International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Dossier: Europe: Denmark: The Carrot and the Stick

· International Viewpoint No. 246, June 1993 · pp 12-14 · 2,384 words

Scandinavia

The carrot and the stick

With the proverbial carrot and With the nroverbial 'carrot and DOSSIER stick', the political establishment in Denmark succeeded in getting a 57% majority for the Maastricht Treaty in the May 18 referendum. But the alliance behind the 'yes' campaign was already breaking up. In inner Copenhagen — one of the few constituencies with a solid 'no' majority - rioting started. Police shot into the crowd, wounding eleven people, in the most violent confrontations during the last ten years. ÅGE SKOVRIND* -Copenhagen, May 21, 1993 T HE riots included only a very small minority of the 43% 'no' votes in the referendum. However, the riots portrayed a general feature of Danish society today - that of more and more people being marginalised, outside political influence. Unemployment has constantly increased and is now expected to hit more than 350,000 (12.5%) by the end of 1993.

There is no doubt that this underprivileged layer of the population is behind the opposition to 'their' Maastricht Treaty and to the European Community (EC) as such. Extraordinary anger was mobilised because, according to many people, this referendum was the same as last year and only organised because the politicians didn't accept the first result.

Statistically, only 7% of the voters shifted from a 'no' to a 'yes' . Most people didn't believe that the Edinburgh summit of the EC last December gave substantial concessions to Denmark, despite claims to the contrary.

Anyway, the 'yes' was to be expected this time. Only 50,000 votes ensured the

INTRODUCTION - The prosecution had no grounds for appeal after a majority of Danes voted againsbt the Maastricht Treaty on June 12, 1992. So a scapegoat was found: wasn't everything at risk of being overturned because of them? Now the 'Danish obstacle' no longer exists. Thanks to a series of opt-out clauses which only delay the implementation date and don't deal with the social effects of the Single European Act and the 'single market a majority has finally been found in Denmark to ratify the Treaty. This was a pyrrhic victory, to say the least, as the Danish referendum only provided a tiny amount of relief from the economic burdens threatening the European Treaty. As we have underlined several times in these pages, the objective necessity for European Union in order to meet the ends of European capital runs up against two great difficulties: the recession and social resistance. The former has developed, for the moment, more rapidly than the anti-crisis remedies that European Union was supposed to bring to bear. The second was inevitable faced with the violence of the social attacks that every European government is carrying out to supposedly recreate the conditions for economic growth. Therefore, a majority of the Danes voted "Yes' but everyone can see perfectly well that the Summit accord on criteria for convergence is already in shreds. The dynamic is no longer that of convergence but of a growing divergence around public levels of inflation, deficit and debt. Within the framework of the single market, these divisions between the different economies can only stoke up monetary speculation and the re-adjustment of exchange rates. The European Monetary System, nerve centre of the unification project, is thus itself entering into crisis. To rectify that the governments still have the option of planning stronger and stronger attacks in order to reduce social expenditure and improve competitiveness. but the employers will maintain recession. They would have to do everything at the same time: reduce public sector deficits whilst raising the capacity of the state to intervene, increasing the rate of insolvency, restructure the factories without increasing unemployment! Faced with this conundrum many have ended up by opting for simple strict controls over budgets and monetary supply. But they then need the political capacity and the realtionship of forces that the violence of such 'remedies' calls for. This was the gamble of the German bosses when they tried to break the agreement about the perspective of parity in wages between the new Lander and the rest of the country. But there is also the endeavour, currently led by the Dutch government, to attack, amongst other things, the gains of young people and the students. However, on each occasion, there is a large gap between the intention and the results. The fight-backs are, in effect, more fierce since the employment and social policies had previously been presented as the corner-stone of consensus between the classes. So now it is the States and the bosses' organisations themselves that are putting and end to the policies of 'social peace! The other difficulty for the great European ambition of capital concerns the political fragility of the governments or institutions. Even without having to face up to strong trade union mobilisations these are very difficult policies to carry out when the apparatus of the State is itself entering into crisis. One can think, for example, of Italy and perhaps Belgium tomorrow. There will not, in the short term, be any reversal of this tendency. The workers will be subjected to still more attacks that they will be unable to step aside from. But simply knowing this gives no indication of the capacity of the system to overcome in the long term, its present contradictions. We must, therefore, take note of the political and social phenomena which have the greatest effect on the relationship of forces between the classes. We have to start from the resistance and mobilisations as they are unfolding today in order to map out perspectives for the future; formulate new demands and learn new forms of rebellion surprise 'no' majority last June. The new factor of primary significance was that all the political parties — with the exception of the rightwing Progress Party which stood firm on the 'no' — cooked up a "national compromise, claiming that the second referendum was different from the and intransigence. — Claude Gabriel * first one. Did Edinburgh produce any changes or not? That question was the principal theme of the debate, thus putting the content and the meaning of the European Union somewhat into the background compared to last year.

One of the principal conditions for the

'national compromise' operation was the

*Åge Skovrind is a member of the Socialist Workers

Party (SAP - Danish Section of the Fourth International)

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International Viewpoint #246 June 1993

participation of the Socialist Peoples party (SF — a left reformist party with 8.3% at the last election), one of the main components of the 'no' campaign last year, but now campaigning for a totally different yes' as they said in their posters.

Essential for SF was a desire — and a pressure — to be included in the group of "responsible political parties' . They sought influence or even participation in a future Social Democratic led government. However, this rightwing orientation failed.

The bourgeois government resigned in January when an Inquiry Court concluded that the Prime Minister had given false information to the Parliament and the Minister of Justice had cancelled the legal rights for refugees to be associated with their relatives. The Social Democrats indeed formed a new government, but with three small bourgeois parties - not with the SF!

