ANGOLA The never ending agony of Angola FIGHTING has resumed in Angola, after the holding of legislative and presidential elections in which the main contenders were the MPLA (People's Liberation Movement of Angola) and its president and head of state José Eduardo dos Santos, and Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).
The MPLA won an absolute majority in parliament (63% with 34% for UNITA) while in the presidential elections Dos Santos beat Savimbi by 57% to 40%.
The armed conflict started even before independence from Portugal in 1975 in a three way fight between the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA. After its victory in this war, the MPLA very quickly found itself fighting a new war; this time the FNLA was a fading force, but UNITA, with South African support, was increasingly strong. Some areas of Angola have not known peace for 30 years.
International Viewpoint interviewed Christine Messiant a specialist on Angola, which she visited in October. The first part of the interview is published below; the second part
### Angola facts
ANGOLA has a land area of
1,246,700 square kilometres and a population of about ten million. The largest ethnic groups are the Kimbundu of the region around the capital
Luanda, the Umbundu of the
Inland areas and the Bakongo of the regions abutting on
Zaire to the north and east.
The term Creole refers to those Angolans whose families were involved in the Portuguese colonial structures.
Traditional religious beliefs remain strong, but the
Creoles adopted the Catholic religion of the Portuguese, while dissident anti-colonial elites turned to variants of
Protestantism. Methodists, for example, have been strongly represented in the MPLA leadership. The disasters of the latter's reign have led to a revival of Catholicism.
Civil war, with heavy outside involvement, has ravaged the country since independence in 1975. In particular, apartheid South Africa, unwilling to see a stable
Angola under an anti-imperialist government in its vicinity, intervened heavily to support
UNITA. In response the MPLA government sought Sovietbloc aid, expressed particularly in the sending of Cuban troops and advisors to the country.
Latterly, and especially after the South African defeat at
Cuban hands in the battle of
Cuito Canavale in 1988, the
USA has assumed patronage of UNITA. *
This is why, when the agreements were signed, the UNITA was able to gain support outside the Umbundu populations. Even in this period, therefore, it would be incorrect to view UNITA simply as an ethnic party.
At the moment of the ceasefire, it presented itself as the party of those "humiliated, oppressed and despised" by the MPLA ruling caste, a line that struck a chord in many regions. This rejection of the Luanda regime is particularly intense on the high plateau where the population has been especially deprived of essentials and where the MPLA has been responsible for fierce * Christine Messiant works at the Centre d'Etudes Africaines of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris. The interview took place on November 18.
will appear in our next issue.*
W OULD it be right to define this as an ethnic or regionalist conflict?
This would be a great over-simplification. That element exists and has grown in importance during the war and the so-called "transition period" opened up by the Estoril accords of May 1991. However, we should not confuse cause and effect and impute the ethnic conflict to some kind of atavistic "tribalism". That conflict is the result of the concrete history of the political struggle since the start of nationalism in Angola in the 1950s.
Then, the UPA-FLA was organizing in the Belgian Congo among the Angolan Bakongo in opposition to the MPLA. The small group of men who formed UNITA in 1966 did so on a socio-cultural basis, as a sort of subordinate elite to that of what they saw as the domination of the urban Creole elite within the MPLA.
To this opposition between elites for leadership of the nationalist movement, and, later, for control of the state, other political differences were later added, including shitting international alliances within the context of the Cold War.
This fundamental opposition, which among some UNITA leaders amounts to real hatred for Creoles, has persisted through all that organization's ideological twists and turns. During the election campaign it expressed itself by claims that UNITA repre24 sented the "African people and its culture" in the face of a "ruling caste" distant from "the people" and "Africanness".
•
Throughout the period of the nationalist armed struggle, the UNITA guerillas — despite the sympathy they enjoyed in Protestant circles among the Umbundu, from which most of its leaders came — were very isolated and did not organize the population of the Umbundu regions, which were firmly under Portuguese control. Without significant international support and very weak militarily, the small group that led UNITA resorted to collaboration with the colonial army.
After the Portuguese revolution of April 25, 1974, with the formation of a transitional government bringing together the three movements, UNITA played the ethnic card. And it was only after the struggle between the three movements, which divided the population on the Umbundu plateau along social and ideological lines, degenerated into armed conflict, that the violence of war gave the conflict an ethnic anchor.
