Such a political opening is needed if the revolt by workers crushed by the sharp and uninterrupted fall in their buying power and the vagaries of the Lebanese pound is to take a direct political form rather than the intermittent spontaneous explosions that have taken place up until now. This would also and first of all mean untying the hands of the Syrian workers' movei general takes presidency FOR the first time in its history, the Philippine presidency is now held by a military man. This is perhaps the most noteworthy result of last May's elections. General Fidel Ramos campaigned under the "democratic" banner of Corazon Aquino, who was put in power by the antidictatorship uprising of 1986. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the sense of an enduring legacy that one gets between the 1972-1986 martial law regime of Ferdinand Marcos and the arrival in power of the general.
Elected with only 23.5% of votes cast, the new head of state has devoted the first months of his presidency to strengthening his base of support and broadening his alliances. He has also began a process of negotiations with the guerrilla forces of the National Democratic Front. The question of peace has once again become, as in 1986-1987, a major political issue for the PAUL PETITJEAN T HE May 1992 general elections were the first of their kind since the fall of the dictatorship in 1986. As such, they provide essential data for gauging the evolution (or stagnation) of the political landscape in the Philippines. They mark the end of Corazon Aquino's reign (1986-1992) and set the stage for the beginning of the Ramos regime. At first glance, they leave an impression of comple-
Philippine Left. te confusion.
This is not surprising, given the complexity of the exercise. Every elected post in the country was up for grabs, from the municipal level up to the presidency. Seven candidates bid for the presidency, while tens of thousands fought over the around 17,000 other positions. Voters had to write up to 40 names on their ballot and could distribute 21 their choice of political party as they
October 12, 1992
PHILIPPINES wished, choosing representatives belonging to different lists for the various posts.
The ambiguity of the results is striking. Fidel Ramos is in power alongside a vicepresidential candidate (the actor Joseph Estrada) who received more votes than he (34%) and who campaigned on a competing list. He had to confront a Congress dominated by a rival party whose head, Ramon Mitra, scored a poor fourth place in the race for the presidency.!
The election results upset forecasts. Mitra had been groomed by the ruling LDP and was expected to win. All the bets were on Marcos era business tycoon "Danding" Cojuangco finishing second; in the end he had to be happy with third place, well behind the "anti-corruption" candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago whose financial and organizational resources were relatively weak. Those who predicted the Ramos victory were very few and far between. Indeed, even though he had the blessing of Corazon Aquino, both the LDP apparatus and the powerful Catholic Episcopate (Ramos is a Protestant) were against him.
This explains why political analysts -
Ramos: the General's path to power FIDEL Ramos demonstrated great finesse in the race for power. Marcos' cousin, member of a political family from the province of Pangasinan, trained as a military officer at West Point (USA), Ramos occupied key posts - police and intelligence - in the Police Constabulary of the martial law regime. With the regime in crisis, and he himself threatened with disgrace, he did an aboutface in 1986 and joined the RAM rebellious officers' revolt at the last minute. Saved from Marcos loyalist forces by the people's anti-dictatorial uprising, he became the central figure in the Aquino government (Chief of Staff, Defense Secretary). He broke with the RAM, choosing to seek power via elections and not through a putsch. Though the target of several army factions, with the assistance of the Americans, he helped defeat the seven attempted coups d'Etat staged against the new regime. He co-opted many "vigilante" paramilitary groups (often Protestants, like himself and integrated them into his counter-insurrectionary policy.
After resigning from his positions in anticipation of his succession to the presidency, he received Aquino's support - her way of re-paying her debt to him, against the LDP's choice and the will of a large part of the powerful Cojuangco-Aquino family. He won the support of important interest groups, such as the Makati Business Club and Cebu businessmen. Then he got himself elected to the presidency with only 23.5% of votes cast (but a record in the country's history) - and went on to win the support of a Congress initially dominated by opponents.* such as Amando Doronila, editor-in-chief of the Manila Chronicle - have declared that these elections were characterized by a "popular rebellion against political machines founded on money, patronage and family clans: the entire traditional political system of power-sharing over the last quarter century is in a state of disintegration..."
Referring to this strident appraisal of the situation, journalist Philippe Pons adds a cautionary "up to a certain point" 2 Indeed, however unexpected the election results may be, they can - aside from the impressive results of Miriam Defensor Santiago -be fully understood within the usual boundaries of the Philippine political game.
