Russian political parties COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST ORGANIZATIONS All-Union Committee of Communists: presents itself as the only successor to the old ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (PSU), although no well-known former leader has supported it. On July 4-5, 1992, it held a "29th Congress of the CPSU" in Pushkino in Moscow. All the Communist groups were invited, but most did not show up. The 90 delegates elected a central committee as well as a control commission and adopted an Action Programme. The strength of this organization is unknown.
Russian Communist Workers Party: was founded in November 1991 out of the Communist Initiative and is mainly based on the former party apparatus in Siberia and the Far East. This neo-Stalinist party claims 20,000 members. (Leader General Makashov.)
All-Union Committee Party of Bolsheviks: was formed in November 1991 from different factions of the former CPSU (Unity, the Bolshevik Platform and others). It characterized the August 1991 coup as "stage-managed". It has come out with slogans such as "Motherland and Death", and "Socialism or Death". It is strictly Stalinist and has some 35,000 members. (Leader N. Andreyeva.)
Socialist Workers Party: was formed in October 1991 out of parts of the old apparatus and oppositionists. It considers itself reform Communist. It has some 70,000 members and over 40 deputies. (Leaders: R. Medvedev, I. Rybkin, G. Sklyar and L. Vartarasova.)
Russian Party of Communists: was formed in December 1991 as a reform Communist party (taking the New Economic Policy of the 1920s as its model) and successor to the Marxist Platform. It has some 5,000 members. (Leaders: A. Khrushchev and V. Burdyubov.)
Communist League: was formed out of a section of the former Marxist Platform by A. Prigarin. It has a few hundred members. It favours worker self-management and "all power to the soviets". It also calls for the unification of all Communist organizations.
Party of Labour: was founded on August 29, 1991 as an initiative by the apparatus of the Moscow trade unions (M. Nagaitshev and T. Frolova), a part of the Marxist Platform (A. Buzgalin) and the Socialist Party (B. Kagarlitsky) the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists and Moscow deputies (N. Konchar and V. Kondratov). Its first conference took place in January 1992. The party presents itself as an organization based on the trade unions and defends working class interests. It is in favour of workers' self-management and democratic management of the economy, but also for the rights of independent domestic property owners.
There also a whole series of groupings such as the Association for the
Defence of the Rights of Communists, the Commission for the Investigation of the Activities of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Association of Left Patriotic Forces at the University of Moscow and the United Front of the Working
People. The mouthpieces of the conservative Communist forces have been
Pravda (but no longer), Sovyetskaya Rossiya, Glasnost and Literaturnaya
Rossiya and the magazines Nash Sovremenik and Molodaya Gardiya.
SOCIAL-LIBERAL AND BOURGEOIS PARTIES
Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation: was formed in May
1990; it is oriented towards classical revisionism and Scandinavian Social
Democracy. Most of its 7,000 members are from the scientific intelligentsia.
They are involved in almost every bloc building enterprise. (Leaders: B.
Orlov, O. Rumyantsev.) Republican Party of the Russian Federation: originated in the
CPSU's Democratic Platform. It was founded in November 1990. It has undergone several splits and presents itself as social democratic. Most of its 7,000 members are from the CPSU and the scientific intelligentsia.
Together with the social democrats, they have formed a faction which has more than 50 deputies and controls the monthly Gospodin Narod (circulation of 100,000) and the weekly Respublica (20,000). (Leaders: V. Lysenko,
V. Shostakovsky.) Russian Peasants Party: was formed as an organization of private farmers out of the Movement of Independent Farmers in March 1991. It now • staff on enforced vacations.
One example mentioned by Izvestiya is the Kalinin Plant in Yekaterinburg which has been forced to switch to a three-day week and is now paying its 40,000 workers an average of 2,000 roubles a month (below the poverty line).? A large number of factories are effectively bankrupt — according to the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions 90% of the military industrial enterprises in Moscow are in such a state.
However, there have been no large-scale layoffs or major factory closures thus far. In spite of several readings the Supreme Soviet has failed to pass a bankruptcy law, reflecting pressure from enterprise managers and fear that factory closures will trigger off massive social unrest. On June 14 Yeltsin bypassed the Supreme Soviet by issuing a decree making it possible to declare enterprises bankrupt, but it still remains to be seen how and on what scale this will be implemented.