Subsequently, the development of UNITA's guerilla force and its war with the ruling MPLA, cannot be understood without reference to the considerable support it received from South Africa and then directly from the USA. However, it also drew succour from the despair of sectors of the population conscripted by the Luanda regime to fight a war they found incomprehensible, since they had been abandoned to poverty by the same state they were meant to be defending.
International Viewpoint # 240
December 7, 1992
repression against villages and communities suspected of supporting UNITA. The people here give solid support to UNITA as their only possible hope.
The fact that the making of an "ethnic" conflict requires a whole series of conditions is shown by the fate of the FNLA, the supposed "representative" of the Bakongo. This movement was indeed such a force at the start of the nationalist struggle, but now it has lost this role and the Bakongo's votes have gone either to the two big parties or to a number of small groups. The change is also related to the MPLA's policy of integrating FNLA leaders after 1978 and the Bakongo's involvement in the country's socio-economic life. • But what about the MPLA?
That is another matter. The MPLA's Creole founders imbued it with a universalist, socialistic, national-Jacobin and anti-tribal ideology. The party also represents an alliance with a number of other elites, both in the towns and the countryside. The contradictions underlying these alliances can show up inside the MPLA in various forms favoured by the lack of democracy inside that movement.
After 1974, the MPLA won support that was to be decisive in its struggle with the other two movements in the urban population, both among the waged petty bourgeoisie of the colonial state and the working class. This support was rapidly squandered by the subjection of the urban movement and the repression of dissident groups and then the bloody suppression of an internal coup attempt.
This "normalization", which alienated a section of its social and political support, laid the basis for the transformation of the MPLA from a national liberation movement into a "Marxist-Leninist" party which falsely announced itself the "sole representative" of the Angolan people.
Integrated into the new single party were social, political and ethnic groups which, while hostile to the official ideology, accepted normalization because they felt more threatened by the MPLA's enemies or because it seemed the only way to keep their social position in the party-state.
This was true of the majority of intellectuals (in their majority Creole), the bulk of the former colonial apparatus (mainly Creole and Kimbundu) and latterly of a part of the FLA's Bakongo leaders, cadres and supporters. The need to preserve unity despite these divisions was one of the factors behind the development of a nomenklatura system, enjoying considerable privileges and increasingly distant from the society in terms of living standards and interests. It also became more and more implicated in individual and group corruption with all the centrifugal forces attendant on power networks.
ANGOLA
• How did the MPLA exercise its control over society?
The key is oil, which now represents 80% of Angolan exports. It is based on an enclave economy, basically off-shore and out of range of the war, and has never been managed according to the "socialist" norms of the rest of the economy. Exploited in partnership with foreign companies, oil has provided Angola with considerable income, which has been used mainly to finance the war, satisty the needs of the state-party and maintain the cohesion of the nomenklatura.
Oil income has served to maintain and reinforce a "caste" which abandoned ideological references to Communism years since. For years now, the regime has stopped trying to meet the essential needs of the population, relying instead on the oil money.
In recent years this has meant an increasing and now almost total loss of concern for the rural areas. Health and education provision have declined, public services such as electricity, water and transport, have been effectively privatized. The "people's stores" in which essentials were sold at prices compatible with salaries, have been emptied in favour of imports which benefit privileged circles.
The total absence of the so-called formal democratic rights has been followed by the disappearance of much vaunted "real" rights. In the really existing Angolan system, working is largely a waste of time, since wages are derisory in relation to the cost of living. Money wages form only a small part of real income, the rest being made up of gifts of goods or the profits of resale of goods on the parallel markets.
The system is sharply divided between the beneficiaries of the regime and the rest. But the latter still depend on the system for everything. Given the lack of rights and the worthlessness of wages, living standards are assured by integration into circles of privilege. The parallel economy, fed mainly by the nomenklatura, is also an effective means of social control.
This is why it is so difficult to change this system, when, with the fall in oil prices and the pressure of international creditors, the regime is forced to contemplate economic reform. Such reform threatens to upset the systems of income distribution and meets resistance both at the top — among those who benefit from the system of distribution of goods — and below, among the system's dependents.
The dependence of those at the top on the redistribution system, allied to the fear of being obliged to undertake some measure of political liberalization that lay behind the failure to implement the reform plans announced in 1987.
As for those "below": a wave of strikes erupted around the currency reform in October 1990. This involved an exchange of old for new kwanzas and the obligatory retention by the state of 95% of the sums deposited. However, the strikes petered out. But, given that the system as such still existed, the "natural" demand was not for increased wages but to obtain gifts in kind on an individual basis.