At its Congress in May, the party reacted with a left turn, now calling for a government without participation of the bourgeois parties and threatening to vote against the government. But the recommendation of the Maastricht vote was not changed.

Only about 20% of SF's electorate seem to have followed the shift of the leadership in their referendum vote and among the membership too there seems to have been some opposition. Three of their 15 Members of Parliament (MPs) voted against. The youth organisation turned out for a 'no' — despite the recommendation of the leadership. Some SF members have left the party in protest.

But at the Congress, only about 15% of the delegates voted against the political resolution, and the main opposition spokespersons underlined that they intend to stay in the party. Their fundamental problem is that they don't have a different overall perspective.

There were 'no' votes coming from all sides. It was said that the typical 'no' voter was a woman, less than 50 years old, living in Copenhagen and without major education. Social Democratic voters were particularly decisive because of their numerical weight (one third of the total electorate). A substantial number of them went from a 'no' to a 'yes'. In Denmark there has always been a considerable amount of opposition to the EC. This has been a source of division in the Social Democratic party and particularly in the trade unions. In that sense, opposition to Maastricht clearly has a left tendency although this is much less manifest than earlier.

Unlike last year, in this referendum the Social Democrats managed to win over a majority of their voters to the 'yes' side. One explanation is that they have feel more confident given that they are represented in the EC by a government of their own. Moreover, this time the Social Democrats ran a real campaign while last year they were engaged in an internal struggle over the election of a new president.

One of the main arguments advanced by the Social Democrats was that the single market needs political regulation, particularly concerning the environment and social protection.

The new government has also announced a tax reform, presented the day after the referendum. Together with employers and union leaders, although with differing emphasis, the government made it clear that the economy would be better off after

'yes' to Maastricht. With only a one seat majority in Parliament they are desperate to offer something that will improve their sed in recent opinion polls, some of them indicating that support is higher than the 2% necessary for Parliamentary representation.

Enhedslisten tried to conduct an internationalist campaign directed mainly towards the electorate of the workers parties. A big internationalist event was organised in Copenhagen on April 23 & 24 and 350,000 copies of an agitational paper were printed that underlined the need for an internationalist alternative to the Maastricht Union.2 However, the Enhedslisten campaign was also affected by the general focus on the possible exemptions contained in the Edinburgh agreements.

Nonetheless, the campaign has strengthened Enhedslisten, increasing its audience and improving the possibilities of gaining parliamentary representation in the next elections which will be held before the end of 1994.

In the period prior to the next elections for the European parliament in 1994, much of the debate of this year will probably be revived.

In the last European elections in 1989, the Peoples Movement Against the EC took 4 of the 16 Danish seats. Although the May 18 referendum showed that the control the traditional political parties have over their electorate on the EC question still remains very weak, it will not be easy to retain these four seats.

There are number of reasons for this:

Firstly, the Peoples Movement has split during the last few years with three of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) going over to the June Movement, the principal movement up to the May referendum. (Theoretically, the difference between the two movements is that the June Movement is opposed only to the

How Danes have voted on

Europe

63.4%

36.6%

YES

NO

1972 vote on

EC membership

56.2%

50.7%

49.3%

.8%

43.8

YES

YES

NO

NO

1986

1992 vote on vote on

56.8%

2%

43.2

YES

NO

1993 vote on

European single

Maastricht

Treaty market

Union popularity. According to opinion polls they are set to lose that majority after new elections.

There should be no doubt that Denmark's participation in the EC will remain a central political question in Danish politics.

The referendum campaign also helped Enhedslisten (Red-Green Alliance)' to get more publicity, as it is the most important political formation to the left of the tion to the lett of the SF. Support for the Allance has ıncrea- Alliance has increa-

Maastricht Treaty but not necessarily to the EC as such.)

Secondly, and as a result of the split, there is an increasing problem about uniting opponents of the EC on that basis alone, particularly as European integration continues and one has to face the EC as a policy making reality.

Thirdly, while the Peoples Movement has been put on a sideline in this referendum, only this movement has the legal right to stand in the next European

1. Enhedslisten - the Red-Green Alliance. The coalition unites a number of different political forces, including the Left Socialists (VS), the Communist Party (DKP), the Socialist Workers Party (SAP - Section of the Fourth International) and many socialists not organised in any political party. Enhedslisten was formed in 1989, primarily to overcome the 2% barrier to be represented in Parliament. At the 1989 general election it polled 1.7%. Since then, it has developed into a political coalition which is not exclusively related to electoral work. It has around 10 representatives in several city councils, including three on the Copenhagen City Council.

2. See International Viewpoint 245, May 1993 2. See International Viewpoint 245, May 1993

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International Viewpoint #246 June 1993

ITALY elections. To obtain that right, one has to collect about 60,000 signatures during a period of one year. The June Movement has begun collection of signatures, but it seems unlikely that they will succeed. This has to do also with the fact that the June Movement has conducted a media rather than a real mass campaign based on activiDOSSIER ties. It claims to have 3,500 members.

Thus, much depends on the possibility of finding a formula which can unite the competing movements in the next European elections. As for Enhedslisten, it will be impossible to collect 60,000 signatures. The only possible way to stand in the elections will be in co-operation with the no' movements. However, this will also involve a political problem.

The arguments of the principal "no' movements changed for the better compared to last year, partly because of the real impact of the referendum on the rest of Europe. Then, the main argument was that Denmark should have some exemptions and allow the other countries to go ahead. This time, the argument was that a Danish vote would put an end to the whole Maastricht construction and that the new debates

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