One of the main reasons for the relative social calm, in spite of the drop in living standards is precisely the very low rate of unemployment. There are only a few hundred thousand registered unemployed -less than 1% of the workforce, though many more workers are affected by forced reductions in working hours. But due to the intense struggle in the ruling circles around the question of enterprise closures, mass redundancies seem to have so far been averted, and it is unlikely that the forecast by the International Labour Office (ILO) of 10 million unemployed by the end of this year will come true.
### Enterprise closures
With Yeltsin's decree on bankruptcies and the announcement of a sweeping privatization programme it is clear that the issue of enterprise closures and property rights will be to the fore this autumn. Recently the government has been trying to portray the issuing of share vouchers to every citizen as a miracle solution that will secure both a smooth privatization process and an even distribution of state-owned assets among the population.
In principle this system could offer the workers collective possibilities for taking a share in a given factory, but in practice this is nearly impossible because the authorities are working to discourage it. As Boris
Kagarlitsky remarks: "How can one discuss democratic privatization, with the participation of the workers' collective, if you don't pose the questions about how and where these collectives get the means to moderni-
7. Izvestiva, August 19 and 20, 1992.
8. ITAR-TASS, July 9, 1992.
9. The programme presented in Izvestiya on June 27,
1992 for example, aims at privatizing property 13 worth 72 billion roubles in 1992, 350 billion in 1993 and 470 billion in 1994.
RUSSIA ze production, how they receive credits, how stable deliveries can be secured, and what should happen to those who don't work in a factory. Of course, workers can be dragged into this process for various expedient reasons: it creates a collective responsibility for what will happen. Then later, when the enterprise closes or is sold cheaply to a private entrepreneur, the blame will lie with the workers, who allegedly made wrong dispositions with the property". 10
The real conflict looming behind much of the factional scuffle around the Russian government is precisely the question of industrial development and with that the place of Russia in the international division of labour. The policies of the Gaidar government have been particularly beneficial for the speculative layers of entrepreneurs often linked to mafia-style structures in the old apparatus, but have generally been harmful to the state enterprises.
### Zealous conformity
Throughout the process of drafting and implementing the first phases of the "stabilization programme" the government has zealously conformed with the demands of the IMF - to the point where Russia appears as the IMF "role model" for the other CIS states. But even the $24bn promised by the G7 - of which only about one billion has been paid over — is little more than a drop in the ocean. According to economics minister Andrei Nechaev the debt service of Russia will amount to $22bn in 1992 alone." The West has put considerable pressure on Russia to win political and economic concessions in exchange for the financial support - prompting vice-president Alexander Rutskoy to describe Western aid as "free cheese in a mousetrap"
The increasingly undisguised blackmail from the West reached its peak during the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies in April, when US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady threatened an end to all economic aid if the Gaidar government, which resigned briefly, was not reinstated. 12
During and after the People's Congress strong criticism of Gaidar was voiced in the Supreme Soviet, circles of politically influential intellectuals (for example, Yavlinsky and Petrakov) and the corps of enterprise managers. The wave of publicly expressed discontent marked a stepping up of the power battle within the Yeltsin-led coalition. An attack spearheaded by the 10. Pravda, May 7, 1992. 11. Trud, August 6, 1992 12. On the question of foreign pressure Gaidar told The Economist of April 25: "On balance that is helpful. It could harm us if it is overdone, if the country 14 thin thinks outsiders want to make economic policy for
• claims 12,700 members and demands the "restoration of peasant property on the land", aiming to represent the "political, economic and social interests of peasants". Its journal Russkoye Pole has a circulation of
50,000. It has seven deputies.
People's Party of Russia: was founded in May 1992 by the investigators Gdlyan and Borodin who had been strongly attacked because of some of the investigations they undertook. It stands for "economic freedom and human rights" and has 6,000 members. It is probably only a transitional formation.
Christian-Democratic Union of Russia: was set up in August 1989 by various dissident groups; it has some 6,000 members, overwhelmingly religious believers from the intelligentsia. Its programme is based on that of its Western counterparts, but it also includes social demands. (Leaders: A. Ogorodnikov, Y. Tverdochlebov.)