### Divided electorates
The high number of presidential candidates (seven, all "serious") divided certain electorates. The candidacy of Imelda Marcos, theatrical widow of the fallen dictator, spoiled the hopes of Danding Cojuangco, who was fishing for votes in the same water. Mitra's surprisingly low score can be explained in part by the internal faction struggles of the LDP and by the particular nature of this electoral exercise: the regional heads of his party logically centred their efforts around their own re-election or that of their provincial entourage. This they did with definite success, while neglecting the interests of their national candidate.
Ramos was only a political "outsider" in a very peculiar sense. Before the imposition of Martial Law in 1972, the army, carefully controlled by the civilian regime, was not in a position to produce a president. The Marcos regime — Marcos being himself a civilian - transformed the situation. High-ranking officers of the armed forces are now to be found in the office of the presidency and its corridors (Ramos' private advisers), firmly entrenched in the government (particularly in the Ministry of Defense, which wasn't even the case before 1986), elected as mayors of large urban centres (including the capital Manila), named to the head of important administrative bodies (including the reputedly lucrative Customs division) and enterprises. Thus, the supposed "modernity" of the new Philippine regime puts it in the same league as Thailand and Indonesia, while not endowing it with anywhere near their level of military perfection.
Beyond this, Ramos had become and has remained a traditional politician (known in Philippines as a trapo?). He demagogically rode on the democratic coat-tails of Corazon Aquino, incessantly invoking the "February Revolution" of 1986 and his visible role in it. This doesn't change the fact that he was a work horse for the martial law regime under Marcos and a major player in the counterinsurrection under Aquino — and that he remains one of the heads of the far-right wing "vigilante" paramilitary groups.
Ramos has become a master in the art of doublespeak and psychological manipulation. As a general, he swore that he was only a "professional" without political aspirations, even though nobody could ignore his presidential ambitions. During the election campaign, he swore that he was merely a "politician" , even though everyone was aware of the links he maintained with his old comrades-in-arms and the armed forces behind which these were hidden.
With the wind of Aquino's support in his sails, Ramos hoped to become the official
LDP candidate. The government apparatus preferred Mitra over him, and that forced him to launch a new formation late in the game. This is the history of Ramos' LakasNUCP. But he had been preparing his rise to power for years, and to make sure this continued on schedule he did what every trapo does: he siphoned off the administration's financial and organizational resources, established alliances with provincial clans and enticed away politicians who were members of rival parties. 4
The May 1992 elections opened up a debate - which may already have been overtaken by events — in the Philippine left about the meaning of votes for Ramos and Santiago and about the degree to which the traditional clientelist networks have been weakened.S
Ramos benefited from "anti-trapos" votes because he was supported by the outgoing president, because he cultivated his image as a "different" candidate, and because he was running against two archetypes of the 1. Based on the American model, the Filipino Congress is made up of a Senate (24 seats) and a House of Representatives (200 seats). This body recognized Ramos as the winner on June 22, after sifting endlessly through the ballots — the general elections ended on May 11. The new president didn't actually take power, however, until the day of the institutional transfer of powers, June 30. For party acronyms, see the box accompanying this article. For a useful collection of articles on the election campaign (most are in English), see Filippijnengroep Nederland: Informatiemap, De Filipijnen Verkiezingen in mei 1992, FGN: Utrecht 1992. 2. Le Monde, June 11, 1992. 3. The word "trapo" comes from the English "traditional politician". But in Tagalog (Filipino) it also means..."rag". Coincidence is the author of great works! 4. Men Sta. Ana, "Trapos Still Rule", Conjuncture, May 1992.
International Viewpoint # 236 • October 12, 1992
traditional politician, Cojuangco and Mitra. But his real identity is more important than the tales he spun for the benefit of a small section of the electorate. His victory is that of a military man-turned-trapo.
The success of Miriam Defensor-Santiago is the most significant of all the changes in the electoral field.
She campaigned as an "outsider" whose sole programme was the fight against corruption. A self-proclaimed "Terminator II", she ran an aggressive populist campaign, both "vulgar" and "prophetic" in tone, invoking God in her fight against "the forces of evil". ", declaring that she would rip out the teeth" of thieves. Accusing Ramos of massive fraud, she challenged him to sort out their differences in a boxing ring 6 In this way she won the support of young voters sickened by the corruption, hypocrisy and nepotism of those in power.
