacão Social-Democratica
BAKIN Indonesian Military Intelligence Coordination Agency
CNRM National Council of Maubere
Resistance (formed in 1987)
Falintil Forças Armadas de Libertacão Nacional do Timor-Leste
Freitlin Frente Revolucionaria do
Timor-Leste
OPSUS Special operations unit of the Indonesian government
UDT União Democratica Timorense
The Australians favoured integration since it would give them access to oil and gas deposits in the East Timor Gap at a time when the world economy was still reeling from the OPEC price hikes of the mid-1970s.
The new Portuguese regime had its hands full in Angola and Mozambique. Although it appears that the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) representatives in the East Timorese capital Dili — favourable to East Timorese self-determination — were given a free hand, in Lisbon some sectors felt that East Timor would be integrated into Indonesia much like Goa had been in India.
Thus, the fall of the Caetano regime on 25 April 1974 in Portugal triggered a series of fateful events for the future of East Timor.
Events in Portugal precipitated the formation of the three main political parties in East Timor. Apodeti was clearly the creation of the Indonesian military and as such has always been a wellfinanced and organised shell of a real party. Both the UDT and the ASDT, which in September of that year changed its name to Fretilin, had genuine roots in the East Timorese nation.
This early period of political development saw Freitlin win a substantial mass base in the countryside as a result of literacy and rural co-operation programmes and through the use of East
Timorese culture and its main language, Tetum, as mobilising tools. Such a strategy was the product of the Marxist wing within Freitlin which traced many of its ideas to the political debates in both Portugal and contemporary struggles in Latin America.
In January 1975, the AFM representatives in Dili organised the formation of a coalition between the UDT and Freitlin with the aim of delivering self-determination.
The local elections, which were organised under the aegis of the new Portuguese government between March and July 1975 revealed the depth of Freitlin's support. It won 55% of the vote.
### Jakarta's worst fears
In the first half of 1975, it was becoming self-evident that Freitlin was rapidly becoming the majority current of the East Timor independence movement and that it was taking on an increasingly Marxist hue which had led to the eclipsing of the original social democratic leadership of Jose Horta. This only confirmed the worst fears of Jakarta and Canberra where alarm bells had been ringing for some time.
A section of the Indonesian military-political leadership had always viewed East Timor as an integral part of a greater Indonesia. But the issue had failed to sur-
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
face since the coup of 1965, an event whose success the Indonesian ruling class needed time to digest.!
As early as 1969, the issue of East Timor began to re-emerge. OPSUS, the . Special Operations Unit of the Indonesian government, began producing documentation which argued that an independent East Timor might pose a security threat to Indonesia. Yet, despite various schemes being drawn up by the security services, right up to the summer of 1974 leading ministers were arguing that Indonesia supported East Timorese independence. In June 1974, Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister, wrote to the leaders of the ASDT assuring them that Indonesia had every intention of respecting East Timor's right to independence.
By the end of 1974 the tide had turned in favour of integration. By mid-1974 BAKIN, the Military Intelligence Coordinating Agency, had already finalised a plan for integration known as Operasi Komodo (Operation Giant Lizard). The coup in Lisbon and the creation of Freitlin on 12 September had given further impetus to the integrationists' campaign.
At the same time, Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, went out of his way to urge the integration of East Timor in a meeting with Suharto and other military leaders. As a result, Adam Malik changed to a pro-integration position.