Russian Christian Democratic Party: was created in June 1991; it is based on Christian values, promotes people's capitalism and has some 3,000 members. (Leader: A Chuyev).
Party of Constitutional Democrats: was formed in May 1990. It has 700 members and considers itself a liberal capitalist party. (Leaders: V. Solotaryov, M. Globachov.)
Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of Popular Freedom): appeared first in June 1991 as the "reformation congress" of the former Cadets, putting forward a neo-conservative economic programme coloured by nationalism. It demands a Russia in its "historic borders". Its 4,000 members are from the intelligentsia, and partly from the CPSU. (Leaders: M. Astafyev, D. Rogoshin, A. Shamin.)
Russian Party of Democratic Change: was formed in September 1991 with the aim of providing the new middle class with a liberal programme. Its 1,800 members are from the intelligentsia and the former party apparatus. (Leaders: A. Braginsky, Y. Gabely, A. Kissilov.)
Islamic Party of Rebirth: was set up in Summer 1990 and exists in all the Islamic regions of the former USSR. It aims to unite the Muslims of all nationalities. It presents Islam as "the only force that can today withstand American-style universalism and its conception of a new world order". It sees Islamicization as "the only chance for Russia to avoid geo-political annihilation" The number of members is unknown, but in some places the party has a mass membership (Tadjikistan). In Russia its main bases are in Tatarstan, North Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad. Its moderate wing, led by W. Sadar, wants to create the conditions for an Islamic way of life, while another under G. Djemal wants an Islamic Republic. THE PARTIES OF CAPITAL The All-Russian Union of the Renewal: is the political wing of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, which has formed a union with similar organizations in all the other republic of the former USSR. About 1,700 enterprises have joined, accounting for 60% of the former USSR's industrial production. The party as such was founded in June 1992 and puts itself forward as the "Party of the Managers". It has a massive influence on the government. According to its vice-president V. Shumeiko: "we need a class of owners and all those now directing production should be a part of it". Its model is Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Its membership is unknown. (Leaders: A. Volsky, A. Vladislavlev, V. Shumeiko.)
Party of Economic Freedom: began its activity in May 1992 on the initiative of K. Dorovoy (head of the Russian Goods and Raw Materials Exchange), drawing its support from the new rich. Its founding congress is planned for October 1992.
Russian Party of Free Labour: was founded in December 1990 as "a party of economic liberalism" and "a party of owners of means of production". Its 3,500 members are mostly from the new bourgeoisie. (Leaders: V. German, I. Korovikov.)
European Liberal Democratic Party: formed in April 1990; with some 6,000 members it sees itself as the party of private property. (Leader: V. Bogachev.)
Civic Union: emerged from a bloc between the Democratic Party of Russia, the All-Russian Party of Renewal and the People's Party of Free Russia. •
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992
managers of state enterprises, but involving significant parts of the old ruling nomenklatura (including the military parts) put Gaidar on the defensive.
At the end of May the influential Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. which consists primarily of managers of state enterprises and is led by former top apparatchik Arkady Volsky, founded a new political party called Renewal. A month later the new party went on to form a broader political bloc, the Civic Union. This alliance also includes vice president Alexander Rutskoy, the People's Party of Free Russia (which, rather dubiously, claims 100,000 members), Nikolai Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia (with 50,000 members) and New Generation (smena) parliamentary faction.
The Civic Union brings together industrialists (including many from the militaryindustrial complex, military leaders and high-ranking state officials, who support the Yeltsin presidency, but want a different reform strategy to Yeltsin's. They put emphasis on a strong Russian state — implying a readiness to intervene in the internal affairs of other CIS states — and an economic reform highlighting "the salvation of the nation's industry" through a slower process of liberalization under tight state control.
### Cabinet reshuffle
By early summer it was increasingly clear that Gaidar's breakneck liberalization had failed and this was reflected in the cabinet reshuffle carried out in early June. Vladimir
Shumeiko, a former enterprise manager and a close ally of Volsky, was appointed first deputy prime minister (on a level with Gaidar) and other Civic Union supporters were incorporated into the cabinet. As the proliberal weekly Kommersant put it, under the headline "A new phase of reform, the directors take power": "In fact this new phase is the long forgotten 'gradual crawling to the market on the basis of a strengthening of the fundamental branches of the economy' devised by Nikolai Ryzhkov and Valentin
Pavlov in 1990-91."13
Meanwhile the industrialists sought new partners to improve their position: on July 8 the Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs entered into a formal alliance with the leadership of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (FNPR).