### Division between youth and political elite
This division between the youth - urban youth in particular — and the political elite (which is not restricted to the Philippines) is the harbinger of a crisis of credibility for the regime. It reflects the impact of the long social crisis, the growing urbanization which weakens the power of the big provincial families and the exasperation of the middle classes faced with the inefficiency of the administration - but it also reflects the experience and critical-mindedness many popular sectors have achieved over the course of numerous struggles. However, all these factors do not translate automatically into a change of the political system itself.?
The activist left has not been able to provide a perspective for this wide-ranging discontent. The protest vote crystalized around Defensor-Santiago. Here, too, we should separate myth from reality. Defensor-Santiago did not fall unexplained from the heavens, nor did she emerge from the people. Under Aquino, she occupied important posts in the civil service in Immigration, Justice and Agrarian Reform). Although she didn't have the same financial resources as her principal rivals, she received the support of the "traditionalist" press (the Manila Bulletin) and the financial support of a part of the Filipino Chinese business community. Her political leanings were in the direction of the far-right, and certainly not in the direction of the self-organization of popular sectors. In other words, she could, in the future, help the system to win over the very electoral base which today escapes its control.
Another feature of Filipino "modernity" is the increasing number of elected representatives coming from the world of popular cinema and television — one into the vicepresidency, others into the senate. There is nothing surprising in this, given that the ins-
PHILIPPINES
The jungle of acronyms
KBL: Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement), Imelda MarcoS.
Lakas-NUCD: Lakas ng Edsa (Edsa Force)-National Union of Christian
Democrats, Fidel Ramos.
LDP: Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Struggle of Filipino Democracy), Ramon Mitra.
LP: Liberal Party; Jovito Salonga.
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front, Nur Misuari.
NDF: National Democratic Front, Manuel Romero.
NP: Nacionalista Party, Salvador Laurel.
NPA: New People's Army, Romulo Kintanar.
NPC: Nationalist People's Coalition, Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco.
CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines, Armando Liwanag.
PDP-Laban: Partido ng Demokratikong Pilipino-Laban (Filipino Democratic Party of Struggle), Aquilino Pimentel.
PMP: Partido ng Masang Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Masses), Joseph Estrada.
PRP: People's Reform Party, Miriam Defensor-Santiago.
RAM: Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (Revolutionary Patriotic Alliance), Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan.* titutional game is played out with personalities not programmes, and given the amount of discredit the professional politicians have heaped upon themselves. But the trapos know how to adapt to this trend: they have the means to win entertainment superstars into their camp.
"Family dynasties" are therefore not the only things that count. But their institutional weight is far from being decisively reduced. They dominate the Congress today, as they did yesterday. If the fortunes of one or the other may vary, the system remains. 8
This continuity sometimes borders on the ridiculous. Of the seven presidential candidates, five are, by and large, products of the Marcos era. This is obviously true for Imelda and Danding. But it is also true for Ramos, Salvador Laurel (prime minister of the dictator before becoming Aquino's vice-president), and Mitra (though detained in 1972, he hooked up with Cojuangco and made his fortune under martial law).
The first steps of the Ramos regime confirm just how much tradition remains in control: there has been a spectacular number of turncoats, and new alliances have been as legion as they have been lucrative. This has allowed the new president to take control of the House of Representatives (but not - yet? - of the Senate).
Against the LDP, and to Aquino's dismay, Ramos has made a bloc with the heirs of the former dictatorial regime. Imelda, the first heir, announced that "the Marcos family is willing to help [the new president] in every possible way."9
Many elected representatives have been lured without great difficulty into the new regime. The LDP parliamentary caucus had 87 members after the elections; at the beginning of September this figure had fallen to 35! As a result, the Lakas-NUCD secretary, Jose de Venecia, was elected speaker of the
House of Representatives, with the notable support of Marcos' KBL and Danding Cojuangco's NCP.