In November 1974, there were regular articles in Berita Yudha, the military's newspaper, "exposing" the Chinese
### East Timor facts
Weather conditions vary enormously due largely to the influence of the mountain range on winds and rainfall. The island has the longest dry season in Southeast Asia with rainfall distribution dividing the country into four rainfall zones. The southern coastal plain catches two wet seasons making two harvests possible, but conditions in the north are much drier. The main cash crops are coffee and sandalwood. Food crops include corn, rice, wheat, potatoes, sweet potatoes, cassava, sago and a variety of vegetables, tubers and tropical fruit. The island of Timor is a racial meeting point, populated by waves of migrants who were predominantly Malay and Melanesian. In the past two centuries, Arab, Chinese and African faces have also become part of the Timorese crowd. The last pre-invasion population figure was 688,711, the figure of the Catholic church published in 1974. The official language was Portuguese, whilst Tetum had become a sort of lingua franca in East Timor. The majority of TImorese still adhered to their traditional beliefs. After the arrival of the Portuguese, many were converted to Catholicism. By the 1970s, about 30% of the population was Catholic. Before the first Europeans arrived in Timor, the island was divided into many small kingdoms; the rulers were called liurals (mainly in the east) or rajas (mainly in the west). Long before the Europeans appeared, Chinese, Arab and Gujarati traders had frequently visited East Timor, especially in search of sandalwood. Although the Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in East and Southeast Asia, the Dutch followed soon after and succeeded in gaining control almost everywhere. The only places where the Dutch failed to expel the Portuguese were Macao and Timor. In 1702, the Portuguese started to set up a colonial administration in Timor but it was not until the middle of the 19th century that the struggle between the Portuguese and the Dutch for the control of the sandalwood trade was more or less settled. The Dutch ruled in the western half of the island which became Indonesian West Timor after the Republic of Indonesia was established. The Portuguese remained in control of East Timor until the Democratic Republic of East Timor was set up on 28 November 1975. * source: Liem Soei Liong & Carmel Budiadjo, The War Against East Timor', Zed Press, 1984.
newspaper, exposing une chinese arming of Freitlin. It accused Freitlin of "seeking communist support". Jakarta radio broadcasts began to claim 70% support for Apodeti.
Early 1975 saw the Suharto regime develop a plan to split the Freitlin/UDT coalition. BAKIN began to meet with UDT leaders and to stress the dominance of Freitlin in the coalition and the "unviability" of East Timor under a radical leadership.
This strategy was unsuccessful. The results of the 1975 local elections and the developing radicalisation of the East Timor independence movement led many of the landowners and urban sectors of the UDT to argue for an alliance with Apodeti and the Indonesians to prevent a Freitlin takeover.
The formation of Revolutionary Brigades, in mid-June 1975, which had a presence in every village in order to implement literacy and health campaigns, exposed the balance of forces inside East Timor for all to see.
The refusal of Freitlin to attend the Portuguese-organised Macao Decolonisation Committee in mid-June, because of the attendance of Apodeti/Indonesian delegates, enabled Apodeti and the UDT to take centre stage and to seal an alliance between them.
The result of these events was an attempted pre-emptive UDT coup in Dili. On 9 August 1975, the UDT staged demonstrations calling for the expulsion of all communists from the country; by 11 August the police headquarters were occupied and the UDT was attempting to seize power through the barrel of a gun.
Although it was supported behind the scenes by Jakarta, the UDT was defeated militarily in a month. Mop up operations lasted until 24 September, when UDT remnants crossed the border into West (Indonesian) Timor. As they crossed they signed a petition calling for the integration of East Timor into Indonesia.
As Freitlin established an effective administration it became apparent that an independent East Timor was a viable option. Indonesia initially tried a strategy of border incursions throughout September and October 1975, the aim of which was to nibble away at East Timorese land and to destabilise the Dili regime. This became bogged down and suggested that if integration was going to take place it would have to be immediate and total rather than piecemeal.
In mid-November, the Indonesians launched an attack on the town of Atabae which was strategically important for any march on Dili. Atabae fell on 24 November. On 28 November Freitlin declared East Timor an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist republic.
### Mass killing
The attack on Dili, Operasi Seroja (Lotus), was swift and brutal. According to the former Bishop of Dili, Costa
1. In 1965, Suharto seized power and unleashed a vicious reign of terror. Many of the victims were members of the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI.
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
Lopez, "The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets; all we could see was killing, killing, killing." Entire households were murdered for displaying the East Timorese flag.
ABRI, the Indonesian army, quickly took many of the coastal urban areas in East Timor through force of numbers. It is estimated that the first few months of the invasion cost 60,000 lives.
By the end of 1976 there were 40,000 troops in East Timor which were only capable of controlling urban areas with a population of 150,000. Freitlin had moved substantial sections of the population up to the mountains where they could be better defended. In mid1977 a situation of military stalemate had developed. The Indonesian leadership decided on a three-pronged strategy to finish off the resistance once and for all.
After significantly re-arming with Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft supplied by the United States, Hawks combat aircraft supplied by Britain and submarines supplied by West Germany, ABRI launched wave after wave of bombardment, encirclement and then heavy troop deployment against the rural strongholds of Falintil. This continued throughout 1978 and substantially destroyed Falintil's military capability. Yet at no point did ABRI completely destroy Falintil. Terror as a political weapon
Unable to secure a comprehensive military victory, the Indonesians used terror as a political weapon. Disappearances became common and the practice of "mandi laut" (going for a swim), when oppositionists were dumped into the sea with weights attached to their legs, played a role in terrorising the urban population.