In the framework of a so-called Assembly of Social Partnership they are now jointly publishing the mass-circulation daily Rabochaya Tribuna. 14
A further sign of the strengthening of the industrialists — and yet another dang şer signal to Gaidar — came in July whi en
Volsky issued a joint statement with one: of the most prolific and influential new ric h entrepreneurs, Konstantin Borovoy. Thi
RUSSIA statement strongly criticized the government's privatization programme as giving too much power to the state authorities. I5
Even if this alliance — and the one between Volsky and the FNPR - is unlikely to be prolonged, given that they are defending mutually contradictory interests in the privatization process, it does underline the extent to which the alliance around the enterprise managers has seized the political initiative. This key process in Russian politics has been described by Russian socialist Nikolai Preobrazhensky: "our directors are now making their entrance into the political arena - with all their experience, connec tions and economic power; well-informed; with their new, considerable freedom to do what they want; no longer subject to party tutelage; ever more distinctly organized into their various organizations; and able to count on the support of at least a part of the work collectives. It is they — not the workers movement (except for the miners) who have the best chance to influence real policy."16
Grand plans postponed
Consequently, the government has been backtracking on a series of major policy issues: the grand plans for a swift move towards full convertibility for the rouble have been postponed. The freeing of all energy prices — a move which would precipitate a wave of bankruptcies) — announced in the official government memorandum to the IMF in March has been slowed down.
The cornerstones of the first phase of the
13. Kommersant, June 8, 1992. Ryzhkov and Pavlov were prime ministers under Gorbachev.
14.In spite of the massive onslaught on working people the FNPR leadership has refrained from an open confrontation with Yeltsin to the extent of signing a so-called General Agreement with the government and employers (worked out in a tripartite commission) by late March. The FNPR now admits that the government has violated virtually every single point in the Agreement. Nevertheless it is working on a new one for 1993.
15. Interfax, July 2, 1992.
16. "The disarray of social forces and political perspectives for the workers movement" in Rubikon, St.
Petersburg, spring 1992. Translated in the Bulletin in Defense of Marxism no. 99.
17. Komsomolskaya Pravda, August 3, 1992.
shock cure, tight monetary and fiscal control, have also been seriously weakened. Several major outlays of credit to indebted enterprises have been announced both by the government and the central bank under its new, and less monetarist, head, Viktor Geraschenko. In early August, he promised that debts of enterprises to the state worth 1.5 billion roubles would be written off, a move which caused panic among hard line economic liberals.!
In several interviews Geraschenko has dismissed the IMF-prescribed programme as harmful to the Russian economy and criticized the voucher privatization scheme as "an unserious whim reminiscent of the paper-money game Monopoly". 18 As the winds have changed even Yeltsin has had to distance himself somewhat from the IMF gospel: "At first the IMF wanted to apply its typical, classical framework to us. But Russia is unique and the reforms are unique. For 74 years Russians didn't know private property, real entrepreneurship and a market economy. Gradually people now find themselves in the market framework, but this is not simple. My warning is: you have to realize that a few months ago l didn't feel any limits to people's confidence in the reforms and the president, but now I do". 19
The industrialists' offensive
The inherent contradictions within the Yeltsinite bloc and the industrialists' offensive may have temporarily led to the postponement of some of the government's more atrocious plans. However, this does not mean that the Civic Union, now setting the fashion, is anti-capitalist or pro-labour.
According to Volsky: "We are not preparing to topple the government, we intend only to help it.
The Civic Union is operating within the
Yeltsinite framework, in itself a diverse and unstable coalition. In spite of several attempts to found an organization which could play a dominant role in the coalition
(a "presidential party" of sorts), this has not happened. In the absence of a "ruling party"
Yeltsin's presidency rests on his own wide- ranging powers and personal apparatus. 21
18. See, for example, Izvestiya, August 24 and September 2, 1992. 19. Izvestiya, July 15, 1992. Yeltsin also stated:
"The IMF has pushed us towards a freezing of wages without a freezing of prices. But we didn't go that far".
