The results of the latest Salvadoran guerrilla offensi Gerry FOLEY The guerrillas January operations seem to have accomplished something like the Tet offensive in Vietnam - that is, make it clear to world public opinion that the government is losing and that there is no way that the guerrillas can be stopped without some drastic change in the terms of the conflict.
At the height of their offensive, the rebels occupied the small city of Berlin in Usulutan province. On February 1, they reportedly destroyed the police station, using 120-mm cannon and firebombs, and then seized the local army base.
The rebels held the town for four days, retiring only in the face of a large-scale counteroffensive by the government armed forces.
The government hit back with everything it had, at enormous political cost. It used the airpower provided by U.S. imperialism to devastate the city from the air, forcing the "moderate" archbishop of San Salvador, Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas to sound an alarm.
On February 6, the archbishop called on the government to end "indiscriminate bombings." He said that about 250 civilians had been killed in the bombings, although half the population fled when the fighting started. The army treated Berlin like an enemy city.
An Agence France-Presse dispatch described the results of the bombing as follows:
"Searching through the rubble, crowds of starving and terrorized people are wandering through the streets of a city devastated by aerial bombing. This city...which a few days ago was calm and prosperous, is now nothing but a pile of ruins."
What is more, in the rush to smash the rebels in Berlin, some of the U.S. advisors got too far up front. A sergeant was hit by groundfire while flying over the battle area in a helicopter.
The incident was politically very da-
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DEATH SQUADS ive maging to Washington. It linked the U.S. directly to a Vietnam-war-style massive terror operation - destroying Berlin to save it. Moreover, this was an operation where Washington's local allies began to look like losers, which also raised memories of a not-too-distant past that the U.S. rulers are anxious to see forgotten.
The fact that the wounded sergeant and two other U.S. officers were immediately shipped home, for overstepping the official rule against U.S. military getting involved in the fighting, points up how carefully the Reagan government has to tread.
Washington as of now is afraid of looking like it is getting involved in an escalation, and in fact the Berlin events placed an additional obstacle in the way of stepped-up U.S. intervention.
In the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings the first week in February, Connecticut senator Christopher Dodd complained that Washington had given nearly a billion dollars in open military aid to El Salvador and : "What do we have to show for it? The military and political situations are not improving at all."
Dodd's remarks were cited in the February 14 issue of the major U.S. magazine Newsweek, which went on to comment: "But the amount of U.S. aid that would be needed to make a substantial difference in the Salvadoran government's military performance remains staggering."
The news weekly pointed out that U.S. experts in El Salvador itself were distinctly gloomy:
" This week showed the coming trend in El Salvador, one frustrated Western observer concluded... Next month, it'll be a town bigger than Berlin, maybe two U.S. advisors wounded - or one killed.' "
In this context, it is not surprising that the disclosure by a Latin-American diplomatic source that U.S. officials were working on a plan for negotiating with che FMLN attracted a good deal of interest.
Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, Thomas Enders, proposed a "two-track strategy," according to the Washington Post Service "in which the United States would promote negotia- the United States would promote negotiations with left guerrillas there while continuing to support the Salvadoran government's military efforts to suppress the rebels."
The negotiations reportedly would be carried out through a third party, probably the Social Democratic government in Spain.
Enders' proposal was in an internal State Department position paper, and was said to have run into opposition from Reagan's ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick in particular. Kirkpatrick, an aggressive rightist, is one of the key figures for Reagan's foreign policy.
In fact, the incapacity of the Salvadoran military, backed up by Washington, to stop the spread of the guerrilla movement, along with the Reagan administration's inability to rally the necessary support for escalation, seem to represent something of a crisis for the U.S. president's policy of an imperialist counteroffensive against the struggles of colonial peoples. On the other hand, any move to negotiate is almost certain to divide and demoralize the local rulers, who fear granting any measure of democratic rights to the masses.
At the height of the guerrilla offensive, Guillermo Ungo, leader of the Frente Democratico Revolucionario, a component of the FMLN, visited Paris. Le Monde of February 9 published an interview with him under the headline: *We Solemnly Reiterate Our Offer of Negotiations."
Ungo told Marcel Niedergang, Le Monde's Latin-American expert:
"We are making this offer when our forces are showing on the ground that they have the initiative. We are not making it out of weakness but because we think that it is necessary to give an immediate answer to the growing number of people in our coun try who want peace." He warned: "If the military balance is broken tomorrow, it could be too late."
Ungo said that the guerrillas' offensive had ushered in a new phase of the war: "The regular army has no offensive capacity. It only reacts, responds to the actions of the guerrilla groups...Equality with the army has not yet been achieved, but we are getting there."
The FDR leader thought Washington would have big difficulties in intervening directly:
"Some diplomats and high-ranking military officers have just said publicly that the recent big American maneuvers in Honduras have at least proved that nothing serious can be done in the region without the United States. This is true in Honduras, where the maneuvers only served to prepare the way for direct U.S. intervention. It is true in El
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Salvador, where the army would collapse without the U.S. aid. But is the public in the U.S. reagly to lose boys in an armed conflict in Central America?"
The FMLN' respect for democratic and humanitarian values has helped to put it in a palitically strong position both inside the country and internationally.
For example, even U.S. experts have had to acknowledge that the FMLN treats captured goldiers well and releases them as soon as possible.
In November, the Los Angeles Times quoted a U.S, psychological warfare expert as saying These freed men are more dangerous to the army than a 120millimeter howitzer. They will tell their fellow soldiers they were treated well, surels pey were bealed well, which will encourage more to surrender the next time they are surrounded.".
In contrast to this, the UN Human Rights Commission report released February 9 pointed out that in 1982, about 5,000 people were murdered in El Salvador, mostly by security forces and rightists. It pointed out that not a single person has ever been convicted of violating human rights by a Salvadoran court.
At obvious ins to find signs of improvement, authors of an official U.S. report uman rights in El Salvador noted che counterinsurgency forces are be ping to take prisoners," although the ber "is still very small." That is, with few exceptions, the army slaughters all resisters they overpower.
In this situation, even the leadership of the AFL-CIO, long closely linked to the U.S. gov ent, 'and by no means to its more ral cireles, has had to come out agi dost continued aid to the junta. Reviving trede-unionist consciousness in the U.S. is certainly a factor in this, since tbe, junta has suppressed union activity and a good deal of the Salvadoran union movement is on the rebel side.
In this contest, the FMLN's proposals for a negotiated settlement based on democracy, without the people's defense forces, disarming, highlight the fact that it b the government and its imperialist backers who are afraid to al. low the people to organize freely and express themselves.
Such initiatives can help to gain the attention and sympathy of the masses in the larger countries in the region and in the imperialist centers, without which it would be extremely difficult to carry through a successful revolution in El Salvador.
The impact that the Salvadoran struggle has had internationally testifies to its political strengths. The pressures created by a growing revolutionary struggle in a key ared for imperialism will continue to pose difficult tests as well as opportunities for the Salvadoran movement. In this sense, the strength of the movement of support for the Salvadoran people can weigh heavily in the outcome. 4