Massacres of resistant villages, imprisonment and torture, which included beatings, burning with cigarettes, sexual abuse, electric shock treatment and the crushing of limbs, all became part of the ABRI portfolio of terror.
Armed resistance was restricted to Armed resistance was restricted to the south and easternmost sectors of East Timor. Military defeats in the late 1970s led to political splits and defections. A notable example was the surrender of Alarico Fernandes, Freitlin's minister of information, who gave key information as to the location of key commanders, leading to a mopping up of the Falintil leadership in 1979. By 1980 most of the original leadership had been eliminated.
The March 1981 National Conference of Freitlin re-organised the military strategy basing itself on attacks on supply lines, the capture of weapons and the maximum possible mobility. Such a strategy depended on the ongoing support of a terrorised population.
### Cultural assimilation
This explains the development of the third prong of the Indonesian strategy.
The captured population in rural areas were herded into resettlement camps with the aim of cutting them off from Falintil. Malnutrition was and still is a common feature of life in the camps and human rights abuses are common. Once the population had been imprisoned the Indonesians aimed to make them forget they were ever East Timorese.
During the 1980s the Indonesians attempted to culturally assimilate the East Timorese. Jakarta often boasts about the number of primary schools that have been built in East Timor. In effect, the schools were supposed to be the site of the elimination of East Timorese identity.
In East Timor, Tetum and Portuguese are banned. Bahasa Indonesia is spoken and the Javanese culture is inculcated. Pancasila, the national ideology of Indonesia, forms the basis of the East Timor primary school curriculum.
In addition to cultural assimilation there has also been a programme of biological population control. Through the use of Depo Provera there has been a "Family Planning Programme" running throughout the 1980s with the aim of the slow extermination of the East Timorese population through birth control
By the end of the 1980s it seemed that the Indonesians were unable to defeat the much reduced but still persistent Falintil forces. 1983 witnessed many local ceasefires as a result of war weariness. Continuous waves of Indonesian offensives throughout the 1980s indicate that while ABRI may be able to temporaA CARAV rily overwhelm Falintil with the use of the "pager betis" (wall of legs) strategy, there was still an essential inability to crush them.
By 1989 Falintil was operating in one third of East Timor (south and east) with between 1,000 and 1,500 in action facing up to 15,000 Indonesian troops. Although the number of Falintil has fallen since then, it is difficult to get an accurate current assessment of their fighting strength. Estimates range from 200 to 1,000.
By the late 1980s Suharto felt confident enough to begin to open East Timor up. Such openings have been exploited to the fullest extent by the CNRM, the broad-based resistance movement created in 1987 as a successor to Freitlin.
The emphasis of the CNRM has been to work towards a political solution while not abandoning the military aspect of the struggle. Since 1989 there have been a series of events which have created the political space for the CNRM to place East Timor on the political agenda.
On 12 October 1989, the Pope held a mass of 100,000 just outside Dili. This proved to be a focus for a demonstration in favour of independence. Despite this, and in persistent belief of their own propaganda, the military has allowed restricted visits of East Timor under the guise of normalisation.
### Unarmed resistance
Two further demonstrations followed in January 1990 and September 1990 which resulted in clashes between students and troops. Such unarmed resistance came to play a more prominent role. A long-promised delegation of Portuguese MPs was finally arranged for the beginning of November 1991.
The East Timorese began preparing to use the visit for a show of political opposition. At the last minute, the Indonesians cancelled the visit under the pretext that they opposed the inclusion of an
Pacific
Ocean
BORNEO
IRIAN
PAPUA
JAYA
KALIMANTAN
NEW
GUINEA
CELEBES
NEW
Banda Sea
GUINEA
Java Sea
INDONÉSIA
JAVA
Arafura Sea
Dill
AUSTRALIA
TIMOR
-
E. TIMOR
W. TIMOR
BALI
Pasuran
Darwin
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
Australian journalist in the delegation.
Despite this, on 12 November a mass pro-independence demonstration took place on the street of Dili leading to the Santa Cruz cemetery. The Indonesian military gunned down 200 demonstrators in front of the world's television cameTas.