21. Neither the loose Democratic Russia alliance nor 20. Izvestiva, August 3, 1992.
- the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform has managed to transform itself into a strong presidential party". Recently Democratic Russia underwent a serious split; some of its founders, including Yuri
Afanasyev and leaders of its St. Petersburg branch left it after criticizing the degeneration of the movement into an obedient mouthpiece for the governing 15 circles.
22. Pravda, May 7, 1992.
RUSSIA • POPULIST AND NATIONALIST PARTIES People's Party of Free Russia: was founded in August 1991 under the name of the Democratic Party of the Communists of Russia with 7,230 members, assuming its current name two months later. Its 100,000 members (and more than 100 deputies) represent the reform minded wing of the old nomenklatura, which has increasingly taken a populist and nationalist line. "We are a pragmatic and non-doctrinaire party" states its Guidelines. "Our aim is not the setting up of a new society... but the solution of the concrete problems posed by life". (Leaders: Vice-president A. Rutskoy, V. Lipitsky.)
Democratic Party of Russia: was formed in May 1990 with the support of already organized opposition groups - Memorial, independent trade unions, Shield (the organization defending the rights of conscripts). Its 50,000 members are mainly drawn from the technical intelligentsia, many from the arms industry (represented by N. Tolstoy). Their president N Travkin is a former apparatchik. The party calls for a market economy and wants to restore the unity of the former USSR. The authoritarian leadership style has led to many splits among which the Russian Bourgeois Democratic Party (1,700 members, same programme) which through I. Butov leads the World Congress of Russian Folk. Another is the Liberal Democratic Union of A. Murashov and the chess champion G. Kasparov, who in April 1991 split off a quarter of the party to openly propagate Thatcherism.
Russian Christian Democratic Movement: was constituted in April 1990 and has some 20,000 members (15 deputies), some of whom collaborated with the former system. Today it demands "private property and Christian justice, competition and solidarity, private initiative and a sense of responsibility". They want to revive the traditions of Russian entrepreneurship and demand a strong Russian state with new borders. (Leader: V. Aksyutshitz, V. Polossin, I. Konstantinov.)
National Republican Party of Russia: was created in April 1990, taking as a reference point the thinking of the writer A. Solzhenitsyn. It wants a "Russian Union" of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the "rights of Russians who live outside their historic homeland to defend themselves, if necessary with arms". They have sent volunteers to South Ossetia (now in Georgia). Their chairman, N. Lysenko, is from the Pamyat movement and promulgates "legal and constitutional authority" and " collaboration with the army and KGB". It has 5,000 members.
Liberal Democratic Party of the USSR: was formed in 1989 with the support of the party apparatus. Its chairman, V. Shirinovsky, worked for the state-sponsored peace movement and helped himself to at least DM 3m. He was a candidate in the recent presidential elections, doing quite well (with 6 million votes - 8% of the total). The party is radical nationalist. The party emblem is notable: a falcon surrounded by a picture of the "old" Russian territories - including Finland, Poland and Alaska.
Russian National Union: was founded as a movement in October 1991 by the nationalist parties and a series of patriotic associations. It is for the family and tradition and sees itself as "an open movement based on state patriotic principles" and, as a "civil and patriotic union of the Russian people" wants to see "the rebirth of Russia in its historic borders"
A controlled market economy would be introduced in a ten-year transitional period. Yeltsin should be overthrown and indicted. At its congress in June 1992 it decided to create a shadow cabinet, whose composition has not been announced. The journal Dyen is close to it. (Leaders: S. Baburin, N. Pavlov.)
Russian People's Assembly: is a union of the previously mentioned nationalist parties and movements, formed in February 1992. It is also supported by the Cadets and the Christian Democrats. Its aim is a government of national unity.
The Sobor of the Russian Nation: was founded in February 1992 as a "Movement of Russian National Resistance", ", with about 1,000 members. It is headed by the former KGB general A. Sterlikov (head of Officers for the Awakening of Russia) and the writer Valentin Rasputin.