This led to an extreme fragmentation of the struggles, some of which gained their immediate aims. However, these gains were rendered meaningless by the successive devaluations and the disappearance of the gifts. (The pre-election period, on the other hand, saw a dramatic improvement in supplies by the government). The social mobilization also lacked any political expression.
• What was the Cuban role?
They were closely associated with the policy and active in setting up the bureaucratic and repressive regime; they were present in all the cogs of the state, had advisors in all the ministries and were involved in the development of the police and security apparatus, particularly after the repression of the 1977 coup and in the struggle against UNITA. As with all other foreigners, they took part in the black market and smuggling.
But there was another side to the considerable Cuban presence (more than 300,000
Cubans passed through the country. They fought alongside the Angolans against attacks from Zaire and South Africa and their
December 7, 1992
ANGOLA military assistance was essential in the winning of independence by Namibia. Unlike other foreign presences, they also played a positive role both in the army and civilian life. Many of them died in combat alongside Angolans and Cuban doctors could be found working in forgotten corners of the country shunned by Angolan doctors. Thus popular feeling about the Cubans is not straightforward.
In fact, their role in the country's political life was not long lasting (for example, from 1982-83 onwards, Hungarians were taken on to advise on the economy. Furthermore, the Cubans themselves often learned a lot from the experience they realized that this was more than a simple battle against the South Africans and their puppets. They were involved in the only survey undertaken in Angola on the national question (in 1984-86) aimed at providing information on the internal reasons for the war. Many were also genuinely shocked by the realities behind Angolan "socialism"
All in all there was marked disillusion on the Cuban side. After UNITA had been militarily "neutralized" they stopped taking part in the fighting inside Angola, aware that there could be no military solution to the political problems. • Has the MPLA looked for a political solution or has it continued to restrict its response to UNITA to the military level?
The combination of the nomenklatura system and the international pressure for economic measures that would strike at the most disadvantaged sections of the population make it increasingly hard for Angola's leaders to make a priority out of "resolving the problems of the people", even if UNITA's advances have made them aware of the need.
The only way in which UNITA could be reintegrated would be in the context of a policy aimed at meeting the urgent needs of the population. UNITA can only be detached from its bases of support if it is recognized, if a cessation of the fighting is negotiated with it and if real moves are taken towards democratization, which force UNITA to show its hand.
But it is intrinsically impossible for the regime to undertake political reforms that would undermine the single party and their control of the state. As a result the military solution was pursued as long as was feasible. • How would you assess the balance of forces at the start of the negotiations that led to these elections? In South Africa, and in particular in ANC circles, the victory over the South Africans at Cuito Canavale is seen as the turning point.
The "solution" to the Angolan crisis has taken place in two stages. The New York 26 after the South Africans had suffered a sharp agreement was signed at the end of 1988 defeat at Cuito Canavale. The outcome of this battle, along with other broader international factors, played a crucial role in the reversal of a South African policy aimed at destabilizing Angola and keeping control of Namibia.
But the South African military defeat also occurred at a time of deep crisis inside Angola, whose main ally, the USSR had signalled its willingness to work for a "regional solution" to the conflict - expressing thereby its own desire to cut back on international commitments that were beyond its means. The USA was ready to assume support for UNITA from the South Africans, essentially through Zaire.
Despite Cuito Canavale, the New York agreement between South Africa, Cuba and Angola enshrined a linkage between Namibian independence and the departure of Cuban troops; Angola had previously firmly opposed this in the face of Washington. While the two great powers had been involved in the working out of the agreement, it did not put an end to outside involvement in Angola — above all as far as the USA was concerned.
The MPLA regime felt that the withdrawal of South African aid to UNITA would allow it to win final military victory and avoid negotiations with its enemy or democratization. In fact, at that very moment, the USA began to step up its aid to UNITA.
After the defeat at Mavinga at the start of 1991, the regime in Luanda had its back to the wall, and it was only then that negotiations began and the MPLA accepted the demands placed on it concerning political pluralism and elections. And it was after the US-led coalition's victory in the Gulf War that the Estoril agreement was signed on terms highly favourable to UNITA. The MPLA's only real achievement was that it was to stay in power until the elections, during a transition period much shorter than it had wanted. • How did the Estoril agreement favour UNITA?
The timing of the accord is significant; just after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, "democratization" and the triumph of the West and its allies were seen as one and the same. In Angola, this meant that UNITA was the hero of "democracy" having fought against a "totalitarian pro-Soviet" regime. The USA built up Savimbi as a freedom fighter.