Ramos has put together a government which the journalist Rigoberto Tiglao has described as being one of the "militaryindustrial elite". Indeed, the majority of its members are businessmen; the others are (former) high-ranking officers, such as the Secretary of Defense Renato de Villa. The advisor on National Security is the former RAM ideologue Jose Almonte. As a senator belonging to a rival party has observed, "Both groups [business and military] share the same authoritarian style of undemocratic organizations that arises from a monopoly of either money or arms". 10
Very early in his reign, Ramos has forgotten certain major themes of his electoral campaign (people's power...). There is nothing new about his economic programme: economic liberalization, submission to the diktats of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a stabilization and austerity plan, "respect" for the debt in its entirety, the re-establishment of good relations (of dependence) with the United States. He promises a return to order, and that top priority will be given to the fight against crime. He 5. See for example Alex Magno, "Defining the May 11 Mandate", Kasarinlan, second trimester 1992. Strangely, he describes Ramos, that old master of the power game, as an "outsider" of Filipino politics. 6. Philippe Pons, op.cit. 7. This is something Alex Magno highlighted, several months before the elections: "In the grip of elite politics", Manila Chronicle, December 14-20, 1991. 8. On the character and influence of the political clans — or large families — in the Philippines, see Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca, All in the Family, a study of elites and power relations in the Philippines, Institute for Popular Democracy: Quezon City, 1992; John McBeth, "Power to the patron", Far Eastern Economic Review, January 17,
23 1991. 9. June 13, 1992 declaration, Philippine News Digest, July 2, 1992.
PHILIPPINES has earned the favour of the army by increasing soldiers' allowances and the number of opportunities for promotion of officers with the creation of 245 new positions.
However, all is not peaches and cream for Ramos. Ideological conflicts may be absent in this government (unlike the Aquino government which included in its ranks — due to the ambiguous heritage of the "February Revolution" of 1986 — human rights lawyers and left-wing personalities alongside business and military leaders well-versed in the art of repression). But there are already increasing conflicts around patronage and influence-peddling. Ramos was compelled to accept the resignation of one of his top aids, Peter Garrucho, only two and alli half months after assuming office.
Ramos had to give his vice-president a position commensurate with his cinematic ambitions. He has put him in charge of the new Presidential AntiCrime Commission, which may turn out to be a bittersweet appointment for the consummate actor Estrada.
Indeed, Estrada's first undertaking in his new post was to call a press conference at which he abruptly ordered the arrest of the high-ranking officers in attendance, including the head of tan anti-kidnapping task force, who was himself accused of being involved in criminal abductions. Large-scale banditry flourishes
The incident created some embarrassing fallout for the regime. It revealed the extent to which large-scale banditry is flourishing in the Philippines. It also throws some light on the shady dealings of the police, who are always quick to point a finger at the guerrillas and rebellious elements in the army.
All this creates considerable disorder and has thus tarnished the image of the Ramos regime.
The situation of the activist left has not radically changed over the past year. It remains characterized by the contrast between the vitality of a series of social movements in which it plays a central role (women's movement, non-governmental organizations, struggles around specific demands) and the absence of nation-wide, unifying perspectives.
Worse, the debate inside the CPP — kicked off with the publication in early 1991 of an exceptionally "open" issue of Ang Bayan, organ of the Central Committee — has been cut off. The editorial board of Ang 224. Bayan announced, *in the January February
1991 issue, the AB editorial committee decided to open the publication as a forum for debate on major and burning issues affecting the revolutionary movement. The Executive Committee of the Central Committee has clarified that it is Rebolusyon, the theoretical journal of the CPP, which is the proper and official forum for inner-Party debate. However, AB will continue to provide background material and hard data on the various issues being debated..."'|
However, to our knowledge, no issue of Rebolusyon published thus far has done anything more than hammer out the official line — a fact which does not augur well for the future of the internal debate.
A certain collective reflection has certainly taken place in several publications of the activist left (Debate, Conjuncture, Kasarinlan, and others). But the continued postponement from year to year of discussion inside the CPP has a negative effect on the whole progressive movement, and makes it that much more difficult to establish a clear approach to the major issues of the day. This was demonstrated during the May elections, for which the people's organizations had a veritable pot pourri of electoral positions.
There are objective difficulties which make the intervention of the popular and revolutionary movements in Philippine-style elections quite difficult. To have a real impact on the results — or just to get a real hearing — they have to build alliances. But no established party is without its "dubious" personalities. This is even true of the tiny Liberal Party of Jovito Salonga, former senator and a nationalist figure respected for his fight against the American bases. 12 In
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992 order to avoid being used for electoral and clientelist ends, the activist left must at least unite its own forces.