Fascists: there are a series of organizations such as Pamyat or Russian National Unity with several thousand members who have formed paramilitary organizations. They have not yet registered as a party. 16 (Survey compiled by Hans-Jurgen Schulz) * International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992
This includes presidential representatives in all regions of the country, as well as newly formed "security council" already dubbed the "new politburo"). Yeltsin's formal power is thus formidable, but it is uncertain to what extent this system actually works, ridden as it is by conflicting interests, rival cliques and corruption.
It is clear that neither the industrialists nor the predominantly conservative People's Congress/Supreme Soviet have any intention of pursuing a line consistently to the benefit of working people. Boris Kagarlitsky's description of the People's Congress hits the nail on the head: "It is not difficult to frighten it and, under the threat of dissolution, force it to carry out any programme of the government - and the People's Congress has already once proved its incompetence, foolishness and lack of ability to withstand manipulation when it handed over the power to Yeltsin and his team. "22
It is vital for the embryonic Russian workers movement to maintain its independence and not subordinate itself to any faction in the apparatus. Nikolai Preobrazhensky makes this point emphatically when speaking about the attempts of enterprise managers to link up with the workers movement: "Generally speaking this classic paternalism ('there are no conflicts between workers and bosses; they are all one big happy family') is actually being advanced to justify a bid for the leadership of the workers movement.
### Director initiated strikes
"We must not forget that in our country we have accumulated three years' experience with "director initiated' strikes, particularly strike calls and pre-strike situations: in the Donbass, Tyumen, on the railroads and in Estonia... However the majority of the factory directors — even those who are concerned about the welfare of the collective as a whole... are at the same time against the independence and self-activity of the labour collectives" 23
It is a sign of the weakness of rank-and-file social organization in Russian society that mobilizations in the streets and in the workplaces have played no direct role in halting Gaidar's programme. There is no doubt about the profound frustration among broad layers of the population. This has been revealed in countless opinion polls -for example in a recent one, people were asked what were the best years for Russians this century: 27% mentioned the Brezhnev years, 20% Tsarism, 8% preferred the Stalin period, 6% that of Khrushchev and only 5% the current period.24 Along with this frus23. Nikolai Preobrazhensky, op. cit. 24. Izvestiya, July 6, 1992. 25. Izvestiya, July 21, 1992.
tration there is also a growing distaste for the whole political scene. A by-election in mid-July in the Dimitrov Region near Moscow saw a voter turnout of less than 30%.25
So far the feeling of gloom, has only rarely been transformed into action. Compared to the spring of 1991 with its protracted miners" strike there was a clear drop in the number of strikes in the first six months of 1992. From January to April there were reports of some 3,000 strikes in Russia causing the loss of more than 1 million working days. In May the number of strikes rose somewhat, primarily due to strikes among health workers and teachers - more than 300,000 people struck in this month. 26
But overall, the independent workers movement is only in its infancy. Nikolai Preobrazhensky gave his assessment of this state of affairs: "Our workers movement is not only extremely weak, but poorly organized and without a firm structure. Should there be a social explosion, it could only act as a ramrod, crashing the gates for others, or a rocket launcher, propelling others to great heights. The old trade unions enjoy no confidence by and large; the new ones, with the exception of those in the mining regions, are very weak. There are no serious political organizations expressing the interests of the workers movement nor parties which the masses of workers could consider their own, their reliability to be counted on without fear of betrayal or deception". 21
Obviously this doesn't mean that there is no potential for action left in the Russian working class - indeed the ruling layers fear this capacity more than anything else.
A fear expressed by among others Arkady
Volsky: "What worried me is that in the internal struggle, in the struggle around the president, we do not understand the danger of a social explosion, when people go out on the streets — not under some banner, but by themselves. If the railroad workers or the workers in the energy sector go on strike this is sufficient to paralyze the country" 28
The immense challenge for the left wing in the Russian workers movement is to link up with the struggles that will undoubtedly appear around such questions as privatization and plant closures, in order to give them a radical perspective of independence from all factions of the apparatus. *
26. Delovoy Mir, June 6, 1992.
27. Nikolai Preobrazhensky op. cit.
28. Izvestiya, August 3, 1992. 28. Izvestiya, August 3, 1992.