The MPLA then presented the initiative as its own idea. But if you look at the agreements, it is clear that the only real beneficiaries are the two armed camps; measures that would really give an opening to civil society and other political forces are absent.
The management of the transition period was entirely in the hands of the MPLA and UNITA; the former remaining in government but with a consensus-based Joint PoliticoMilitary Committee (JPMC) bringing toge-
International Viewpoint # 240 • December 7, 1992 ther UNITA, the government and the three international observers entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the agreement.
This was a big advance for UNITA. Inside the JPMC it had equal weight to that of the MPLA, and could count on the support of the USA observer. It can block any movement, without being directly responsible for unpopular government decisions. It has also won some of the prerogatives of a government: control over its own territory (since the extension of government authority can only take place "progressively and with its agreement") and police.
Above all, it achieved quick elections -15 months after the agreement as opposed to the three years preferred by the government. This meant that there would be no time for any other force to arise to challenge UNITA's ability to capitalize on the discredit of the government.
This opened the prospect for UNITA of arriving in power legitimately and democratically. In the discussion at the negotiations, UNITA worked to assure its own "rights" but also to limit the political field to its bilateral "dialogue" with the MPLA. Indeed, it was able to refer to the agreement for justification when it refused to take part in a "multi-party meeting" called by the government in January 1992.
The government meanwhile limited its commitment to democracy to voting through some laws laid down in the agreement and engaging in consultations with other political forces and "society" as far as this seemed opportune. The measure of these laws is given by that on the formation of parties. This required 3,000 documented signatures in 15 provinces — under conditions of strict MPLA and UNITA control in the areas they rule. This stipulation was abandoned at the last minute since no one had been able to meet it. Other rights, such as that of information and circulation were similarly without substance.
Only during the election campaign itself was free speech possible in the time reserved for parties — and of course the public media remained firmly under government control. Finally, enormous sums of money were channelled into the MPLA's political campaign, managed by a highly professional Brazilian team. Suddenly all kinds of government projects were underway alongside gifts to electorally significant groups and personalities.
As a former minister had said "how could the MPLA lose when it had the administration, the banks, and the means of information in its hands?"
The UNITA and its US backers had based their calculations on an assumption of a safe 40% ethnic base for UNITA, on the discredit of the regime, and on UNITA's monopoly on opposition to the MPLA. Now, after their defeat, they are emphasizing the MPLA's ability to misuse the resources at its disposal as the existing government.
In reality, however UNITA's election defeat and its reaction to it has now revealed to the whole world its anti-democratic nature and its incapacity to transform itself into a political organization which, if in power, could tolerate opposition and respect democratic rights. In fact, it was even unable to carry out the simple negative task of not alarming a population that is sick and tired of war. • But UNITA had massive outside help in its appointed role as the democratic David against the "communist" Goliath in Luanda.
No one can believe that the USA "did not know" that the image they were promoting was false. The fact that UNITA is a total stranger to democracy has been clear since its creation. It rose in revolt against its exclusion from power, not against the single party system. In the "liberated territories" under its control, the dictatorial, indeed totalitarian nature of Savimbi's organization was there for all to see.
Referring to what it presented as "truly African" symbols and methods of rule it functioned as a sect, organized around a personality cult and with power concentrated in the leader's private circle. Opponents both real and potential were murdered and there was systematic "punishment" of "errors" involving imprisonment and public humiliation.
The population under UNITA's control were subjected to a totalitarian and terrorist regime. Evidence of bonfires on which people were burned alive, sometimes accused of witchcraft, are only the most extreme sign. The fact that Savimbi's methods have been so effectively hidden from the outside world is a reflection of the power of his allies.
The fact that a large part of the Angolan population has accepted his rule has much to do with their isolation from the outside world and their total dependence on his organization. The polarization during the war, and then the failure of any third force to emerge during the elections, meant that the voters closed ranks around the two parties.
The same logic was at work in the MPLA. They had fought a war against UNITA and its allies - such sworn enemies of the people as apartheid South Africa, the USA and Zaire. The MPLA could only feel revulsion at the idea of Savimbi coming to power.
nis reeling also operated among ine peopl s a whole and played a part in the MPLA' election victory.
In this climate of polarization the small circles of activists and intellectuals inclined to take part in the formation of an alternative to the party-state system agreed to postpone their criticisms and took part in the denigration of "groupuscules" and democracy as such, seen as a weakening of the MPLA camp against UNITA. *