On 20 November 1992, Xanana Gusmão was captured by ABRI in a Dili suburb. Put on trial in a kangaroo court and sentenced to life imprisonment, subsequently reduced by Suharto to 20 years (see box opposite). This put East Timor in the headlines once again.
The effect of these events has been threefold. Firstly, the United Nations became more fully, albeit temporarily, involved in negotiations around East Timor. Secondly, the possibilities for organising an international movement in solidarity with East Timor has been markedly improved.
Thirdly, and currently most important, the massacre strengthened the hand of those forces within the Democratic Party in the United States for a change in strategy in regard to both East Timor and Indonesia.
The United States has clearly begun to adopt a different strategy in relation to East Timor. The blocking of transfers of F5 fighters in August 1993 and the recent Feingold amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill, which links human rights to arms sales in East Timor, has begun to increase the diplomatic pressures on Jakarta.
The reasons for the US change of position are fairly clear. Needless to say, human rights considerations are operating as a convenient cover for the rather more concrete interests of the American ruling class. The end of the Cold War reduces Indonesia's strategic importance to the US Navy and East Timor no longer appears as another domino set to fall to the communists.
Another factor is the long-term lobbying human rights activists have carried
### Xanana Gusmão declaration
*I am Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, leader of the Maubere resistance against the cowardly and shameful invasion of 7 December 1975 and the criminal and illegal military occupation of East Timor over the last seventeen years. "I reject the competence of any Indonesian court to try me and particularly the jurisdiction of this court, implanted by the force of arms and crimes against my homeland East Timor.... The ones who should be standing before an international court are: in the first place, the Indonesian government for crimes committed in the past seventeen years in East Timor; second, the US administration which gave the green light to the invasion (...) and has since given military aid and political support for Indonesia's genocide in East Timor; third, the governments of Europe and Australia for their complicity; and finally, the Portugese government for its grave irresponsibility in the decolonisation of East Timor. "A government which was established to the accompaniment of the sound of shelling by sea and land of a detenceless population, to the sound of advancing tanks and cannons, can such a government claim any juridical standing? In my opinion it has the same standing as the advance of Iraqi troops into Kuwait, the advance of Russian tanks into Kabul and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. "May I recall that Saddam Hussein reminded the international community that there was already a precedent for disregarding the principles of international law, expressly mentioning East Timor. What value does Indonesia give to the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly (of the United Nations). "The Indonesian generals should be made to realise that they have been defeat-ed politically in East Timor. Here, today, as the commander of Falintil, the glorious forces of national liberation, I acknowledge military defeat on the ground. I am not ashamed to say so. On the contrary, I am proud of the fact that a small guerilla army was able to resist a large nation like Indonesia, a regional power which in a cowardly fashion invaded us and sought to dominate us by the law of terror and crime, by the law of violence, persecution, prison, torture and murder. "Who is afraid of a referendum? Why are they afraid of a referendum? ! am not afraid of a referendum. And if today, under international supervision, the Maubere people were to choose integration, I would make a genuine appeal to my companions in the bush to lay down their arms and I would offer my head to be decapitated in public. Whoever is afraid of a referendum is afraid of the truth. "As a political prisoner in the hands of the occupiers of my country, it is of no consequence at all to me if they pass a death sentence here today. They have killed more than one third of the defenceless population of East Timor. They are killing my people and I am not worth more than the heroic struggle of my people who, because they are small and weak, have always been subjected to foreign domination." * out in the democratic Party over the last decade. Most important, however, is the Clinton administration's assessment of the situation inside Indonesia itself.
Having learned the lessons of the Marcos and Somoza regimes, the US is now planning for a post-Suharto Indonesia. The behind-the-scenes debate within the higher echelons of the Indonesian political and military world revolves around who will succeed Suharto. Within such a context East Timor becomes a lever in the debate which the US is prepared to exploit to its advantage.
A political failure
At the same time, such is the severity of East Timorese resistance to integration that there are clearly sectors of the Indonesian establishment that question whether East Timor is worth the resources being ploughed into it.
Such doubts can only have been reinforced by the re-emergence of popular protest in the 1990s led not only by old activists from the 1970s resistance but by youth and students — those whom Jakarta spent the 1980s persuading that they are Indonesian. If ever there were a sign of political defeat, this is it.*
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
Economy