But if all organizations now concede that an intervention in the electoral terrain is admissible, the importance attributed to such an intervention by each organization
(and inside each organization) still varies considerably.
Armando Liwanag, president of the CPP, complacently asserts that his party "will not place any obstacle in the way of legal democratic forces wishing to in participate such elections" 13
Accordingly, the did
CPP not invest any energy in the campaign nationally, depriving even its sympathizers of support. René
Ciria-Cruz, on the other hand, estimates that from now on the Left should seek to
"attain political power through parliamentary means"
using to this end its traditional extra-parliamentary methods. 14
These are two extreme positions, which while appearing opposed to one another in every aspect actually offer the same unique alternative: either a protracted people's war or the parliamentary road. In this regard, both approaches belong to a common framework of thinking.
Others are looking for a more fluid and dynamic way of integrating the electoral issue into a strategic outlook. They are trying, for example, to sink their organizations' roots in mass social and political activity and to achieve the best possible mix,
10. Ibid.
11. Ang Bayan, May-June 1991, p.31. On the debates in the PCP and the Philippine left, see Paul
Petitjean, "New debates on Philippine left", IV no.
211, July 22, 1991. IV will return in future issues to the debates taking place in the Philippine left.
12. A significant part of the activist left (above all its non-"national-democratic" wing) supported
Salonga's presidential candidacy; many, but not all, also supported the PDP candidate Pimentel for the vice-presidency. Salonga came second last in the presidential race, ahead of Salvador Laurel.
13. Armando Liwanag, "On the Conduct and Outcome of the 1992 Presidential Elections", June 1,
1992, p. 3.
14. Rene Ciria-Cruz, "Why the Philippine Left Must
Take the Parliamentary Road", report given to the forum on the elections organized by Bisig in the The
Hague (Netherlands) on February 7, 1992. See
Debate, March 1992, p. 5 and Kasarinlan, second trimester, 1992, p. 52.
depending on circumstances, of different forms of struggle.
Divided and sometimes paralyzed, the activist and revolutionary left was not able to have any nationwide effect in the May elections. But, in the framework of the new "code" adopted in 1991 on the subject of "local governments" — which decentralized administrative powers — local campaigns were carried out, often with some success it seems. 15 Ramos promises reconciliation
Ramos is out to maintain the initiative on the political front. He has promised a general amnesty, national reconciliation and the legalization of the Communist Party. He has constituted a National Unification Commission, headed by Haydee Yorac, as his advisory body. He needs to overcome the problem of the insurrectionary forces, which risk paralyzing his regime.
He probably feels that it is a favourable time to try to impose his solution to the crisis. He knows that the CPP is riddled with internal differences on the question of the party's orientation; that over the last two or three years it has lost a significant number of members and that the NPA has had to give up territory (although the situation continues to vary depending on the region). And he certainly calculates that the Philippine revolutionary movement is eventually going to feel the effects of its international isolation. 16
Trained in the art of psychological war, Ramos obviously hopes to divide the national-democratic movement. But the counterrevolutionary motivations of the new president are not the decisive factor. War exhaustion is beginning to take its toll in the conflict zones. Thus the question of peace is a major political issue.
The NDF is fully aware of this. It tried in 1990-1992 to re-start negotiations before the end of Aquino's mandate. It had therefore demanded that informal meetings — particularly those in Hong Kong — become official. Aquino refused. However, there seems to have been some wavering in the CPP after last May's elections.
To this effect, Armando Liwanag wrote in the beginning of June that it was "absolutely contrary to the interests of the Filipino people and the revolutionary movement to entertain at this time any offer of reconciliation' or peace talks' with the US-Ramos regime. To do so is to assist the new ruling clique in consolidating its position."|?
Nevertheless, the NDF quickly responded and took over the peace initiative in its own name. A delegation of the national-democratic movement met an envoy of the government on the first of September at The Hague in Netherlands. A joint five-point declaration was published the same day, calling for the opening of "formal peace nego-
PHILIPPINES
The freed activists
(the date of their release is in parentheses)
Rafael Baylosis (July 1992), former Secretary General of the CPP
Aldo Gonzales (September 1992)
Rhodora Gonzales (September 1992)
Romulo Kintanar (September 1992), leader of the NPA
Antonio Lacaba (September 1992)
Bobby Malay (November 1991), NDF negotiator in 86-87
Satur Ocampo (September 1992), NDF leader
Benjamin de Vera (July 1992), former CC member of the CPP
About fifty others have been freed these last weeks, but most still face charges. Among them, former chairman of the CPP Rodolfo Salas, who has spent six years in detention. He was scheduled for release four days after Ramos' show of magnanimity, tiations" aimed at "resolving the armed conflict". To ensure a "just and lasting peace, , the two parties must prepare an "agreement on substantive issues" through independent meetings of "working committees". As for the formal negotiationst, they must be committed to resolving a fairly wide range of questions (human rights; socio-economic, political, and constitutional reforms; the future of the armed forces and so on), 18
This joint declaration has been formally accepted by the National Council of the NDF, though not yet by Ramos who seems to have changed his former position, which made the handing over of arms a pre-condition to any negotiations. The question of peace will be among those which dominate the political scene in the Philippines in the coming period.
Legalization of Communist Party
The same goes for the question of the legalization of the Communist Party. On September 22, Ramos signed into law a bill approved by the Congress repealing the 1957 anti-communist law (RA 1700). This is presented as a spectacular measure, a constitutional legalization of the CPP. Indeed, it was necessary to repeal this anticommunist act to open serious negotiations. But the impact of such a decision is not as significant as it sounds. Indeed, the great majority of political detainees (estimated at 641 at the end of the Aquino regime, while it was 591 at the time of Marcos' fall) are not in jail as a result of this law, but rather — for example — for rebellion or common law crimes. Ramos has requested the introduction of the death penalty for "heinous crimes" including rebellion. 19
On September 27, the chairman of the NDF issued a press statement in which he declares, "the repeal of RA 1700, by itself, is of small consequence" and "will not attract CPP members and members of other NDF-allied organizations to abandon [their] revolutionary struggle and surface aboveground". Manuel Romero, for the National having completed his sentence.* Council of the NDF, goes on by contrasting the actual functioning of the Philippine regime to its claim to the "rule of law" 20
A small number of political prisoners have been freed (see box), but still face charges. In this situation, these leaders of the democratic movement have had the rare opportunity to meet the press and make their point of view known. But at the time this article was written, we were still a long way from seeing a general amnesty. Obviously, this would be an essential first step.* 15. See Phildhrra Notes, "The Local Government Code of 1991, Opportunities and Challenge", November-December, 1991 and two articles in Conjuncture, June-July 1992: Soliman M. Santos Jr., "A Success Story. The Local Face of the National Campaign" and Francisco Cinco, "Kilusang Elektoral sa Bataan. NGOs-POs sa Halalang Panloka" (The electoral movement in Bataan. NGOs and mass organizations bet on the local elections"). 16. The impact of the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc on the PCP and NPA has not been as quick and devastating as on the revolutionary movements of Central America. They are benefiting in a way from their previous isolation: it had been a long time since they stopped receiving aid from China, and they hadn't yet succeeded in procuring aid from the Soviet Union - and so suffered no diplomatic or logistical cut-off. But the evolution of the world situation means that Philippine revolutionaries are having to question their theoretical conceptions and traditional strategies. 17. Armando Liwanag, op. cit, June 1, 1992, p. 8. Balitang Malayang Pilipinas (BMP) published a special issue (no. 1, September, 1992) devoted to the question of the peace negotiations, with the notable contributions of Manuel Romero (president of the NDF) and of Armando Liwanag (president of the PCP). Although Romero does not exclude talks in his June 29 statement, his tone remains very pessimistic, given the conditions set out by Ramos, conditions which the NDF equates with surrender. On the other hand, in the June-July issue of Conjuncture an article by Men Sta. Ana ("Prospects for Peace Under Ramos") cites the long-term impasse of the popular war and calls on the NDF to "meet the challenge" of the peace negotiations in the name of the "broad progressive movement" 18. "Joint Declaration" signed by member of parliament Jose Yap for the government and Luis Jalandoni for the NDF. 19. Rafael Baylosis (Secretary General of the CP at the time of his arrest) — in his August 25, 1992 letter to the Committee on Constitutional Amendments - details the restrictions that would remain even after the abrogation of the anti-communist law. 20. "Repeal of Anti-Subversion Law is of Small Consequence". , Manuel Romero, Chairman, Natio-
25 nal Council of the NDF, Press Statement, September 27, 1992.
HAITI